ttCSB  LIBRARY 


ADMIRAL   DAVID  G.   FARRAGUT 


MAKERS  OF 
AMERICAN 
H  I  STORY 


ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT 
■6 

BY 

Captain  A.  T.  MAHAN,  U.  S.  N. 

President    of    the    United    States    Naval   War 

College,  Author  of  "The  Gulf  and  Inland 

Waters,"  and    "  The  Influence  of  Sea 

Power  Upon  History,  1660- 1783" 


J.     A.     FULL     &     COMPANY 
NEW   YORK  1904 


COPYRIGHT,      1892 
BY 

D.  Appleton   &   Company 


PREFACE. 


In  preparing  this  brief  sketch  of  the  most 
celebrated  of  our  naval  heroes,  the  author  has 
been  aided  by  the  very  full  and  valuable  bi- 
ography published  in  1878  by  his  son,  Mr.  Loy- 
all  Farragut,  who  has  also  kindly  supplied  for 
this  work  many  additional  details  of  interest 
from  the  Admiral's  journals  and  correspond- 
ence, and  from  other  memoranda.  For  the 
public  events  connected  with  Farragut's  ca- 
reer, either  directly  or  indirectly,  recourse  has 
been  had  to  the  official  papers,  as  well  as  to 
the  general  biographical  and  historical  liter- 
ature bearing  upon  the  war,  which  each  suc- 
ceeding year  brings  forth  in  books  or  maga- 
zines. The  author  has  also  to  express  his 
thanks  to  Rear-Admiral  Thornton  A.  Jenkins, 
formerly  chief-of-staff  to  Admiral  Farragut ;  to 
Captain  John  Crittenden  Watson,  formerly  his 
flag-lieutenant ;  and  to  his  friend  General  James 
Grant   Wilson,    for   interesting  anecdotes   and 

reminiscences. 

A.  T.  M. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER 

I  —Family  and  Early  Life,  1801-1811     . 
II. — Cruise  of  the  Essex,  1811-1814  . 
III.— Midshipman  to  Lieutenant,  1814-1825 
IV.— Lieutenant,  1825-1841    . 
V.— Commander  and  Captain,  1841-1860    . 
VI.— The  Question  of  Allegiance,  1860-1861 
VII.— The  New  Orleans  Expedition,  1862  . 
VIII.— The  First  Advance  on  Vicksburg,  1862 
IX.— The  Blockade,  and  the  Passage  of  Port 

SON,    1862-1863  

X.— Mobile  Bay  Fight,  1864 
XI.— Later  Years  and  Death,  1864-1870    . 
XII.— The  Character  of  Admiral  Farragut 


PAGE 

I 

IO 

■  51 

.  69 

.  89 

.  I06 

•  "5 

•  177 


Hud- 


196 

237 
294 
308 


LIST   OF   ILLUSTRATIONS. 


FACING 
PAGE 


Portrait  of  Admiral  Farragut       .       .       Frontispiece 

General   Map   of   the   scene    of    Farragut's   opera- 
tions  115 

Passage  of  Mississippi  Forts 127 

Passage  of  Vicksburg  Batteries 187 

Passage  of  Port  Hudson  .        .        .    '    .       .        .        .213 

Battle  of  Mobile  Bay 247 


ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 


CHAPTER  I. 

FAMILY    AND    EARLY    LIFE. 
l8oi-l8lI. 

The  father  of  Admiral  Farragut,  George  Farra- 
gut,  was  of  unmixed  Spanish  descent,  having  been 
born  on  the  29th  of  September,  1755,  in  the  island 
of  Minorca,  one  of  the  Balearic  group,  where  the 
family  had  been  prominent  for  centuries.  One  of  his 
ancestors,  Don  Pedro  Ferragut,  served  with  great 
distinction  under  James  I,  King  of  Aragon,  in  the 
wars  against  the  Moors,  which  resulted  in  their  ex- 
pulsion from  Majorca  in  1229,  and  from  the  king- 
dom of  Valencia,  in  the  Spanish  Peninsula,  in  1238. 
As  Minorca  in  1755  was  a  possession  of  the  British 
Crown,  to  which  it  had  been  ceded  in  17 13  by  the 
Treaty  of  Utrecht,  George  Farragut  was  born  under 
the  British  flag;  but  in  the  following  year  a  French 
expedition,  fitted  out  in  Toulon,  succeeding  in  wrest- 
ing from  the  hands  of  Great  Britain  both  the  island 
and  its  excellent  fortified  harbor,  Port  Mahon,  one 
of  the  most  advantageous  naval  stations  in  the 
Mediterranean.  It  was  in  the  course  of  the  opera- 
tions which  resulted  in  this  conquest  of  Minorca  by 


2  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

the  French  that  the  British  fleet,  under  the  command 
of  Admiral  Byng,  met  with  the  check  for  which  the 
admiral  paid  the  penalty  of  his  life  a  few  months 
later.  At  the  close  of  the  Seven  Years'  War,  in  1763, 
the  island  was  restored  to  Great  Britain,  in  whose 
hands  it  remained  until  1782,  when  it  was  again  re- 
taken by  the  French  and  Spaniards. 

George  Farragut,  however,  had  long  before  sev- 
ered his  connection  with  his  native  country.  In 
March,  1776,  he  emigrated  to  North  America,  which 
was  then  in  the  early  throes  of  the  Revolutionary 
struggle.  Having  grown  to  manhood  a  subject  to 
Great  Britain,  but  alien  in  race  and  feeling,  he  natu- 
rally espoused  the  cause  of  the  colonists,  and  served 
gallantly  in  the  war.  At  its  end  he  found  himself, 
like  the  greater  part  of  his  adopted  countrymen, 
called  to  the  task  of  building  up  his  own  fortunes, 
neglected  during  its  continuance ;  and,  by  so  doing, 
to  help  in  restoring  prosperity  to  the  new  nation.  A 
temper  naturally  adventurous  led  him  to  the  border 
lines  of  civilization ;  and  it  was  there,  in  the  region 
where  North  Carolina  and  eastern  Tennessee  meet, 
that  the  years  succeeding  the  Revolution  appear 
mainly  to  have  been  passed.  It  was  there  also  that 
he  met  and  married  his  wife,  Elizabeth  Shine,  a 
native  of  Dobbs  County,  North  Carolina,  where  she 
was  born  on  the  7th  of  June,  1765.  At  the  time  of 
their  marriage  the  country  where  they  lived  was 
little  more  than  a  wilderness,  still  infested  by  In- 
dians ;  and  one  of  the  earliest  recollections  of  the 
future  admiral  was  being  sent  into  the  loft,  on  the 
approach  of  a  party  of  these,  while  his  mother  with 
an  axe  guarded  the  door,  which  she  had  barricaded. 
This  unsettled  and  dangerous  condition  necessitated 


FAMILY  AND  EARLY  LIFE.  3 

a  constant  state  of  preparedness,  with  some  organi- 
zation of  the  local  militia,  among  whom  George  Far- 
ragut  held  the  rank  of  a  major  of  cavalry,  in  which 
capacity  he  served  actively  for  some  time. 

While   resident  in    Tennessee,   George    Farragut 
became    known  to  Mr.  W.  C.  C.  Claiborne,  at  that 
time    the   member   for   Tennessee   in   the    National 
House  of  Representatives.      Mr.  Claiborne  in   1801 
became   governor   of  Mississippi  Territory ;    and  in 
1803,  when  the  United  States  purchased  from  France 
the  great  region  west  of  the  Mississippi  River,   to 
which    the  name    Louisiana    was    then   applied,   he 
received  the  cession  of  the  newly  acquired  posses- 
sion.    This  was  soon  after  divided  into  two  parts  by 
a  line  following  the  thirty-third  parallel  of  north  lati- 
tude, and  Claiborne  became  governor  of  the  southern 
division,  which  was  called  the  Territory  of  Orleans. 
To  this  may  probably  be  attributed  the  removal  of 
the  Farraguts  to  Louisiana  from  eastern  Tennessee. 
The  region  in  which   the  latter  is  situated,  remote 
both  from  tide-water  and    from  the  great  river  by 
which  the  Western  States  found  their  way  to  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico,  was  singularly  unfitted  to  progress  under 
the  conditions  of  communication  in  that  day  ;  and  it 
long  remained  among  the  most  backward  and  primi- 
tive portions  of  the  United  States.     The  admiral's 
father,  after   his  long  experience  there,  must  have 
seen  that  there  was  little  hope  of  bettering  his  for- 
tunes.    Whatever  the  cause,  he  moved  to  Louisiana 
in  the  early  years  of  the  century,  and  settled  his 
family  in  New  Orleans.      He  himself  received   the 
appointment   of  sailing-master  in  the  navy,  and  was 
ordered  to  command  a  gun-boat  employed  in  the  river 
and  on  the  adjacent  sounds.     A  dispute  had  arisen 


4  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

between  the  United  States  and  the  Spanish  Govern- 
ment, to  whom  the  Floridas  then  belonged,  as  to  the 
line  of  demarcation  between  the  two  territories ;  and 
George  Farragut  was  at  times  employed  with  his 
vessel  in  composing  disturbances  and  forwarding  the 
views  of  his  own  government. 

David  Glasgow,  the  second  son  of  George  Farra- 
gut, and  the  future  Admiral  of  the  United  States 
Navy,  was  born  before  the  removal  to  Louisiana,  on 
the  5th  of  July,  1801,  at  Campbell's  Station,  near 
Knoxville,  in  eastern  Tennessee.  In  1808,  while  liv- 
ing in  his  father's  house  on  the  banks  of  Lake  Pont- 
chartrain,  an  incident  occurred  which  led  directly 
to  his  entrance  into  the  navy,  and  at  the  same  time 
brought  into  curious  coincidence  two  families,  not 
before  closely  associated,  whose  names  are  now 
among  the  most  conspicuous  of  those  in  the  annals 
of  the  navy.  While  George  Farragut  was  fishing  one 
day  on  Lake  Pontchartrain  he  fell  in  with  a  boat,  also 
engaged  in  fishing,  in  which  was  an  old  gentleman 
prostrated  by  the  heat  of  the  sun.  He  took  him  to 
his  own  house,  where  he  was  cared  for  and  nursed 
until  he  died,  never  having  recovered  strength  suffi- 
cient to  be  removed.  The  sufferer  was  David  Porter, 
the  father  of  the  Captain  David  Porter  who  after- 
ward commanded  the  frigate  Essex  in  her  advent- 
urous and  celebrated  cruise  in  the  Pacific  during  the 
years  1813  and  1814,  and  grandfather  of  the  still  more 
distinguished  Admiral  David  D.  Porter,  who,  over 
half  a  century  later,  served  with  David  Farragut  on 
the  Mississippi  in  the  civil  war,  and  in  the  end  suc- 
ceeded him  as  second  admiral  of  the  navy.  Captain, 
or  rather,  as  he  then  was,  Commander  Porter  being 
in  charge  of  the  naval  station  at  New  Orleans,  his 


FAMILY  AND   EARLY   LIFE.  5 

father,  who  had  served  actively  afloat  during  the 
Revolution  and  had  afterward  been  appointed  by 
Washington  a  sailing-master  in  the  navy,  had  ob- 
tained orders  to  the  same  station,  in  order  to  be  with, 
though  nominally  under,  his  son.  The  latter  deeply 
felt  the  kindness  shown  to  his  father  by  the  Farraguts. 
Mrs.  Farragut  herself  died  of  yellow  fever,  toward  the 
end  of  Mr.  Porter's  illness,  the  funeral  of  the  two  tak- 
ing place  on  the  same  day ;  and  Commander  Porter 
soon  after  visited  the  family  at  their  home  and  offered 
to  adopt  one  of  the  children.  Young  David  Farragut 
then  knew  little  of  the  element  upon  which  his  future 
life  was  to  be  passed ;  but,  dazzled  by  the  com- 
mander's uniform  and  by  that  of  his  own  elder 
brother  William,  who  had  received  a  midshipman's 
warrant  a  short  time  before,  he  promptly  decided  to 
accept  an  offer  which  held  forth  to  him  the  same 
brilliant  prospects.  The  arrangement  was  soon  con- 
cluded. Porter  promised  to  be  to  him  always  a 
friend  and  guardian ;  and  the  admiral  wrote  in  after 
life, "  I  am  happy  to  have  it  in  my  power  to  say,  with 
feelings  of  the  warmest  gratitude,  that  he  ever  was  to 
me  all  that  he  promised."  The  boy  returned  to  New 
Orleans  with  his  new  protector,  in  whose  house  he 
thenceforth  resided,  making  occasional  trips  across 
Lake  Pontchartrain  to  a  plantation  which  his  father 
had  purchased  on  the  Pascagoula  River.  A  few 
months  later  Commander  Porter  appears  to  have 
made  a  visit  to  Washington  on  business  connected 
with  the  New  Orleans  station,  and  to  have  taken 
Farragut  with  him  to  be  placed  at  school,  for  which 
there  were  few  advantages  at  that  time  in  Louisiana. 
The  boy  then  took  what  proved  to  be  a  last  farewell 
of  his  father.     George  Farragut   continued  to   live 


6  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

in  Pascagoula,  and  there  he  died  on  the  4th  of  June, 
1817,  in  his  sixty-second  year. 

The  trip  north  was  made  by  Porter  and  his  ward 
in  the  bomb-ketch  Vesuvius,  a  stop  being  made  at 
Havana;  where  the  commander  had  business  grow- 
ing out  of  the  seizure  by  him  in  the  Mississippi  River 
of  some  French  privateers,  for  which  both  Spain  and 
the  United  States  had  offered  a  reward.  At  Havana 
the  lad  heard  of  an  incident,  only  too  common  in  those 
days,  which  set  his  heart,  as  those  of  his  countrymen 
were  fast  being  set,  against  Great  Britain.  Presum- 
ing confidently  upon  the  naval  weakness  of  the 
United  States,  and  arguing  from  their  long  forbear- 
ance that  insults  to  the  flag  would  be  indefinitely 
borne  for  the  sake  of  the  profitable  commerce  which 
neutrality  insured,  Great  Britain,  in  order  to  support 
the  deadly  struggle  in  which  she  was  engaged  with 
France,  had  endeavored  to  shut  off  the  intercourse 
of  her  enemy  with  the  rest  of  the  world,  by  imposing 
upon  neutral  trade  restrictions  before  unheard  of 
and  without  justification  in  accepted  international 
law.  Both  the  justice  and  policy  of  these  restrictions 
were  contested  by  a  large  party  of  distinguished 
Englishmen  ;  but  upon  another  principle  men  of  all 
parties  in  the  old  country  were  practically  agreed^ 
and  that  was  the  right  of  the  British  Government  to 
compel  the  services  of  British  seamen  wherever 
found.  From  this  grew  the  claim,  which  few  Eng- 
lishmen then  dared  to  disavow,  that  their  ships  of 
war  could  rightfully  take  from  any  neutral  merchant 
ship  any  seaman  of  British  birth  who  was  found  on 
board.  In  estimating  this  monstrous  pretention, 
Americans  have  shown  little  willingness  to  allow  for 
the  desperate  struggle  in  which  Great  Britain  was 


FAMILY  AND   EARLY   LIFE.  7 

involved,  and  the  injury  which  she  suffered  from  the 
lumber  of  her  seamen  who,  to  escape  impressment 
in  their  home  ports  and  the  confinement  of  ships  of 
war,  sought  service  in  neutral  merchant  ships.  Her 
salvation  depended  upon  her  navy  ;  and  seamen  were 
so  scarce  as  seriously  to  injure  its  efficiency  and 
threaten  paralysis.  This  was  naturally  no  concern  of 
the  United  States,  which  set  up  its  simple,  unde- 
niable right  to  the  protection  the  neutral  flag  should 
give  to  all  persons  and  goods  under  it,  which  were 
not  involved  in  any  infraction  of  belligerent  rights. 
The  straits  of  Great  Britain,  however,  were  too  dire 
to  allow  the  voice  of  justice  to  override  that  of  ex- 
pediency. Had  the  United  States  Navy  been  a  force 
as  respectable  in  numbers  as  it  was  in  efficiency,  the 
same  dictates  of  expediency  might  have  materially 
controlled  the  action  of  her  opponent ;  might  have 
prevented  outrage  and  averted  war.  As  it  was,  right 
was  set  up  against  right — the  right  of  the  neutral 
flag  on  the  one  hand  against  the  right  of  a  country 
to  the  service  of  all  her  citizens  on  the  other.  The 
United  States  protested  and  wrote  with  all  the  con- 
viction of  a  state  upon  whose  side  justice  was.  She 
resorted  to  measure  after  measure  of  peaceable  coer- 
cion ;  but  she  had  no  military  force  to  show  upon 
the  sea,  and  her  utterances  were  consequently  too 
uncertain  to  command  respect.  Great  Britain  con- 
tinued to  take  seamen  from  American  merchant 
ships  upon  the  plea  of  her  right  to  impress  British 
seamen  in  any  place  ;  and,  though  the  claim  to  detain 
or  search  ships  of  war  had  been  explicitly  disavowed 
after  the  Chesapeake  affair  of  1807,  scant  deference 
was  shown  to  the  vessels  of  a  power  so  little  able  to 
stand  up  for  itself.     In  a  day  when  most  vessels 


8  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

carried  some  guns  for  self-defense,  it  was  a  simple 
matter  to  ignore  the  national  character  of  an  armed 
ship  and  to  stop  it  unceremoniously.  Of  such  an 
insult  Farragut  heard  during  this  stay  in  Havana. 
The  brig  Vixen,  of  the  United  States  Navy,  had  been 
fired  into  by  a  British  ship  of  war.  "  This,"  wrote 
Farragut  in  his  journal,  "  was  the  first  thing  that 
caused  in  me  bad  feeling  toward  the  English  nation. 
I  was  too  young  to  know  anything  about  the  Revolu- 
tion; but  I  looked  upon  this  as  an  insult  to  be  paid 
in  kind,  and  was  anxious  to  discharge  the  debt  with 
interest."  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  say  how  keen- 
ly this  feeling  was  shared  by  his  seniors  in  the 
service,  to  whom  the  Vixen  incident  was  but  one 
among  many  bitter  wrongs  which  the  policy  of  their 
Government  had  forced  them  humbly  to  swallow. 

After  their  arrival  in  Washington  Farragut  was 
put  to  school,  where  he  remained  until  Porter  was 
relieved  from  the  New  Orleans  station.  During  his 
stay  at  the  capital  he  was  presented  by  his  guardian 
to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Paul  Hamilton,  of 
South  Carolina;  who,  after  ascertaining  his  wish  to 
enter  the  service,  promised  him  a  midshipman's  war- 
rant when  he  should  be  ten  years  old.  The  promise 
was  more  than  kept,  for  the  warrant,  when  issued, 
was  dated  December  17,  1810;  the  future  admiral 
thus  finding  himself  at  least  a  titular  officer,  in  the 
service  which  he  was  afterward  to  adorn,  when  not 
quite  nine  and  a  half  years  of  age.  Although  at 
that  time,  and  in  earlier  generations,  boys,  no  older 
than  Farragut  then  was,  were  not  infrequently  turned 
aboard  ship  to  fight  their  own  way  in  life,  Porter  did 
not  so  construe  his  duties  to  his  charge.  In  the  lat- 
ter part  of  1810  he  finally  left  New  Orleans  and  went 


FAMILY   AND   EARLY   LIFE.  g 

North  again,  this  time  by  the  Mississippi  River  and 
in  a  gun-boat.  The  voyage  to  Pittsburg  against  the 
swift  current  took  three  months;  and  it  was  not  till 
toward  the  close  of  the  year  that  he  and  his  family 
were  again  settled  in  their  home  at  Chester,  in  Penn- 
sylvania, the  birthplace  of  Mrs.  Porter.  Farragut 
was  then  removed  from  Washington  and  put  to 
school  in  Chester,  there  to  remain  until  his  guardian 
should  be  able  to  take  him  to  sea  under  his  own 
eyes,  in  a  vessel  commanded  by  himself.  This  op- 
portunity was  not  long  in  arriving. 


CHAPTER   II. 

CRUISE    OF    THE    ESSEX. 
18H-1814. 

Child  though  Farragut  was  when  he  obtained 
his  nominal  admission  to  the  navy,  he  had  but  a  short 
time  to  wait  before  entering  upon  its  stern  realities 
—realities  far  harsher  in  that  day  than  now.  The 
difficulties  that  had  existed  between  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain,  ever  since  the  outbreak  of  war 
between  the  latter  and  France  in  1793,  were  now  fast 
drifting  both  nations  to  the  collision  of  181 2.  The 
Non-intercourse  Act  of  March,  1809,  forbidding 
American  merchant  ships  to  enter  any  port  of  France 
or  Great  Britain,  as  a  retaliation  for  the  outrages  in- 
flicted by  both  upon  American  commerce,  had  ex- 
pired by  its  own  limitations  in  May,  1810,  when  com- 
merce with  the  two  countries  resumed  its  natural 
course ;  but  Congress  had  then  passed  a  proviso  to 
the  effect  that  if  either  power  should,  before  March 
3,  181 1,  recall  its  offensive  measures,  the  former  act 
should,  within  three  months  of  such  revocation,  re- 
vive against  the  one  that  maintained  its  edicts.  Na- 
poleon had  contrived  to  satisfy  the  United  States 
Government  that  his  celebrated  Berlin  and  Milan 
decrees  had  been  recalled  on  the  1st  of  November; 
and,  consequently,  non-intercourse  with  Great  Britain 


CRUISE  OF   THE  ESSEX.  H 

was  again  proclaimed  in  February,  1811.  The  im- 
mediate result  was  that  two  British  frigates  took 
their  station  off  New  York,  where  they  overhauled 
all  merchant  ships,  capturing  those  bound  to  ports 
of  the  French  Empire,  and  impressing  any  members 
of  the  crews  considered  to  be  British  subjects.  The 
United  States  then  fitted  out  a  squadron,  to  be  com- 
manded by  Commodore  John  Rodgers;  whose  orders, 
dated  May  6,  181 1,  were  to  cruise  off  the  coast  and 
to  protect  American  commerce  from  unlawful  inter- 
ference by  British  and  French  cruisers.  Ten  days 
later  occurred  the  collision  between  the  commodore's 
ship,  the  President,  and  the  British  corvette  Little 
Belt.  Of  Rodgers's  squadron  the  frigate  Essex,  ex- 
pected shortly  to  arrive  from  Europe,  was  to  be  one ; 
and  Commander  Porter,  who  did  not  obtain  his  pro- 
motion to  the  grade  of  captain  until  the  following 
year,  was  ordered  to  commission  her.  He  took  his 
ward  with  him,  and  the  two  joined  the  ship  at  Norfolk, 
Virginia,  in  August,  181 1,  when  the  young  midship- 
man had  just  passed  his  tenth  birthday.  Long  years 
afterward  Mrs.  Farragut  was  told  by  Commodore 
Bolton,  one  of  the  lieutenants  of  the  Essex,  that  he 
remembered  to  have  found  the  little  boy  overcome 
with  sleep  upon  his  watch,  leaning  against  a  gun- 
carriage,  and  had  covered  him  with  his  pea-jacket  to 
protect  him  from  the  night  air.  An  amusing  inci- 
dent, however,  which  occurred  during  these  first 
months  of  his  naval  career  showed  that  the  spirit  of 
battle  was  already  stirring.  Porter,  probably  with  a 
view  to  keep  the  lad  more  immediately  under  his 
own  eye,  had  made  him  midshipman  of  his  gig,  as 
the  captain's  special  boat  is  called.  On  one  occasion 
he  was  sent  in  to  the  wharf,  to  wait  for  the  captain 


12  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

and  bring  him  to  the  ship  when  he  came.  A  crowd 
of  dock-loungers  gradually  collected,  and  the  young- 
ster who  stood  erect  in  the  boat,  doubtless  looking 
pleasedly  conscious  of  his  new  uniform  and  impor- 
tance, became  the  object  of  audible  comment  upon 
his  personal  appearance.  The  boat's  crew  sat  silent 
but  chafing,  the  bowman  holding  on  with  his  boat- 
hook,  until  one  loafer  proceeded  from  witticism  to 
practical  joking  by  sprinkling  the  midshipman  with 
an  old  water-pot.  Quick  as  look  the  bowman  caught 
his  boot-hook  in  the  culprit's  pocket  and  dragged 
him  into  the  boat,  while  the  rest  of  the  crew,  by 
this  time  spoiling  for  a  fight,  seized  their  stretchers, 
jumped  ashore,  and  began  laying  on  right  and  left. 
Farragut,  so  far  from  restraining,  went  with  them, 
waving  his  dirk  and  cheering  them  on.  The  vic- 
torious seamen  fought  their  way  up  to  Market  Square, 
where  the  police  interfered,  arresting  all  parties,  and 
the  little  officer  was  formally  bound  over  to  keep  the 
peace. 

The  Hartford,  upon  which  Farragut  first  hoisted 
his  admiral's  flag,  has  obtained  a  particular  interest 
from  its  close  association  with  the  whole  of  his  course 
of  victory ;  and  the  Essex,  a  ship  of  very  different 
type,  would  attract  attention  as  the  one  that  cradled 
his  career,  and  witnessed  the  part  of  it  which  is  only 
second  in  excitement  to  his  exploits  as  a  commander- 
in-chief,  had  she  no  special  claims  of  her  own  to  no- 
tice. But  the  Essex,  both  in  her  origin  and  through 
her  subsequent  history,  especially  when  under  Por- 
ter's command,  was  a  marked  ship.  She  was  an  off- 
spring of  the  quarrel  between  the  United  States  and 
the  French  Republic,  which  arose  out  of  the  extrava- 
gant demands  made  by  the  latter  upon  the  compli- 


CRUISE  OF   THE   ESSEX. 


13 


ance  of  her  former  ally,  in  consequence  of  the  service 
which  it  was  claimed  had  been  rendered  during  the 
Revolutionary  War.  Ignoring  the  weakness  of  the 
American  Republic,  and  the  dependence  of  a  large 
section  of  the  country  upon  commerce,  the  French 
Government  had  expected  that  it  should  resist,  even 
by  force,  the  seizure  by  British  cruisers  of  French 
property  in  American  vessels,  and  thus  bring  on  hos- 
tilities with  Great  Britain  ;  and  that,  although  the 
United  States  Government  admitted  the  practice  of 
capturing  enemy's  property  in  neutral  ships,  how- 
ever objectionable  in  theory,  to  be  part  of  the  tradi- 
tional and  recognized  law  of  nations.  Going  on  from 
step  to  step,  in  the  vain  endeavor  by  some  means  to 
injure  the  maritime  predominance  of  Great  Britain, 
which  defied  the  efforts  both  of  their  navy  and  of 
their  privateers,  the  French  Legislature  in  January, 
1798,  decreed  that  any  neutral  vessel  which  should 
be  found  to  have  on  board,  not  merely  British  prop- 
erty, but  property,  to  whomsoever  belonging,  which 
was  grown  or  manufactured  in  England  or  her  colo- 
nies, should  be  a  lawful  prize  to  French  cruisers. 
This  extravagant  claim,  which  not  only  seized  goods 
that  had  been  heretofore  and  by  all  others  accounted 
free,  but  also,  contrary  to  precedent,  confiscated  the 
vessel  as  well  as  the  cargo,  broke  down  the  patience 
of  the  United  States,  where  the  Government  was 
then  still  in  the  hands  of  the  Federalists,  whose  sym- 
pathies were  rather  British  than  French.  Nearly  a 
year  before,  President  Adams  had  called  a  special 
meeting  of  Congress  and  recommended  an  increase 
of  the  navy,  to  the  numerical  weakness  of  which  was 
due  the  recklessness  with  which  both  Great  Britain 
and  France  inflicted  insult  and  injury  upon  our  sea- 


H 


ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 


men    and    upon    our   commerce.      That  the  United 
States  of  that  day,  so  inferior  in  wealth  and  numbers 
to  both  belligerents,  should  dream  of  entering  the 
lists  with  either  singly,  was  perhaps  hopeless ;  but 
through  the  indifference  of  Congress  the  navy  of  a 
people,  then  second  only  to  the  English  as  maritime 
carriers,  was  left  so  utterly  impotent  that  it  counted 
for  naught,  even  as  an  additional  embarrassment  to 
those  with  which  the  contending  powers  were  already 
weighted.      When,  therefore,  in    retaliation    for  the 
seizures  made  under  the  French  decree  of  January, 
1798,  Congress,  without  declaring  war,  directed  the 
capture  of  French  armed  vessels,  wherever  found  on 
the  high  seas,  it  became  necessary  to  begin  building 
a  navy  which  to  some  slight  degree  might  carry  out 
the  order.     An  act,  intended  to  hasten  the  increase 
of  the  navy,  was  passed  in  June,  1798,  authorizing 
the   President   to   accept   such  vessels  as  might  be 
built  by  the  citizens  for  the  national  service,  and  to 
issue  six-per-cent  stock  to  indemnify  the  subscribers. 
Under  this  law  the  Essex   was   built    in    Salem, 
Massachusetts,  by  a  subscription  raised  among  the 
citizens.     As  the  project  grew,  and  the  amount  likely 
to  be  obtained  became  manifest,  the  purpose  to  which 
it  should  be  devoted  was  determined  to  be  the  build- 
ing of  a  frigate  of  thirty-two  guns;  one  of  the  well- 
recognized,    but    smaller,  classes    under    which    the 
vessels  called  frigates  were  subdivided.     Except  the 
work  of  the  naval  architect  proper,  the  model  and 
the  superintendence,  which  were  undertaken  by  a  gen- 
tleman from  Portsmouth,  everything  in  the  building 
and  equipment  was  portioned  out  among  Salem  men, 
and  was  supplied  from  the  resources  of  the  town  or 
of  the  surrounding  country.     During  the  winter  of 


CRUISE  OF   THE   ESSEX. 


15 


1798  to  1799  the  sleds  of  all  the  farmers  in  the 
neighborhood  were  employed  bringing  in  the  tim- 
ber for  the  frames  and  planking  of  the  new  ship. 
The  rigging  was  manufactured  by  the  three  rope- 
walks  then  in  the  place,  each  undertaking  one  mast ; 
and  the  sails  were  of  cloth  so  carefully  selected  and 
so  admirably  cut  that  it  was  noticed  the  frigate  never 
again  sailed  so  well  as  with  this  first  suit.  When 
the  rope  cables,  which  alone  were  then  used  by  ships 
instead  of  the  chains  of  the  present  day,  were  com- 
pleted, the  workmen  took  them  upon  their  shoulders 
and  marched  with  them  in  procession  to  the  vessel, 
headed  by  a  drum  and  fife.  The  building  of  the 
Essex  was  thus  an  effort  of  city  pride  and  local 
patriotism  ;  and  the  launch,  which  took  place  on  the 
30th  of  September,  1799,  became  an  occasion  of  gen- 
eral rejoicing  and  holiday,  witnessed  by  thousands 
of  spectators  and  greeted  by  salutes  from  the  bat- 
tery and  shipping.  The  new  frigate  measured  850 
tons,  and  cost,  independent  of  guns  and  stores,  some- 
what over  $75,000.  Her  battery  in  her  early  history 
was  composed  of  twenty-six  long  twelve-pounders  on 
the  main  deck,  with  sixteen  thirty-two-pound  carron- 
ades  and  two  chase  guns  on  the  deck  above.  At  a 
later  day,  and  during  the  cruise  under  Porter,  this 
was  changed  to  forty  thirty-two-pound  carronades 
and  six  long  twelves.  This  battery,  though  throw- 
ing a  heavier  weight,  was  of  shorter  range  than  the 
former;  and  therefore,  though  advantageous  to  a 
ship  able  to  choose  her  position,  was  a  fatal  source  of 
weakness  to  a  slow  or  crippled  vessel,  as  was  pain- 
fully apparent  in  the  action  where  the  Essex  was  lost. 
Notwithstanding  the  zeal  and  emulation  aroused 
by  the  appeal  to  Salem  municipal  pride,  and  notwith- 


!6  admiral  farragut. 

standing  the  comparative  rapidity  with  which  ships 
could  then  be  built,  the  Essex  in  her  day  illustrated 
the  folly  of  deferring  preparation  until  hostilities 
are  at  hand.  The  first  French  prize  was  taken  in 
June,  1798,  but  it  was  not  till  December  22d  of  the 
following  year  that  the  Essex  sailed  out  of  Salem 
harbor,  commanded  then  by  Edward  Preble,  one  of 
the  most  distinguished  officers  of  the  early  American 
navy.  Newport  was  her  first  port  of  arrival.  From 
there  she  sailed  again  on  the  6th  of  January,  1800,  in 
company  with  the  frigate  Congress,  both  being  bound 
for  Batavia,  whence  they  were  to  convoy  home  a  fleet 
of  merchant  ships ;  for  in  the  predatory  warfare  en- 
couraged by  the  French  Directory,  the  protection  of 
our  commerce  from  its  cruisers  was  a  duty  even  more 
important  than  the  retaliatory  action  against  the 
latter,  to  which  the  quasi  war  of  1798  was  confined. 
When  six  days  out,  the  Congress  was  dismasted. 
The  Essex  went  on  alone,  and  was  thus  the  first 
ship-of-war  to  carry  the  flag  of  the  United  States 
around  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  into  the  Indian 
Ocean.  A  dozen  years  later  the  bold  resolution  of 
Porter  to  take  her  alone  and  unsupported  into  the 
Pacific,  during  the  cruise  upon  which  young  Farragut 
was  now  embarking,  secured  for  this  little  frigate  the 
singular  distinction  of  being  the  first  United  States 
ship-of-war  to  double  Cape  Horn  as  well  as  that  of 
Good  Hope.  In  the  intervening  period  the  Essex 
had  been  usefully,  but  not  conspicuously,  employed  in 
the  Mediterranean  in  the  operations  against  Tripoli 
and  in  protecting  trade.  In  181 1,  however,  she  was 
again  an  actor  in  an  event  of  solemn  significance. 
Upon  her  return  to  the  United  States,  where  Porter 
was  waiting  to  take  command,  she  bore  as  a  passen- 


CRUISE   OF   THE   ESSEX.  17 

ger  William  Pinkney,  the  late  Minister  to  Great 
Britain;  who,  after  years  of  struggle,  on  his  part 
both  resolute  and  dignified,  to  obtain  the  just  de- 
mands of  the  United  States,  had  now  formally  broken 
off  the  diplomatic  relations  between  the  two  powers 
and  taken  an  unfriendly  leave  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment 

Being  just  returned  from  a  foreign  cruise,  the 
Essex  needed  a  certain  amount  of  refitting  before 
again  going  to  sea  under  her  new  commander;  but 
in  October,  181 1,  she  sailed  for  a  short  cruise  on  the 
coast,  in  furtherance  of  the  Government's  orders  to 
Commodore  Rodgers  to  protect  American  commerce 
from  improper  interference.     Orders  of  such  a  char- 
acter were  likely  at  any  moment  to  result  in  a  collis- 
ion, especially  in  the  hands  of  a  gallant,  hasty  officer 
scarcely  out  of  his  first  youth ;  for  Porter  was  at  this 
time  but  thirty-one,  and  for  years  had  felt,  with  the 
keen  resentment  of  a  military  man,  the  passive  sub- 
mission to  insult  shown  by  Jefferson's  government. 
No  meeting,  however,  occurred  ;  nor  were  the  months 
that  elapsed  before  the  outbreak  of  war  marked  by 
any  event  of  special   interest  except  a  narrow  escape 
from  shipwreck  on  Christmas  eve,  when  the  Essex 
nearly  dragged  on  shore  in  a  furious  northeast  gale 
-under  the  cliffs  at  Newport.     Farragut  has  left  on 
record  in  his  journal,  with  the  proper  pride  of  a  mid- 
shipman in  his  ship,  that  the  Essex  was  the  smartest 
vessel    in    the   squadron,    and    highly  complimented 
as  such  by  Commodore  Rodgers.     In  acknowledg- 
ment of  the  skill  and  activity  of  his  seamen,  Porter 
divided  the  ship's  company  into  three  watches,  in- 
stead of  the  usual  two— an  arrangement  only  possible 
when  the  smaller  number  in  a  watch  is  compensated 


1 8  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

by  their  greater  individual  efficiency.  This  arrange- 
ment continued  throughout  the  cruise,  until  the  ship 
was  captured  in  1814. 

On  the  18th  of  June,  1812,  war  was  at  last  de- 
clared against  Great  Britain.  The  Essex  had  again 
been  cruising  during  the  spring  months ;  but  the 
serious  character  of  the  new  duties  before  her  made 
a  thorough  refit  necessary,  and  she  was  not  able  to 
sail  with  the  squadron  under  Commodore  Rodgers, 
which  put  to  sea  from  New  York  on  the  21st  of 
June.  On  the  3d  of  July,  however,  she  got  away, 
Porter  having  the  day  before  received  his  promotion 
to  post-captain,  then  the  highest  grade  in  the  United 
States  Navy.  The  ship  cruised  off  the  coast,  making 
several  prizes  of  vessels  much  inferior  to  herself  in 
force,  and  on  the  7th  of  September  anchored  within 
the  capes  of  the  Delaware.  Much  to  Porter's  sur- 
prise and  annoyance,  although  ready  to  sail  at  once 
if  furnished  with  provisions,  none  reached  him.  The 
ship  was  therefore  taken  up  the  Delaware  and  an- 
chored off  Chester,  where  she  was  prepared  for  a 
long  and  distant  cruise  directed  against  British  com- 
merce, the  suggestion  of  which  Porter  believed  came 
first  from  himself.  By  this  a  squadron  consisting 
of  the  Constitution,  Essex,  and  Hornet  sloop-of-war, 
under  the  command  of  Commodore  Bainbridge  in 
the  first-named  frigate,  were  to  proceed  across  the 
Atlantic  to  the  Cape  Verde  Islands,  thence  to  the 
South  Atlantic  in  the  neighborhood  of  Brazil,  and 
finally  to  the  Pacific,  to  destroy  the  British  whale- 
fishery  there.  The  plan  was  well  conceived,  and 
particularly  was  stamped  with  the  essential  mark  of 
all  successful  commerce-destroying,  the  evasion  of 
the    enemy's    cruisers ;    for,   though    the    American 


CRUISE   OF   THE   ESSEX. 


19 


cruisers  were  primed  to  fight,  yet  an  action,  even  if 
successful,  tended  to  cripple  their  powers  of  pursuit. 
A  rapid  transit  through  the  Atlantic,  with  an  ulti- 
mate destination  to  the  then  little-frequented  Pacific, 
was  admirably  calculated  to  conceal  for  a  long  time 
the  purposes  of  this  commerce-destroying  squadron. 
As  it  happened,  both  the  Constitution  and  Hornet 
met  and  captured  enemy's  cruisers  off  the  coast 
of  Brazil,  and  then  returned  to  the  United  States. 
Farragut  thus  lost  the  opportunity  of  sharing  in  any 
of  the  victories  of  1812,  to  be  a  partaker  in  one  of 
the  most  glorious  of  defeats. 

The  Constitution  and  Hornet  being  in  Boston, 
and  the  Essex  in  the  Delaware,  it  became  necessary 
to  appoint  for  the  three  a  distant  place  of  meeting, 
out  of  the  usual  cruising  grounds  of  the  enemy,  in 
order  that  the  ships,  whose  first  object  was  to  escape 
crippling,  could  pass  rapidly  through  the  belt  of  Brit- 
ish cruisers  then  girding  the  coast  of  the  United 
States.  The  brilliant  record  made  by  United  States 
ships  in  their  single  combats  with  the  enemy  during 
this  war  should  not  be  allowed  to  blind  our  people 
to  the  fact  that,  from  their  numerical  inferiority, 
they  were  practically  prisoners  in  their  own  ports; 
and,  like  other  prisoners,  had  to  break  jail  to  gain 
freedom  to  act.  The  distant  and  little  frequented 
Cape  Verde  group,  off  the  African  coast,  was  there- 
fore designated  as  the  first  rendezvous  for  Bain- 
bridge's  squadron,  and  the  lonely  island  of  Fernando 
Noronha,  off  the  coast  of  Brazil,  close  under  the 
equator,  as  the  second.  Both  of  these  places  were 
then  possessions  of  Portugal,  the  ally  of  Great  Brit- 
ain though  neutral  as  to  the  United  States.  With 
these  orders  the  Constitution  and  Hornet  sailed  from 


20  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

Boston  on  the  26th  of  October,  1812,  and  the  Essex 
two  days  later  from  the  capes  of  the  Delaware. 
Their  course  in  the  passage  was  to  be  so  directed  as 
to  cross  at  the  most  favorable  points  the  routes  of 
British  commerce. 

On  the  27th  of  November  the  Essex,  after  an  un- 
eventful voyage,  anchored  at  Porto  Praya,  in  the 
Cape  Verdes,  where  she  remained  five  days.  Re- 
ceiving no  news  of  Bainbridge,  Porter  sailed  again 
for  Fernando  Noronha.  On  the  nth  of  December 
a  British  packet,  the  Nocton,  was  captured,  and 
from  her  was  taken  $55,000  in  specie — an  acquisition 
which  contributed  much  to  facilitate  the  distant 
cruise  contemplated  by  Porter.  Four  days  later  the 
Essex  was  off  Fernando  Noronha,  and  sent  a  boat 
ashore,  which  returned  with  a  letter  addressed  osten- 
sibly to  Sir  James  Yeo,  of  the  British  frigate  South- 
ampton ;  but  between  the  lines,  written  in  sympa- 
thetic ink,  Porter  found  a  message  from  Bainbridge, 
directing  him  to  cruise  off  Rio  and  wait  for  the  Con- 
stitution. On  the  29th  of  December  he  was  in  the 
prescribed  station,  and  cruised  in  the  neighborhood 
for  some  days,  although  he  knew  a  British  ship-of- 
the-line,  the  Montagu,  was  lying  in  Rio ;  but  only 
one  British  prize  was  taken,  the  merchant  vessels  of 
that  nation  usually  waiting  in  port  until  they  could 
sail  under  convoy  of  a  ship-of-war.  Attempting  to 
get  to  windward  in  a  heavy  sea,  the  Essex  was 
much  racked  and  injured  some  of  her  spars,  and  her 
captain  therefore  decided  to  bear  away  for  refit  to 
St.  Catherine's — a  port  five  hundred  miles  south  of 
Rio  Janeiro,  which  had  been  named  in  his  instruc- 
tions as  a  contingent  rendezvous.  On  the  20th  of 
January,  1813,  the  Essex  anchored  there,  and  began 


CRUISE   OF   THE   ESSEX.  2I 

the  work  of  refitting  and  filling  with  water  and 
fresh  provisions.  A  few  days  after  her  arrival  a 
small  Portuguese  vessel  came  in,  bringing  an  account 
of  the  capture  by  the  Montagu  of  an  American  cor- 
vette, which  Porter  supposed  to  be  the  Hornet,  as 
well  as  a  rumor  of  the  action  between  the  Constitu- 
tion and  the  Java,  and  a  report  that  re-enforcements 
were  reaching  the  British  naval  force  on  the  station. 
The  history  of  past  wars  convinced  Porter  that  the 
neutrality  of  the  Portuguese  port  in  which  he  was 
lying  would  not  be  respected  by  the  enemy.  In 
a  very  few  days  his  presence  there  must  become 
known  ;  any  junction  with  his  consorts  was  rendered 
most  unlikely  by  the  news  just  received,  and  he  de- 
termined at  once  to  undertake  alone  the  mission  for 
which  the  three  ships  had  been  dispatched.  With 
admirable  promptitude,  both  of  decision  and  action, 
the  Essex  sailed  the  same  night  for  the  Pacific. 

From  the  time  of  leaving  the  United  States  the 
crew  of  the  ship  had  been  restricted  to  that  close 
and  economical  allowance  of  provisions  and  water 
which  was  necessary  to  a  vessel  whose  home  ports 
were  blocked  by  enemy's  cruisers,  and  which  in  every 
quarter  of  the  globe  might  expect  to  meet  the  fleets 
and  influence  of  a  powerful  foe.  The  passage  round 
Cape  Horn,  always  stormy,  was  both  a  long  and  se- 
vere strain  to  a  vessel  bound  from  east  to  west,  and 
dependent  wholly  upon  sail ;  for  the  winds  prevail 
from  the  westward.  The  utmost  prudence  was  re- 
quired in  portioning  out  both  food  and  water,  and 
of  bread  there  remained,  on  leaving  St.  Catherine's, 
only  enough  for  three  months  at  half  allowance — 
that  is,  at  half  a  pound  per  day.  The  boy  Farragut 
thus  found  himself,  at  the  outset  of  his  career,  ex- 


22  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

posed  to  one  of  the  severest  tests  of  his  arduous 
calling — a  long  and  stormy  passage,  made  in  the 
teeth  of  violent  gales,  and  with  a  crew  reduced  to 
the  scantiest  possible  allowance  of  food,  under  con- 
ditions when  the  system  most  demands  support.  In 
his  journal  he  speaks,  as  Porter  does  in  his,  of  the 
severe  suffering  and  dreadful  weather  experienced. 
For  twenty-one  days  the  Essex  struggled  with  the 
furious  blasts,  the  heavy  seas,  and  the  bitter  weather, 
which  have  made  the  passage  round  Cape  Horn  pro- 
verbial for  hardship  among  seamen.  On  the  3d  of 
March,  he  writes,  a  sea  was  shipped  which  burst  in, 
on  one  side  of  the  ship  and  from  one  end  to  the 
other,  all  the  ports  through  which  the  guns  are  fired, 
and  which,  for  such  a  passage,  are  closed  and  se- 
curely fastened.  One  boat  on  the  weather  side  was 
driven  in  on  deck,  and  that  on  the  opposite  carried 
overboard;  but  with  great  difficulty  the  latter  was 
saved.  Large  quantities  of  water  rushed  below,  lead- 
ing those  there  to  imagine  that  the  ship  was  sinking. 
"  This  was  the  only  instance  in  which  I  ever  saw  a  real 
good  seaman  paralyzed  by  fear  at  the  dangers  of  the 
sea.  Several  of  the  sailors  were  seen  on  their  knees 
at  prayer;  but  most  were  found  ready  to  do  their 
duty.  They  were  called  on  deck,  and  came  promptly, 
led  by  William  Kingsbury,  the  boatswain's  mate. 
Long  shall  I  remember  the  cheering  sound  of  his 
stentorian  voice,  which  resembled  the  roaring  of  a 
lion  rather  than  that  of  a  human  being,  when  he  told 
them :  '  D — n  their  eyes,  to  put  their  best  foot  for- 
ward, as  there  was  one  side  of  the  ship  left  yet.' " 

Cape  Horn,  however,  was  at  last  passed  and 
enough  ground  gained  to  the  westward  to  allow  the 
Essex  again  to  head  north.     On  the  nth  of  March 


CRUISE   OF   THE   ESSEX.  23 

she  was  off  the  city  of  Valparaiso,  in  Chile.  As  far 
as  Porter  then  knew,  Chile  was  still  a  province  of 
Spain,  and  Spain  was  the  ally  of  Great  Britain  ;  whose 
armies  for  four  years  past  had  been  engaged  in  war 
in  the  Peninsula,  to  shake  from  it  the  grip  of  Na- 
poleon. There  had  been  trouble  also  between  Spain 
and  the  United  States  about  the  Floridas.  The  first 
lieutenant  of  the  Essex  was  therefore  first  sent 
ashore  to  see  what  reception  would  be  given,  and 
returned  with  the  satisfactory  intelligence  that  Chile 
was  in  revolution  against  the  mother  country,  and  was 
ready  heartily  to  welcome  a  ship-of-war  belonging 
to  the  American  Republic.  He  also  brought  the 
news  that  the  Viceroy  of  Spain  in  Peru  had  fitted 
out  privateers  against  Chilian  commerce;  and  that 
these,  on  the  plea  of  being  allies  of  Great  Britain, 
had  begun  to  capture  American  whalers.  It  seemed, 
therefore,  that  the  Essex  had  arrived  as  opportunely 
for  the  protection  of  United  States  interests  as  for 
the  injury  of  British  commerce. 

Several  days  were  lost  in  these  preliminaries,  so 
that  it  was  not  till  the  15th  that  the  anchor  was 
dropped  in  Valparaiso.  Despite  the  cordial  reception 
given,  Porter  was  in  haste  to  reach  his  scene  of  ac- 
tion in  the  North  and  sailed  again  on  the  22d.  Four 
days  later  he  met  a  Peruvian  privateer,  the  Nereyda, 
the  captain  of  which  was  deceived  by  the  Essex 
hoisting  British  colors.  Coming  on  board  the  frigate, 
he  stated  freely  that  the  Spaniards  considered  them- 
selves the  allies  of  Great  Britain,  that  he  was  him- 
self cruising  for  American  whalers,  and  had  on  board 
at  the  moment  the  crews  of  two  of  these  which  he 
had  taken.  Having  extracted  all  the  information  he 
wanted,  Porter  undeceived  the  privateersman,  took 


24  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

possession  of  the  ship,  threw  overboard  her  guns  and 
ammunition,  and  then  released  her,  with  a  letter  to 
the  Viceroy ;  which,  backed  by  the  presence  of  the 
Essex,  was  calculated  to  insure  peaceable  treatment 
to  American  vessels. 

There  were  at  this  time  on  the  coast  of  Peru  and 
in  the  neighboring  waters  twenty-three  American 
whalers,  worth,  with  their  cargoes,  two  and  a  half 
million  dollars,  and  mostly  unarmed,  having  left 
home  in  a  time  of  peace.  Of  English  ships  there 
were  twenty;  but,  their  country  having  been  long 
at  war,  these  were  generally  armed,  and  in  many 
cases  provided  with  letters  of  marque  authorizing 
them  to  act  as  privateers  and  capture  vessels  hostile 
to  their  Crown.  In  this  state  of  things,  so  unpromis- 
ing for  American  interests,  the  arrival  of  the  Essex 
entirely  turned  the  scales,  besides  stopping  the  Span- 
ish depredations  which  had  but  just  begun. 

On  the  27th  of  March,  off  the  harbor  of  Callao, 
the  port  of  Lima,  Porter  recaptured  the  Barclay,  one 
of  the  American  ships  seized  by  the  Nereyda;  but, 
although  the  frigate  again  disguised  her  nationality 
by  hoisting  British  colors,  there  was  among  the  sev- 
eral vessels  in  the  harbor  only  one  that  showed  the 
same  flag.  With  the  Barclay  in  company,  the  Essex 
now  stood  away  for  the  Galapagos  Islands.  These 
are  a  group  situated  just  south  of  the  equator  and 
some  five  hundred  miles  from  the  South  American 
coast.  Uninhabited  then,  as  for  the  most  part  they 
still  are,  they  were  in  1813  a  favorite  rendezvous  for 
British  whalers,  who  had  established  upon  one  of  the 
islands  (Charles)  a  means  of  communication  by  a  box 
nailed  to  a  tree,  which  was  called  the  post-office. 
They  abound  in  turtle,  some  of  which  weigh  several 


CRUISE   OF    THE   ESSEX. 


25 


hundred  pounds,  and  form  a  very  valuable  as  well  as 
acceptable  change  of  diet  to  seamen  long  confined  to 
salt  food.  On  the  17th  of  April  the  Essex  came  in 
sight  of  Chatham  Island,  one  of  the  largest,  and  re- 
mained cruising  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  group 
till  the  beginning  of  June,  when  want  of  water  com- 
pelled her  to  go  to  Tumbez,  a  port  on  the  continent 
just  abreast  of  the  Galapagos.  In  this  period  seven 
British  whalers  were  taken  ;  so  that  on  the  24th  of 
June  there  were  anchored  in  Tumbez  Bay,  including 
the  frigate  and  the  Barclay,  nine  vessels  under  Por- 
ter's command.  Of  these,  he  commissioned  one — 
the  fastest  and  best,  somewhat  less  than  half  the 
size  of  the  Essex  herself — as  a  United  States  cruiser, 
under  his  command.  She  was  named  the  Essex 
Junior,  carried  twenty  guns,  of  which  half  were  long 
six-pounders  and  half  eighteen-pounder  carronades, 
and  was  manned  by  sixty  of  the  Essex's  crew  under 
her  first  lieutenant. 

The  first  service  of  the  Essex  Junior  was  to  con- 
voy to  Valparaiso  the  Barclay  and  four  of  the  British 
prizes.  The  occasion  was  one  of  great  importance 
and  interest  to  Farragut ;  for,  though  but  a  boy  of 
twelve,  he  was  selected  to  command  the  party  of  sea- 
men detailed  to  manage  the  Barclay  during  this  long 
passage.  The  captain  of  the  Barclay  went  with  his 
ship,  but  in  great  discontent  that  the  command  of 
the  seamen  was  given  not  to  himself,  but  to  such  a 
lad  from  the  ship-of-war.  Being  a  violent-tempered 
old  man,  he  attempted  by  bluster  to  overawe  the  boy 
into  surrendering  his  authority.  "  When  the  day 
arrived  for  our  separation  from  the  squadron," 
writes  Farragut  in  his  journal,  "  the  captain  was 
furious,  and  very  plainly  intimated  to  me  that  I 
3 


26  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

would  'find  myself  off  New  Zealand  in  the  morning,' 
to  which  I  most  decidedly  demurred.  We  were  lying 
still,  while  the  other  ships  were  fast  disappearing 
from  view,  the  commodore  going  north  and  the 
Essex  Junior,  with  her  convoy,  steering  to  the  south 
for  Valparaiso.  I  considered  that  my  day  of  trial 
had  arrived  (for  I  was  a  little  afraid  of  the  old  fel- 
low, as  every  one  else  was).  But  the  time  had  come 
for  me  at  least  to  play  the  man  ;  so  I  mustered  up 
courage  and  informed  the  captain  that  I  desired  the 
maintopsail  filled  away,  in  order  that  we  might  close 
up  with  the  Essex  Junior.  He  replied  that  he  would 
shoot  any  man  who  dared  to  touch  a  rope  without 
his  orders;  he 'would  go  his  own  course,  and  had  no 
idea  of  trusting  himself  with  a  d — d  nutshell  ' ;  and 
then  he  went  below  for  his  pistols.  I  called  my  right- 
hand  man  of  the  crew  and  told  him  my  situation.  I 
also  informed  him  that  I  wanted  the  maintopsail 
filled.  He  answered  with  a  clear  '  Ay,  ay,  sir ! '  in 
a  manner  which  was  not  to  be  misunderstood,  and 
my  confidence  was  perfectly  restored.  From  that 
moment  I  became  master  of  the  vessel,  and  immedi- 
ately gave  all  necessary  orders  for  making  sail, 
notifying  the  captain  not  to  come  on  deck  with  his 
pistols  unless  he  wished  to  go  overboard,  for  I 
would  really  have  had  very  little  trouble  in  having 
such  an  order  obeyed.  I  made  my  report  to  Captain 
Downes  (of  the  Essex  Junior),  on  rejoining  him  ;  and 
the  captain  also  told  his  story,  in  which  he  endeav- 
ored to  pursuade  Downes  that  he  only  tried  to  fright- 
en me.  I  replred  by  requesting  Captain  Downes  to 
ask  him  how  he  succeeded ;  and  to  show  him  that  I 
did  not  fear  him,  I  offered  to  go  back  and  proceed 
with  him  to  Valparaiso.    He  was  informed  that  I  was 


CRUISE   OF   THE   ESSEX. 


27 


in  command,  he  being  simply  my  adviser  in  navigat- 
ing the  vessel  in  case  of  separation.  So,  this  being 
settled  and  understood,  I  returned  to  the  Barclay, 
and  everything  went  on  amicably  up  to  our  arrival 
in  Valparaiso." 

It  was  on  the  30th  of  June  that  the  little  squad- 
ron sailed  from  Tumbez,  standing  to  the  westward 
till  they  should  reach  the  trade-winds;  and  on  the 
4th  of  July  that  the  Essex  Junior  separated,  with  the 
prizes,  and  Farragut  had  his  scene  with  the  captain 
of  the  Barclay.  As  the  winds  on  the  west  coast  of 
South  America  blow  throughout  the  year  from  the 
southward,  the  passage  of  sailing  vessels  in  that  di- 
rection is  always  long ;  but  for  the  same  reason  the 
return  is  quickly  made.  When,  therefore,  the  Essex 
Junior  rejoined  the  Essex  at  the  Galapagos,  on  the 
30th  of  September,  she  brought  comparatively  recent 
news,  and  that  of  a  very  important  character.  Let- 
ters from  the  American  consul  in  Buenos  Ayres  in- 
formed Porter  that  on  the  5th  of  July  the  British 
frigate  Phoebe,  of  thirty-six  guns,  a  vessel  in  every 
way  of  superior  force  to  the  Essex,  had  sailed  from 
Rio  Janeiro  for  the  Pacific,  accompanied  by  two 
sloops-of-war,  the  Cherub  and  Raccoon,  of  twenty- 
four  guns  each.  This  little  squadron  was  charged 
with  the  double  mission  of  checking  the  ravages  of 
the  Essex  and  of  destroying  the  fur  trade  of  Ameri- 
can citizens  at  the  mouth  of  the  Columbia  River. 
From  the  date  of  their  leaving  Rio  these  ships  were 
not  improbably  now  on  the  coast ;  and  allowing  for 
time  to  refit  after  the  stormy  passage  round  the  Horn, 
they  might  be  expected  soon  to  seek  Porter  at  the 
Galapagos,  the  headquarters  of  the  British  whalers. 

The  Essex  Junior  brought  back  the  prize-crews 


2g  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

and  prize-masters  who  had  navigated  the  captured 
ships  to  Valparaiso,  and  with  the  others  Farragut 
now  rejoined  the  frigate.  During  their  absence  Por- 
ter had  taken  four  more  valuable  vessels.  Accord- 
ing to  his  information,  there  remained  but  one  uncapt- 
ured  of  the  British  whalers  which  centered  around 
the  islands.  The  Essex  had  taken  eleven;  and 
among  these,  six  carried  letters  of  marque  from  their 
Government,  authorizing  them  to  seize  for  their  own 
profit  vessels  of  a  nation  at  war  with  Great  Britain. 
These  powers  would  doubtless  have  been  exercised 
at  the  expense  of  the  unprepared  American  whalers 
but  for  the  opportune  appearance  of  the  Essex, 
which  had  also  released  the  vessels  of  her  country 
from  the  ports  to  which,  at  the  time  of  her  arrival, 
they  had  been  driven  by  Peruvian  privateers.  Por- 
ter's work  in  this  region  was  therefore  finished.  He 
had  entirely  broken  up  an  important  branch  of  Brit- 
ish commerce,  inflicting  damage  estimated  at  nearly 
three  million  dollars;  but  the  coming  of  an  enemy's 
force  considerably  superior  to  his  own,  an  event 
wholly  beyond  his  control,  reversed  all  the  conditions 
and  imposed  upon  him  some  new  line  of  action.  For 
this  he  was  already  prepared,  and  he  took  his  decision 
with  the  promptitude  characteristic  of  the  man.  The 
commander  of  the  British  squadron,  Captain  Hillyar, 
was  personally  well  known  to  him,  being  an  old 
acquaintance  in  the  Mediterranean  ;  and  he  doubtless 
realized  from  observation,  as  well  as  from  his  past 
record,  that  his  enemy  was  not  a  man  to  throw  away, 
through  any  carelessness  or  false  feeling  of  chivalry, 
a  single  advantage  conferred  by  his  superior  force. 
On  the  other  hand,  Porter  himself  was  not  one  quiet- 
ly to  submit  to  superiority  without  an  effort  to  regain 


CRUISE   OF  THE   ESSEX.  29 

the  control  which  the  chances  of  naval  war  might 
yet  throw  into  his  hands.  He  was  determined  to 
fight,  if  any  fair  chance  offered;  but  to  do  so  it  was 
necessary  to  put  his  ship  in  the  highest  state  of  effi- 
ciency, which  could  only  be  done  by  leaving  the  spot 
where  he  was  known  to  be,  and,  throwing  the  enemy 
off  his  scent,  repairing  to  one  where  the  necessary 
work  could  be  performed  in  security.  Two  days 
after  the  arrival  of  the  Essex  Junior  all  the  vessels 
sailed  from  the  Galapagos  Islands  for  the  Marquesas. 
On  the  25th  of  October  they  anchored  at  one  of  this 
group,  called  Nukahiva  Island. 

During  the  six  weeks  the  Essex  lay  at  this 
anchorage  her  crew  bore  a  part  in  several  expedi- 
tions on  shore,  designed  to  protect  the  natives  in  the 
neighborhood  against  hostile  tribes  in  other  parts  of 
the  island.  In  this  land  fighting  Farragut  and  his 
younger  messmates  were  not  allowed  to  share;  but 
were,  on  the  contrary,  compelled  to  attend  a  school 
established  on  board  of  one  of  the  prizes,  with  the 
ship's  chaplain  for  school-master.  They  were,  how- 
ever, permitted  out  of  school  hours  and  after  the 
day's  work,  which  for  the  ship's  company  ended  at 
4  p.  m.,  to  ramble  freely  in  the  island  among  the 
natives;  considerable  liberty  being  allowed  to  all 
hands,  who,  during  their  year's  absence  from  the 
United  States,  had  had  little  opportunity  to  visit  any 
inhabited  places.  Farragut  here  learned  to  swim,  and 
the  aptitude  of  the  natives  to  the  water  seems  to 
have  impressed  him  more  than  their  other  peculiari- 
ties which  have  since  then  been  so  liberally  described 
in  books  of  travel.  "  It  appears  as  natural,"  he 
wrote,  "  for  these  islanders  to  swim  as  to  eat.  I  have 
often  seen  mothers  take  their  little  children,  appar- 


30  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

ently  not  more  than  two  years  old,  down  to  the  sea 
on  their  backs,  walk  deliberately  into  deep  water,  and 
leave  them  to  paddle  for  themselves.  To  my  aston- 
ishment, the  little  creatures  could  swim  like  young 
ducks." 

On  the  9th  of  December,  1813,  the  Essex  and 
Essex  Junior  sailed  for  Valparaiso  with  one  of  the 
prizes,  leaving  the  others  at  the  Marquesas.  Noth- 
ing of  interest  occurred  during  the  passage,  but  the 
crew  were  daily  exercised  at  all  the  arms  carried  by 
the  ship — with  the  cannon,  the  muskets,  and  the 
single-sticks.  The  latter  are  for  training  in  the  use 
of  the  broadsword  or  cutlass,  the  play  with  which 
would  be  too  dangerous  for.  ordinary  drills.  Porter 
had  a  strong  disposition  to  resort  to  boarding  and 
hand-to-hand  fighting,  believing  that  the  very  sur- 
prise of  an  attack  by  the  weaker  party  would  go  far 
to  compensate  for  the  inequality  of  numbers.  On 
more  than  one  occasion  already,  in  the  presence  of 
superior  force,  he  had  contemplated  resorting  to 
this  desperate  game  ;  and  to  a  ship  the  character  of 
whose  battery  necessitated  a  close  approach  to  the 
enemy,  the  power  to  throw  on  board,  at  a  moment's 
notice,  a  body  of  thoroughly  drilled  and  equipped 
swordsmen  was  unquestionably  of  the  first  impor- 
tance. "  I  have  never  since  been  in  a  ship,"  said 
Farragut  at  a  later  day,  "  where  the  crew  of  the  old 
Essex  was  represented,  but  that  I  found  them  to  be 
the  best  swordsmen  on  board.  They  had  been  so 
thoroughly  trained  as  boarders  that  every  man  was 
prepared  for  such  an  emergency,  with  his  cutlass  as 
sharp  as  a  razor,  a  dirk  made  from  a  file  by  the 
ship's  armorer,  and  a  pistol."  With  a  ship  well  re- 
fitted and  with  a  crew  thus  perfectly  drilled,  Porter 


CRUISE   OF   THE   ESSEX.  31 

had  done  all  that  in  him  lay  in  the  way  of  prepara- 
tion for  victory.  If  he  did  not  win,  he  would  at  least 
deserve  to  do  so.  For  Farragut  it  is  interesting  to 
notice  that,  in  his  tender  youth  and  most  impressible 
years,  he  had  before  him,  both  in  his  captain  and  in 
his  ship,  most  admirable  models.  The  former  daring 
to  recklessness,  yet  leaving  nothing  to  chance ;  fear- 
less of  responsibility,  but  ever  sagacious  in  its  exer- 
cise ;  a  rigid  disciplinarian,  who  yet  tempered  rigor 
by  a  profound  knowledge  of  and  sympathy  with  the 
peculiarities  of  the  men  who  were  under  him.  The 
latter— the  ship— became,  as  ships  under  strong  cap- 
tains tend  to  become,  the  embodiment  of  the  com- 
mander's spirit.  Thoroughly  prepared  and  armed 
at  all  points,  she  was  now  advancing  at  the  close  of 
her  career  to  an  audacious  encounter  with  a  greatly 
superior  force.  Whether  the  enterprise  was  justifi- 
able or  not,  at  least  nothing  that  care  could  do  to 
insure  success  was  left  to  chance  or  to  favor.  Por- 
ter might  perhaps  have  quitted  the  Pacific  in  Decem- 
ber, 1813,  and,  reaching  the  United  States  coast  in 
the  winter,  have  escaped  the  blockade  which  at  that 
season  was  necessarily  relaxed.  By  doing  so  he 
might  have  saved  his  ship ;  but  the  United  States 
Navy  would  have  lost  one  of  the  most  brilliant  pages 
in  its  history,  and  its  future  admiral  one  of  the  most 
glorious  episodes  in  his  own  great  career. 

On  the  12th  of  January,  1814,  the  Essex  arrived  off 
the  coast  of  Chile,  making  the  land  well  to  the  south- 
ward— that  is,  to  windward — of  Valparaiso.  From 
this  point  of  arrival  she  ran  slowly  to  the  northward, 
looking  into  the  old  town  of  Concepion,  between  two 
and  three  hundred  miles  from  Valparaiso.  In  the 
latter  port  she  anchored  on  the  3d  of  February.    The 


32 


ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 


ordinary  salutes  and  civilities  with  the  authorities  hav- 
ing been  exchanged,  every  effort  was  made  to  get  the 
ship  ready  for  sea,  the  Essex  Junior  being  employed 
cruising  off  the  port  so  as  to  give  timely  notice  of 
the  approach  of  an  enemy ;  a  precaution  necessary 
at  all  times,  even  in  a  neutral  port,  but  especially  so 
at  a  period  when  neutral  rights  were  being  openly 
disregarded  in  every  direction  by  both  the  great 
belligerents,  France  and  Great  Britain.  Moreover, 
Captain  Hillyar,  though  a  brave  and  experienced 
officer,  a  favorite  with  Nelson,  whose  esteem  could 
not  be  won  without  high  professional  merit,  was 
reputed  to  have  shown  scanty  scruples  about  neutral 
rights  on  a  previous  occasion,  when  the  disregard  of 
them  procured  an  advantage  to  the  enterprise  he  had 
in  hand.  Being  sent  with  several  armed  boats  to  at- 
tack two  Spanish  corvettes  lying  in  the  port  of  Barce- 
lona, in  the  year  1800,  he  had  pulled  alongside  a 
neutral  vessel,  a  Swede,  which  was  standing  into  the 
harbor  ;  and  after  examining  her  papers  in  the  due 
exercise  of  his  right  as  a  belligerent,  his  boats 
hooked  on  to  her,  thus  using  a  neutral  to  tow  them 
into  the  enemy's  port,  so  that  his  men  reached  their 
scene  of  exertion  unfatigued  by  the  oar,  and  for  a 
great  part  of  the  way  protected  by  such  respect  as 
the  Spanish  batteries  might  show  to  a  neutral  coerced 
into  aiding  a  hostile  undertaking.  "  Having  ap- 
proached within  about  three  quarters  of  a  mile  of  the 
nearest  battery,"  says  the  British  naval  historian 
James,  "  and  being  reminded  by  two  shots  which 
passed  over  the  galliot  that  it  was  time  to  retire 
from  the  shelter  of  a  neutral  vessel,  Captain  Hillyar 
pulled  away."  Both  the  Spanish  and  Swedish  Gov- 
ernments complained  of  this  act,  and  their  complaints 


CRUISE   OF   THE   ESSEX. 


33 


delayed  the  promotion  which  Hillyar's  gallantry 
would  otherwise  have  won.  Whatever  the  strict  pro- 
priety of  his  conduct  in  this  case,  it  was  sufficiently 
doubtful  to  excite  a  just  suspicion  that  Hillyar 
would  not  be  deterred,  by  over-delicacy  about  the 
neutrality  of  the  port,  from  seizing  any  advantage 
offered  him  by  the  unwariness  of  his  enemy ;  and 
so  the  event  proved. 

On  the  7th  6f  February  a  dance  was  given  on 
board  the  Essex,  which  lasted  till  midnight.  In  or- 
der that  her  officers  might  share  in  the  entertain- 
ment, the  Essex  Junior  was  allowed  to  anchor, 
though  in  a  position  to  have  a  clear  view  of  the  sea ; 
but,  when  the  guests  began  to  depart,  her  commander 
went  on  board  and  got  under  way  to  resume  his  sta- 
tion outside.  Before  the  decorations  of  the  ball- 
room had  been  taken  down,  a  signal  was  made  from 
her  that  two  enemy's  ships  were  in  sight.  A  whole 
watch — one  third  of  the  Essex's  crew — were  then  on 
shore,  but  were  quickly  recalled  by  a  gun.  The  ship 
was  at  once  cleared  for  action,  and  the  men  at  their 
quarters,  with  all  the  rapidity  to  be  expected  from 
the  careful  drilling  they  had  had  during  their  long 
commission.  Porter  himself  had  gone  to  the  lookout 
ship  to  reconnoitre  the  enemy.  Upon  his  return  he 
found  the  frigate  all  ready  for  battle,  it  being  then 
just  an  hour  and  a  half  since  the  alarm  was  given. 
The  Essex  Junior  was  then  anchored  in  a  position  to 
support  the  Essex  should  occasion  arise. 

The  strangers  were  the  Phoebe  and  the  Cherub. 
The  third  British  ship,  the  Raccoon,  had  gone  north 
to  the  Columbia.  As  has  before  been  said,  Captain 
Hillyar  was  an  old  friend  of  Porter's.  The  two  men 
had  been  thrown  together  in  the  Mediterranean,  and 


34 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


the  American  had  been  a  frequent  visitor  in  the 
other's  house  at  Gibraltar.  On  one  occasion  Hill- 
yar's  family  had  made  a  passage  from  Malta  to  Gib- 
raltar in  an  American  ship-of-war ;  for  in  those 
troubled  times  would-be  voyagers  had  to  avail 
themselves  of  such  opportunities  as  offered,  and  the 
courtesy  of  a  large  armed  ship  was  among  the  most 
favorable.  It  was  natural,  therefore,  that,  as  the 
Phoebe  stood  into  the  harbor,  Captain  Hillyar  should 
bring  his  ship,  the  wind  allowing  it,  close  to  the  Es- 
sex and  hail  the  latter  with  a  polite  inquiry  after 
Captain  Porter's  health ;  but  it  was  going  rather 
too  far,  under  all  the  circumstances,  not  to  be  content 
with  passing  slowly  under  the  Essex's  stern,  than 
which  no  more  favorable  position  could  be  found  for 
an  exchange  of  civil  words.  Instead  of  so  doing,  the 
helm  of  the  Phoebe  was  put  down  and  the  ship  luffed 
up  into  the  wind  between  the  Essex  and  the  Essex 
Junior,  the  latter  lying  now  near  the  senior  ship  and 
on  her  starboard  beam.  Whethei  Hillyar  counted 
upon  his  own  seamanship  to  extricate  his  ship  from 
the  awkward  position  in  which  he  had  placed  her,  or 
whether,  as  the  Americans  believed,  he  intended  to 
attack  if  circumstances  favored,  he  soon  saw  that  he 
had  exposed  himself  to  extreme  peril.  As  the  Phoebe 
lost  her  way  she  naturally  fell  off  from  the  wind,  her 
bows  being  swept  round  toward  the  Essex,  while  her 
stern  was  presented  to  the  Essex  Junior.  Both  her 
enemies  had  their  guns  trained  on  her;  she  could 
use  none  of  hers.  At  the  same  time,  in  the  act  of 
falling  off,  she  approached  the  Essex ;  and  her  jib- 
boom,  projecting  far  beyond  her  bows,  swept  over 
the  forecastle  of  the  latter.  Porter,  who  had  been 
watching  the  whole  proceeding  with   great  distrust, 


CRUISE   OF   THE   ESSEX.  35 

had  summoned  his  boarders  as  soon  as  the  Phoebe 
luffed.  The  Essex  at  the  moment  was  in  a  state  of 
as  absolute  preparation  as  is  a  musket  at  full  cock 
trained  on  the  mark,  and  with  the  marksman's  eye 
ranging  over  the  sights  ;  every  man  at  his  post,  every 
gun  trained,  matches  burning,  and  boarders  standing 
by.  The  position  was  one  of  extreme  tension.  The 
American  captain  had  in  his  hand  a  chance  such  as 
in  his  most  sanguine  dreams  he  could  scarcely  have 
hoped.  His  guns,  feeble  at  a  distance,  could  tell 
with  the  greatest  effect  at  such  short  range;  and  even 
if  his  enemy  dropped  an  anchor,  in  the  great  depths 
of  Valparaiso  Bay  he  would  not  fetch  up  till  far  past 
the  Essex.  Until  then  he  was  for  the  moment  help- 
less. Porter  hailed  that  if  the  ships  touched  he  should 
at  once  attack.  Hillyar  kept  his  presence  of  mind 
admirably  at  this  critical  juncture,  replying  in  an  in- 
different manner  that  he  had  no  intention  of  allow- 
ing the  Phoebe  to  fall  on  board  the  Essex — an  as- 
surance that  was  well  enough,  and,  coupled  with  his 
nonchalant  manner,  served  the  purpose  of  keeping 
Porter  in  doubt  as  to  whether  a  breach  of  neutrality 
had  been  intended.  But  the  British  frigate  was  un- 
questionably in  a  position  where  a  seaman  should 
not  have  placed  her  unless  he  meant  mischief.  It  is 
good  luck,  not  good  management,  when  a  ship  in 
the  Phoebe's  position  does  not  foul  one  in  that  of  the 
Essex.  While  this  was  passing,  Farragut  was  witness 
to  a  circumstance  which  shows  by  what  a  feather's 
weight  scales  are  sometimes  turned.  Of  all  the 
watch  that  had  been  on  shore  when  the  enemy  ap- 
peared, he  says,  one  only,  a  mere  boy,  returned 
under  the  influence  of  liquor.  "  When  the  Phoebe 
was  close  alongside,  and  all  hands  at  quarters,  the 


36 


ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 


powder-boys  stationed  with  slow  matches  ready  to 
discharge  the  guns,  the  boarders,  cutlass  in  hand, 
standing  by  to  board  in  the  smoke,  as  was  our  cus- 
tom at  close  quarters,  the  intoxicated  youth  saw,  or 
imagined  that  he  saw,  through  the  port,  some  one 
on  the  Phoebe  grinning  at  him.  '  My  fine  fellow,  I'll 
stop  your  making  faces,'  he  exclaimed,  and  was  just 
about  to  fire  his  gun,  when  Lieutenant  McKnight  saw 
the  movement  and  with  a  blow  sprawled  -him  on  the 
deck.  Had  that  gun  been  fired,  I  am  convinced  that 
the  Phoebe  would  have  been  ours."  She  probably 
would,  for  the  Essex  could  have  got  in  three  broad- 
sides of  her  twenty  thirty-two-pounder  carronades 
before  the  enemy  could  effectively  reply,  a  beginning 
which  would  have  reversed  the  odds  between  the 
two  ships.  Farragut  fully  shared  the  belief  of  all 
his  shipmates  that  an  attack  was  intended,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  information  given  to  Captain  Hill- 
yar,  as  he  was  entering,  by  the  boat  of  an  English 
merchant  ship  in  the  port,  that  half  the  crew  of 
the  Essex  was  on  shore.  As  the  Phoebe  luffed 
through  between  the  two  Americans  a  turn  of  her 
helm  would  have  landed  her  on  the  bows  of  the 
Essex,  if  the  latter  had  been  caught  at  disadvantage. 
Instead  of  this,  she  was  found  fully  prepared.  The 
Essex  Junior  was  also  on  the  spot,  while  the  Cherub, 
having  drifted  half  a  mile  to  leeward,  could  not  have 
taken  any  part  till  the  action  was  decided.  Under 
these  conditions,  although  their  force  was  inferior, 
the  advantage  was  with  the  Americans,  whose  ships 
were  anchored  and  cleared,  while  the  Phoebe  still 
had  her  canvas  spread  and  the  anchoring  to  do, 
which  is  a  troublesome  operation  in  water  so  deep  as 
that  of  Valparaiso  Bay.     If  men's  motives  can  be 


CRUISE   OF   THE    ESSEX.  37 

judged  by  their  acts,  Captain  Hillyar  afforded  Porter 
full  justification  for  opening  fire.  He  extricated 
himself  from  a  false  position  with  consummate  cool- 
ness; but  his  adversary,  when  taken  later  at  disad- 
vantage, had  reason  to  regret  the  generosity  with 
which  he  allowed  him  the  benefit  of  the  doubt  as  to 
his  intentions  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  the  port. 
As  it  was,  when  the  two  ships  were  almost  touching, 
the  Englishman  threw  his  sails  to  the  mast,  and,  back- 
ing clear  of  the  Essex,  anchored  finally  some  distance 

astern. 

The  two  British  ships  remained  in  port  for  a  few 
days,  during  which  their  captains  called  upon  Cap- 
tain Porter  on  shore,  where  he  was  then  living  in  the 
house  of  a  gentleman  named  Blanco  ;   and  an  amica- 
ble intercourse  also  grew  up  between  the  officers  and 
crews  of  the  two   parties.      Hillyar,  however,   told 
Porter  frankly  that  he  should  not  throw  away  the 
advantage  given'byhis  superior  force,  for  the  event 
of  a  naval  action  was   ever  uncertain,   liable  to  be 
decided  by  the  accidental  loss  of  an  important  spar 
or  rope;  whereas,  by  keeping  his  two  ships  together, 
he  thought   he  could  effectually  blockade  the  Essex 
and   prevent   her    renewing    her  depredations  upon 
British  commerce  until  the  arrival  of  other  ships  of 
war  which  were  on  their  way.     From  this  wary  atti- 
tude Porter  in  vain  tried  to  force  his  antagonist  by 
varied  provocations ;  but,  although  the  exchange  of 
official  insults,  verging  closely  at  times  upon  person- 
al imputations,  caused  bitterness  to   take  the  place 
of  the  first  friendly  courtesies,  Hillyar  was  too  old 
an  officer,  and  his  reputation  for  courage  too  well 
known,  to  allow  his  hand  to  be  thus  forced. 

After  filling  with  provisions  and   refitting,  the 


38  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

British  ships  left  the  anchorage  and  cruised  off  the 
approach  to  it,  thus  preventing  the  retreat  of  the 
Essex  to  the  ocean,  unless  she  could  succeed  in  pass- 
ing and  then  outsailing  them.  Valparaiso  Bay  is  not 
an  enclosed  harbor,  but  simply  a  recess  in  the  coast, 
which,  running  generally  north  and  south,  here  turns 
abruptly  to  the  eastward  for  two  or  three  miles  and 
then  trends  north  again,  leaving  thus  a  concave 
beach  facing  the  north.  Along  this  beach  lies  the 
city  of  Valparaiso,  stretching  back  and  up  on  the 
hillsides,  which  rise  to  a  height  of  twelve  or  fifteen 
hundred  feet  behind  it.  The  prevailing  winds  along 
this  coast  being  from  the  southward  throughout  the 
year,  this  formation  gives  an  anchorage  sheltered 
from  them  ;  but  during  the  winter  months  of  the 
southern  hemisphere,  from  May  to  October,  there 
are  occasional  northerly  gales  which  endanger  ship- 
ping, more  from  the  heavy  sea  that  rolls  in  than 
from  the  violence  of  the  wind.  In  ordinary  weather, 
at  the  season  when  the  Essex  was  thus  blockaded, 
the  harbor  is  quiet  through  the  night  until  the  fore- 
noon, when  the  southerly  wind  prevailing  outside 
works  its  way  in  to  the  anchorage  and  blows  freshly 
till  after  sundown.  At  times  it  descends  in  furious 
gusts  down  the  ravines  which  cleave  the  hillsides, 
covering  the  city  with  clouds  of  dust  and  whirling 
sand  and  pebbles  painfully  in  the  faces  of  those  who 
walk  the  streets. 

On  the  28th  of  March,  1814,  such  a  blast  descend- 
ed upon  the  Essex,  whose  captain  had  by  that  time 
come  to  despair  of  forcing  Hillyar  to  single  combat. 
As  the  frigate  straightened  out  her  cables  under  the 
force  of  the  wind,  one  of  them  broke,  and  the  anchor 
of  the  other  lost  its  hold  upon  the  bottom.     The 


CRUISE   OF   THE   ESSEX.  39 

Essex   began  to  drift  to   sea,  and  it   was   apparent 
would  by  this  accident  be   carried  out  of  reach  of 
the  port.      Porter  therefore    ordered  the  cable  cut 
and  made  sail  on  the  ship,  intending  now  to  escape. 
The  British  ships  kept  habitually  close  to  the  west- 
ern point  of  the  bay ;  so  that  in  case  of  such  an  at- 
tempt by  their  enemy  he  would  have  to  pass  to  lee- 
ward of  them,  giving  them  a  fair  wind  to  follow.    As 
Porter  stood  out,  however,  he  thought  possible,  by 
keeping   close   to   the  wind,  to    pass   to   windward, 
which,  with   the    superior    sailing    qualities   of   the 
Essex,  would  force  the  Phoebe  to  separate  from  the 
Cherub,  unless  Hillyar  supinely  acquiesced  in  his  es- 
cape—an inadmissible  supposition.     If  successful,  he 
might  yet  have  the  single  action  he  desired,  and  un- 
der conditions  which  would  enable  him  to  choose  his 
distance  and  so  profit  by  the  qualities  of  his  carron- 
ades.     The  Essex  therefore  hugged  the  wind ;  but 
as  she  was  thus  passing  the  western  point  of  the 
bay,   under  a  press  of   sail,  a   violent    squall   came 
down   from  the  highland  above,  bearing  the  vessel 
over  on  her  side  and  carrying   away   the  maintop- 
mast,  which  fell  into  the  sea,  drowning  several  of  the 
crew.     The  loss  of  so  important  a  part  of  her  sail 
power  made  escape  to  sea  impossible,  and  the  Essex 
tried  to   regain  the   port.     The  wind,  however,  was 
adverse  to  the  attempt  in  her  crippled  condition,  so 
that  she  was  only  able  to  reach  the  east  side  of  the 
bay,  where  she  anchored    about    three  miles  from 
the  city,  but  within  pistol-shot  of  the  shore,  before 
the  enemy  could  overtake  her.     As  the  conventional 
neutral  line  extends  three  miles  from  the  beach,  the 
Essex  was  here  clearly  under  the  protection  of  Chil- 
ian neutrality.     Hillyar  himself,  in  his  official  report 


40 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


of  the  action,  says  she  was  "  so  near  the  shore  as  to 
preclude  the  possibility  of  passing  ahead  of  her  with- 
out risk  to  His  Majesty's  ships."  He  seems,  how- 
ever, to  have  satisfied  his  conscience  by  drawing  a 
line  between  the  neutrality  of  the  port  and  the  neu- 
trality of  the  country.  The  Essex  was,  he  implies, 
outside  the  former.  "Not  succeeding  in  gaining 
the  limits  of  the  port,  she  bore  up  and  anchored  near 
the  shore,  a  few  miles  to  leeward  of  it."  *  At  all 
events,  having  his  adversary  at  such  serious  disad- 
vantage, he  did  not  propose  to  imitate  the  weakness 
Porter  had  shown  toward  himself  six  weeks  before. 

The  crucial  feature  in  the  approaching  action 
was  that  the  Essex  was  armed  almost  entirely  with 
carronades,  and  her  principal  enemy  with  long  guns. 
The  carronade,  now  a  wholly  obsolete  arm,  was  a 
short  cannon,  made  extremely  light  in  proportion  to 
the  weight  of  the  ball  thrown  by  it.  The  compara- 
tive lightness  of  metal  in  each  piece  allowed  a 
greater  number  to  be  carried,  but  at  the  same  time 
so  weakened  the  gun  as  to  compel  the  use  of  a  small 
charge  of  powder,  in  consequence  of  which  the  ball 
moved  slowly  and  had  but  short  range.  In  compen- 
sation, within  its  range,  it  broke  up  the  hull  of  an 
enemy's  ship  more  completely  than  the  smaller  but 
swifter  ball  from  a  long  gun  of  the  same  weight ; 
for  the  same  reason  that  a  stone  thrown  by  hand  de- 
molishes a  pane  of  glass,  while  a  pistol-bullet  makes 
a  small,  clean  hole.  It  was  this  smashing  effect  at 
close  quarters  which  gave  the  carronade  favor  in 
the  eyes  of  one  generation  of  seamen;  but  by  1812 
it  was  generally  recognized  that,  unless  a  vessel  was 

*  Marshall's  Naval  Biography,  article  Hillyar,  vol.  iv,  p.  861. 


CRUISE   OF   THE   ESSEX. 


41 


able  to  choose  her  own  position,  the  short  range  of 
carronades  might  leave  her  helpless,  and,  even  when 
she  had  the  greater  speed,  an  enemy  with  long  guns 
might  cripple  her  as  she  approached.  Porter  had 
begged  to  change  his  carronades  for  long  guns  when 
he  joined  the  Essex.  The  request  was  refused,  and 
the  ship  in  this  action  had  forty  thirty-two-pounder 
carronades  and  six  long  twelve  -  pounders.  The 
Phoebe  had  twenty-six  long  eighteen  -  pounders,  one 
long  twelve,  and  one  long  nine,  besides  eight  carron- 
ades. The  Essex  being  crippled  and  at  anchor,  Cap- 
tain Hillyar,  faithful,  and  most  properly,  to  his  prin- 
ciple of  surrendering  no  advantage,  chose  his  posi- 
tion beyond  effective  carronade  range.  The  battle 
was  therefore  fought  between  the  six  long  twelves 
of  the  Essex  and  the  broadside  of  the  Phcebe,  con- 
sisting of  thirteen  long  eighteens,  one  twelve,  and 
one  nine.  Taking  no  account  of  the  Cherub,  the  dis- 
parity of  force  is  sufficiently  obvious. 

Although,  from  the  assurances  Hillyar  had  made 
to  him  in  conversation,  Porter  had  hoped  that  the 
neutrality  of  the  port  might  be  regarded,  the  manner 
in  which  the  enemy's  vessels  approached  his  new  an- 
chorage gave  serious  reason  to  fear  an  attack.  The 
ship  was  again  got  ready  for  action,  and  a  spring  put 
on  the  cable  to  enable  the  guns  to  be  turned  on  the 
enemy  in  any  position  he  might  take.  The  desper- 
ateness  of  the  situation  was,  however,  manifest  to 
all.  "  I  well  remember,"  wrote  Farragut  at  a  later 
day,  "  the  feelings  of  awe  produced  in  me  by  the 
approach  of  the  hostile  ships;  even  to  my  young 
mind  it  was  perceptible  in  the  faces  of  those  around 
me,  as  clearly  as  possible,  that  our  case  was  hopeless. 
It  was  equally  apparent  that  all  were  ready  to  die  at 
4 


42 


ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 


their  guns  rather  than  surrender  ;  and  such  I  believe 
to  have  been  the  determination  of  the  crew,  almost 
to  a  man."  A  crippled  ship,  armed  with  carronades, 
was  indeed  in  a  hopeless  plight.  At  six  minutes  be- 
fore four  in  the  afternoon  the  attack  began.  The 
Essex  riding  to  an  anchor  with  a  southerly  wind,  the 
Cherub  took  position  on  her  starboard  bow,  or  south- 
west from  her  ;  the  Phcebe  north,  under  her  stern. 
Both  British  ships  began  fighting  under  sail,  not 
being  yet  ready  to  anchor.  The  spring  on  the 
Essex's  cable  being  shot  away,  she  was  unable  to 
turn  her  broadside  as  was  wished  ;  but  the  Ameri- 
cans ran  out  of  the  stern-ports  three  of  their  long 
guns,  which  were  so  well  served  as  to  cut  away  some 
of  the  most  important  of  the  Phoebe's  ropes  and  sails, 
and  Hillyar  for  a  moment  feared  his  ship  would  be 
drifted  out  of  action.  The  Cherub  also  was  forced 
to  leave  her  first  position  and  join  the  Phcebe.  The 
latter's  damages  being  repaired,  she  regained  her 
ground  and  anchored;  both  she  and  her  consort 
placing  themselves  on  the  starboard  quarter  of  the 
Essex,  a  position  on  which  the  American  guns,  neither 
from  the  stern  nor  the  broadside,  could  be  brought  to 
bear  unless  by  the  springs  on  the  cables.  These,  un- 
fortunately, were  three  times  shot  away  as  soon  as 
they  had  been  placed.  The  first  lieutenant  of  the 
Phcebe,  a  frank  and  gallant  young  Englishman, 
whose  manly  bearing  had  greatly  attracted  the  offi- 
cers of  the  Essex,  is  said  to  have  remarked  to  his 
captain  that  it  was  no  better  than  murder  to  go  on 
killing  men  from  such  a  position  of  safety,  and  to 
have  urged  him  to  close  and  make  a  more  equal  fight 
of  it.  Hillyar,  so  the  story  goes,  replied  that  his 
reputation  was  established,  and   that  as  his  orders 


CRUISE   OF   THE   ESSEX.  43 

were  peremptory  to  capture  the  Essex,  he  was  deter- 
mined to  take  no  risks.  He  might  have  added — prob- 
ably did — that  it  was  open  to  the  Americans  to  save 
their  lives  by  surrendering.  The  same  view  of  the 
situation  now  impelled  Porter,  finding  himself  unable 
to  give  blow  for  blow,  to  try  and  close  with  his  wary 
enemy.  Only  one  light  sail  was  left  to  him  in  con- 
dition for  setting — the  flying-jib.  With  it,  the  cable 
having  been  cut,  the  head  of  the  Essex  was  turned 
toward  the  enemy ;  and,  fanned  along  by  the  other 
sails  hanging  loose  from  the  yards,  she  slowly  ap- 
proached her  foes  till  her  carronades  at  last  could 
reach.  The  wary  Englishman  then  slipped  his  cable 
and  stood  away  till  again  out  of  range,  when  he  re- 
sumed the  action,  choosing  always  his  own  position, 
which  he  was  well  able  to  do  from  the  comparatively 
manageable  condition  of  his  ship.  Finding  it  impos- 
sible to  get  into  action,  Porter  next  attempted  to 
run  the  Essex  aground,  where  the  crew  could  escape 
and  the  vessel  be  destroyed.  She  was  headed  for 
the  beach  and  approached  within  musket-shot  of  it, 
when  a  flaw  of  wind  from  the  land  cruelly  turned  her 
away. 

The  engagement  had  lasted  nearly  two  hours 
when  this  disappointment  was  encountered.  As  a 
last  resort,  Porter  now  ordered  a  hawser  to  be  made 
fast  to  an  anchor  which  was  still  left.  This  was  let 
go  in  the  hope  that,  the  Essex  being  held  by  it 
where  she  was,  the  enemy  might  drift  out  of  action 
and  be  unable  to  return  when  the  wind  fell  with  the 
approaching  sunset.  The  hawser,  however,  parted, 
and  with  it  the  last  hope  of  escape.  Great  numbers 
of  the  crew  had  already  been  killed  and  wounded  by 
the  relentless  pounding  the  ship  had  received  from 


44  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

her  enemies,  for  whom,  toward  the  end,  the  affair 
became  little  more  than  safe  target  practice,  with  a 
smooth  sea.  As  yet  no  voice  had  been  raised  in 
favor  of  submission  ;  but  now  entreaty  was  made  to 
Porter  to  spare  the  lives  of  the  remnant  that  was  left, 
by  ceasing  a  resistance  which  had  become  not  only 
hopeless  but  passive,  and  which,  however  prolonged, 
could  end  only  in  the  surrender  of  the  ship.  The  lat- 
ter had  already  been  on  fire  several  times,  and  was 
now  alarmingly  so,  the  flames  rushing  up  the  hatch- 
ways and  being  reported  to  be  near  the  magazine. 
Porter  then  gave  permission  for  such  of  the  crew  as 
wished,  to  swim  ashore ;  the  colors  being  still  flying, 
they  were  not  yet  prisoners  of  war.  He  next  called 
his  officers  together  to  inform  him  as  to  the  condition 
of  the  ship  in  the  different  parts  where  they  served, 
but  one  only  of  the  lieutenants  was  able  to  answer 
the  summons.  After  consultation  with  him,  satisfied 
that  nothing  more  remained  to  be  done,  the  order 
was  given  at  twenty  minutes  past  six  to  lower  the 
flag  of  the  Essex,  after  an  action  which  had  lasted 
two  hours  and  a  half.  She  had  gone  into  battle  with 
two  hundred  and  fifty-five  men.  Of  these,  fifty-eight 
were  killed,  sixty-six  wounded,  and  thirty-one  miss- 
ing. The  last  item  is  unusually  large  for  a  naval  ac- 
tion, and  was  probably  due  to  the  attempt  to  escape 
to  shore  by  swimming. 

Farragut  lacked  still  three  months  of  being  thir- 
teen years  old  when  he  passed  through  this  tremen- 
dous ordeal  of  slaughter,  the  most  prolonged  and  the 
bloodiest  of  his  distinguished  career.  At  his  tender 
years  and  in  his  subordinate  position  there  could  be, 
of  course,  no  demand  upon  the  professional  ability 
or  the  moral  courage  which  grapples  with  responsi- 


CRUISE   OF   THE   ESSEX.  45 

bility,  of  which  he  gave  such  high  proof  in  his  later 
life.     In  the  Essex  fight  his  was  but  to  do  and  dare, 
perhaps  it  may  rather  be  said  to  do   and  bear ;  for 
no  heavier  strain  can  be  laid  upon  the  physical  cour- 
age than  is  required  by  passive  endurance  of  a  dead- 
ly attack  without  the  power  of  reply.     In  the  cele- 
brated charge  of  the  Six  Hundred  at  Balaklava  the 
magnificent  display  of  courage  was  at  least  aided  by 
the  opportunity  allowed   for  vehement  action;  the 
extreme    nervous   tension    excited    by    such   deadly 
danger  found  an  outlet  in  the  mad  impetus  of  the 
forward  rush.     Farragut  has  himself  recorded  a  sin- 
gular instance  in  the  Essex  fight,  which  illustrates  the 
sufficiently  well-known  fact  that   in  the  excitement 
of  approaching  action  the   sense  of  danger   is  sub- 
dued, even  in  a  man  who  has  not  the  strong  nerves 
that  endure  the  passive  expectation  of  death.     "  On 
one   occasion    Midshipman  Isaacs    came  up   to   the 
captain  and  reported  that  a  quarter-gunner   named 
Roach  had  deserted  his  post.     The  only  reply  of  the 
captain,  addressed  to  me,  was  :  '  Do  your  duty,  sir  ! ' 
I  seized  a  pistol  and  went  in   pursuit  of  the  fellow, 
but  did  not  find  him.      It    appeared    subsequently 
that  when  the  ship  was  reported  to  be  on  fire  he  had 
contrived  to  get  into   the  only  boat  that  could  be 
kept  afloat,  and  escaped,  with  six  others,  to  the  shore. 
The  most  remarkable  part  of  this  affair  was  that 
Roach  had  always  been  a  leading  man  in  the  ship, 
and  on  the  occasion  previously  mentioned,  when  the 
Phoebe  seemed  about  to  run  into  us  in  the  harbor  of 
Valparaiso   and  the   boarders    were  called  away,  I 
distinctly  remember  this  man  standing  in  an  exposed 
position  on  the  cat-head,  with  sleeves  rolled  up  and 
cutlass  in  hand,  ready  to  board,  his  countenance  ex- 


46  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

pressing  eagerness  for  the  fight ;  which  goes  to 
prove  that  personal  courage  is  a  very  peculiar  vir- 
tue." 

Of  his  own  courage  the  boy,  in  this  his  first  ac- 
tion, gave  the  most  marked  proof.  He  was  con- 
stantly under  the  captain's  eye,  and  conducted  him- 
self so  entirely  to  the  satisfaction  of  that  gallant 
officer  as  to  be  mentioned  particularly  in  the  dis- 
patches. "  Midshipmen  Isaacs,  Farragut,  and  Ogden 
exerted  themselves  in  the  performance  of  their  re- 
spective duties,  and  gave  an  earnest  of  their  value  to 
the  service."  "  They  are  too  young,"  Porter  added, 
"  to  recommend  for  promotion  " — a  phrase  which 
Farragut  thought  had  an  ill-effect  on  his  career,  but 
which  certainly  implied  that  his  conduct  merited  a 
reward  that  his  years  did  not  justify.  During  the 
action  he  was  employed  in  the  most  multifarious 
ways,  realizing  the  saying  that  whatever  is  nobody 
else's  business  is  a  midshipman's  business  ;  or,  to  use 
his  own  quaint  expression,  "  I  was  like  '  Paddy  in 
the  catharpins ' — a  man  on  occasions.  I  performed 
the  duties  of  captain's  aid,  quarter-gunner,  powder- 
boy,  and,  in  fact,  did  everything  that  was  required  of 
me.  I  shall  never  forget  the  horrid  impression  made 
upon  me  at  the  sight  of  the  first  man  I  had  ever 
seen  killed.  He  was  a  boatswain's  mate  and  was 
fearfully  mutilated.  It  staggered  and  sickened  me 
at  first ;  but  they  soon  began  to  fall  around  me  so 
fast  that  it  all  appeared  like  a  dream  and  produced 
no  effect  upon  my  nerves.  I  can  remember  well, 
while  I  was  standing  near  the  captain  just  abaft  of 
the  mainmast,  a  shot  came  through  the  waterways 
and  glanced  upward,  killing  four  men  who  were 
standing  by  the  side  of  the  gun,  taking  the  last  one 


CRUISE   OF   THE   ESSEX.  47 

in  the  head  and  scattering  his  brains  over  both  of  us. 
But  this  awful  sight  did  not  affect  me  half  as  much 
as  the  death  of  the  first  poor  fellow.  I  neither 
thought  of  nor  noticed  anything  but  the  working  of 
the  guns.  .  .  .  When  my  services  were  not  required 
for  other  purposes,  I  generally  assisted  in  working  a 
gun  ;  would  run  and  bring  powder  from  the  boys  and 
send  them  back  for  more,  until  the  captain  wanted 
me  to  carry  a  message  ;  and  this  continued  to  em- 
ploy me  during  the  action." 

Although  included  in  the  report  of  the  slightly 
wounded,  Farragut  received  no  serious  injury,  but 
he  was  not  without  the  narrow  escapes  which  must 
have  been  undergone  by  all  the  survivors  of  so  des- 
perate an  action.  One  has  just  been  related  ;  and  he 
has  himself  recorded  two  other  incidents  which  came 
near  making  an  end  of  him.  "  An  old  quartermaster 
named  Francis  Bland  was  standing  at  the  wheel  when 
I  saw  a  shot  coming  over  the  fore  yard  in  such  a  di- 
rection that  I  thought  it  would  strike  him  or  me;  so 
I  told  him  to  jump,  at  the  same  time  pulling  him  to- 
ward me.  At  that  instant  the  shot  took  off  his  right 
leg,  and  I  afterward  found  that  my  coat-tail  had  been 
carried  away.  I  helped  the  old  fellow  below,  and 
inquired  for  him  after  the  action,  but  he  had  died 
before  he  could  be  attended  to."  At  another  time 
"  some  gun-primers  were  wanted  and  I  was  sent  after 
them.  In  going  below,  while  I  was  on  the  ward-room 
ladder,  the  captain  of  the  gun  directly  opposite  the 
hatchway  was  struck  full  in  the  face  by  an  eighteen- 
pound  shot  and  fell  back  on  me ;  we  tumbled  down 
the  hatch  together.  I  struck  on  my  head,  and,  fortu- 
nately, he  fell  on  my  hips.  I  say  fortunately,  for, 
as  he  was  a  man  of  at  least  two  hundred  pounds' 


48 


ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 


weight,  I  would  have  been  crushed  to  death  if  he  had 
fallen  directly  across  my  body.  I  lay  for  some  mo- 
ments stunned  by  the  blow,  but  soon  recovered  con- 
sciousness enough  to  rush  on  deck.  The  captain,  see- 
ing me  covered  with  blood,  asked  if  I  were  wounded, 
to  which  I  replied :  '  I  believe  not,  sir.'  '  Then,' 
said  he,  '  where  are  the  primers  ?'  This  brought  me 
completely  to  my  senses,  and  I  ran  below  and  carried 
the  primers  on  deck.  When  I  came  up  the  second 
time  I  saw  the  captain  fall,  and  in  my  turn  ran  up 
and  asked  if  he  were  wounded.  He  answered  me  al- 
most in  the  same  words  :  '  I  believe  not,  my  son  ;  but 
I  felt  a  blow  on  the  top  of  my  head.'  He  must  have 
been  knocked  down  by  the  wind  of  a  passing  shot,  as 
his  hat  was  somewhat  damaged."  The  bruises  from 
this  fall  down  the  hatch  were  the  only  injuries  Farra- 
gut  received. 

When  the  surrender  was  determined,  Farragut,  at 
the  captain's  order,  dropped  the  signal  book  over- 
board, watching  it  as  it  sank  in  the  water  till  out  of 
sight ;  and  then  in  company  with  another  midshipman 
amused  himself  throwing  overboard  the  pistols  and 
other  small  arms,  to  keep  them  out  of  the  enemy's 
hands.  The  following  morning  he  went  on  board 
the  Phoebe,  where  the  mortification  of  defeat  drew 
tears  from  his  eyes;  a  state  of  dejection  from  which 
he  was  roused  by  seeing  a  pet  pig  belonging  to  the 
Essex  in  the  custody  of  one  of  the  Phoebe's  midship- 
men. Farragut  at  once  set  up  a  claim  to  the  porker 
as  being  private  property,  and  as  such  to  be  respect- 
ed by  all  civilized  nations.  The  claim  was  resisted 
by  the  new  owner  ;  but  his  messmates,  always  ready 
for  a  lark,  insisted  that  so  doubtful  a  question  must 
be  decided  by  trial  of  battle.     A  ring  being  formed, 


CRUISE   OF  THE   ESSEX.  49 

Farragut,  after  a  short  contest,  succeeded  in  thrash- 
ing his  opponent  and  regaining  the  pig,  and  with  it  a 
certain  amount  of  complacency  in  that  one  Briton  at 
least  had  felt  the  pangs  of  defeat.  His  grief  mas- 
tered him  again  soon  afterward,  when  asked  by  Cap- 
tain Hillyar  to  breakfast  with  himself  and  Captain 
Porter.  Hillyar,  seeing  his  discomfiture,  spoke  to 
him  with  great  kindness,  saying  :  "  Never  mind,  my 
little  fellow,  it  will  be  your  turn  next  perhaps";  to 
which,  says  Farragut,  "  I  replied  I  hoped  so,  and  left 
the  cabin  to  hide  my  emotion." 

xVfter  the  action  Porter  and  Hillyar  entered  into 
an  arrangement  by  which  the  Essex  Junior  was  dis- 
armed and  allowed  to  proceed  to  the  United  States 
as  a  cartel,  under  the  charge  of  Lieutenant  Downes, 
who  had  commanded  her  while  a  United  States  cruis- 
er. All  the  survivors  of  the  Essex  except  two,  whose 
wounds  did  not  permit,  embarked  in  her  and  sailed 
from  Valparaiso  on  the  27th  of  April  for  the  United 
States,  arriving  on  the  7th  of  July  in  New  York. 
On  the  5th,  off  the  coast  of  Long  Island,  she  was 
stopped  by  a  British  ship-of-war,  whose  captain  ques- 
tioned the  right  of  Hillyar  to  give  her  the  passports 
she  carried,  and  indicated  an  intention  of  detaining 
her.  Porter  construed  this  violation  of  the  stipula- 
tion between  himself  and  his  captor  as  releasing  him 
from  his  obligations,  and  escaped  to  shore  with  a 
boat's  crew.  After  a  detention  of  nearly  twenty-four 
hours  the  vessel  was  allowed  to  proceed ;  but  was 
again  overhauled  by  another  British  frigate  as  she 
approached  Sandy  Hook.  There  could  be  no  seri- 
ous question  of  detaining  a  ship  that  had  been  given 
a  safeguard,  under  such  circumstances  and  with  such 
deliberation,  by  so  experienced  an  officer  as  Hillyar. 


5o 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


But  it  is  instructive  to  Americans,  who  are  accus- 
tomed to  see  in  the  war  of  1812  only  a  brilliant  series 
of  naval  victories,  to  note  that  within  a  few  hours'  sail 
of  their  principal  port  British  cruisers  were  lying  in 
perfect  security,  stopping  whom  they  would. 

The  Essex,  upon  which  Farragut  made  his  maid- 
en cruise,  and  whose  interesting  career  ended  in  so 
sad  a  catastrophe,  remained,  of  course,  in  the  hands 
of  the  victors.  The  little  frigate  was  patched  up 
and  taken  to  England,  where  she  was  bought  into 
the  British  Navy,  and  was  borne  on  its  register  until 
1837,  when  she  was  sold.  After  that  all  trace  of  her 
history  is  lost. 

The  Essex  Junior,  being  a  prize  to  the  Essex  and 
allowed  to  pass  under  Hillyar's  safeguard,  was  sold 
in  New  York  for  the  benefit  of  the  captors. 

Note. — The  spelling  Chile  (instead  of  Chili)  used  in  this 
chapter  is  that  adopted  by  the  United  States  Board  on  Geographic 
Names,  appointed  by  President  Harrison,  September  4,  1890,  to 
settle  a  uniform  usage  for  the  Executive  Departments  of  the 
Government. 


CHAPTER  III. 

MIDSHIPMAN    TO    LIEUTENANT. 
1814-1825. 

In  common  with  the  other  survivors  of  the  Essex, 
Farragut  landed  in  the  United  States  as  a  paroled 
prisoner  of  war.  Captain  Porter  took  him  at  once 
to  Chester  and  put  him  again  to  school,  this  time 
to  an  old  gentleman  named  Neif,  who  had  served  in 
the  guards  of  Napoleon.  The  method  of  instruction 
practiced  by  him  seems  to  have  been  unsystematic 
and  discursive ;  but  Farragut,  who  was  ever  atten- 
tive to  make  the  most  of  such  opportunities  as 
offered  for  self-improvement,  derived  profit  here  also, 
and  said  afterward  that  the  time  thus  passed  had 
been  of  service  to  him  throughout  his  life.  Until 
very  lately  there  were  residents  of  that  neighbor- 
hood who  could  recall  the  young  midshipman  as  he 
was  at  Neif's  school ;  a  lad  short  of  stature  and  not 
very  handsome  in  face,  but  who  bore  himself  very 
erect  because,  as  he  often  declared,  he  could  not 
afford  to  lose  a  fraction  of  one  of  his  .scanty  inches. 
There  was,  and  still  is,  near  the  spot  where  he  went 
to  school  a  tavern  called  the  Seven  Stars,  which  has 
been  a  public  house  since  the  time  of  the  Revolution, 
and  which  had  sheltered  Howe  and  Cornwallis  as  the 
British  army  advanced  from  the  head  of  the  Chesa- 


52  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

peake  toward  Philadelphia,  in  1777.  Upon  its  porch 
Farragut  spent  much  of  his  leisure  time,  and  within 
its  walls  joined  in  the  social  gayeties  of  the  neighbor- 
ing families,  who  afterward  recalled  with  pride  and 
interest  this  association  with  the  young  sailor  be- 
fore whom  lay  such  a  brilliant  but  unforeseen  future. 
In  November,  1814,  Farragut  was  exchanged,  and 
at  once  ordered  to  New  York  to  join  the  brig  Spark, 
which  was  intended  to  form  one  of  a  squadron  of 
small  vessels  to  cruise  against  British  commerce  un- 
der the  command  of  Captain  Porter.  He  was  here 
for  the  first  time  separated  from  his  guardian  and 
thrown  wholly  upon  his  own  force  of  character  to 
guide  his  steps  ;  and  this  beginning  was  made  with  a 
set  of  messmates  with  whom  he  was  temporarily 
quartered  on  board  the  John  Adams,  among  whom 
were  several  very  wild  young  men.  Farragut  evi- 
dently felt  the  force  of  the  temptation,  for  he  speaks 
with  warm  thankfulness  of  the  counter-influence  of 
the  first  lieutenant,  to  which  he  attributed  much  of 
his  deliverance  from  the  dissipation  by  which  he  was 
surrounded.  "When  I  have  looked  back  with  a  feel- 
ing of  horror  to  that  period  of  my  life,"  he  wrote, 
"  I  have  always  remembered  with  gratitude  Mr. 
Cocke's  counsels  and  kind-hearted  forbearance."  It 
was  indeed  characteristic  of  the  man  that,  while  by 
no  means  insensible  to  the  natural  temptations  of 
youth,  he  was  ever  more  attracted  to  and  influenced 
by  the  good  than  by  the  evil  around  him.  Dur- 
ing the  following  year,  on  his  cruise  to  the  Medi- 
terranean, he  was  messmate  with  a  midshipman 
named  William  Taylor,  a  young  man  of  singularly 
fine  character,  which  seems  to  have  been  the  chief- 
cause  of  the  influence  he  exerted  upon  Farragut. 


MIDSHIPMAN    TO   LIEUTENANT. 


S3 


"  He  took  me  under  his  charge,  counseled  me  kindly, 
and  inspired  me  with  sentiments  of  true  manliness, 
which  were  the  reverse  of  what  I  might  have  learned 
from  the  examples  I  saw  in  the  steerage  of  the  John 
Adams.  Never  having  had  any  real  love  for  dissi- 
pation, I  easily  got  rid  of  the  bad  influences  which 
had  assailed  me  in  that  ship."  He  noted  also  that, 
of  the  twelve  or  thirteen  midshipmen  there  associated 
with  him,  in  less  than  two  years  all  but  one,  his  old 
messmate  Ogden,  of  the  Essex,  had  disappeared  from 
the  navy.  The  habit  of  strict  attention  to  duty 
which  he  had  contracted  under  the  rule  of  the  Essex 
also  contributed,  by  keeping  him  occupied  and  at- 
tentive, to  deter  him  from  yielding  to  practices  in- 
compatible with  its  due  discharge. 

The  conclusion  of  peace  put  an  end  to  the  pro- 
posed cruise  of  the  Spark,  and  Farragut  was  next  or- 
dered, in  March,  1815,  to  the  Independence,  a  seventy- 
four-gun  ship,  or  ship-of-the-line,  as  such  were  com- 
monly called.  She  was  the  flag-ship  of  a  numerous 
squadron,  composed  mostly  of  small  vessels,  destined 
to  act  against  Algiers,  with  whom  war  had  recently 
been  declared.  Upon  arriving  in  the  Mediterranean 
it  was  found  that  Commodore  Decatur  had  already 
brought  the  Dey  to  terms,  so  that  Farragut  saw  here 
no  more  fighting,  and  the  squadron  returned  home 
by  winter.  The  following  spring  he  was  ordered  to 
the  Washington,  also  a  seventy-four,  about  to  sail 
for  Naples,  bearing  on  board  Mr.  William  Pinkney, 
our  minister  to  that  court.  This  cruise  gave  our 
young  midshipman  an  experience  of  a  kind  he  had 
not  before  had,  and  which  in  more  ways  than  one 
was  useful  to  him.  The  Washington  was  one  of 
those  exceptional   vessels  which    illustrated   in   the 


54 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


highest  degree  the  kind  and  pitch  of  perfection  to 
which,  by  unremitting  severity  and  exaction,  the 
appearance  and  drills  of  a  ship-of-war  could  be 
brought.  Her  commander,  Captain  Creighton,  had 
the  reputation  of  being  the  greatest  martinet  in  the 
navy ;  and  being  seconded  by  a  singularly  efficient 
and  active  set  of  officers,  the  ship  was  made  to  real- 
ize the  extreme  ideal  of  a  naval  officer  of  that  day 
in  smartness,  order,  and  spotless  cleanliness.*  "  But," 
says  Farragut,  "all  this  was  accomplished  at  the 
sacrifice  of  the  comfort  of  every  one  on  board.  My 
experience  in  the  matter,  instead  of  making  me  a 
proselyte  to  the  doctrine  of  the  old  officers  on  this 
subject,  determined  me  never  to  have  ■  a  crack  ship* 
if  it  was  only  to  be  attained  by  such  means."  His 
feeling  on  the  matter  was  doubtless  somewhat  quick- 
ened by  the  personal  discomfort  which  he,  in  common 
with  all  subordinates,  underwent  under  such  a  sys- 
tem, although  he  was  rather  a  favorite  with  the  cap- 
tain, whose  aid  he  was;  but  it  shows  independence 
of  character  to  have  thought  so  clearly  for  himself 
at  such  an  age,  and  to  have  ventured  to  differ  from 
standards  which  were  then,*  and  for  a  long  time  after- 
ward, implicitly  accepted  throughout  the  service. 
The  tradition  of  those  days,  being  mainly  oral,  has 
nearly  disappeared ;  but  fragments  of  it  remain  here 

*  The  writer  remembers  to  have  heard  in  his  early  days  in  the 
service  a  tradition  of  a  ship  commanded  by  Creighton,  which  he 
believes  to  have  been  the  Washington,  and  which  illustrates  the 
methods  by  which  this  extreme  smartness  was  obtained.  In  each 
boat  at  the  booms  was  constantly  a  midshipman  in  full  dress, 
cocked  hat  included,  so  that  no  time  might  be  lost  in  dropping 
alongside  when  called  away.  The  full  crew  was  probably  also 
kept  in  her. 


MIDSHIPMAN   TO   LIEUTENANT.  55 

and  there  in  the  minds  of  those  who,  as  youngsters 
thirty  or  forty  years  ago,  were  brought  in  contact 
with  men,  then  already  elderly,  who  had  had  person- 
al experience  of  ships  like  the  Washington.     These 
stories,  in  their  grotesque  severities,  have  almost  the 
air   of  an  extravaganza.     It    must,  however,  be  in 
justice   remembered    that    they  were   the   extrava- 
gances of  a  few  among  the  men   who   had  brought 
the   United  States  Navy  to   the  high  efficiency  in 
which  it  then  was  ;  and  to  whom,  and  not  to  either 
the  people  or  the  Government  of  that  day,  was  due 
the  glorious  record  of  1812.     A  few  of  them  added 
to    their    military    ardor    and    efficiency    an    undue 
amount  of  that  spirit  of  the  good  housekeeper  which 
makes  a  home   unbearable.     Farragut  was  aided  to 
his  wise  conclusion  by  his  previous  experience  in  the 
Essex,  where  a  high  state  of  efficiency  was  gained 
without  wanton   sacrifice    of  comfort;    for    Porter, 
though  a  man  of  hasty  temper,  was  ever  considerate 
of  his  crew.     But  for  the  naval  officers  of  that  day 
Farragut  throughout  his  life  retained  a  profound  ad- 
miration.     Talking  about  them  at  his  dinner-table 
in  New  Orleans  fifty  years  later,  but  a  few  days  be- 
fore his  famous  passage  of  the  Mobile  forts,  he  said : 
"We  have  no  better  seamen  in   the  service  to-day 
than    those    gallant    fellows    Bainbridge,    Decatur, 
Hull,  Perry,  Porter,  and  Charles  Stewart ;  and,"  he 
added,  "  I  must  not  forget  to  mention  McDonough, 
and  poor  unlucky  Lawrence,  as  splendid-looking  a 
sailor  as  I  ever  saw.     If  I  only  had  their  chance  and 
could  lay  the  Hartford  alongside  of  an  English  ship, 
I  should  like  it  better  than  fighting  our  own  people." 
Some  years  later  he  again  expressed  the  same  feelings 
to  the  same  friend,  to  whom  the  author  is  indebted 


e6  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

for  the  communication  of  them.  His  own  glorious 
career  was  then  finished,  and  his  life's  work  lay  open 
to  the  mature  reflection  of  his  declining  years,  when 
he  thus  acknowledged  his  obligations  to  the  heroes 
of  his  boyhood.  "  Isaac  Hull,"  he  said,  "  was  as  good 
a  seaman  as  ever  sailed  a  ship.  If  I  have  done  the 
country  any  service  afloat,  it  is  in  no  small  degree 
owing  to  the  ambition  and  enthusiasm  he  created  in 
me,  when  I  was  a  youngster,  by  his  fair  fight  with 
and  capture  of  an  English  frigate.  I  always  envied 
Hull  that  piece  of  good  work."  It  is  to  be  suspected 
that  the  Admiral  always  felt  that  something  was 
lacking  to  the  fullness  of  his  cup,  in  that  he  had 
only  been  allowed  to  fight  forts,  and  not  ships  like 
his  own  ;  and  it  is  no  small  evidence  of  the  gener- 
osity of  his  character  that  his  enthusiasm  was  so 
aroused  by  the  deeds  of  others.  He  spoke  of  the 
fight  between  the  Kearsarge  and  the  Alabama  in  as 
glowing  terms  as  were  aroused  by  his  recollection 
of  the  Constitution  and  the  Guerriere.  "I  had 
sooner  have  fought  that  fight,"  he  wrote,  "  than  any 
ever  fought  upon  the  ocean." 

The  Washington  stopped  a  few  days  at  Gibraltar, 
where  the  rest  of  the  squadron  were  then  at  anchor; 
and  then  sailed  with  all  of  them  in  company  to  Na- 
ples. During  the  remainder  of  the  year  1816  the 
ship  cruised  along  the  Barbary  coast  until  the  win- 
ter had  fairly  set  in,  when  she  with  the  other  vessels 
repaired  to  Port  Mahon.  Although  now  so  close  to 
the  spot  where  his  race  originated,  Farragut's  jour- 
nal betrays  no  interest  in  the  fact.  He  was  still  too 
young  for  the  sentimental  considerations  to  weigh 
much  in  his  mind;  and  it  was  not  till  many  years 
later,  in  the   height  of  his  glory  as  a  naval   com- 


MIDSHIPMAN   TO   LIEUTENANT.  57 

mander,    that    he    visited    his    father's    birthplace, 
Ciudadela,  the  capital  city  of  Minorca.     In  the  fol- 
lowing  spring    the  squadron    resumed    its   cruising 
and  made  quite  a  round  of  the  Mediterranean  west 
of  Italy;  the  journal  mentioning  visits  to  Gibraltar, 
Malaga,  Leghorn,  Naples,  Sicily,  and  the  cities   on 
the  Barbary  coast.     Farragut  made  full  and  intelli- 
gent use  of  the  opportunities  thus  afforded  him  for 
seeing  the  world ;  and  his  assiduous  habit  of  obser- 
vation did  much  to,store  his  mind  with  information, 
which  the  circumstances  of   his  early  life  had  pre- 
vented his  gaining  in  the  ordinary  ways  of  school 
and  reading.     He  was  fortunate  also  at  this  time  in 
•having  the  society  of  an   intelligent   and  cultivated 
man,  the  chaplain   of  the  Washington,   Mr.  Charles 
Folsom.     The  chaplain  in  those  days  was  commonly 
the   only    schoolmaster    the    midshipmen  had;    and 
their  opportunities  of  learning  from   him   depended 
very  much  upon  the  pressure  exercised  by  the  cap- 
tain to  compel  the  attention  of  a  set  of  boys.     Mr. 
Folsom,  however,  was  drawn    to    Farragut  by  the 
eager  willingness  of  the  latter  to  acquire,  and  by 
his  sense  of  his  deficiencies.      The    manly   character 
which  had  resisted  the  temptations  to  low  dissipation, 
and  sought  naturally  the  companionship  of  the  bet- 
ter rather  than  the  worse  among  his  associates,  also 
attracted  him.     The  friendship  thus  formed  became, 
through  a  series  of  incidents,  the  cause  of  an  un- 
usual opportunity  for  improvement  being  offered  to 
Farragut.     In  the  autumn  of  181 7   Mr.  Folsom  re- 
ceived the  appointment  of  consul  to  Tunis,  which 
had   just    been    vacated.     The  summer  cruising  of 
the  squadron  was  drawing  to  an  end,  and  the  winter 
quarters  at  Port  Mahon  about  to  be  resumed.    There- 
5 


eg  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

fore,  while  the  Washington  was  lying  in  Gibraltar, 
Mr.  Folsom  wrote  to  the  commander-in-chief,  Com- 
modore Chauncey,  asking  permission  to  take  the 
young  midshipman  to  spend  the  winter  with  him  in 
Tunis,  to  pursue  his  education  under  his  care.  In 
the  letter  he  spoke  very  earnestly  of  his  pupil's  zeal 
for  improvement,  of  his  close  attention,  and  ready 
response  to  any  effort  on  the  part  of  his  instructor. 
The  letter  is  interesting  also  in  its  recognition  of 
Farragut's  still  existing  relations  to  Captain  Porter, 
"  to  whose  wishes  this  request  can  not  be  repugnant." 
The  letter  was  dated  October  14,  1 817;  and,  the  re- 
quired permission  being  given,  the  two  friends  in 
the  following  month  sailed  from  Gibraltar  for  Mar- 
seille as  passengers  in  the  sloop-of-war  Erie.  At 
Marseille  a  slight  incident  occurred  which,  while  not 
quite  creditable  to  our  hero,  may  have  interest  as 
showing  natural  character.  Spending  the  evening 
at  the  house  of  a  Mr.  Fitch,  he  was;  much  against  his 
will,  obliged  to  play  whist,  for  which  he  had  no  fond- 
ness. "  Not  getting  along  very  well  with  my  hand, 
the  party  showed  great  impatience,  and  I  thought 
were  rather  insulting  in  their  remarks.  One  individ- 
ual went  so  far  as  to  dash  his  cards  on  the  table  in 
derision  of  my  play,  when  I  returned  the  compli- 
ment by  throwing  them  at  his  head.  I  apologized 
to  Mr.  Fitch  and  retired,  much  mortified,  but  my 
temper  had  been  sorely  tried."  The  display  of  tem- 
per was  scarcely  more  than  the  provocation  justified ; 
and  it  is  noteworthy  that  during  a  period  when  duel- 
ing was  so  common  Farragut,  though  quick  to  re- 
sent, appears  never  to  have  been  involved  in  a  seri- 
ous personal  difficulty. 

Early  in  1818  the  Erie,  carrying  Mr.  Folsom  and 


MIDSHIPMAN   TO   LIEUTENANT. 


59 


his  pupil,  arrived  in  Tunis,  where  the  latter  re- 
mained for  nine  months,  pursuing  his  studies  on  the 
site  of  the  ancient  maritime  empire  of  Carthage.  He 
mentions  particularly  the  subjects  of  mathematics, 
English  literature,  French,  and  Italian.  For  lan- 
guages he  had  great  natural  aptitude,  and  in  later 
life  was  able  to  converse  in  several.  The  monotony 
of  study  was  varied  by  the  society  of  the  few  but 
agreeable  foreign  families  residing  in  Tunis,  and  by 
occasional  excursions  in  the  neighborhood ;  when 
the  interest  of  the  present  was  happily  blended, 
under  the  guidance  of  such  a  man  as  Mr.  Folsom, 
with  thoughts  upon  the  past  grandeur  and  history  of 
the  Carthaginian  empire  and  the  Roman  province 
which  had  successively  flourished  on  that  soil.  In 
one  of  these  excursions  Farragut  received  a  partial 
stroke  of  the  sun,  from  the  effects  of  which  he  suf- 
fered for  many  years. 

The  period  of  his  stay  in  Tunis  exceeded  the 
original  intention,  but  doubtless  with  the  approval 
of  the  commodore.  It  was  brought  to  a  close  in  the 
fall  of  1818  by  an  outbreak  of  the  plague,  which 
increased  to  such  an  alarming  extent  that  Mr.  Fol- 
som felt  compelled  to  send  his  charge  away  just 
when  the  approach  of  another  winter  of  comparative 
idleness  for  the  squadron  would  have  justified  a  longer 
stay.  But  deaths  in  Tunis  had  risen  to  a  hundred  a 
day,  and  all  the  families  were  living  in  a  state  of 
complete  isolation,  the  houses  being  barricaded 
against  outsiders;  therefore  on  the  9th  of  October 
Farragut  departed  in  a  Genoese  brig  for  Leghorn. 
Thence,  after  a  quarantine  of  forty  days,  he  went  to 
Pisa ;  and  from  there  to  Messina,  where  the  squad- 
ron had  assembled  for  the  winter  of  1818-19. 


60  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT 

The  friendship  between  Farragut  and  Mr.  Folsom 
did  not  end  with  this  separation.  The  latter  sur- 
vived to  the  end  of  the  civil  war,  and  was  thus  privi- 
leged to  follow  the  successful  and  great  career  of 
the  admiral  to  whom,  while  yet  an  unformed  boy,  he 
had  thoughtfully  extended  a  helping  hand.  As  late 
as  1865  letters  passed  between  the  two,  showing  that 
both  cherished  warm  recollections  of  that  early 
association ;  Mr.  Folsom  dating  his,  as  though  care- 
ful to  make  the  coincidence,  on  the  anniversary  of 
the  day  when  he  parted  with  his  pupil  in  the  harbor 
of  Tunis  and  returned  alone  to  the  plague-stricken 
city. 

The  officers  of  the  United  States  squadron  passed 
a  gay  winter  in  Messina  in  1819.  Farragut  was  not 
yet  eighteen  years  of  age,  but  his  bodily  develop- 
ment had  kept  pace  with  his  mental,  and  he  writes 
that  he  always  held  his  own  at  this  time  in  all  ath- 
letic exercises.  The  succeeding  spring  and  summer 
were  again  spent  in  routine  cruising  on  board  the 
Franklin,  seventy-four,  which  had  taken  the  place  of 
the  Washington.  In  the  fall  of  1819  the  squadron 
was  in  Gibraltar  ;  and  there,  "  after  much  opposition," 
Farragut  was  appointed  an  acting  lieutenant  on 
board  the  brig  Shark.  This  promotion,  coming  at 
so  early  an  age,  he  afterward  looked  upon  as  one  of 
the  most  important  events  of  his  life.  "  It  caused 
me  to  feel  that  I  was  now  associated  with  men,  on 
an  equality,  and  must  act  with  more  circumspection. 
When  I  became  first  lieutenant,  my  duties  were  still 
more  important,  for  in  truth  I  was  really  commander 
of  the  vessel,  and  yet  I  was  not  responsible  (as  such) 
— an  anomalous  position  which  has  spoiled  some  of 
our  best  officers.     I  consider  it  a  great  advantage  to 


MIDSHIPMAN  TO  LIEUTENANT.  6l 

obtain  command  young,  having  observed,  as  a  general 
rule,  that  persons  who  come  into  authority  late  in  life 
shrink  from  responsibility,  and  often  break  down  un- 
der its  weight."  This  last  sentence,  coming  from  a 
man  of  such  extensive  observation,  and  who  bore  in 
his  day  the  responsibility  of  such  weighty  decisions, 
deserves  most  serious  consideration  now,  when  com- 
mand rank  is  reached  so  very  late  in  the  United 
States  Navy. 

After  a  short  year  in  the  Shark  Farragut  was 
ordered  to  return  to  the  United  States,  to  pass  the 
examination  required  of  all  midshipmen  before  they 
could  be  confirmed  to  the  rank  of  lieutenant.     No 
opportunity  offering  for  passage  in  a  ship-of-war,  he 
embarked  in  a  merchant  vessel  called  the  America. 
On  the  passage  he  found  himself,  with  the  ship,  con- 
fronted by  an  apparent  danger,  which  occasioned  a 
display  of  the  fearlessness  and  energy  always  latent 
in  his  character.     Those  were  days  when  piracy  was 
rife  upon  the  seas  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  West 
Indies  and  of  the  Spanish  Main.     The  system  was  an 
outgrowth  of  the  privateering  carried  on  by  French 
and  Spanish  marauders,  for  they  were  little  better, 
against  both  British  and  neutral   commerce  during 
the  wars  of  the  French  Revolution  and  Empire ;  and 
it  had  received  a  fresh  impulse  from  the  quarrel  then 
existing  between  Spain  and  her  American  colonies, 
which   since    1810    had  been   in   revolt  against    the 
mother  country.     Privateering,  having  booty  as  its 
sole  motive,  rapidly  tends  to  indiscriminate  robbery, 
if  not  held  strictly  responsible  by  the  country  using 
it;  and  the  remote,  extensive,  and  secluded  shores 
of  Cuba,  Haiti,  and  the  South  American  coast  defied 
the  careless  supervision  of  th«  weak  Spanish  Govern- 


62  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

ment.  When  within  a  few  days'  sail  of  the  United 
States,  the  America  fell  in  with  an  armed  brig  showing 
the  colors  of  the  new  Colombian  republic ;  but  a  flag 
was  little  guarantee  for  the  character  of  a  vessel  if 
other  signs  told  against  her.  Farragut  describes  both 
captain  and  crew  of  the  America  as  being  so  over- 
whelmed with  fear  that,  though  expecting  no  mercy, 
they  entertained  no  idea  of  resistance.  Under  the 
circumstances  he  took  command ;  and  having,  fortu- 
nately, as  passengers  two  seamen  from  the  squadron 
going  home  sick,  these  formed  a  nucleus  around 
which  rallied  the  courage  of  the  others,  paralyzed 
only  through  disuse.  It  was,  however,  the  firmness 
of  the  lad  of  eighteen,  supported  by  his  position  as 
an  officer  and  acting  upon  the  two  men  prepared  to 
recognize  him  as  such,  that  redeemed  the  others  from 
imbecility  to  manhood.  The  incident  had  no  results, 
the  stranger  proving  to  be  a  regularly  commissioned 
cruiser,  and  treating  them  with  civility.  Farragut's 
thoughtful,  not  to  say  philosophical,  turn  of  mind 
was  shown  in  his  recorded  reflections  upon  the  dif- 
ference between  the  conduct  of  the  man-of-war's  men 
and  the  merchant  seamen,  which  he  justly  attributed 
not  to  inherent  difference  of  natural  courage,  but  to 
the  habit  of  arms  and  of  contemplating  danger  under 
a  particular  form. 

On  the  20th  of  November,  1820,  Farragut  again 
landed  in  the  United  States,  having  been  absent  four 
years  and  a  half.  He  felt  himself  a  stranger,  having 
left  as  a  mere  boy,  and  knowing  no  one  but  Commo- 
dore Porter  and  his  family.  His  examination  soon 
followed,  and  was  passed ;  but  apparently  not  quite 
to  his  own  satisfaction.  A  period  of  comparative 
quiet  followed,  spent  principally  in  Norfolk,  Virginia, 


MIDSHIPMAN   TO   LIEUTENANT.  63 

during  which  he  formed  the  attachment  which  re- 
sulted in  his  first  marriage.  In  May,  1822,  he  was 
again  ordered  to  sea  in  the  sloop-of-war  John  Adams, 
in  which  he  made  a  short  cruise  in  the  Gulf  of  Mex- 
ico and  to  Vera  Cruz,  where  the  Spanish  power  in 
Mexico  was  then  making  its  last  stand  in  the  well- 
known  fortress,  San  Juan  de  Ulloa.  The  ship  re- 
turned to  the  United  States  early  in  December,  1822, 
when  Farragut  found  the  Mosquito  fleet,  as  it  was 
called,  fitting  out  against  the  pirates  of  the  Caribbean 
Sea.  Learning  that  it  was  to  be  commanded  by  his 
old  captain,  Commodore  David  Porter,  he  asked  for 
and  obtained  orders  to  the  Greyhound,  one  of  the 
small  vessels  composing  it,  commanded  by  Lieuten- 
ant John  Porter,  a  brother  of  the  commodore. 

Since  the  peace  with  Great  Britain,  Captain  Por- 
ter had  been  a  member  of  the  Board  of  Navy  Com- 
missioners; a  body  of  three  officers  appointed  by  an 
act  of  Congress  passed  early  in  1815,  whose  duties 
were  to  administer  the  affairs  of  the  navy  under  the 
supervision  of  the  Secretary.  Meanwhile  the  suffer- 
ings, not  only  of  American  property  but  of  the  per- 
sons of  American  citizens,  from  the  prevalence  of 
piracy  in  the  Caribbean  Sea,  had  become  unendura- 
ble. Ordinary  naval  vessels  were,  from  their  size, 
unable  to  enforce  a  repression  for  which  it  was 
necessary  to  follow  the  freebooters  and  their  petty 
craft  into  their  lairs  among  the  lagoons  and  creeks 
of  the  West  India  islands.  The  general  outcry 
rousing  the  Government  to  the  necessity  of  further 
exertion,  Captain  Porter  offered  his  services  to  extir- 
pate the  nuisance;  with  the  understanding  that  he 
was  to  have  and  fit  out  the  kind  of  force  he  thought 
necessary  for  the  service.     He  resigned  his  position 


g4  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

on  the  board  on  the  31st  of  December,  1822  ;  but 
before  that  date  he  had  bought  and  begun  to  equip 
eight  Chesapeake  schooners,  of  fifty  to  sixty  tons 
burden,  of  which  the  Greyhound,  Farragut's  new 
vessel,  was  one.  He  also  built  five  rowing  barges, 
unusually  large,  pulling  twenty  oars  With  these, 
supported  by  the  ordinary  man-of-war  schooners,  of 
which  several  were  already  in  the  service,  and  by 
the  sloops-of-war,  he  expected  to  drive  the  pirates 
not  merely  off  the  sea,  but  out  of  their  hiding- 
places. 

The  commodore  put  to  sea  with  all  his  squadron 
on  the  14th  of  February,  1823.  A  northeast  gale  was 
at  once  encountered,  but  the  tiny  vessels  ran  through 
it  without  any  harm.  For  the  next  six  months  Farra- 
gut  was  actively  employed  in  the  operations  of  the 
little  fleet,  the  Greyhound  being  one  of  the  five 
which  were  sent  through  the  Mona  Passage,  between 
Porto  Rico  and  Haiti,  and  thence  ransacked  the 
southern  shores  of  the  latter  island  and  of  Cuba  as 
far  as  Cape  San  Antonio,  where  Cuba  ends.  There 
were  many  encounters  between  the  pirates  and  the 
squadron,  sometimes  afloat,  sometimes  ashore,  in 
several  of  which  our  officer  served,  forcing  his  way 
with  his  party  through  marsh  and  chaparral  and 
cactus — a  service  often  perilous,  always  painful  and 
exhausting.  His  health  fortunately  held  out  through 
it ;  nor  did  he  take  the  yellow  fever,  which,  as  the 
summer  wore  on,  made  sad  havoc  among  both  offi- 
cers and  men.  Toward  the  end  of  his  time  he  ob- 
tained the  command  of  one  of  the  Mosquito  schoon- 
ers, which,  however,  he  held  but  for  a  short  period ; 
for,  not  having  yet  received  his  lieutenant's  commis- 
sion, he  was  relieved  by  the  arrival  of  an  officer  of 


MIDSHIPMAN   TO   LIEUTENANT. 


65 


that  rank.  An  interesting  incident  of  this  cruise  was 
a  meeting  with  his  brother  William,  then  already  a 
lieutenant,  whom  he  had  not  seen  for  thirteen  years. 
Soon  after  that  he  obtained  permission  to  visit  New 
Orleans;  and  it  is  a  curious  coincidence  that  the 
vessel  in  which  he  took  passage  thither  was  carrying 
the  first  load  of  bricks  to  build  Fort  Jackson,  one  of 
the  defenses  of  New  Orleans,  by  the  passage  of 
which  nearly  forty  years  later  he  began  his  career  as 
commander-in-chief.  His  father  had  then  been  many 
years  dead ;  but  he  met  his  sister,  with  whom  he  had 
to  make  acquaintance  after  so  long  a  separation. 

The  service  of  the  Mosquito  fleet  was  one  of 
great  exposure  and  privation.  "  I  never  owned  a 
bed  during  my  two  years  and  a  half  in  the  West 
Indies,"  wrote  Farragut,  "  but  lay  down  to  rest 
wherever  I  found  the  most  comfortable  berth."  It 
was,  however,  effectual,  both  directly  and  indirectly, 
to  the  suppression  of  piracy ;  seconded  as  it  was  by 
the  navy  of  Great  Britain,  interested  like  our  own 
country  in  the  security  of  commerce.  Driven  off  the 
water,  with  their  lurking-places  invaded,  their  plun- 
der seized,  their  vessels  burned,  their  occupation 
afloat  gone,  the  marauders  organized  themselves 
into  bandits,  and  turned  their  predatory  practices 
against  the  towns  and  villages.  This  roused  the 
Spanish  governors  from  the  indolent  complacency 
with  which  they  had  watched  robberies  upon  for- 
eigners that  brought  profit  rather  than  loss  to  their 
districts.  When  the  evil  was  thus  brought  home, 
the  troops  were  put  in  motion  ;  and  the  pirates, 
beset  on  both  sides,  gradually  but  rapidly  disap- 
peared. 

This  Mosquito  war  had,  however,  one  very  sad 


66  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

result  in  depriving  the  navy  of  the  eminent  services 
of  Commodore  Porter.  In  1824  a  gratuitous  insult, 
accompanied  by  outrage,  offered  to  one  of  his  offi- 
cers, led  him  to  land  a  party  at  the  town  of  Foxardo, 
in  Porto  Rico,  and  force  an  apology  from  the  guilty 
officials.  Although  no  complaint  seems  to  have 
been  made  by  Spain,  the  United  States  Government 
took  exception  to  his  action  and  brought  him  to 
trial  by  court-martial.  Porter  confidently  expected 
an  acquittal,  having  proof  that  the  outrage  was 
wanton,  and  that  the  officials  had  engaged  in  it  to 
protect  some  piratical  plunder  which  had  been  taken 
into  the  place.  He  argued  also  that  the  wording  of 
his  orders  from  the  department  authorized  his  ac- 
tion. The  court,  however,  found  him  guilty  of  an 
offense  which  was  charged  as  "  disobedience  of  or- 
ders, and  conduct  unbecoming  an  officer,"  and  sen- 
tenced him  to  six  months'  suspension.  The  sentence 
was  accompanied  by  the  expression  that  the  court 
"  ascribes  the  conduct  of  the  accused  which  is  deemed 
censurable  to  an  anxious  disposition,  on  his  part,  to 
maintain  the  honor  and  advance  the  interest  of  the 
nation  and  of  the  service."  Indignant  at  the  result, 
Porter  resigned  from  the  navy  and  took  service  with 
the  Mexican  Republic.  After  spending  there  four 
years  of  harassing  disappointments,  the  election  of 
General  Jackson  to  the  presidency  gave  him  a  friend 
in  power.  He  returned  to  the  United  States  in  Oc- 
tober, 1829,  under  the  encouragement  of  letters  from 
persons  closely  connected  with  the  new  administra- 
tion. The  President  offered  to  nominate  him  to  his 
old  position  in  the  navy,  but  Porter  declined  "  to 
associate  with  the  men  who  sentenced  me  for  up- 
holding  the  honor   of   the   flag."     This,  striking  a 


MIDSHIPMAN    TO   LIEUTENANT. 


67 


kindred  chord  in  Jackson's  breast,  elicited  a  warm 
note  of  approval,  and  he  appointed  the  commo- 
dore Consul-General  to  Algiers.  The  conquest  of 
that  country  by  France  put  an  end  to  the  office 
before  he  could  assume  the  duties.  The  Presi- 
dent then  nominated  him  to  be  Charge  d'Affaires 
to  Turkey.  He  went  there  in  August,  1831,  be- 
came Minister  Resident  in  1839,  and  died  in  this 
post  in  1843. 

After  his  return  from  the  Mosquito  fleet,  Farra- 
gut  married,  on  the  24th  of  September,  1823,  Miss 
Susan  C.  Marchant,  the  daughter  of  a  gentleman  of 
Norfolk,  Virginia.  He  was  at  this  time  far  from 
well ;  fever,  which  spared  him  while  on  that  sickly 
service,  having  seized  him  upon  arrival  in  a  healthier 
climate.  It  was  probably  due  in  part  to  this  that 
two  years  passed  after  his  marriage  before  he  again 
joined  a  ship.  During  this  period  he  spent  some 
weeks  with  his  bride  in  the  house  of  Commodore 
Porter,  who  had  returned  temporarily  from  his  squad- 
ron to  regain  his  strength  after  a  severe  attack  of 
yellow  fever.  This  was  probably  his  last  close  per- 
sonal association  with  his  early  benefactor,  whom 
the  issue  of  the  trial  afterward  separated  from  his 
country ;  but  the  correspondence  between  the  two 
continued  through  life,  Farragut  maintaining  to  the 
last  a  grateful  recollection  of  kindness  shown  to  him 
by  one  whom  he  termed  his  "most  venerated  friend 
and  commander."  As  late  as  1835,  writing  from  Con- 
stantinople in  reply  to  a  letter  received  from  his  for- 
mer ward,  Porter,  then  an  ailing  and  broken  man, 
notices  this  trait  in  him  :  "  I  have  found  in  yours  that 
treasure  of  a  grateful  heart  which  should  be  so  much 
prized.     I  have  never  looked  for  any  other  return 


68  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

than  what  my  feelings  gave  me,  and  to  find  such  sen- 
timents of  gratitude  from  you,  after  all  others  had 
forgotten  that  they  had  received  any  benefits  from 
me,  is  truly  refreshing  to  the  feelings."  The  rela- 
tions thus  testified  to  are  an  honor  to  the  memory 
of  both. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

LIEUTENANT. 
1825-1841. 

After  the  termination  of  his  cruise  in  the  Mos- 
quito fleet,  and  up  to  the  beginning  of  the  Civil  War, 
the  story  of  Farragut's  life  is  for  the  most  part  but 
the  record  of  the  routine  service  of  a  naval  officer 
in  times  of  peace — periods  of  distant  foreign  cruising 
succeeding  to,  and  being  again  succeeded  by,  periods 
of  employment  on  shore  in  some  of  the  many  duties 
connected  with  the  administration  of  the  navy.  But 
while  in  their  superficial  aspect  there  is  little  to  dis- 
tinguish these  monotonous  years,  with  their  occa- 
sional breaks  of  exceptional  incident,  from  the  or- 
dinary experiences  of  all  naval  officers,  the  journal 
of  Farragut  shows  an  activity  of  mind,  a  constant 
habit  of  observation,  especially  in  professional  mat- 
ters, and  a  painstaking  diligence  in  embracing  every 
passing  opportunity  for  improvement,  which  reveal 
to  some  extent  the  causes  of  his  subsequent  great 
successes.  It  is  not  indeed  always  possible  to  trace 
the  precise  connection  between  this  or  that  observa- 
tion, this  or  that  course  of  study,  and  the  later  re- 
sults ;  it  is  rather  in  the  constant  habit  of  doing  the 
best  at  every  moment,  and  in  the  gradual  formation 
of  mental  character  and  correct  professional  knowl- 


7o 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


edge,  that  are  to  be  found  the  fruits  of  the  strenuous 
exertion  made  throughout  his  life  by  Admiral  Farra- 
gut.  It  is  a  noteworthy,  though  by  no  means  un- 
precedented, circumstance  that  these  characteristics 
obtained  little  or  no  recognition  during  his  early  and 
middle  career.  Unlike  the  great  British  admiral, 
Nelson,  no  war  occurred  to  bring  his  high  qualities 
into  notice ;  and,  when  lacking  but  a  year  of  Nel- 
son's age  when  he  fell  at  Trafalgar,  Farragut  was 
vainly  petitioning  the  Navy  Department  for  the 
command  of  a  sloop-of-war  in  the  war  with  Mexico, 
although  he  alleged  his  intimate  knowledge  of  the 
scene  of  operations,  the  close  personal  examination 
he  had  made  of  it,  and  the  privilege  he  had  had  of 
witnessing  an  attack  by  a  French  squadron  but  a 
few  years  before. 

The  early  age  at  which  he  had  left  his  home,  the 
long  absences  of  his  youth,  and  the  death  of  his  fa- 
ther, had  all  contributed  to  sever  his  associations 
with  New  Orleans ;  so  that  his  marriage  in  Norfolk, 
as  was  the  case  with  so  many  officers  of  his  day,  fixed 
that  city  as  his  place  of  residence  when  not  at  sea. 
It  is  worthy  of  remembrance,  in  connection  with  his 
firm  determination  at  a  later  day  to  stand  by  the 
Union  rather  than  by  a  section  of  the  country,  that 
the  only  home  Farragut  had  known  out  of  a  ship-of- 
war  was  the  Southern  city  where  he  had  twice  mar- 
ried, and  where  the  general  sentiment  was  contrary 
to  the  course  he  took.  The  interest  of  the  fact  lies  not 
in  its  bearing  upon  the  rights  or  wrongs  of  the  great 
quarrel  that  all  are  now  fain  to  forget,  but  in  showing 
the  rare  strength  of  character  which,  sustained  only 
by  its  own  clear  convictions,  resisted  the  social  and 
friendly  influences  that  overcame  so  many  others. 


LIEUTENANT.  .    y\ 

In  August,  1825,  Farragut  was  promoted  to  be 
lieutenant,  and  at  the  same  time  ordered  to  the  frig- 
ate Brandywine,  chosen  to  carry  back  to  France  La- 
fayette, who  was  just  drawing  to  a  close  his  mem- 
orable visit  to  the  United  States.  The  ship  sailed 
from  the  capes  of  the  Chesapeake  in  September, 
reaching  Havre  after  a  passage  of  twenty-five  days. 
From  there  she  went  to  England,  and  thence  to  the 
Mediterranean,  returning  to  New  York  in  May,  1826. 
After  his  arrival  Farragut  was  detached  and  went  to 
New  Haven  with  his  wife,  who  had  become  a  great 
sufferer  from  neuralgia  and  continued  to  be  an  in- 
valid during  the  remainder  of  their  married  life. 
While  living  in  New  Haven  he  availed  himself  of 
the  opportunity  to  attend  lectures  at  Yale  College. 
After  his  wife's  treatment  was  finished  they  returned 
to  Norfolk,  where  he  remained  until  October,  1828, 
attached  to  the  receiving  ship  and  living  on  board 
with  Mrs.  Farragut.  Here  the  interest  which  he 
had  showed  in  the  improvement  of  his  own  mind  was 
transferred  to  the  ship's  boys,  most  of  whom  did 
not  even  know  their  letters.  Farragut  organized  a 
school  for  these  waifs,  who  at  that  time  were  little 
accustomed  to  receive  such  care,  and  was  gratified  to 
find  very  tangible  results  in  the  improvement  shown 
by  them.  He  next  received  orders  to  the  sloop-of-war 
Vandalia,  which  sailed  from  Philadelphia  in  the  last 
days  of  1828  for  the  Brazil  station.  On  this  cruise, 
which  for  him  lasted  but  a  year,  he  for  the  first  time 
visited  the  Rio  de  la  Plata  and  Buenos  Ayres,  and 
came  in  contact  with  the  afterward  celebrated  dicta- 
tor of  that  country,  Rosas.  The  different  provinces, 
whose  union  is  now  known  by  the  political  name  of 
the  Argentine  Republic,  had,  under  the  later  days  of 


jr2  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

Spanish  rule,  constituted  with  Bolivia,  Paraguay  and 
Uruguay  the  Viceroyalty  of  Buenos  Ayres.    On  the 
25th  of    May,  1810,   a  declaration  of  independence 
was  issued  in  the  city  of  Buenos  Ayres.     A  long  pe- 
riod of  disturbance,  internal  and  external,  followed. 
At  the  time  of  this  first  visit  of  Farragut  a  contest 
had  for  some  time  been  going  on  between  two  par- 
ties,  representing  two  opposite  political  ideas,  and 
striving  in  arms  for  the  control  of  the  State.     The 
ideal  of  one  was  a  strong  centralized  government 
supported  by  a  powerful  standing  army.    This  natu- 
rally found  its  most  numerous  constituents  among 
the  wealthy  and  educated  inhabitants  of  the  princi- 
pal city,  Buenos  Ayres.     The  province  of  the  same 
name,  however,  and  the  other  provinces  generally, 
favored  a  looser  form  of  confederation.    The  former 
party,  known  as  the  Unitarios,  held  a  brief  lease  of 
power  ;  but  their  opponents  found  an  able  leader  in 
Juan  Manuel  de  Rosas,  who  personified  the  best  and 
worst  features  of  the  gaitcho  of  the  pampas  and  ob- 
tained unbounded  popularity  and  following  among 
those  wild  herdsmen.     In  1828  Rosas  and  his  allies 
forced  the  Unitarian  president  to  resign,  and  installed 
one  of  themselves,  named   Dorrego,  as  governor  of 
Buenos  Ayres.     This  success  was  but  one  step  in  the 
series  of  bloody  struggles  which  ended  in  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  dictator ;  but  it  marked  the  point  at 
which  Farragut  first   saw  Buenos  Ayres   and  Rosas 
himself,  with  whom  he  was  at  a  later  date  thrown  in 
intimate  contact  and  who  at  that  moment  was  in  the 
full  flush  of  his  early  popularity. 

In  December,  1829,  Farragut's  eyes  were  in  such 
bad  condition  that  it  was  found  necessary  to  send 
him  home.     He  arrived  in  February,  1830,  and  re- 


LIEUTENANT.  73 

mained  in  Norfolk  for  a  period  of  nearly  three  years, 
broken  only  by  occasional  absences.  During  a  part 
of  this  time  he  was  again  attached  to  the  receiving 
ship  in  the  port ;  and,  as  before,  manifested  an  inter- 
est, unusual  in  those  days,  in  those  under  his  com- 
mand. One  of  these,  then  a  midshipman,  writes  to 
the  author  that  he  still  recalls,  after  the  lapse  of 
nearly  sixty  years,  the  kindness,  consideration  and 
hospitality  shown  him  by  the  future  admiral,  who 
was  then  known  through  the  service  as  the  "  Little 
Luff  "  Farragut — luff  being  a  naval  abbreviation,  now 
obsolete,  for  lieutenant.  But  with  all  his  kindness 
there  was  no  relaxation  in  the  enforcement  of  neces- 
sary duty.  In  December,  1832,  he  was  again  ordered 
to  sea  in  the  sloop-of-war  Natchez,  as  her  first  lieu- 
tenant ;  or,  as  the  expression  now  is,  as  executive 
officer.  It  was  the  time  of  the  nullification  troubles 
in  South  Carolina,  and  the  ship  was  first  sent  to  an- 
chor near  Charleston,  where  she  would  be  prepared 
to  support  the  authority  of  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment. Fortunately,  no  occasion  arose  for  her  to 
act;  and  a  stay  which  began  with  taking  precautions 
against  possible  fire-ships  from  the  city,  ended  in  a 
series  of  balls  and  general  exchanges  of  courtesy  be- 
tween the  officers  and  the  citizens.  In  April,  1833, 
the  Natchez  returned  to  Hampton  Roads;  and  the 
following  month  sailed,  carrying  Farragut  back  again 
to  the  Brazils.  On  the  30th  of  July  he  was  again  at 
anchor,  in  his  new  ship,  off  Buenos  Ayres.  Since  his 
former  visit  the  country  had  passed  through  much 
trouble.  A  confederation  had  been  formed  between 
the  principal  provinces,  in  January,  1831,  based  upon 
the  loosest  ties  of  union  ;  but  the  army  had  become 
dissatisfied  with  the  progress  of  changes  which  arose 
6 


j  a  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

largely  from  jealousy  of  the  military  power,  and  had 
risen   in    revolt  under   the   leadership  of  a  general 
named  Lavalle,  who  for  a  time  had  sided  with  Rosas. 
He  met  at  first  with  success,  defeated  Dorrego  and 
Rosas,  and  put  the  former  to  death;  but  Rosas  ral- 
lied again,  defeated  Lavalle,  and  became  in  his  place 
head  of  the   army  and  governor  of  Buenos  Ayres. 
To  this  position  he  was  re-elected  in  1832,  and  by 
virtue  of  it  he  was,  at  the  time  of  Farragut's  second 
visit,  in  chief  control  of  the  external  policy  and  in- 
ternal   affairs   of    the   confederation;    the   principal 
and   seaboard    province  inevitably  taking   the  lead 
and  representing  the  country  under  even  the  loosest 
form  of  combination.    Disturbed  though  the  internal 
state  of  affairs  was,  Rosas's  strong  hand  appears  to 
have  so  far  preserved  the  safety  of  foreigners  as  to 
give  no  cause  for  the  interference  of  their  ships-of- 
war.     Farragut's  stay  on  the  station  was,  however, 
again   cut    short.      The   schooner   Boxer  arrived  in 
Rio  Janeiro  on  her  way  home  from  the  East  Indies; 
and  it  becoming  necessary  to  give  her  a  new  com- 
manding officer,  he  received  orders  to  take  her  to 
the  United  States.     He  sailed  in  her  on  the  8th  of 
June,  1834,  and  on  the  25th  of  July  reached  Norfolk, 
where  the  vessel  was   put  out  of  commission  and  he 
again  returned  to  his  family.     A  period  of  nearly 
four  years  of  shore  duty  followed.    During  the  latter 
two  of  these  Farragut  was  a  constant  applicant  for 
sea  service,  which  he  could   not  obtain.     His  wife 
was  at  this  time  becoming  ever  weaker  and  weaker. 
"  I  was  necessarily  confined  very  much  to  the  house," 
he  writes,  "  for  my  wife  was  so  helpless  I  was  obliged 
to  lift  her  and  carry  her  about  like  a  child."     His 
tender  and  untiring  devotion  to  the  suffering  invalid 


LIEUTENANT. 


75 


was  no  less  conspicuous  than  his  careful  attention 
to  the  other  duties  of  life,  and  was  the  constant  re- 
mark of  those  who  were  witnesses  of  this  sorrowful 
period. 

In  April,  1838,  Farragut  was  again  ordered  to  sea 
in  the  home  squadron,  and  in  the  following  August, 
though  still  only  a  lieutenant,  took  command,  in  Pen- 
sacola,  of  the  sloop-of-war  Erie;  a  position  that  could 
only  be  temporary,  because  belonging  naturally  to 
an  officer  of  higher  rank.  It  fell  to  him,  however, 
at  a  period  of  peculiar  interest — when  France  be- 
came involved  with  Mexico  in  one  of  those  brief 
hostilities  by  which  alone  were  broken  the  long 
years  of  peace  between  Waterloo  and  the  Crimean 
War.  The  quarrel  between  the  two  was  simply  as  to 
the  reparation  due  to  French  subjects  for  injuries 
received  during  the  long  years  of  confusion  through 
which  Mexico  then  had  been  and  still  was  passing. 
As  a  political  question  it  possesses  no  present  inter- 
est whatever ;  but  to  a  naval  officer  of  Farragut's 
strong  professional  feeling  and  close  habits  of  ob- 
servation it  offered  a  peculiar  opportunity  for  noting 
the  silent  progress  made  during  the  long  peace  by  the 
material  of  war  among  the  navies  of  Europe,  where 
the  necessity  of  constant  preparation  insures  an  ad- 
vance in  which  the  United  States  then,  as  now,  tended 
to  lag  behind.  It  supplied  also  a  test,  under  certain 
conditions,  of  the  much-vexed  question  of  the  power 
of  ships  against  forts ;  for  the  French  squadron, 
though  few  in  numbers,  deliberately  undertook  to 
batter  by  horizontal  fire,  as  well  as  to  bombard,  in 
the  more  correct  sense  of  the  word,  with  the  vertical 
fire  of  mortars,  the  long  renowned  castle  of  San 
Juan  de  Ulloa,  the  chief  defense  of  Vera  Cruz.     It 


76 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


was  still  the  day  of  sailing-ships,  both  of  war  and  of 
commerce.  But  a  few  years  had  elapsed  since  a  man 
of  considerable  scientific  attainment  had  pronounced 
the  crossing  of  the  Atlantic  to  be  impossible  to  ves- 
sels depending  upon  steam  power  alone;  and  only  in 
the  same  year  as  the  French  attack  on  Vera  Cruz 
(1838)  had  been  seen  the  falsification  of  the  prediction 
by  the  passage  of  the  Sirius  and  Great  Western  from 
England  to  New  York. 

As  a  first  means  of  compulsion,  the  French  Gov- 
ernment had  in  1837  established  a  blockade  of  the 
Atlantic  ports  of  Mexico.  In  two  months  the  Mexi- 
can treasury  lost  two  million  dollars  in  duties,  which 
would  have  been  collected  if  the  ships  turned  away 
had  been  permitted  to  enter  ;  but  the  Government 
and  people  seemed  little  moved  by  a  result  that 
merely  added  one  more  to  the  many  ills  with  which 
they  were  already  afflicted.  The  question  was  then 
raised  by  the  French  authorities,  diplomatic  and 
military,  whether  the  possession  of  the  fortress  of 
San  Juan  de  Ulloa,  which  commanded  the  city  of 
Vera  Cruz,  the  most  important  of  the  coast  ports, 
would  not  also  confer  control  of  a  great  part  of  the 
seaboard,  and  thus  enforce  a  security  not  otherwise 
obtainable  for  the  persons  and  property  of  French 
subjects.  Blockade,  though  a  less  extreme  measure, 
was  difficult,  protracted,  and  productive  of  serious 
loss.  The  violent  northerly  gales  of  winter  exposed 
the  ships  to  peril,  and  the  yellow  fever  of  the  sum- 
mer months  was  deadly  to  the  crews.  Moreover,  the 
deprivation  of  commerce,  though  a  bitter  evil  to  a 
settled  community  whose  members  were  accustomed 
to  the  wealth,  luxury,  and  quiet  life  attendant  upon 
uninterrupted  mercantile  pursuits,  had  been  proved 


LIEUTENANT. 


77 


ineffective  when  applied  to  a  people  to  whom  quiet 
and  luxuries  were  the  unrealized  words  of  a  dream. 
The  French  Government  speedily  determined  to  aban- 
don the  half-measure  for  one  of  more  certain  results ; 
and  in  October,  1838,  began  to  arrive  the  ships  of  an 
expedition  destined  to  proceed  to  open  hostilities, 
under  the  command  of  Admiral  Baudin,  a  veteran  of 
the  Napoleonic  wars.  Appointed  in  the  navy  in  1799, 
immediately  after  the  return  from  Egypt  and  the  es- 
tablishment of  the  Consulate,  by  the  direct  interven- 
tion of  Bonaparte,  who  was  a  friend  of  his  father's, 
Baudin  had  served  with  distinction  until  the  fall 
of  the  empire,  losing  his  right  arm  in  battle ;  and 
after  Waterloo  it  was  he  who  made  the  proposition, 
familiar  to  all  readers  of  Napoleon's  life,  to  cover 
the  escape  of  the  Emperor  from  Rochefort  by  sacri- 
ficing the  ships  under  his  command  in  an  heroic  re- 
sistance to  the  English  cruisers  while  the  vessel 
bearing  the  fallen  monarch  escaped.  "  Sixteen  years 
ago,"  said  he,  "  my  father  died  of  joy  upon  learning 
the  return  from  Egypt  of  General  Bonaparte ;  and  I 
myself  to-day  would  die  of  grief  to  see  the  Emperor 
leave  France  if  I  thought  that  by  remaining  he  could 
again  do  aught  for  her.  But  he  must  leave  her  only 
to  live  honored  in  a  free  country,  not  to  die  a  prison- 
er to  our  rivals."  Such  was  that  career,  belonging  to 
an  early  and  singular  generation,  which  here  for  a 
moment  crossed  and  linked  with  that  of  the  great 
naval  hero  of  our  own  days.  Farragut  has  recorded 
his  impression  of  him.  "Admiral  Baudin,"  he  writes, 
"  would  be  undoubtedly  a  rara  avis  in  any  navy.  He 
is  about  fifty  years  of  age  (he  was  fifty-four),  has 
lost  his  right  arm,  looks  like  a  North  of  Europe  man, 
has  a  fine  address,  and  speaks  English  well.     He  has 


73 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


every  mark  of  a  polished  seaman  and  officer,  with 
the  expression  of  great  decision,  with  firmness  and 
activity  to  execute  his  well-digested  plans.  These 
were  my  remarks  the  first  time  I  saw  him,  and  his 
subsequent  conduct  soon  proved  I  was  right."  His 
French  biographer  makes  a  remark,  commonplace 
enough,  which  yet  notes  the  essential  difference  in 
the  lot  of  the  two  gallant  men  who  thus  casually  met. 
"  For  the  few  who  allow  occasions  to  escape  them, 
how  many  could  justly  complain  that  a  chance  has 
never  been  offered  them  ?  Admiral  Baudin  never  had 
the  opportunity  to  which  his  capacities  suited  him ; 
all  his  aptitudes  designated  him  for  war  on  a  great 
scale ;  a  man  such  as  he,  succeeding  Latouche-Tr£- 
ville,  would  have  saved  us  the  sorrows  of  Trafalgar." 
Farragut  was  fortunate,  for  in  him  the  opportunity 
and  the  man  met  in  happy  combination. 

When  he  reached  his  station,  Admiral  Baudin 
suffered  no  time  to  be  lost.  The  wintry  gales  were 
approaching,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  his  first  ex- 
perience showed  the  miseries  of  disease  on  that  sickly 
coast.  Of  the  two  frigates  there  before  he  came, 
which  had  been  blockading  during  the  summer,  one 
had  buried  forty-five  seamen  and  five  officers  out  of 
a  ship's  company  of  four  hundred  men  ;  the  other,  at 
the  time  of  his  arrival,  had  three  hundred  and  forty- 
three  sick  among  a  crew  of  five  hundred.  With  such 
conditions,  trifling  is  out  of  place.  An  ultimatum 
was  at  once  sent  to  the  Mexican  Government,  a  brief 
time  only  being  allowed  for  a  reply,  because  the 
claims  of  the  French  cabinet  were  already  clearly 
understood.  On  the  25th  of  November  the  last  of  his 
squadron,  two  bomb-vessels,  arrived.  On  the  21st  he 
had  given  notice  that  he  would  wait  till  noon  of  the 


LIEUTENANT. 


79 


27th  for  the  final  decision.     On  the  28th  the  attack 
was  made. 

The  castle  of  San  Juan  de  Ulloa  lies  half  a  mile 
east  and  to  seaward  of  the  city  of  Vera  Cruz,  which 
it  commands,  and  from  which  it  is  separated  by  wa- 
ter averaging  from  fifteen  to  twenty  feet  deep.  It 
is  built  on  the  inner  extremity  of  a  reef  that  extends 
from  it  a  little  over  a  mile  to  the  eastward,  in  the 
general  prolongation  of  the  line  connecting  the  castle 
and  the  town.  This  shoal  being  covered  by  a  foot 
or  two  of  water,  the  builders  of  the  fort  counted 
upon  it  for  protection  in  that  direction  against  ships, 
and  against  attack  either  by  regular  approaches  or 
by  escalade.  The  work  itself  was  in  general  outline  a 
parallelogram,  with  bastions  at  the  four  angles.  The 
longer  sides  fronted  the  east  and  west ;  and  of  these 
the  former,  facing  the  shoal  and  the  open  gulf,  con- 
tained the  gate  of  the  fortress  and  was  covered  by  a 
demi-lune  and  line  of  water  batteries.  There  were 
mounted  in  the  castle  and  dependent  works,  at  the 
time  of  the  French  attacks,  one  hundred  and  eighty- 
six  cannon.  The  strength  of  the  fortifications,  the 
number  of  the  guns,and  the  character  of  the  surround- 
ings, had  all  contributed  to  bestow  upon  San  Juan  de 
Ulloa  the  reputation  of  being  the  strongest  position 
in  Spanish  America.  It  was,  indeed,  considered  im- 
pregnable to  naval  attack,  for  the  best  hope  of  ships 
under  such  circumstances  is  to  approach  closely  and 
drive  the  defenders  from  their  guns  by  the  superior 
number  and  weight  of  the  pieces  opposed  to  them  ; 
but  in  San  Juan  this  was  forbidden  by  the  extent  and 
formation  of  the  reef.  Like  most  coral  banks,  this 
rises  sheer  from  the  bottom,  making  the  approach 
very  dangerous  to  vessels  dependent  only  upon  sail- 


g0  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

power ;  and  the  ground  about  it,  though  not  too  deep 
for  anchorage,  is  rocky  and  foul. 

Admiral  Baudin,  however,  was  thoroughly  ac- 
quainted with  the  weak  points  of  the  fortress,  through 
information  obtained  from  Madrid;  where  plans  of 
the  works,  dating  from  the  times  of  the  Spanish 
occupancy,  were  on  file.  He  possessed  also  two 
steamers,  the  first  to  cross  the  Atlantic  under  the 
French  flag,  by  aid  of  which,  though  small  and  of 
weak  power,  he  could  count  upon  placing  his  sail- 
ing frigates  exactly  where  he  wished  them.  Finally, 
the  wretched  condition  of  the  Mexican  forces,  de- 
moralized by  years  of  irregular  warfare  and  internal 
commotion,  and  miserably  provided  with  material  of 
war,  gave  additional  chances  of  success. 

On  the  morning  of  November  28th  the  two 
steamers  towed  the  bomb-vessels  to  the  eastern  ex- 
tremity of  the  reef,  a  little  over  a  mile  from  the  cas- 
tle. Next  two  of  the  frigates  were  taken  by  them 
and  anchored  close  to  the  reef,  southeast  from  the 
works  and  distant  from  them  half  a  mile.  The  third 
frigate,  using  her  sails  alone,  succeeded  in  taking 
position  a  little  ahead  of  her  consorts.  These  opera- 
tions were  all  completed  before  noon  and  were  con- 
ducted under  the  eyes  of  the  Mexicans,  who  were 
restrained  from  impeding  them  by  the  orders  of  their 
Government  not  to  fire  the  first  gun.  A  delay  fol- 
lowed, owing  to  a  flag  of  truce  coming  from  the 
shore  ;  but  the  proposition  brought  by  it  proved  un- 
acceptable, and  the  squadron  opened  fire  at  half-past 
two.  Between  that  and  sundown  the  three  frigates, 
aided  only  by  a  small  corvette  which  attacked  under 
way,  poured  upon  the  castle  7,771  round  shot  and 
177  shell,  the  mortar- vessels  at  the  same  time  throw- 


LIEUTENANT.  8l 

ing  in  302  bombs.  At  eight  the  fire  ceased,  and  ne- 
gotiations began.  The  following  day,  at  noon,  the 
castle  was  delivered  into  the  hands  of  the  French, 
who  placed  a  garrison  in  it.  "  It  was  high  time," 
said  Admiral  Baudin ;  "  the  wind  was  freshening,  the 
sea  getting  up,  and  the  anchors  were  breaking  like 
glass  upon  the  bottom,  composed  of  sharp  rocks." 
But  the  loss  among  the  defenders  had  been  so  great, 
and  the  re-enforcements  at  hand  were  so  few,  that  fur- 
ther resistance  was  impracticable. 

The  terms  of  the  convention  made  by  the  com- 
mander of  the  Mexican  forces  had  stipulated  that 
only  a  certain  number  of  troops  should  constitute 
the  garrison  of  Vera  Cruz  until  the  affairs  between 
the  two  nations  were  settled  ;  but  upon  the  4th  of 
December  the  French  admiral  learned,  to  his  great 
indignation,  that  the  Mexican  Government  had  dis- 
avowed the  action  of  the  general,  declared  war 
against  France,  and  was  throwing  re-enforcements 
into  the  city.  He  immediately  took  measures  to  dis- 
arm the  works  which  might  threaten  his  fleet  at  their 
anchorage,  hoping  at  the  same  time,  by  surprising 
the  enemy,  to  gain  possession  of  Santa  Anna,  the  new 
commander  of  the  troops  and  then  the  most  promi- 
nent man  in  Mexico.  While  the  French  were  making 
their  preparations  in  secret,  Farragut  went  on  shore 
and  called  upon  Santa  Anna,  who  promised  to  care  for 
the  persons  and  property  of  American  citizens,  add- 
ing :  "  Tell  President  Van  Buren  that  we  are  all  one 
family,  and  must  be  united  against  Europeans  obtain- 
ing a  foothold  on  this  continent." 

The  following  morning,  before  daylight,  the 
French  embarked  fifteen  hundred  seamen,  accom- 
panied by  a  few  engineer  soldiers,  in  the  boats  of  the 


82  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

squadron  ;  and,  being  covered  by  a  thick  fog,  landed 
at  six  o'clock  upon  the  beach  before  Vera  Cruz. 
Formed  in  three  divisions  and  unseen  by  the  enemy, 
they  blew  open  the  gates  of  the  city  and  at  the  same 
time  stormed  the  forts  which  at  the  north  and  south 
terminate  the  seaward  wall.  The  Mexicans,  taken 
wholly  by  surprise,  retreated  before  the  assailants. 
The  center  division  of  the  French,  which  had  entered 
by  the  gates,  pursued  rapidly  toward  the  quarters  of 
Santa  Anna.  A  short,  vigorous  resistance  by  a  part 
of  his  guard  enabled  the""  commander-in-chief  to  es- 
cape in  shirt  and  trousers;  but  General  Arista  was 
taken.  Meanwhile  the  two  flank  divisions,  having 
dismounted  the  guns  in  the  forts  and  chopped  the 
carriages  in  pieces,  moved  along  the  walls  toward 
the  gate.  There  they  united  with  the  center ;  and 
the  whole  body,  having  accomplished  its  object  in 
disarming  the  sea  face  of  the  town,  fell  back  upon 
their  boats  lying  along  the  mole.  Most  had  already 
re-embarked  when  the  Mexicans,  led  by  Santa  Anna 
in  person,  charged  from  the  gate  and  down  the  mole 
at  double-quick.  Admiral  Baudin  himself  was  still 
on  shore,  waiting  to  see  the  last  man  off.  Though 
scarcely  expecting  this  gallant  return  from  a  force 
that  had  been  so  badly  worsted  and  was  much  in- 
ferior in  numbers,  the  French  were  not  unprepared. 
A  six-pound  gun  on  the  extremity  of  the  mole,  be- 
longing to  the  Mexicans,  had  been  turned  so  as  to 
sweep  the  approach  with  grape ;  and  five  of  the 
boats  of  the  squadron,  mounting  small  carronades, 
were  also  disposed  to  repel  attack.  The  admiral 
ordered  the  six-pounder  fired,  and  entered  his  barge. 
The  discharge  swept  away  the  head  of  the  Mexican 
column,  and    Santa    Anna    himself    fell    with    three 


LIEUTENANT.  3, 

wounds,  from  one  of  which  he  lost  his  left  leg.  Some 
of  the  broken  column  fell  back  upon  the  town,  from 
the  loop-holes  of  whose  walls  a  sharp  fire  of  musketry 
began,  while  others  continued  down  the  mole  and 
opened  vigorously  upon  the  retreating  French,  di- 
recting their  aim  especially  upon  the  admiral's  barge. 
The  admiral  himself  escaped,  but  narrowly;  his  cock- 
swain and  a  midshipman  standing  by  him  being  killed, 
and  another  midshipman  wounded.  "  The  Mexicans 
continued  to  fight  with  great  gallantry,"  wrote  Faxra- 
gut ;  and  it  was  perhaps  well  for  the  assailants  that 
the  fog  sweeping  in  again  covered  their  further  re- 
treat. 

Of  all  these  incidents  Farragut  was  a  close  and 
interested  observer.  Upon  joining  the  Erie  as  her 
commander,  he  found  that  the  ship  was  under  orders 
to  proceed  with  the  utmost  dispatch  to  the  Mexican 
coast,  to  afford  to  American  citizens  and  their  prop- 
erty the  protection  so  likely  to  be  needed  in  event  of 
active  hostilities.  On  the  26th  of  August  she  was 
anchored  under  the  island  of  Sacrificios,  off  Vera 
Cruz,  which  was  then  still  undergoing  the  blockade 
which  preceded  recourse  to  stronger  measures.  Far- 
ragut remained  there  till  the  19th  of  September, 
when  he  returned  to  Pensacola;  but  early  in  Novem- 
ber he  was  again  off  the  Mexican  coast  at  Tampico, 
where  a  revolution  threatened,  for  Mexico  at  the 
time  was  not  only  menaced  with  foreign  attack,  but 
also  a  prey  to  the  utmost  internal  disorder.  On  the 
17th  of  this  month  the  Erie  ran  down  again  to  Vera 
Cruz  ;  and  learning  there  that  the  27th  was  fixed  as 
the  day  for  a  final  conference  and  settlement  of  the 
questions  at  issue,  her  commander  of  course  decided 
to  remain  throughout  the  affair,  making  preparations 


84  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

to  receive  on  board  Americans  and  their  movable 
property  in  case  the  city  was  bombarded. 

In  his  journal,  and  afterward  in  a  letter  to  Com- 
modore Barron,  then  the  senior  officer  in  the  United 
States  Navy,  Farragut  has  preserved  a  very  full  and 
detailed  account  of  the  attack,  the  principal  features 
of  which  have  already  been  mentioned ;  and  it  is  in- 
teresting to  note,  as  testifying  to  the  care  and  accu- 
racy of  his  observations,  that  the  account  in  his  journal 
corresponds  very  closely  with  that  given  in  the  Life 
of  Admiral  Baudin,  published  in  France  within  the 
last  few  years.  He  was  particularly  impressed  with, 
and  distinguishes  as  matters  of  principal  importance, 
the  utility  of  the  small  French  steamers  in  towing 
the  fighting  ships  into  position,  and  the  destructive 
effects  of  the  shell  upon  the  soft  masonry  of  the  fort. 
Admiral  Baudin,  in  his  reports,  indulged  in  some  of 
the  pardonable  grumbling  of  a  seaman  of  the  old 
school  about  the  constant  ailments  of  the  little 
steam-vessels;  but  he  was  too  capable  an  officer  to 
ignore  their  value,  "  and  never,"  wrote  Farragut  in 
his  report,  "  was  the  utility  of  these  vessels  so  ap- 
parent. Everything  was  done  by  them.  The  day 
was  calm,  or  nearly  so,  and  the  ships  had  no  sails  to 
manage.  As  soon  as  the  anchor  was  let  go  they 
were  ready  for  action.  The  bomb-vessels  were  next 
placed  (for  which  the  range  had  been  calculated), 
and  two  sloops  took  position  at  right  angles  with 
the  range,  to  tell  by  signal  the  effect  of  the  bombs. 
So  you  see  all  was  arranged  with  science  and  skill 
and  without  the  slightest  interruption,  for  the  Mexi- 
cans had  given  an  order  to  the  commander  of  the 
fort  not  on  any  account  to  fire  the  first  gun."  This 
order  was,  in  Farragut's  opinion,  the  principal  cause 


LIEUTENANT. 


85 


of  the  French  sustaining  so  little  loss.  A  well-di- 
rected fire  from  the  fort  would,  he  thought,  have  de- 
stroyed the  steamers  and  prevented  the  frigates  from 
gaining  the  carefully  chosen  position,  where  they 
were  least  exposed  to  the  guns  of  the  works. 

Immediately  after  the  submission  of  the  castle 
Farragut  went  ashore  to  examine  and  note  the  ef- 
fects of  the  fire,  and  especially  of  the  horizontal 
shell  fire  ;  which  was  then  so  much  a  novelty  in  na- 
val warfare  that  he  speaks  of  the  missiles  continu- 
ously as  shell-shot,  apparently  to  distinguish  them 
from  the  vertically  thrown  bombs.  "  Now  it  was 
seen  for  the  first  time  that  the  material  of  which 
Ulloa  is  built  (soft  coral)  was  the  worst  substance  in 
the  world  for  protection  against  the  modern  shell. 
The  French  threw  almost  entirely  shell-shot,  which 
entered  the  wall  twelve  or  eighteen  inches  and  then 
exploded,  tearing  out  great  masses  of  stone,  and  in 
some  instances  rending  the  wall  from  base  to  top. 
The  damage  done  by  these  shell-shot  was  inconceiv- 
ably greater  than  that  by  the  shell  from  the  bomb- 
vessels,  owing  to  the  former  striking  horizontally, 
while  the  latter  fell  vertically  upon  the  bomb-proofs, 
doing  but  little  damage.  ...  I  am  satisfied  of  one 
fact — viz.,  that  they  might  have  bombarded  with  the 
bomb-vessels  for  a  month  without  success,  while  the 
frigates  would  in  four  hours  more,  with  their  shell- 
shot,  have  reduced  the  fort  to  a  heap  of  ruins." 
This  opinion  as  to  the  inefficacy  of  bomb-firing  to 
destroy  a  work  anticipated  the  experience  of  the 
Civil  War,  where  the  conclusion  was  that  it  might 
wear  out  the  endurance  of  the  garrison  by  constant 
harassment,  but  not  directly  reduce  the  works  them- 
selves.    It  is  only  just  to  say  that  his  estimate  of  the 


g6  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

effect  of  the  horizontal  fire  upon  the  walls  is  more 
favorable  than  that  of  the  French  engineers,  who  did 
not  consider  that  the  damage  done  necessarily  en- 
tailed a  capitulation  ;  but  seamen  and  engineers  have 
rarely  agreed  in  their  opinions  upon  this  subject. 

The  same  zeal  which  led  Farragut  to  this  minute 
inspection  of  the  battered  fortress  carried  him  also 
on  board  one  of  the  French  ships,  while  she  still  re- 
mained cleared  for  action,  to  note  matters  of  detail 
which  differed  from  those  then  prevalent  in  his  own 
service.  Of  these  he  made  a  very  full  representa- 
tion, and  one  much  in  disparagement  of  the  United 
States  Navy;  which,  since  the  glories  of  1812  and 
the  first  re-organization  and  development  procured 
for  it  by  the  popular  favor  consequent  upon  its  vic- 
tories, had  been  allowed  to  drop  into  a  state  of  back- 
wardness, as  regards  the  material,  similar  to  that 
which  followed  the  Civil  War,  and  from  which  it  is 
but  now  beginning  to  emerge.  The  points  which  he 
noted,  though  most  important  to  that  rapidity  and 
order  upon  which  the  efficient  service  of  a  ship's  bat- 
teries depends,  would  have  now  no  attraction  for 
the  unprofessional  reader;  nor  for  the  professional, 
except  as  matters  of  antiquarian  interest.  They 
showed  that  spirit  of  system,  of  scientific  calculation, 
of  careful  adaptation  of  means  to  ends,  which  have 
ever  distinguished  the  French  material  for  naval 
war,  except  when  the  embarrassments  of  the  treasury 
have  prevented  the  adoption  of  expensive  improve- 
ments— a  spirit  which  for  over  a  century  made  the 
French  ships  the  models  which  their  usually  victo- 
rious rivals  were  fain  to  copy.  "  The  English  and 
ourselves  may  affect  to  despise  the  French  by  sea," 
wrote  Farragut  to  Barron,  "  but  depend  upon  it,  sir, 


LIEUTENANT.  87 

they  are  in  science  far  ahead  of  us  both,  and  when 
England  next  meets  France  upon  the  ocean  she  will 
find  a  different  enemy  from  that  of  the  last  war. 
Of  all  this  I  know  you  have  seen  much  in  theory, 
but  I  have  seen  it  tested  in  practice." 

The  substance  of  Farragut's  letter  to  Barron 
deals  with  matters  which  the  progress  of  time  and 
the  accompanying  advances  in  naval  science  have 
now  made  obsolete ;  but  the  spirit  which  inspired 
the  letter  and  accumulated  the  materials  for  it  can 
never  become  obsolete.  It  was  then,  and  it  is  now, 
the  indication  of  a  man  keeping  abreast  of  his  time 
and  awake  to  its  necessities  ;  it  held  then,  as  it  does 
now,  the  promise  of  one  who,  when  occasion  arose, 
would  have  his  faculties  in  readiness,  by  constant 
training,  to  exert  all  the  powers  with  which  nature 
had  gifted  him.  The  conditions  of  1861  were  very 
different  from  those  of  1838  ;  but  the  officer  who 
was  found  awake  to  the  first  in  their  day  would  not 
be  behind  the  others  in  theirs.  The  letter  concluded 
with  a  pregnant  observation,  which  deserves  to  be 
quoted  as  thoroughly  characteristic  of  the  writer : 
"  I  have  already  said  too  much  for  a  letter  to  any 
other  person  of  your  rank ;  but  I  flatter  myself  that 
I  know  your  love  of  improvement,  and  that  my  in- 
tentions will  be  duly  appreciated.  If  we  who  wan- 
der about  the  world  do  not  keep  those  at  home  in- 
formed of  the  daily  improvements  in  other  navies, 
how  can  we  hope  to  improve,  particularly  when  we 
see  men  impressed  with  the  idea  that  because  they 
once  gained  a  victory,  they  can  do  it  again  ?  So 
they  may,  but  I  can  tell  them  it  must  be  with  the 
means  of  1838,  and  not  those  of  181 2."  This  trans- 
mission of  information  concerning  the  progress  of 


88  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

other  navies,  upon  which  Farragut  laid  such  just 
stress,  is  now  systematized  and  perfected  under  a 
particular  branch  of  the  Navy  Department,  known 
as  the  Office  of  Naval  Intelligence.  Upon  every 
ship  afloat  there  is  an  officer  whose  duty  is  to  ob- 
serve and  report  to  that  office  upon  such  matters, 
and  upon  all  the  experiences  of  foreign  navies  which 
are  open  to*the  examination  of  outsiders. 

After  the  French  affair  at  Vera  Cruz  the  Erie 
returned  to  Pensacola,  and  there  on  the  12th  of 
January,  1839,  Farragut  gave  up  the  command  to  an 
officer  of  senior  rank  and  went  home.  Upon  his 
arrival  in  Norfolk,  finding  his  wife's  health  to  be 
very  precarious,  he  remained  unemployed  until  her 
death,  which  occurred  on  the  27th  of  December, 
1840.  "  No  more  striking  illustration  of  his  gentle- 
ness of  character,"  says  his  biography  by  his  son, 
"  is  shown  than  in  Farragut's  attention  to  his  invalid 
wife.  His  tenderness  in  contributing  to  her  every 
comfort,  and  catering  to  every  whim,  through  six- 
teen years  of  suffering,  forms  one  of  the  brightest 
spots  in  the  history  of  his  domestic  life.  When  not 
at  sea,  he  was  constantly  by  her  side,  and  proved 
himself  a  faithful  and  skillful  nurse.  It  was  the  sub- 
ject of  remark  by  all  who  were  thrown  with  him  ;  and 
a  lady  of  Norfolk  said, '  When  Captain  Farragut  dies, 
he  should  have  a  monument  reaching  to  the  skies, 
made  by  every  wife  in  the  city  contributing  a  stone.' " 


CHAPTER  V. 

COMMANDER     AND     CAPTAIN. 
1841-1860. 

Immediately  after  the  death  of  his  wife  Farragut 
applied  for  sea  service;  and  on  the  22d  of  February, 
1841,  he  was  ordered  to  the  Delaware,  a  ship-of-the- 
line,  which  was  fitting  for  sea  in  Norfolk  and  des- 
tined to  take  him  for  the  third  time  to  the  Brazil 
station.  He  was  then  among  the  senior  lieutenants 
of  the  navy ;  but  as  it  was  in  accordance  with  cus- 
tom that  a  commander  should  be  the  executive  offi- 
cer of  a  ship-of-the-line,  his  expected  promotion  would 
not,  when  it  arrived,  cause  him  to  leave  his  position. 
Some  time  passed  before  the  Delaware  was  fully 
ready  for  sea.  Before  sailing,  she  was  sent  up  the 
Chesapeake  to  the  mouth  of  the  Severn  River,  where 
she  was  visited  by  numbers  of  people  from  the  neigh- 
boring city  of  Annapolis,  as  well  as  by  large  parties 
of  congressmen  and  public  officials  from  Washington, 
among  whom  came  the  then  Secretary  of  the  Navy! 
It  was  while  lying  off  Annapolis,  on  the  27th  of  Sep- 
tember, 1841,  that  Farragut  received  his  commission 
as  commander  in  the  navy.  His  seniority  as  such 
was  from  September  8,  1841.  A  few  days  later  the 
Delaware  returned  to  Hampton  Roads,  and  thence 
sailed  for  her  station  on  the  1st  of  November.  Oa 
7 


90 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


the  1 2th  of  January  she  anchored  in  Rio  Janeiro. 
After  a  stay  of  six  weeks  there,  the  whole  squadron 
sailed  for  the  Rio  de  la  Plata,  the  usual  resort  of  the 
ships  on  that  station  during  the  summer  months  of 
the  southern  hemisphere,  when  the  yellow  fever  is  apt 
to  be  prevalent  in  Rio  Janeiro.  On  the  ist  of  June, 
1842,  Farragut  was  ordered  to  command  the  Decatur, 
a  small  sloop-of-war,  relieving  Commander  Henry 
W.  Ogden ;  who  as  a  midshipman  of  the  Essex  had 
been  his  messmate  nearly  thirty  years  before,  and 
was  now  compelled  to  leave  his  ship  by  an  illness 
which  never  allowed  him  to  resume  the  active  pur- 
suit of  his  profession.  The  transfer  of  the  command 
appears  to  have  been  made  in  the  harbor  of  Rio  Ja- 
neiro. In  severing  his  connection  with  the  Delaware, 
with  his  new  rank,  Farragut  felt  that  he  had  parted 
finally  with  the  subordinate  duties  of  his  calling; 
and,  as  rarely  happens,  he  passed  directly  from  the 
active  exercise  of  the  lower  position  to  fill  the  higher. 
His  journal  records  the  fact  with  a  characteristic 
comment :  "  Thus  closed  my  service  on  board  the 
Delaware  as  executive  officer ;  to  which  I  shall  al- 
ways look  back  with  gratification,  as  it  was  the  last 
step  in  the  ladder  of  subordinate  duties,  and  I  feel 
proud  to  think  I  performed  it  with  the  same  zeal  as 
the  first."  He  was  then  nearly  forty-one  years  old. 
On  the  2d  of  July  the  Decatur  sailed  for  the  La 
Plata  in  company  with  the  Delaware.  Soon  after 
reaching  Montevideo,  Commodore  Morris  embarked 
on  board  the  former,  and  went  in  her  to  Buenos 
Ayres;  ships  of  the  size  of  the  Delaware  not  being 
able  to  approach  that  city  on  account  of  the  great 
distance  to  which  very  shoal  water  extends  from 
it.     After  exchanging  the  usual  official  civilities  and 


COMMANDER  AND  CAPTAIN. 


91 


transacting  some  business  with  Rosas,  who  then  em- 
bodied in  his  own  person  all  the  powers  of  the  state, 
the  commodore  returned  to  Montevideo ;  but  the 
Decatur  was  soon  sent  back,  and  Farragut  spent 
most  of  the  latter  half  of  1842  at  Buenos  Ayres,  in 
constant  intercourse,  both  official  and  social,  with 
Rosas  and  his  family.  Of  the  latter  he,  in  common 
with  most  American  naval  officers  who  visited  the 
La  Plata  at  that  time,  received  very  agreeable  im- 
pressions; and  since,  as  commanding  officer,  his  du- 
ties were  less  exacting  and  his  time  much  more  at 
his  own  command  than  as  executive,  he  gave  free 
play  to  the  social  disposition  which  was  prominent 
in  his  character.  Much  of  his  journal  during  his 
stay  is  taken  up  with  the  accounts  of  social  and  of- 
ficial entertainments  in  which  he  shared.  "  During 
the  month  of  September,"  he  writes,  "  I  made  it  a 
rule  to  spend  two  or  three  evenings  a  week  at  the 
governor's  "  (Rosas).  "  On  the  5th  of  November  I 
was  invited  to  a  ball  at  the  Victoria  Theatre,  where, 
as  on  all  similar  occasions,  I  danced  the  first  qua- 
drille with  the  charming  'Manuelita,"  the  daughter  of 
Rosas.  The  pleasant  and  familiar  relations  thus  es- 
tablished enabled  him  to  do  many  kind  acts  for  the 
Unitarios,  whose  lives  were  in  constant  danger  by 
political  accusations,  if  not  from  actual  offenses. 

Rosas  himself  was  then  in  the  full  exercise  of  the 
dictatorial  power  with  which  he  had  been  invested 
some  years  before,  after  refusing  a  re-election  as 
governor  of  Buenos  Ayres.  His  rule,  which  lasted 
under  successive  renewals  of  his  office  until  1852,  was 
arbitrary  and  bloody ;  but  in  the  disorganized  con- 
dition of  the  provinces  at  that  period  a  man  of  his 
force  of  character  seems  to  have  been  necessary,  to 


92 


ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 


avert  the  greater  horrors  of  constant  intestine  strife. 
"  We  concluded  from  our  observations,"  notes  Farra- 
gut  in  his  journal,  "  that  he  was  a  man  of  uncommon 
mind  and  energy,  and,  as  a  general  thing,  reason- 
able; but  on  the  subject  of  secret  societies  he  was  a 
madman,  if  we  might  judge  from  his  furious  denun- 
ciation of  them."  They  constituted,  indeed,  the  one 
resource  of  the  cowed  Unitarios,  and  were  the  chief 
danger  then  threatening  him.  "We  had  an  excellent 
opportunity  to  form  an  idea  of  his  character,  as  he 
appeared  to  throw  off  all  restraint  while  with  us. 
But  the  commodore  informed  us  that,  as  soon  as  he 
laid  business  matters  before  him,  Rosas  was  a  dif- 
ferent person ;  he  was  calm  and  measured  in  manner 
and  language."  The  ladies  of  the  family  were  ami- 
able, intelligent  and  hospitable ;  but,  like  all  the 
women  of  Buenos  Ayres  at  that  time,  were  perforce 
ardent  Federalists  and  detesters  of  the  "  savage 
Unitarios."  Farragut  mentions  an  incident  occur- 
ring at  an  official  festivity  in  honor  of  Rosas,  which 
shows  the  savagery  that  lay  close  under  the  surface 
of  the  Argentine  character  at  that  time,  and  easily 
found  revolting  expression  in  the  constant  civil 
strife  and  in  the  uncontrolled  rule  of  the  dictator. 
"  In  the  ball-room  was  a  picture  which  would  have 
disgraced  even  barbarian  society.  It  was  a  full- 
sized  figure  representing  a  Federal  soldier,  with  a 
Unitarian  lying  on  the  ground,  the  Federal  pressing 
his  knees  between  the  victim's  shoulders,  whose  head 
was  pulled  back  with  the  left  hand,  and  the  throat 
cut  from  ear  to  ear,  while  the  executioner  exultingly 
held  aloft  a  bloody  knife  and  seemed  to  be  claiming 
the  applause  of  the  spectators.  I  am  sure  I  do  not 
err  in  saying  that  every  one  of  our  party  felt  an  in- 


COMMANDER   AND   CAPTAIN. 


93 


voluntary  shudder  come  over  him  when  his  eye  fell 
upon  this  tableau ;  nor  did  we  afterward  recover  our 
spirits,  everything  in  the  way  of  gayety  on  our  part 
during  the  night  was  forced  and  unnatural." 

It  is  a  matter  of  some,  though  minor,  interest  to 
note  that  Farragut  has  occasion  at  this  time  to  men- 
tion Garibaldi,  in  connection  with  the  wars  then  wag- 
ing. The  Italian  patriot,  whose  name  was  then  far 
from  having  the  celebrity  it  has  since  attained,  had 
for  some  time  been  engaged  on  the  popular  side  in 
revolutionary  struggles  in  the  southern  provinces  of 
Brazil.  Thence  he  had  passed  into  Uruguay,  and 
become  a  teacher  of  mathematics  in  Montevideo. 
Rosas  had  the  ambition  to  bring  into  the  Argentine 
confederation  all  the  provinces  which  once  formed 
the  viceroyalty  of  Buenos  Ayres,  of  which  Uruguay 
was  one;  and,  finding  a  pretext  in  the  civil  dissen- 
sions of  the  latter,  had  opened  hostilities  as  the  ally 
of  one  party  in  the  State.  Garibaldi,  who  began  life 
as  a  seaman,  had  command  of  the  Uruguayan  naval 
forces,  and  in  that  Capacity  undertook  to  carry  stores 
to  Corrientes,  an  important  point  far  up  the  river 
Parana.  "  As  he  met  with  many  obstacles  in  his 
course,"  notes  Farragut,  "the  Argentine  admiral, 
Brown,  was  enabled  to  overtake  him.  Garibaldi  ran 
his  vessel  into  a  creek  and  made  a  most  desperate 
resistance;  fought  until  he  had  expended  everything 
in  the  way  of  ammunition,  then  landed  his  crew  and 
set  his  vessel  on  fire."  On  the  17th  of  October  a 
grand  ball  was  given  in  honor  of  this  success,  which 
Commander  Farragut  attended;  as  he  did  all  the 
other  gayeties  during  his  stay  in  Buenos  Ayres. 

The  Decatur  had  already  been  long  on  the  station 
when  Farragut  assumed  command,  and  the  time  had 


94  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

now  arrived  for  her  to  return  home.  After  leaving 
Buenos  Ayres  she  made  short  stops  at  Montevideo, 
Rio  Janeiro,  Maranham,  and  Para,  the  latter  being 
the  seaport  of  the  Amazon  River.  On  the  18th  of 
February,  1843,  she  arrived  in  Norfolk,  and  Farragut 
was  relieved.  His  health  being  delicate  at  this  time, 
he  spent  the  following  summer  at  Fauquier  Springs, 
Virginia. 

From  the  mountains  he  returned  in  the  autumn  to 
Norfolk  ;  and  there  on  the  26th  of  December,  1843, 
he  married  Miss  Virginia  Loyall,  the  eldest  daughter 
of  Mr.  William  Loyall,  a  well-known  and  respected 
citizen  of  Norfolk. 

In  April,  1844,  Commander  Farragut  was  ordered 
as  executive  officer  to  the  receiving  ship  at  Nor- 
folk, the  Pennsylvania,  of  one  hundred  and  twenty 
guns;  which,  in  the  days  of  sailing  ships,  was  by  far 
the  largest  vessel  the  United  States  ever  had,  and 
one  of  the  largest  in  the  world.  Some  time  later  he 
was  transferred  to  the  navy  yard  at  the  same  place, 
on  which  duty  he  was  employed  when  the  war  with 
Mexico  arose. 

As  soon  as  the  already  existing  difficulties  with 
that  country  began  to  wear  an  ominous  outlook,  Farra- 
gut wrote  to  the  Navy  Department,  asking  for  service 
in  the  Gulf.  In  his  application  he  stated  the  qualifi- 
cations he  thought  he  possessed,  from  his  knowledge 
and  close  study  of  the  ground,  and  from  his  ac- 
quaintance with  the  Spanish  language.  He"  in- 
stanced particularly  the  occasions  on  which  he  had 
been  employed  in  that  neighborhood,  and  the  close 
study  he  had  been  privileged  to  make  on  the  spot 
during  Admiral  Baudin's  operations.  Although  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  at  that  time  was  the  able  and 


COMMANDER  AND  CAPTAIN.  95 

enlightened  Mr.  George  Bancroft,  this  letter  received 
no  reply  ;  and  a  second,  sent  after  the  beginning  of 
the  war,  was  barely  acknowledged  without  any  ac- 
tion being  taken.  After  Mr.  Bancroft  left  the  De- 
partment, Farragut  renewed  his  application,  express- 
ing a  decided  opinion  that  the  castle  of  San  Juan  de 
Ulloa  could  be  taken  either  by  artillery  attack  or  by 
escalade ;  offering  to  undertake  the  task  with  the 
Pennsylvania  and  two  sloops-of-war.  If  not  thought 
to  have  rank  enough  for  such  a  command,  he  was 
willing  to  go  back  to  the  position  of  executive  officer 
of  the  Pennsylvania,  in  order,  in  that  capacity,  to 
organize  the  crew  for  the  attack.  The  opinion  thus 
expressed  ran  counter  to  the  routine  prejudices  of 
the  day,  and,  coming  from  an  officer  who  had  as  yet 
had  no  opportunity  to  establish  his  particular  claim 
to  be  heard,  rather  hurt  than  improved  his  chances 
for  employment.  It  was  not  till  February,  1847, 
nearly  a  year  after  the  war  began,  and  then  with 
"much  difficulty,"  that  he  obtained  command  of  the 
sloop-of-war  Saratoga  ;  but  when  he  reached  Vera 
Cruz  in  her,  the  castle  had  already  passed  into  the 
hands  of  the  United  States,  having  surrendered  to 
the  forces  under  General  Scott  on  the  26th  of  March. 
That  this  capture  should  have  been  made  by  the 
army  rather  than  by  the  navy  was  a  severe  disap- 
pointment to  Farragut,  who  had  so  long  cherished 
the  hope  that  its  fall  should  have  been  the  brilliant 
achievement  of  his  own  service.  In  his  mortification 
he  used  an  expression  which,  in  the  light  of  his  own 
subsequent  career,  seems  a  twofold  prophecy.  "  The 
navy  would  stand  on  a  different  footing  to-day  if  our 
ships  had  made  the  attack.  It  was  all  we  could  do, 
and  should  have  been  done  at  all  hazards.     Commo- 


g6  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

dore  Conner  thought  differently,  however,  and  the 
old  officers  at  home  backed  his  opinion ;  but  they  all 
paid  the  penalty — not  one  of  them  will  wear  an  ad- 
miral's flag,  which  they  might  have  done  if  that  castle 
had  been  taken  by  the  navy,  which  must  have  been 
the  result  of  an  attack."  It  was  to  such  enterprise 
at  the  hands  of  the  men  of  his  own  time,  among 
whom  he  was  foremost,  that  the  navy  at  a  later 
day  did  obtain  the  admiral's  flag  which  it  had  so 
long  in  vain  desired. 

The  frustration  of  this  high  ambition  was  not  the 
only  misfortune  to  Farragut  arising  out  of  the  Mexi- 
can war.  He  contracted  the  yellow  fever  on  the 
station,  nearly  losing  his  life ;  and  subsequently  be- 
came involved  in  a  controversy  with  the  commodore 
of  the  squadron,  who  he  believed  had,  in  the  assign- 
ment of  duty,  treated  him  and  his  ship  with  unfair 
discrimination,  due  to  personal  ill-will  toward  him- 
self. The  correspondence  had  no  results ;  but  such 
quarrels  are  rarely  other  than  hurtful  to  the  junior 
officer  engaged.  It  is  not  singular,  therefore,  that 
he  speaks  of  this  cruise  as  the  most  mortifying  of. all 
the  service  he  had  seen  since  entering  the  navy.  "  I 
have  little,"  he  said  again,  "  to  look  back  to  with 
satisfaction  or  pleasure  at  this  time,  except  the  con- 
sciousness of  having  done  my  duty."  Smarting  under 
the  belief  that  he  was  being  imposed  upon,  he  wrote 
to  the  Navy  Department  complaining  of  injustice,  and 
asking  that  either  he  himself  should  be  relieved  or 
the  ship  sent  home.  He  candidly  admits  that  his 
letters  were  considered  improper  by  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy,  but  the  Saratoga  was  ordered  to  return  to 
the  United  States,  and  was  paid  off  at  New  York  in 
February,  1848.     In  her  short  cruise  there  had  been 


COMMANDER   AND   CAPTAIN. 


97 


one  hundred  cases  of  yellow  fever  in  her  crew  of  one 
hundred  and  fifty,  and  her  commander  had  been 
obliged,  to  use  his  own  expression,  "  to  rid  the  serv- 
ice "  of  five  of  her  junior  officers,  and  on  the  last  day 
to  bring  the  first  lieutenant  to  trial  for  drunkenness. 
Altogether,  the  Mexican  war  and  the  cruise  of  the 
Saratoga  seem  to  have  marked  the  lowest  point  of 
disappointment  and  annoyance  that  Farragut  was 
called  upon  to  encounter  during  his  naval  career. 

Immediately  after  leaving  the  Saratoga,  Farragut 
was  again  ordered  to  duty  in  his  former  position  at 
the  Norfolk  navy  yard.  Two  years  later  he  was 
called  to  Washington  to  draw  up,  in  connection  with 
some  other  officers,  a  book  of  Ordnance  Regula- 
tions for  the  navy.  This  occupied  him  for  eighteen 
months.  As  when  in  New  Haven,  twenty-five  years 
before,  he  had  improved  the  opportunity  of  hearing 
the  lectures  at  Yale  College,  so  at  this  later  period  he 
attended  regularly  those  of  the  Smithsonian  Institu- 
tion, losing,  he  records,  but  a  single  one.  "  You  will 
rarely  come  away  from  such  lectures,"  he  adds, 
"  without  being  somewhat  wiser  than  you  went  in." 
Where  precisely  such  knowledge  might  come  into 
play  he  could  not,  indeed,  foresee,  but  he  acted  always 
on  the  principle  that  any  knowledge  might  at  some 
time  become  useful ;  just  as,  when  at  Vera  Cruz, 
though  he  did  not  at  the  time  look  forward  to  a  war 
with  Mexico,  he  closely  examined  every  point  of  in- 
terest, for  "  I  have  made  it  a  rule  of  my  life  to  note 
these  things  with  a  view  to  the  possible  future." 

When  the  Ordnance  Regulations  were  finished, 
in  the  spring  of  1852,  Farragut  was  again  assigned 
to  the  Norfolk  navy  yard,  and  directed  to  utilize  the 
experience  he  had  gained  in  compiling  them  by  giving 


93 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


weekly  lectures  on  gunnery  to  the  officers  on  the 
station.  In  prosecution  of  the  same  line  of  profes- 
sional work,  he  was  soon  after  ordered  to  conduct  a 
series  of  experiments  at  Old  Point  Comfort,  near 
Norfolk,  to  determine  certain  questions  connected 
with  the  endurance  of  iron  cannon ;  the  discharges 
being  continued  with  one  or  two  of  each  class  of 
service  guns  until  they  burst.  Some  very  important 
results  were  obtained;  but  the  circumstance  con- 
nected with  this  duty  which  has  now  most  interest, 
is  that  in  it  Farragut  was  associated  with  Lieutenant 
Percival  Drayton,  who  was  afterward  his  flag-captain 
and  chief-of-staff  at  the  battle  of  Mobile  Bay.  The 
intimacy  formed  during  this  year  of  experimental 
duty  at  Old  Point  lasted  throughout  their  lives. 

Soon  after  this  the  Crimean  war  broke  out.  Far- 
ragut's  desire  for  his  own  professional  improvement 
and  for  the  progress  of  the  service  led  him  to  make 
application  to  the  Navy  Department  to  be  sent  to  the 
seat  of  war, "  to  visit  the  fleets  of  England  and  France, 
and  ascertain  whether  in  the  outfits  and  preparation 
for  war  they  possess  any  advantages  over  our  own 
ships-of-war,  and,  if  so,  in  what  they  consist."  The 
utility  of  such  a  mission  can  not  be  doubted,  and  his 
occupations  of  the  past  few  years  particularly  pre- 
pared him  for  such  an  inquiry.  Had  the  Navy  De- 
partment then  had  any  systematic  record  of  the 
aptitude  shown  by  individual  officers,  and  of  the  work 
done  by  them,  it  must  have  recognized  Farragut's 
peculiar  fitness  for  duties  of  this  kind;  which  have 
since  his  time  been  organized  and  given  a  most  com- 
prehensive scope  under  the  Intelligence  Office  of  the 
Navy  Department.  As  it  was,  his  application  re- 
ceived no  other  reply  than  a  polite  acknowledgment 


COMMANDER   AND   CAPTAIN.  99 

A  commission,  consisting  of  three  officers  of  the  En- 
gineer Corps  of  the  army,  was  sent  by  the  War  De- 
partment to  visit  Europe  and  the  seat  of  war,  and 
upon  its  return  made  an  elaborate  report;  but  at  this 
critical  period  of  naval  progress,  when  sail  was  mani- 
festly giving  place  to  steam,  when  the  early  attempts 
at  iron-clad  batteries  were  being  made,  and  the  vast 
changes  in  armament  that  have  since  taken  place 
were&certainly,  though  as  yet  dimly,  indicated,  it  did 
not  appear  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
a  matter  of  sufficient  importance  to  inquire,  on  the 
spot,  into  the  practical  working  of  the  new  instru- 
ments under  the  test  of  war. 

Although   doubtless  not  so   intended,  the  Navy 
Department  emphasized  its  decision  not  to  send  Far- 
ragut  to  the   East  by  assigning  him  to  duty  as  far 
west  as  the  naval  interests  of  the  United  States,  with- 
in its  own  borders,  then  allowed.     In  August,  1854, 
four  months  after  his  application  for  the  former  em- 
ployment, he  was  ordered  to  California  as  first  com- 
mandant of  the  navy  yard  at  Mare  Island.     The  site 
had  been  selected  in  the  year  1852  by  a  commission 
of  three  officers,  but  as  yet  no  navy  yard  existed.     It 
was  to   be  Farragut's   particular  duty  to  plan  and 
build  it  up  under  the  general  instructions  of  the  De- 
partment.    His  selection  for  this  difficult  and  oner- 
ous, but  at  the  same  time  very  flattering,  appointment 
was  among  the  first  evident  results  of  the  diligent, 
painstaking  effort  which  had  marked  his  professional 
career.     By  that,  and  by  that  only,  had  he  as  yet  had 
any  opportunity  of  marking  himself  above  the  or- 
dinary run  of  men ;  but  he  stood  high  in  the  esteem 
of   Commodore  Joseph   Smith,   then   and  for  many 
years  both  before  and  after,  the  chief  of  the  Bureau 


IOO  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

of  Yards  and  Docks,  under  whose  charge  the  man- 
agement and  development  of  navy  yards  more  par- 
ticularly came.  At  the  critical  period  when  the 
selection  of  an  officer  to  command  in  the  attack  upon 
New  Orleans  had  to  be  made,  Smith,  who  had  close 
confidential  relations  with  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
always  held  that  Farragut  was  the  man  above  all 
others  for  the  place. 

The  site  of  the  new  yard  was  in  the  extensive 
sheet  of  inland  waters  connected  with  the  bay  of 
San  Francisco,  and  some  thirty  miles  from  the  city. 
There  being  no  accommodations  upon  the  island, 
Farragut,  with  his  family,  for  some  seven  months 
lived  on  board  an  old  sloop-of-war  anchored  near  by. 
He  remained  at  this  station  for  four  years,  during 
which  great  progress  was  made  in  the  development 
of  the  yard ;  but  the  duty,  though  most  important 
and  particularly  responsible,  because  of  the  length 
of  time  required  by  correspondence  to  pass  to  and 
from  Washington,  was  not  fruitful  of  incident.  These 
were  the  troublous  early  times  of  California — the  days 
of  the  Vigilance  Committee  and  the  Law  and  Order 
Party.  With  these  intestine  troubles  of  a  State  the 
military  officers  of  the  United  States  had  no  proper 
concern  ;  but  there  was  continually  a  possibility  that 
they  might  be  forced  to  take  a  stand  by  the  interfer- 
ence of  one  side  or  the  other  with  civil  officials  of 
the  United  States  Government,  or  might  be  induced, 
by  a  request  from  the  authorities,  to  act  upon  the 
ground  that  there  was  no  time  to  refer  to  Washing- 
ton for  instructions.  It  is  unnecessary  to  enter  into 
any  examination  of  Farragut's  course  during  this 
period,  although  the  affairs  with  which  he  had  to  deal 
became  at  times  both  critical  and  delicate.     It  will 


COMMANDER  AND  CAPTAIN.  ior 

be  sufficient  to  say  that  the  Navy  Department,  after 
receiving  his  reports,  approved  his  conduct  as  having 
been  prudent  and  yet  marked  by  a  proper  spirit. 

In  July,  1858,  Farragut  returned  to  the  East  by 
the  only  route  then  available,  the  Isthmus  of  Pana- 
ma. During  his  absence,  on  the  14th  of  September, 
1855,  he  had  been  promoted  to  the  rank  of  captain, 
which,  prior  to  the  Civil  War,  was  the  highest  grade 
in  the  United  States  Navy ;  the  title  commodore, 
then  so  frequently  applied  to  the  older  officers  of  the 
service,  being  simply  one  of  courtesy  given  to  a  cap- 
tain who  had  commanded  a  squadron  of  several 
vessels,  but  who  did  not  thereby  cease  to  be  borne 
as  a  captain  upon  the  Navy  Register.  Soon  after  his 
arrival  Farragut  was  ordered  to  command  the  Brook- 
lyn, one  of  six  steam  sloops-of-war  just  being  com- 
pleted. She  belonged  to  that  new  navy  of  thirty 
years  ago  which  the  United  States  Government, 
most  luckily  for  itself,  had  determined  to  build,  and 
which  became  fairly  available  just  in  time  for  the 
exigencies  of  the  Civil  War. 

It  has  been  said,  and  that  on  the  floors  of  Congress 
by  a  politician  conspicuous  in  his  party,  that  past  his- 
tory teaches  that  preparation  for  war  is  unnecessary  to 
the  United  States,  and  the  conditions  precedent  to  the 
wars  of  1812  and  1861  have  been  cited  in  support  of 
the  assertion.  Certainly  no  one  cognizant  of  the  facts 
will  deny  that  the  United  States  was  most  miserably 
unprepared  for  either  war  as  regards  the  size  of  her 
navy ;  but  it  so  happened  on  both  occasions,  more  by 
good  luck  than  good  management,  that  what  navy  it 
did  have  was  of  remarkably  fine  quality,  and,  to  the 
extent  to  which  its  numbers  permitted  it  to  be  em- 
ployed, was  generally  perfectly  adequate  to  the  work 


l02  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

it  had  to  do.  It  could  not,  however,  begin  to  touch 
the  full  amount  of  service  it  ought  to  have  done.  In 
1812  it  could  not  protect  the  Chesapeake  nor  the 
Mississippi;  it  was  blockaded  in  its  own  ports,  es- 
caping only  by  evasion  ;  it  could  not  protect  Ameri- 
can commerce,  which  suffered  more  than  did  that  of 
Great  Britain.  In  1861,  had  its  numbers  been  at  all 
adequate,  it  could  by  prompt  action  have  forestalled 
the  preparations  of  the  enemy,  and  by  prevention 
secured  immediate  advantages  which  were  afterward 
achieved  only  by  large  expenditure  of  time  and  fight- 
ing. Such  were  the  results  of  unpreparedness.  It 
was  to  the  preparation,  scanty  as  it  was — to  the  fine 
ships  and  superior  armaments,  both  too  few — that  the 
successes  of  either  era  were  due.  The  frigates  and 
sloops  of  1812  were  among  the  finest  of  their  class  to 
be  found  anywhere,  with  powerful  batteries  and  ex- 
cellently officered;  while  in  the  decade  before  the 
Civil  War  began  there  had  been  built  eighteen  or 
twenty  new  steamships,  admirably  efficient  for  their 
day,  and  with  armaments  of  an  advanced  and  power- 
ful type.  Upon  these  fell  the  principal  brunt  of  the 
naval  fighting  that  ensued.  These  ships,  and  par- 
ticularly those  of  the  Brooklyn  class,  were  the  back- 
bone of  Farragut's  fleet  throughout  all  his  actions, 
even  in  the  last  at  Mobile  in  1864.  Had  there  been 
thrice  as  many,  the  work  would  have  been  sooner  and 
therefore  more  cheaply  done;  but  had  the  lack  of 
preparation  in  1861  equaled  that  of  185 1  or  1881,  it 
may  be  questioned  whether  any  of  his  successes  could 
have  been  won. 

When  Farragut  took  command  of  the  Brooklyn, 
ten  years  had  elapsed  since  he  was  last  afloat — years 
pregnant  with  naval  change.     He  had  never  before 


COMMANDER   AND   CAPTAIN.  103 

served  in  a  steamer,  except  for  a  very  short  time  in 
a  primitive  one  belonging  to  Porter's  Mosquito  fleet, 
in  1823.  The  changes  in  the  disposition  and  hand- 
ling of  the  guns  had  not  been  radical.  They  were 
still  arranged  "  in  broadside,"  along  the  two  sides  of 
the  vessel ;  nor  were  the  pivot  guns — which,  as  their 
name  implies,  could  be  pivoted  to  one  side  or  the 
other,  according  to  the  position  of  an  enemy — a  new 
idea.  In  these  matters  there  had  been  improvement 
and  development,  but  not  revolution.  But  while  the 
mode  of  placing  and  handling  was  essentially  the 
same,  the  guns  themselves  had  greatly  increased  in 
size  and  received  important  modifications  in  pattern. 
The  system  then  in  vogue  was  that  associated  with 
the  name  of  the  late  Admiral  Dahlgren.  The  shape 
of  the  gun  had  been  made  to  conform  to  the  strains 
brought  by  the  discharge  upon  its  various  parts,  as 
determined  by  careful  experiment ;  and  in  place  of 
the  32-pounder,  or  six-inch  gun,  which  had  been  the 
principal  weapon  of  the  earlier  ships,  the  batteries  of 
the  new  frigates  and  sloops  were  composed  chiefly  of 
nine-inch  guns,  with  one  or  more  pivots  of  ten-  or 
eleven-inch  bore.  The  shell-shot,  whose  destructive 
effects  had  excited  Farragut's  comments  in  1838,  were 
now  the  recognized  type  of  projectile;  and  the  new 
guns  were  spoken  of  distinctively  as  shell-guns,  be- 
cause not  expected  to  use  solid  shot  under  ordinary 
circumstances.  The  Brooklyn  and  her  fellows,  among 
which  was  Farragut's  future  flag-ship,  the  Hartford, 
although  screw  steamers,  had  also  the  full  sail  power 
of  the  former  sailing  ship;  and  they  were  wooden, 
not  iron  vessels. 

The  service  of  the  Brooklyn,  while  under  Farra- 
gut's command,  was  chiefly  confined  to  his  old  cruis- 


104 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


ing  ground  in  the  West  Indies  and  in  Mexico.  In 
the  latter  country,  since  the  termination  of  the  war 
with  the  United  States  in  1848,  there  had  been  a 
constant  succession  of  revolutions ;  and  at  the  time 
of  the  Brooklyn's  cruise  there  was  established  in 
Vera  Cruz  a  constitutional  party,  at  whose  head  was 
Benito  Juarez,  the  lawful  claimant  of  the  presidency. 
Opposed  to  this,  in  the  city  of  Mexico,  was  the  party 
headed  by  General  Miramon,  who  had  succeeded  by 
force  to  the  authority  of  Juarez's  predecessor.  The 
United  States  threw  its  influence  on  the  side  of 
Juarez ;  and  its  minister,  Robert  McLane,  was  per- 
mitted to  use  the  Brooklyn  to  carry  him  from  point 
to  point  of  the  coast.  While  no  force  was  exerted, 
the  support  given  to  the  minister's  remonstrances 
by  the  constant  presence  of  a  powerful  ship-of-war 
served  to  emphasize  the  policy  of  the  Government, 
which  had  recognized  Juarez.  This  recognition  was 
followed  some  time  later  by  a  similar  step  on  the 
part  of  the  ministers  of  England,  France,  and  Spain. 
Mr.  McLane  continued  with  the  Brooklyn  during 
great  part  of  1859,  and  in  December  of  that  year  re- 
turned in  her  to  the  Mississippi,  where  he  was  landed 
at  a  plantation  below  New  Orleans.  This  visit  to 
his  early  home  was  marked  by  a  sad  coincidence  to 
Farragut.  His  elder  brother,  William,  a  lieutenant 
in  the  navy,  had  long  been  retired  from  active  serv- 
ice, for  which  he  was  unfitted  by  rheumatism.  In 
consequence  he  had  not  received  promotion,  remain- 
ing at  the  head  of  the  list  of  lieutenants,  and  being 
assigned  to  duty  at  the  naval  rendezvous  in  New 
Orleans.  When  the  Brooklyn  entered  the  river  he 
was  lying  at  the  point  of  death,  but  heard  of  his 
brother's  approach,  and  expressed  a  hope  that   he 


COMMANDER  AND  CAPTAIN.  105 

might  live  long  enough  to  see  him  again  after  so 
many  years  of  separation.  The  wish  was  not  to  be 
fulfilled.  Though  ignorant  of  the  danger,  Captain 
Farragut  hastened  to  the  city,  himself  also  looking 
forward  with  pleasure  to  the  meeting;  but  he  ar- 
rived only  in  time  to  see  his  brother  dead,  and  to 
follow  him  to  the  grave. 

Farragut  remained  attached  to  the  Brooklyn  for 
two  years.  In  October,  i860,  he  was  relieved  by 
Captain  W.  S.  Walker,  and  returned  to  his  home  in 
Norfolk.  This  ended  his  sea  service  prior  to  the 
Civil  War,  and  as  the  captain  of  a  single  ship. 
Thenceforward,  during  the  brief  but  important  rem- 
nant of  his  active  career,  he  was  to  command  great 
fleets. 


CHAPTER   VI. 

THE   QUESTION    OF    ALLEGIANCE. 
1860-1861. 

When  Captain  Farragut  returned  to  Norfolk  in 
October,  i860,  he  was,  albeit  unconsciously,  rapidly 
approaching  the  turning  point  of  his  life,  the  tide  in 
his  affairs  which  taken  at  the  flood  should  lead  on 
to  fortune.  That  he  seized  the  opportunity  was  due  to 
no  dexterous  weighing  of  the  effects  of  either  course 
upon  his  personal  future,  but  to  that  preparedness  of 
mind  which  has  already  been  mentioned  as  one  of 
his  characteristic  traits,  and  to  the  tenacity  with 
which  were  held  his  convictions  thus  deliberately 
and  maturely  formed.  For  several  years  he  had 
watched  with  unquiet  mind  the  gathering  clouds 
which  preceded  the  approaching  storm,  and  in  com- 
mon with  others  had  felt  the  distress  and  perplexity 
which  would  attend  the  rupture  of  the  Union.  He 
did  not,  however,  remain  a  merely  passive  spectator, 
agitated  as  such  by  hopes  and  fears,  but  trusting-, 
withal  to  the  chapter  of  accidents.  He  had  con- 
sidered the  effect  of  the  alternatives  before  the 
country,  and  what  his  own  duty  should  be  in  any 
case.  He  could  not,  in  his  modest  position,  control 
the  course  of  events ;  but,  whatever  befell,  he  would 
be  ready  to  take  his  stand,  strengthened  in  so  doing 


THE   QUESTION   OF  ALLEGIANCE.  107 

by  the  settled  principles  to  which  his  conscientious 
meditation  had  led  him.  Thus  his  fixed  purpose,  en- 
lightened by  reason,  had  in  it  nothing  of  obstinacy; 
yet  resisted  those  appeals  to  affection,  to  interest,  or 
to  prejudice,  under  which  so  many  succumbed. 

Within  a  month  after  his  leaving  the  Brooklyn, 
on  the  6th  of  November,  i860,  the  presidential  elec- 
tion was  held,  and  resulted,  as  had  been  expected,  in 
the  choice  of  Mr.  Lincoln.  On  the  20th  of  Decem- 
ber South  Carolina  seceded,  and  her  course  was  fol- 
lowed within  the  next  six  weeks  by  the  other  cotton 
States.  In  February,  186 1,  delegates  from  these 
States  met  in  convention  at  Montgomery,  Alabama, 
adopted  a  constitution,  and  elected  Jefferson  Davis 
to  be  president  of  their  confederation.  On  the  18th 
he  was  inaugurated,  and  the  new  government  was 
thus  formally  constituted. 

Here  for  a  moment  the  secession  movement 
paused,  and  Farragut  earnestly  trusted  would  stop. 
Born  in  a  Southern  State,  and  passing  his  childhood 
in  the  extreme  Southwest,  his  relations  with  both  had 
been  severed  at  too  early  an  age  to  establish  any 
lasting  hold  upon  his  affections;  but,  though  he  was 
to  the  end  carried  upon  the  Navy  Register  as  a  citi- 
zen of  Tennessee,  the  tenderest  and  most  enduring 
ties  of  his  life  had  been  formed  in  Virginia.  No- 
where were  local  bonds  stronger,  nowhere  State  pride 
greater  or  more  justified,  than  in  the  famous  Common- 
wealth, which  had  stood  in  the  center  of  the  line  in 
the  struggle  for  independence,  and  had  given  to  the 
nation  so  many  illustrious  men  from  Washington 
downward.  It  was  impossible  that  Farragut — who  at 
so  early  an  age,  and  when  attached  to  no  other  spot, 
had  married  in  Norfolk,  and  thenceforward  gone  in 


I08  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

and  out  among  its  people — should  be  insensible  to 
these  influences,  or  look  without  grief  to  a  contin- 
gency which  should  force  him  to  sunder  all  these 
associations  and  go  forth,  on  the  verge  of  old  age, 
to  seek  elsewhere  a  new  home.  Nor  is  it  possible 
to  many,  however  conscious  of  right,  to  bear  without 
suffering  the  alienation  and  the  contempt  visited 
upon  those  who,  in  times  of  keen  political  excite- 
ment, dare  to  differ  from  the  general  passion  which 
sways  the  mass  around  them. 

Farragut  therefore  naturally  hoped  that  this  bit- 
ter trial  might  be  spared  him.  The  Virginian  people 
had  taken  what  seemed  then  to  be  a  conservative 
attitude ;  and,  although  he  was  determined  to  abide 
by  the  Union  if  it  were  severed  by  violent  action,  he 
was  anxious  to  believe  that  his  home  might  be  saved 
to  him.  The  Legislature  of  the  State  met  early  in 
January  and  recommended  all  the  States  to  appoint 
deputies  to  a  peace  convention,  which  accordingly 
met  on  the  4th  of  February ;  but  the  propositions 
made  by  it  were  not  such  as  the  National  Congress 
could  accept.  On  the  13th  of  the  same  month  there 
was  assembled  at  Richmond  a  State  convention, 
the  majority  of  the  delegates  to  which  were  Union 
men,  in  the  then  sense  of  the  word  in  that  State. 
This  fact,  and  the  character  of  some  of  the  speeches 
made,  tended  to  encourage  the  belief  to  which  Farra- 
gut's  wishes  led  him  ;  but  this  hope  was  soon  damped 
by  the  passage  of  resolutions  affirming  the  right  of 
secession,  and  defining  the  grounds  upon  which  Vir- 
ginia would  be  justified  in  exercising  the  right. 
Among  these  grounds  were  the  adoption  of  any 
warlike  measures  by  the  United  States  Government, 
the  recapture  of  the  forts  which  had  been  seized  by 


THE   QUESTION   OF  ALLEGIANCE.  I0<) 

the  States  already  seceded,  or  any  attempt  to  exact 
duties  from  them.     True,  this  was  followed  during 
the  first  week  in  April  by  the  rejection  of  a  proposi- 
tion to  secede  by  a  vote  of  eighty-nine  to  forty-five; 
but,  as  Farragut  held  that  the  President  would  be 
justified  in  calling  out  troops  when  the  forts  and 
property  of  the  nation  had  been  violently  taken  from 
it,  the  contrary  avowal  of  the  Legislature  of  his  State 
showed  that  he  might  soon  be  forced  to  choose  be- 
tween it  and  the  National  Government.    In  that  case 
his  mind  was  fully  made  up;  the  choice  was  painful, 
but  not  doubtful.     "  God  forbid,"  he  said,  "  that  I 
should  have  to  raise  my  hand  against  the   South ! " 
but  the  words  themselves  showed  that,  however  bit- 
ter the  decision,  he  was  ready  to  make  it.    If  separa- 
tion between  the  sections  came  peacefully,  by  mutual 
consent,  he  would  abide  in  the  only  home  his  man- 
hood had  known,  and  cast  his  lot  thenceforth  with 
the  people  to  whom  he  was  allied  and  among  whom 
his  interests  lay  ;  but  if  the  rupture  took  the  form 
of  violent  rebellion  against  the  Central  Government, 
whose  claims  he  admitted   and  to  which  he  owned 
allegiance,   he  was  prepared  to  turn  his  arms  even 
against  those   who   in  the  other  alternative  would 
have  been  his  countrymen.     The  attitude  thus  held 
during  those  long  months  of  suspense  and  anxiety 
was  honorable  alike  to  his  heart,  which  responded 
warmly  to  the  calls  of  natural  affection,  and  to  his 
conscience,  which   subordinated  the  dictates  of  the 
heart   to    his  convictions    of    right ;    while   the   un- 
hesitating character  of  his  resolution,  amid  the  un- 
certainties  that    unsettled    so  many   men,  must   be 
attributed  to  that  habit  of  preparing  for  emergencies 
which  characterized  his  career. 


HO  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

On  the  12th  of  April,  1861,  the  long  period  of 
waiting  and  watching  was  brought  to  an  end  by  the 
attack  upon  Fort  Sumter.  On  the  15th  President 
Lincoln  issued  his  proclamation  formally  announcing 
the  condition  of  affairs  which  existed  in  the  seceded 
States,  the  defiance  of  the  Central  Government,  and 
the  seizure  of  its  property.  In  consequence  he  called 
for  seventy-five  thousand  men  from  the  militia  of 
the  various  States,  and  avowed  clearly  that  "  the 
first  service  assigned  to  the  forces  hereby  called 
forth  will  probably  be  to  repossess  the  forts,  places, 
and  property  which  have  been  seized  from  the  Union." 
This  was  clearly  an  appeal  to  arms,  provoked  finally 
by  the  assault  upon  Fort  Sumter,  but  which  the  con- 
vention then  sitting  in  Richmond  had  pronounced  to 
be  a  lawful  cause  for  secession.  In  the  excitement 
of  the  hour  the  Union  men,  whose  attitude  toward 
the  more  violent  party  had  been  almost  apologetic, 
were  swept  away  by  the  current  of  feeling,  and  an 
ordinance  of  secession  was  passed  by  the  convention 
on  the  17th  of  April,  1861. 

During  the  previous  winter  Farragut  had  been 
residing  in  Norfolk,  unemployed  by  the  Government, 
but  in  daily  association  both  with  citizens  and  naval 
officers ;  many  of  whom,  like  himself,  were  married 
and  settled  there.  He  and  his  friends  met  daily  at 
one  of  those  common  rendezvous  which  are  to  be 
found  in  every  small  town,  and  there  discussed  the 
news  which  each  day  brought  of  change  and  excite- 
ment. In  this  way  Farragut  became  acquainted  with 
the  views  of  most  of  the  resident  officers,  and  real- 
ized, without  being  himself  swayed  by,  the  influences 
to  which  all  of  them,  and  especially  those  of  Southern 
birth,  were  subjected.     With  the  conservatism  com- 


THE   QUESTION   OF   ALLEGIANCE.  m 

mon  in  seamen  who  have  been  for  long  periods  sepa- 
rated by  their  profession  from  their  native  places, 
the  great  majority  of  these  officers,  already  men  of 
middle  age,  could  not  but  feel  keen  sorrow  at  the 
prospect  of  changes,  which  would  remove  them  from 
the  navy  and  separate  them  from  the  flag  which  had 
hitherto  stood  to  them  for  country.  But,  moved  by 
feeling  and  prejudice,  wrought  upon  by  the  strong 
appeals  of  those  they  loved,  and  unfortified  by  the 
well-reasoned  convictions  which  made  the  strength 
of  Farragut,  it  was  equally  impossible  for  the  greater 
part  of  them  to  imitate  his  example.  The  sense  of 
duty  and  official  honor  which  they  owed  to  their  long 
training  in  a  generous  service  stood  by  them,  and 
few  were  the  cases  of  men  false  to  trusts  actually  in 
their  charge ;  but  theirs  was  not  that  sense  of  per- 
sonal allegiance  to  the  Government  which  gave  the 
light  of  the  single  eye,  and  enabled  Farragut's  final 
decision  to  be  as  prompt  as  it  was  absolute. 

On  the  1 8th  of  April,  the  day  after  the  ordinance 
of  secession  had  been  passed,  Farragut  went  as  usual 
to  the  place  of  meeting,  and  saw,  immediately  upon 
entering,  by  the  faces  of  those  there,  that  a  great 
change  had  passed  over  "the  relations  between  them. 
He  spoke  with  his  usual  openness,  and  expressed  his 
deliberate  convictions.  He  did  not  believe  that  the 
action  of  the  convention  represented  the  sober  judg- 
ment of  the  people.  The  State  had  been,  as  he 
phrased  it,  "dragooned"  out  of  the  Union;  and 
President  Lincoln  was  perfectly  justified  in  calling 
for  troops  after  the  seizure  of  the  forts  and  arsenals. 
One  of  those  present  remarked  impatiently  that  a 
person  with  such  sentiments  could  not  live  in  Nor- 
folk, and  this  feeling  was  evidently  shared  by  the 


II2  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

bystanders ;  there  was,  indeed,  some  danger,  in  those 
excited  moments,  of  personal  violence  to  those  who 
dared  gainsay  the  popular  passion.  "  Very  well,"  re- 
plied Farragut,  •' I  can  live  somewhere  else."  No 
time  was  needed  to  take  a  decision  already  contin- 
gently formed,  and  for  executing  which  he  had,  with 
his  customary  foresight,  been  accumulating  the  neces- 
sary funds.  He  at  once  went  to  his  house  and  told 
his  wife  the  time  had  come  for  her  to  decide  whether 
she  would  remain  with  her  own  kinsfolk  or  follow 
him  North.  Her  choice  was  as  instant  as  his  own, 
and  that  evening  they,  with  their  only  son,  left  Nor- 
folk, never  to  return  to  it  as  their  home.  Mrs.  Far- 
ragut's  sister  and  her  young  family  accompanied 
them  in  the  steamer  to  Baltimore.  Upon  reaching 
the  latter  city  they  found  it  also  boiling  over  with 
excitement.  The  attack  upon  the  Massachusetts 
troops  had  just  taken  place,  and  the  railroad  bridges 
over  the  Susquehanna  were  then  burning.  The  usual 
means  of  communication  being  thus  broken  off,  Far- 
ragut and  his  party  had  to  take  passage  for  Philadel- 
phia in  a  canal  boat,  on  which  were  crowded  some 
three  hundred  passengers,  many  of  them  refugees 
like  themselves.  It  is  a  curious  illustration  of  the 
hardships  attending  a  flight  under  such  exigency, 
even  in  so  rich  a  country  as  our  own,  that  a  baby  in 
the  company  had  to  be  fed  on  biscuit  steeped  in 
brandy  for  want  of  proper  nourishment. 

From  Philadelphia  the  journey  to  New  York  was 
easy,  and  Farragut  there  settled  his  family  in  a  small 
cottage  in  the  village  of  Hastings,  on  the  Hudson 
River.  Here  he  awaited  events,  hoping  for  employ- 
ment ;  but  it  is  one  of  the  cruel  circumstances  at- 
tending civil  strife  that  confidence  is  shaken,  and  the 


THE   QUESTION   OF   ALLEGIANCE.  113 

suspicions  that  arise,  however  unjust,  defy  reason  and 
constrain  the  Government  to  defer  to  them.     No  man 
could  have  given  stronger  proof  than  Farragut  had 
of  his  perfect  loyalty  ;  but  all  shades  of  opinion  were 
known   to   exist   among  officers  of  Southern  origin, 
even  when  they  remained  in  the  service,  and  there 
were  those  who,  though  refusing  to  follow  the  South, 
would  willingly  have  avoided  striking  a  blow  against 
the  seceding  States.     Men  were  heard  to  say  that 
they    would    not   go    with    their    State,  but   neither 
would  they  fight  against   her;    or  that   they  would 
remain  in  the  navy,  but  seek  employment  that  might 
spare  them  the  pain  of  taking  part  in  such  a  contest. 
These  illogical  positions  were  soon  abandoned  as  the 
spirit   of  war  gained  more  and  more  hold  upon  the 
feelings  of  men,  but  for  Farragut  they  never  existed 
after  the  first  blow  was  struck.     Through  whatever 
struggles  with  himself  he  may  have   passed  in  the 
earlier   stages  of  the   secession   movement,  his  de- 
cision, when  reached,  admitted  no  half-measures,  nor 
halted   between    two    opinions.     "  He    stood   on   no 
neutral  ground,  he  longed  to  take  an  active  part  in 
the  war."     Nevertheless,  the   Government  could  not 
at  once  accept,  as  a  title  to  full  and  implicit  confi- 
dence, even  the  sacrifice  of  home  and  life-long  asso- 
ciations which    he    had    made    to    the   cause  of  the 
Union.     If  given  any  duty,  a  man  of  Farragut's  rank 
and  attainments  must  needs  have  one  involving  much 
responsibility,   failure    in   which   would    involve   not 
only  himself  but  those  who  had  employed  him.     The 
cry  of  treachery  was  sure  to   follow,  and  prudent 
officers  of  Southern  birth  found  it  advisable  to  decline 
employments  where  they  foresaw  that  delays  were 
unavoidable,  because  they  felt  that  what  might  be 


H4 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


explained  in  the  case  of  a  Northern  man  would  in 
them  be  stamped  by  public  opinion  as  the  result  of 
disaffection.  In  Hastings  and  its  neighborhood  the 
most  grotesque  suspicions  were  spread  concerning 
the  Southern  captain  who  had  thus  come  to  dwell 
among  them,  and  who,  for  conscience  and  country, 
had  given  up  more  than  had  been  demanded  of  those 
who  thus  distrusted  him.  Time  was  needed  to  allow 
men's  minds  to  reach  a  more  reasonable  frame,  and 
for  the  Government  itself  to  sift  and  test,  not  merely 
the  fidelity,  but  the  heartiness  and  the  probable  ca- 
pacity of  the  officers  at  its  command. 

Farragut's  first  employment  was  as  a  member  of 
a  board  to  recommend  officers  for  retirement  from 
active  service,  under  an  act  approved  August  3, 
1861.  The  object  of  this  act  was  to  assist  the  De- 
partment in  the  discrimination  necessary  to  be  made 
between  the  competent  and  those  disabled  by  years 
or  infirmity,  for  up  to  that  time  there  had  been  no 
regular  system  of  retirement,  and  men  were  retained 
on  the  active  list  past  the  period  of  efficiency,  be- 
cause no  provision  for  removing  them  existed.  The 
duty,  though  most  important  with  war  actually  exist- 
ing, was  delicate  and  trying,  and  far  from  consonant 
to  Farragut's  active,  enterprising  character.  More 
suitable  employment  was,  however,  fast  approaching 


Bradley  i-  Bmtet  Bngn,  .v.  1". 


Scene  of  Farragu 


Operations,  1862  1864. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE    NEW    ORLEANS   EXPEDITION. 
1862. 

The  necessity  of  controlling  the  Mississippi  val- 
ley had  been  early  realized  by  the  United  States 
Government.  In  its  hands  the  great  stream  would 
become  an  impassable  barrier  between  two  large 
sections  of  the  Southern  Confederacy;  whereas  in 
the  possession  of  the  latter  it  remained  a  link  bind- 
ing together  all  the  regions  through  which  it  flowed, 
or  which  were  penetrated  by  any  of  its  numerous 
tributaries.  The  extensive  territory  west  of  the 
river  also  produced  a  large  part  of  the  provisions 
upon  which  depended  the  Southern  armies,  whose 
main  field  of  action  was,  nevertheless,  on  the  eastern 
side.  In  a  country  habitually  so  unprepared  for  war 
as  is  the  United  States,  and  where,  of  course,  such  a 
contingency  as  an  intestine  struggle  between  the 
sections  could  not  have  been  provided  for,  there 
seemed  room  to  hope  that  the  national  forces  might 
by  rapid  action  seize  the  whole  course  of  the  river, 
before  the  seceding  States  were  able  to  take  ade- 
quate measures  for  its  defense.  The  Government 
had  the  support  of  that  part  of  the  country  which 
had  received  the  largest  manufacturing  development, 
and  could,  therefore,  most  quickly  prepare  the  ma- 


Il6  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

terial  for  war,  in  which  both  sides  were  lamentably 
deficient ;  and,  what  was  yet  more  important,  it  pos- 
sessed in  the  new  navy  built  since  1855  an  efficient 
weapon  to  which  the  South  had  nothing  to  oppose. 
The  hope  was  extravagant  and  doomed  to  disappoint- 
ment ;  for  to  overrun  and  hold  so  extensive  a  terri- 
tory as  the  immediate  basin  of  the  Mississippi  re- 
quired a  development  of  force  on  the  one  side  and 
a  degree  of  exhaustion  on  the  other  which  could 
not  be  reached  so  early  in  the  war.  The  relative 
strengths,  though  unequal,  were  not  yet  sufficiently 
disproportioned  to  enable  the  gigantic  work  to  be 
accomplished  ;  and  the  principal  result  of  an  effort 
undertaken  without  due  consideration  was  to  para- 
lyze a  large  fraction  of  a  navy  too  small  in  numbers 
to  afford  the  detachment  which  was  paraded  gal- 
lantly, but  uselessly,  above  New  Orleans.  Nor  was 
this  the  worst ;  the  time  thus  consumed  in  marching 
up  the  hill  in  order  at  once  to  march  down  again 
threw  away  the  opportunity  for  reducing  Mobile  be- 
fore its  defenses  were  strengthened.  Had  the  navy 
been  large  enough,  both  tasks  might  have  been  at- 
tempted; but  it  will  appear  in  the  sequel  that  its 
scanty  numbers  were  the  reason  which  postponed 
the  attack  on  Mobile  from  month  to  month,  until  it 
became  the  most  formidable  danger  Farragut  ever 
had  to  encounter. 

Despite  the  extensive  sea-coast  of  the  United 
States  and  the  large  maritime  commerce  possessed 
by  it  at  the  opening  of  the  war,  the  navy  had  never, 
except  for  short  and  passing  intervals,  been  regarded 
with  the  interest  its  importance  deserved.  To  this 
had  doubtless  contributed  the  fixed  policy  of  the 
Government  to  concentrate  its  attention  upon  the 


THE   NEW  ORLEANS  EXPEDITION. 


117 


internal  development  of  the  country,  and  to  concern 
itself  little  with  external  interests,  except  so  far  as 
they  promoted  the  views  of  that  section  which  de- 
sired to  give  extension  to  slaveholding  territory. 
The  avoidance  of  entangling  alliances  had  become 
perverted  to  indifference  to  the  means  by  which 
alone,  in  the  last  resort,  the  nation  can  assert  and 
secure  control  in  regions  outside  its  borders,  but 
vitally  affecting  its  prosperity  and  safety.  The  power 
of  navies  was  therefore,  then  as  now,  but  little 
understood.  Consequently,  when  the  importance  of 
the  Mississippi  Valley  was  realized,  as  it  immediately 
was,  there  was  but  one  idea  as  to  the  means  of  con- 
trolling it,  and  that  was  by  a  land  invasion  from  the 
great  Western  and  Northwestern  States.  To  this  a 
navy  was  indeed  to  be  adjoined,  but  in  a  manner  so 
distinctly  subsidiary  that  it  was,  contrary  to  all  cus- 
tom, placed  under  the  orders  of  the  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  Western  army,  and  became  simply  a  div- 
ision of  the  land  forces.  From  this  subordinate 
position  it  was  soon  raised  by  its  own  intrinsic  value 
and  the  logic  of  facts  ;  but  the  transient  experience 
is  noteworthy,  because  illustrating  the  general  ig- 
norance of  the  country  as  to  the  powers  of  the 
priceless  weapon  which  lay  ready,  though  unnoticed, 
to  its  hand. 

Happily,  in  the  Navy  Department  itself  juster 
views  prevailed  ;  and  the  general  indifference  per- 
mitted it  at  least  one  compensation — to  follow  its 
own  ways.  The  Secretary  himself  was  not  a  profes- 
sional man,  though  he  had  had  official  connection 
with  the  service  in  the  past ;  but  most  fortunately 
there  was  called  to  his  assistance  one  who  had  been 
for  eighteen  years  in  the  navy,  had  passed  while  in 


H8  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

it  to  the  command  of  mail  steamers,  and  only  five 
years  before  the  war  had  resigned  and  entered  civil 
life.  This  gentleman,  Mr.  Gustavus  V.  Fox,  thus 
combined  with  business  experience  and  an  extensive 
acquaintance  with  naval  officers  the  capacities  of  a 
seaman.  He  knew  what  ships  could  do  and  what 
they  could  not ;  but  to  this  common  knowledge  of 
sea  officers,  gained  by  the  daily  habit  of  sea  life,  he 
had  added  the  results  of  study  and  reflection  upon 
events  passing  elsewhere  than  under  his  own  obser- 
vation. The  experiences  of  the  allied  navies  in  the 
Crimean  War  had  convinced  him  that,  if  the  wooden 
sides  of  ships  could  not  be  pitted  in  prolonged  stand- 
up  fight  against  the  stone  walls  of  fortresses,  they 
were  capable  of  enduring  such  battering  as  they  might 
receive  in  running  by  them  through  an  unobstructed 
channel.  This  conviction  received  support  by  the 
results  of  the  attacks  upon  Hatteras  Inlet  and  Port 
Royal.  He  might,  indeed,  have  gone  much  further 
back  and  confirmed  his  own  judgment  as  a  seaman 
by  the  express  opinion  of  an  eminent  soldier.  Nearly 
a  hundred  years  before,  Washington,  at  the  siege  of 
Yorktown,  had  urged  the  French  Admiral  De  Grasse 
to  send  vessels  past  Cornwallis's  works  to  control  the 
upper  York  River,  saying:  "  I  am  so  well  satisfied  by 
experience  of  the  little  effect  of  land  batteries  on 
vessels  passing  them  with  a  leading  breeze  that,  un- 
less the  two  channels  near  Yorktown  should  be  found 
impracticable  by  obstructions,  I  should  have  the 
greatest  confidence  in  the  success  of  this  important 
service."* 

In  this  conviction  of  Mr.  Fox's  lay  the  inception 

*  Washington 's  Letters,  October  I,  1781. 


THE  NEW  ORLEANS  EXPEDITION.    up 

of  the  expedition  against  New  Orleans.  It  was,  in 
his  view,  to  be  a  purely  naval  attack.  Once  over 
the  bar  at  the  mouth  of  the  river,  the  channel  as  far 
as  the  city  had  no  natural  obstruction,  was  clearly 
defined,  and  easily  followed,  by  day  or  night,  without 
a  pilot.  The  heavy  current  of  the  early  spring 
months,  while  it  would  retard  the  passage  of  the 
ships  and  so  keep  them  longer  under  fire,  would 
make  it  difficult  for  the  enemy  to  maintain  in  po- 
sition any  artificial  barrier  placed  by  him.  The 
works  to  be  passed— the  seaward  defenses  of  New 
Orleans,  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip— were  power- 
ful fortifications  ;  but  they  were  ultimately  dependent 
upon  the  city,  ninety  miles  above  them,  for  a  support 
which  could  come  only  by  the  river.  A  fleet  an- 
chored above  the  forts  lay  across  their  only  line  of 
communication,  and  when  thus  isolated,  their  fall 
became  only  a  question  of  time.  The  work  pro- 
posed to  the  United  States  Navy  was,  therefore,  to 
turn  the  forts  by  passing  their  fire,  seize  their  line  of 
communications — the  upper  river — and  their  base, 
New  Orleans,  and  then  to  give  over  the  latter  to  the 
army,  which  engaged  to  furnish  a  force  sufficient  to 
hold  the  conquest. 

Having  first  taken  the  necessary,  but  strictly 
preliminary,  step  of  seizing  as  a  depot  Ship  Island, 
in  Mississippi  Sound,  about  a  hundred  miles  from 
the  mouth  of  the  river,  Mr.  Fox's  proposition,  which 
had  been  adopted  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  was 
submitted  to  the  President.  Mr.  Lincoln,  himself  a 
Western  man,  unfamiliar  with  maritime  matters  and 
engrossed  with  the  idea  of  invasion  from  the  north, 
was  disposed  to  be  incredulous  of  success  ;  but  with 
his  usual  open-mindedness  consented  to  a  full  dis- 


120  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

cussion  before  him  by  experts  from  both  services.- 
A  meeting  was  therefore  held  with  General  McClel- 
lan  at  his  headquarters.  There  were  present,  besides 
the  President,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Mr.  Fox, 
and  Commander  David  D.  Porter,  who  had  recently 
returned  from  service  off  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi. 
The  antecedents  of  General  McClellan  were  those  of 
an  officer  of  the  engineers,  who  are  generally  dis- 
posed to  exaggerate  the  powers  of  forts  as  compared 
with  ships,  and  to  contemplate  their  reduction  only 
by  regular  approaches ;  just  as  an  officer  of  the  line 
of  the  army,  looking  to  the  capture  of  a  place  like 
New  Orleans,  will  usually  and  most  properly  seek 
first  a  base  of  operations,  from  which  he  will  project 
a  campaign  whose  issue  shall  be  the  fall  of  the  city. 
To  this  cause  was  probably  due  the  preference  ob- 
served by  the  Navy  Department  to  exist  in  army 
circles,  for  an  attack  upon  Mobile  first.  Being  close 
to  the  sea,  which  was  completely  under  the  control 
of  the  navy,  the  necessary  land  operations  would 
begin  under  far  more  favorable  conditions,  and  could 
be  more  easily  maintained  than  in  the  alluvial  soil  of 
the  Mississippi  delta.  McClellan,  who  was  an  accom- 
plished master  of  his  profession  in  all  its  branches, 
received  at  first  the  impression  that  regular  mili- 
tary operations  against  New  Orleans  by  way  of  the 
river  were  being  proposed  to  him,  and  demurred ; 
but,  on  learning  that  the  only  demand  was  for  a  force 
to  hold  the  city  and  surroundings  in  case  of  success, 
he  readily  consented  to  detail  ten  or  fifteen  thousand 
troops  for  the  purpose.  Though  more  hazardous, 
the  proposition  of  the  Navy  Department  was  in 
principle  strategically  sound.  The  key  of  the  po- 
sition was  to  be  struck  for  at  once,  and  the  outlying 


THE   NEW  ORLEANS   EXPEDITION.  121 

defenses  were  expected  then  to  fall  by  the  severance 
of  their  communications.  The  general  might  have 
his  own  opinion  as  to  the  power  of  the  navy  to  carry 
out  the  proposed  passage  of  the  forts,  and  as  to 
whether  its  coal,  when  once  above,  would  outlast  the 
endurance  of  the  hostile  garrisons;  but  those  were 
points  upon  which  the  Navy  Department,  which 
undertook  the  risk,  might  be  presumed  to  have  more 
accurate  judgment  than  himself. 

The  conference,  which  was  held  about  the  middle 
of  November,  1861,  resulted  in  the  adoption  of  Mr. 
Fox's  plan  in  its  main  outlines;  but  with  an  impor- 
tant addition,  which  threatened  at  one  time  to  become 
a  very  serious  modification.  Commander  Porter  sug- 
gested that  the  naval  vessels  should  be  accompanied 
by  a  mortar  flotilla,  to  subdue  the  fire  of  the  forts  by 
bombardment,  and  so  to  allow  the  fleet  to  pass  with- 
out risk,  or  with  risk  much  diminished.  This  propo- 
sition approved  itself  to  the  engineer  instincts  of 
McClellan,  and  was  adopted.  The  general  then 
designated  Major  Barnard,  of  the  Engineer  Corps,  to 
represent  him  in  adjusting  the  details  of  the  expedi- 
tion. Barnard  also  took  strong  ground  in  favor  of 
the  mortars,  and  to  this  added  the  opinion — in  which 
Porter  concurred — that  the  forts  should  be  not  merely 
bombarded,  but  reduced  before  the  passage.  He 
summed  up  his  conclusions  in  the  following  perfectly 
clear  words:  "To  pass  those  works  (merely)  with  a 
fleet  and  appear  before  New  Orleans  is  merely  a  raid 
— no  capture.  New  Orleans  and  the  river  can  not 
be  held  until  communications  are  perfectly  estab- 
lished." The  assertion  of  the  last  sentence  can  not 
be  denied;  it  admits  of  no  difference  of  opinion. 
The  point  in  dispute  between  the  two  arguments  was 
Q 


I22  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

not  this,  but  whether  the  fall  of  the  city,  which  had 
no  local  defenses,  would  entail  that  of  the  forts,  and 
so  open  the  communications.  Mr.  Fox  strongly  held 
that  it  would;  but  although  he  stuck  to  his  opinion, 
he  had  a  deservedly  high  estimate  of  Porter's  pro- 
fessional ability — so  much  so  that,  had  the  latter's 
rank  justified,  he  would  have  urged  him  for  the  com- 
mand of  the  expedition.  In  this  doubtful  state  of 
the  argument,  it  will  be  seen  of  how  great  impor- 
tance was  the  choice  of  the  officer  to  be  put  in  charge 
of  the  whole  undertaking.  Had  he  also  taken  the 
view  of  Barnard  and  Porter  in  favor  of  the  more 
cautious,  but — as  it  proved — more  dangerous  course, 
it  could  scarcely  have  failed  that  Fox  would  have 
been  overruled. 

The  nomination  of  this  officer  could  not  be  longer 
deferred.  Secrecy  and  rapidity  of  action  were  large 
elements  in  the  hoped-for  achievement,  and  secrecy 
depends  much  upon  the  length  of  time  the  secret 
must  be  kept.  Among  the  officers  whose  length  of 
service  and  professional  reputation  indicated  them  as 
suitable  for  the  position,  there  was  little  to  guide  the 
department  to  the  man  who  would  on  emergency 
show  the  audacity  and  self-reliance  demanded  by  the 
intended  operations.  The  action  proposed,  though 
it  falls  within  the  limits  of  the  methods  which  history 
has  justified,  and  has,  therefore,  a  legitimate  place 
in  the  so-called  science  of  war,  was,  nevertheless, 
as  the  opinions  of  Barnard  and  Porter  show,  con- 
trary to  the  more  usual  and  accepted  practice.  It 
disregarded  the  safeguards  commonly  insisted  upon, 
overleaped  the  successive  steps  by  which  military 
achievement  ordinarily  advances  to  its  end,  and, 
looking  only  to  the  exceptional  conditions,  resorted 


THE   NEW  ORLEANS   EXPEDITION.  i2\ 

fearlessly  to  exceptional  methods.  For  such  a  duty 
the  department  needed  a  man  of  more  than  average 
determination  and  vigor. 

Farragut's  name  was  necessarily  among  those  con- 
sidered ;  but  the  final  choice  appears  to  have  been  de- 
termined by  the  impression  made  upon  Mr.  Fox,  and 
through  him  upon  the  department,  by  his  course  in 
leaving  Norfolk  at  the  time  and  in  the  way  he  did. 
This,  Fox  argued,  showed  "great  superiority  of 
character,  clear  perception  of  duty,  and  firm  resolu- 
tion in  the  performance  of  it."  His  conspicuous 
ability  was  not  then  recognized,  could  not  be  until 
revealed  by  war  ;  but  it  was  evident  that  he  stood 
well  above  the  common  run  of  simply  accomplished 
officers.  Still,  further  tests  were  required  ;  in  a  mat- 
ter of  so  much  importance  the  department  had  need 
to  move  warily.  That  Farragut  was  faithful  could 
not  be  doubted  ;  but  was  his  heart  so  far  in  the  con- 
test that  he  could  be  depended  upon  to  exert  his 
abilities  to  the  full  ?  Commander  Porter  was  ordered 
to  go  to  New  York  on  duty  connected  with  the  mor- 
tar flotilla,  and  while  there  to  make  an  opportunity 
to  visit  Farragut.  There  had  been,  as  is  known,  a 
close  relation  between  the  two  families,  and  to  him 
Farragut  was  likely  to  show  how  hearty  he  was  in 
the  cause.  Porter's  account  was  most  favorable,  and 
it  then  remained  only  to  judge  whether  he  was  in 
sympathy  with  the  military  plan  of  the  proposed  ex- 
pedition. 

For  this  object  Farragut  was  ordered  to  report 
at  the  department,  and  Fox  undertook  to  meet  him 
at  the  train  and  talk  over  the  matter  informally. 
He  arrived  in  Washington  on  the  21st  of  Decem- 
ber, was  met  as  arranged,  and  taken  to  the  house 


j  24  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT, 

of  the  Postmaster-General,  Montgomery  Blair.  The 
latter  was  brother-in-law  to  Fox,  and  the  three  break- 
fasted together.  "  After  breakfast,  Fox  laid  before 
Farragut  the  plan  of  attack,  the  force  to  be  employed, 
and  the  object  to  be  attained,  and  asked  his  opinion. 
Farragut  answered  unhesitatingly  that  it  would  suc- 
ceed. Fox  then  handed  him  the  list  of  vessels  being 
fitted  out,  and  asked  if  they  were  enough.  Farragut 
replied  he  would  engage  to  run  by  the  forts  and  capt- 
ure New  Orleans  with  two  thirds  the  number.  Fox 
told  him  more  vessels  would  be  added,  and  that  he 
would  command  the  expedition.  Farragut's  delight 
and  enthusiasm  were  so  great  that  when  he  left  us 
Fox  asked  if  I  did  not  think  he  was  too  enthusiastic. 
I  replied  I  was  most  favorably  impressed  with  him, 
and  sure  he  would  succeed."  *  There  could  be  no 
question,  at  any  rate,  that  his  whole  heart  was  in  the 
war  and  in  the  expedition ;  whether  he  would  rise 
equal  to  his  task  still  remained  to  be  seen.  He  said, 
however,  frankly,  that  had  he  been  previously  con- 
sulted, he  would  have  advised  against  the  employ- 
ment of  the  mortar  flotilla.  He  had  no  faith  in  the 
efficacy  of  that  mode  of  attack  since  his  observations 
of  the  results  at  San  Juan  de  Ulloa,  twenty-three 
years  before.  He  was  convinced  that  the  fleet  could 
run  by  the  forts,  and  anticipated  nothing  but  delay 
from  the  bombardment.  Nevertheless,  since  the  ar- 
rangements had  been  made,  he  was  willing  to  give 
the  bombs  a  trial.  "  He  was  never  profuse  in  prom- 
ises," writes  Mr.  Welles,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
"but  he  felt  complimented  that  he  was  selected,  and 
I  saw  that  in  modest  self-reliance  he  considered  him- 


*  Montgomery  Blair,  in  The  United  Service,  January,  1881. 


THE  NEW  ORLEANS  EXPEDITION.  125 

self  equal  to  the  emergency  and  to  the  expectation 
of  the  Government."*  To  his  home  he  wrote: 
"  Keep  your  lips  closed  and  burn  my  letters,  for  per- 
fect silence  is  to  be  observed— the  first  injunction  of 
the  Secretary.  I  am  to  have  a  flag  in  the  Gulf,  and 
the  rest  depends  upon  myself.  Keep  calm  and  silent. 
I  shall  sail  in  three  weeks." 

On  the  23d  of  December,  1861,  Farragut  received 
preparatory  orders,  and  on  the  9th  of  the  following 
January  was  formally  appointed  to  command  the  West- 
ern Gulf  Blockading  Squadron  ;  the  limits  of  which, 
on  the  coast  of  the  Confederacy,  were  defined  as  from 
St.  Andrew's  Bay  to  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande. 
The  coasts  of  Mexico  and  Yucatan  were  also  embraced 
in  them.    The  steam  sloop-of-war  Hartford  was  se- 
lected for  his  flag-ship.    On  the  20th  of  January  final 
orders  were  issued  to  him.    These  were  somewhat  dis- 
creetly worded,  and,  literally  understood,  must  be  con- 
ceded to  take  from  the  department  the  credit  of  boldly 
adhering  to,  and  assuming  the  responsibility  of,  the 
original  plan— a  credit  Mr.  Welles  seems  desirous  to 
claim.     "  When  you  are  completely  ready,"  they  read, 
"  you  will  collect  such  vessels  as  can  be  spared  from 
the  blockade,  and  proceed  up  the  Mississippi  River 
and  reduce  the  defenses  which  guard  the  approaches  to 
New  Orleans,  when  you  will  appear  off  that  city  and 
take  possession  of  it  under  the  guns  of  your  squad- 
ron."    Understood  according  to   the  plain  meaning 
of  the  words,  these  orders  prescribed  the  reduction 
of  the  works  "as  a  condition  precedent  to  appearing 
off  the  city,  and  so  recur  to  the  fears  expressed  by 
both  Barnard  and  Porter  as  to  the  consequences  of 


*  Gideon  Welles,  in  the  Galaxy,  November,  1 87 1. 


I26  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

leaving  the  forts  unreduced.  There  is  not  in  them 
even  "  the  latitude  and  discretion  in  the  employment 
of  the  means  placed  under  his  command  "  which  Mr. 
Welles  claimed.*  Had  Farragut,  after  leaving  the 
forts  unreduced,  as  he  did,  met  with  serious  disaster, 
it  can  scarcely  be  doubted  that  the  phrase  quoted 
would  have  been  used  to  acquit  the  Government. 

The  steam-sloop  Hartford,  upon  which  Farragut 
now  hoisted  his  flag,  and  in  which  he  continued 
throughout  the  war,  was  a  nearly  new  vessel,  having 
sailed  on  her  first  cruise  to  China  in  the  summer  of 
1859.  She  belonged  to  the  early  period  of  the  tran- 
sition from  sails  to  steam  for  the  motive  power  of 
vessels;  the  steam  being  regarded  as  auxiliary  only, 
and  giving  her  a  speed  of  but  eight  knots  per 
hour,  while  the  spars  and  sail  area  were  those  of  a 
full-rigged  ship.  The  deficiency  of  horse-power  was 
a  serious  drawback  in  such  an  operation  as  passing 
forts,  especially  when,  as  in  the  Mississippi,  the  cur- 
rent was  strong  and  always  adverse  to  vessels  as- 
cending the  river.  The  Hartford  had,  on  the  other 
hand,  a  powerful  battery  of  the  best  existent  type. 
She  carried  twenty-two  Dahlgren  nine-inch  shell 
guns,  eleven  on  each  side  ;  and,  owing  to  the  lowness 
of  the  river  banks,  these  guns  would  be  on  a  level 
with  or  even  above  those  in  the  lower  tier  of  the 
batteries  opposed  to  her.  The  Pensacola,  Brooklyn, 
and  Richmond  were  vessels  of  the  same  type  as  the 
Hartford,  and  built  at  the  same  time. 

On  the  2d  of  February,  1862,  the  Hartford  sailed 
from  Hampton  Roads,  and  on  the  20th  reached  Ship 
Island.     The  following  day  Farragut  took  over  the 

*  Gideon  Welles,  in  the  Galaxy,  December,  1871. 


«* 


fT    ST    PHILIP 


First  Division — Lending  under  command  of 
Captain  Theodoi  us  liailey. 

1.  Cayuga.  Flag-Gunboat.  Lieut. -Com.  Harrison, 

2.  Pensacola.  Captain  H.  W.  Morris. 

3.  Mississippi,  Captain  M   Smith. 

4.  Oneida  Commander  S.  P.  Lee. 
fi.  Varuna,  Commander  C.  S.  Boggs. 
0.  Katahdin.  Lieut. -Com.  G.  H.  Preble. 

7.  Kinco.  Lieut. -Com.  Ransom. 

8.  Wissahickon,  Lieut. -Com.  A.  N.  Smith. 

Center  Division— Admiral  Farragitt. 

9.  Hartford,  Commander  Wainwright. 
10.  Brooklyn,  Captain  T.  T.  Craven, 
il.  Richmond,  Commander  J.  Alden. 

Third  Division—  Captain  H.  H.  Bell. 
12    Sciota,  Lieut. -Com.  Edward  Donaldson. 

13.  Iroquois.  Com.  John  De  Camp. 

14.  Kennebec,  Lieut.  Com.  John  H.  Russell. 
1  .  Pinola,  Lieut. -Com.  P.  Crosby. 

16.  Itasca.  Lieut. -Com.  C.  H.  B.  Caldwell. 

17.  Winona,  Lieut. -Com.  E.  T.  Nichols. 
18  Commander  Porter's  Gunboats. 
19.  Sloop  Portsmouth,  Commanders.  Swart  wont 


Passage  of  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip,  April  24,  1862. 
Order  of  Attack. 


THE   NUW  ORLEANS   EXPEDITION.  127 

command  of  his  district  and  squadron  from  Flag 
Officer  McKean,  who  up  to  that  time  had  had  charge 
of  both  the  East  and  West  Gulf.  None  of  the  other 
vessels  of  the  expedition  were  yet  there  ;  but  they 
came  in  one  by  one  and  were  rapidly  assembled  at 
the  Southwest  Pass,  then  the  principal  entrance  to 
the  river.  Much  difficulty  was  encountered  in  get- 
ting the  heavier  ships  over  the  bar,  two  weeks'  work 
being  needed  to  drag  the  Pensacola  inside  ;  but  on 
the  7th  of  April  she  floated  in  the  river,  and  Farragut 
found  his  force  complete.  It  then  consisted,  inde- 
pendently of  the  steamers  attached  to  the  mortar 
flotilla,  of  four  steam  sloops-of-war  of  about  two 
thousand  tons  each,  three  of  half  that  size,  one 
large  side-wheel  ship-of-war,  the  Mississippi,  of  seven- 
teen hundred  tons,  and  nine  gun-boats  of  five  hun- 
dred. The  latter  had  been  hurriedly  built  to  meet 
the  special  exigencies  of  this  war,  and  were  then 
commonly  known  as  the  "  ninety -day  "  gunboats. 
Each  carried  one  eleven -inch  shell-gun  and  one 
thirty-pounder  rifle.  The  aggregate  batteries  of  the 
seventeen  vessels  composing  the  squadron,  excluding 
some  light  brass  pieces,  amounted  to  one  hundred 
and  fifty-four  cannon,  of  which  one  hundred  and 
thirty-five  were  thirty-two  pounders  or  above. 

The  two  forts  which  constituted  the  principal  de- 
fenses of  New  Orleans  against  a  naval  attack  from 
the  sea  were  at  Plaquemine  Bend,  about  twenty  miles 
above  the  Head  of  the  Passes ;  by  which  name  is 
known  the  point  where  the  main  stream  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi divides  into  several  channels,  called  passes, 
through  which  its  waters  find  their  way  to  the  Gulf. 
The  river,  whose  general  course  below  New  Orleans 
is  southeast,  turns   at   Plaquemine  Bend  northeast 


I28  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

for  a  mile  and  three-quarters,  and  then  resumes  its 
previous  direction.  The  heavier  of  the  two  works, 
Fort  Jackson,  is  on  the  right  bank,  at  the  lower  angle 
of  the  Bend.  It  was  a  casemated  brick  structure, 
pentagonal  in  form,  carrying  in  barbette  over  the 
casemates  twenty-seven  cannon  of  and  above  the 
size  of  thirty-two  pounders,  besides  eleven  twenty- 
four  pounders.  In  the  casemates  were  fourteen  of 
the  latter  caliber.  Attached  to  this  fort,  but  below 
it,  was  a  water  battery  carrying  half  a  dozen  heavy 
cannon.  Fort  St.  Philip  was  nearly  opposite  Fort 
Jackson,  but  somewhat  below  it,  so  as  to  command 
not  only  the  stream  in  its  front,  but  also  the  stretch 
down  the  river,  being  thus  enabled  to  rake  vessels 
approaching  from  below  before  they  came  abreast. 
It  comprised  the  fort  proper  and  two  water  batteries, 
which  together  mounted  forty-two  guns.  The  sites 
of  these  fortifications  had  been  skillfully  chosen  ;  but 
their  armaments,  though  formidable  and  greatly  su- 
perior to  those  of  the  fleet — regard  being  had  to  the 
commonly  accepted  maxim  that  a  gun  ashore  is 
equivalent  to  four  afloat — were  not  equal  to  the  de- 
mands of  the  situation  or  to  the  importance  of  New 
Orleans.  Out  of  a  total  of  one  hundred  and  nine 
pieces,*  of  which  probably  over  ninety  could  be  used 
against  a  passing  fleet,  fifty-six,  or  more  than  half, 
were  of  the  very  old  and  obsolete  caliber  of  twenty- 
four  pounders. 

This  inadequate  preparation,  a  year  after  the 
attack  upon  Fort  Sumter  and  the  outbreak  of  hos- 
tilities, is  doubtless  to  be  attributed  to  surprise. 
The  Southern  authorities,  like  those  of  the  National 

*  There  were  some  guns  bearing   inland   and   some  flanking 
howitzers,  besides  those  already  enumerated. 


THE   NEW  ORLEANS   EXPEDITION.  129 

Government,  were  firmly  possessed   with  the   idea 
that  the  Mississippi,  if  subdued  at  all,  must  be  so  by 
an  attack  from  the  north.     Despite  the  frequency  of 
spies  and  treason  along  the  border  line  of  the  two 
sections,  the   steps  of  the  Navy   Department  were 
taken  so  quietly,  and  followed  so  closely  upon  the 
resolve  to  act,  that  the  alarm  was  not  quickly  taken ; 
and  when  intimations  of  attack   from   the  sea   did 
filter  through,  they  had    to  encounter  and  dislodge 
strong  contrary  preoccupations  in  the  minds  of  the 
Southern    leaders.      Only   the   Confederate   general 
commanding  the  military  division  and  his  principal 
subordinates  seem  to  have  been  alive  to  the  danger 
of    New   Orleans,   and  their  remonstrances  had  no 
effect.     Not  only  were  additional  guns  denied  them 
and   sent   North,   but   drafts  were   made   on    their 
narrow    resources   to   supply   points   considered   to 
be  in  greater  danger.    A  striking  indication  of  the 
prepossessions  which   controlled   the   authorities  at 
Richmond    was  elicited  by  Commodore  Holhns,  of 
the  Confederate  Navy.     That  gallant  veteran  was 
ordered  to   take   to    Memphis   several  of   the  rams 
extemporized    at  New  Orleans.     He   entreated     he 
Navy  Department  to  allow  him  to  remain,  bu    the 
reply  was  that  the  main  attack  upon  New  Orleans 
would  be  from  above,  not  from  below      After  the 
fleet   entered  the    river  he   telegraphed  from  Mem- 
phis for  permission  to  return,  but  received  the  an- 
swer that  the  proposition  was  wholly  -admissible. 
Before  the  Court  of  Inquiry  upon  the  loss  of  New 
Orleans,  he  testified  that  the  withdrawal  of  his  ships 

was  the  chief  cause  of  the  disaster.* 

*  Official  Records  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion,  Series  I,  vol.  vi. 
p.  610. 


130 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


"While  the  heavy  ships  were  being  dragged  over 
the  bar  at  the  Southwest  Pass,  the  mortar  flotilla  had 
entered  the  river  under  the  command  of  Commander 
Porter.  No  time  was  avoidably  lost,  though  there 
were  inevitable  delays  due  to  the  magnitude  of  the 
preparations  that  in  every  quarter  taxed  the  energies 
of  the  Government.  On  the  16th  of  April,  less  than 
ten  days  after  the  Pensacola  got  safely  inside,  the 
fleet  was  anchored  just  out  of  range  of  the  forts. 
On  the  1 8th  the  mortar  vessels  were  in  position,  and 
at  10  a.  m.  the  bombardment  by  them  began,  con- 
tinuing throughout  the  succeeding  days  till  the  pas- 
sage of  the  fleet,  and  being  chiefly  directed  upon 
Fort  Jackson.  From  daylight  to  dark  a  shell  a 
minute  was  fired,  and  as  the  practice  was  remarkably 
good  a  great  proportion  of  these  fell  within  the  fort. 
As  Farragut  had  predicted,  they  did  not  in  the 
course  of  six  days'  bombardment  do  harm  enough  to 
compel  a  surrender  or  disable  the  work  ;  but  they 
undoubtedly  harassed  the  garrison  to  an  extent  that 
exercised  an  appreciable  effect  upon  the  fire  of  Jack- 
son during  the  passage. 

While  the  bombardment  was  progressing,  the 
lighter  vessels  of  the  squadron  were  continuously 
engaged  by  detachments  in  protecting  the  mortar 
flotilla,  steaming  up  above  it  and  drawing  upon 
themselves  the  fire  of  the  forts.  A  more  important 
duty  was  the  removal  of  the  obstructions  that  the 
enemy  had  thrown  across  the  river,  below  the  works, 
but  under  their  fire.  Opinions  differed,  both  in  the 
United  States  squadron  and  in  the  counsels  of  the 
enemy,  as  to  the  power  of  the  ships  to  pass  the  forts ; 
but  it  was  realized  on  both  sides  that  any  barrier  to 
their  passage  which  should  force  them  to  stop  under 


THE   NEW  ORLEANS  EXPEDITION.  131 

fire,   or    should   throw   confusion    into    their    order, 
would  materially  increase  the  chances  against  them. 
Whatever  the  blindness  or  neglect  of  the  Confederate 
Government,  the  Confederate  officers  of  the  depart- 
ment had  not  been  remiss  in  this  matter.     The  con- 
struction   of   a  floating  barrier  had   early  engaged 
their  attention,  and,  despite  the  difficulties  presented 
by  so  rapid  a  current,  a   formidable  raft  had  been 
placed  early  in  the  winter.     It  consisted  of  cypress 
logs  forty  feet  long  and  four  or  five  feet  in  diameter, 
lying  lengthwise  in   the  river,  with   an   interval  of 
three  feet  between  them  to  allow  drift  to  pass.     The 
logs  were    connected   by  two  and  a  half   inch  iron 
cables,  stretching  underneath  from  one  side  of  the 
stream  to  the  other ;  and  the  whole  fabric  was  held 
up  against  the  current  by  some  thirty  heavy  anchors 
and  cables.     So  long  as  it  stood,  this  constituted  a 
very  grave  difficulty  for  an  attacking  fleet ;  but  the 
water  was  deep  and  the  holding  ground  poor,  so  that 
even  under  average  conditions  there  was  reason  to 
fear  its  giving  way.     The  fleet  arrived  in  the  early 
spring,  the  season  when  the  current,  swollen  by  the 
melting  snows  about  the  head  waters  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi and  its  tributaries,  is  at  its  strongest ;  and  in 
1862  the  spring  rise  was  greater  than  for  many  years. 
In  February  the  raft  began  to  show  signs  of  yielding 
under  the  pressure  of  the  drift  wood   accumulating 
on  it  from  above,  and  on    the   10th   of  March  the 
cables  had  parted,  the  sections  on  either  side  being 
swept  against  the  banks  and  leaving  about  a  third  of 
the  river  open.     The  gap  was  filled  by  anchoring  in 
it  eight  heavy  schooners  of  about  two  hundred  tons 
burden.     They  were  joined  together  as  the  cypress 
logs  had  been,  but  with  lighter  chains,  probably  be- 


132 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


cause  no  heavy  ones  were  at  hand  ;  and,  as  a  further 
embarrassment  to  the  assailants,  their  masts  were 
unstepped  and  allowed  to  drag  astern  with  the 
rigging  attached,  in  the  hopes  that  by  fouling  the 
screws  the  ascending  vessels  might  be  crippled. 

This  central  barrier  of  schooners  was  not  intrin- 
sically strong,  but  it  was  not  to  be  despised,  con- 
sidering the  very  moderate  speed  possessed  by  the 
ships  and  the  strength  of  the  current  which  they  had 
to  stem.  It  was  doubtful  whether  they  could  break 
through  with  so  little  loss  of  way  as  to  produce  no 
detention  ;  and  the  mere  presence  of  so  many  hulls 
on  a  dark  night  and  under  the  added  gloom  of  the 
battle's  smoke  was  liable  to  increase  a  confusion 
which  could  redound  only  to  the  advantage  of  the 
defense.  It  became  necessary,  therefore,  to  remove 
the  schooners  in  whole  or  in  part.  This  was  ef- 
fected in  a  very  daring  manner  by  two  gunboats, 
the  Itasca  and  Pinola,  Captains  Caldwell  and 
Crosby  ;  the  fleet  captain,  Henry  H.  Bell,  an  officer 
in  whom  Farragut  had  the  most  unbounded  confi- 
dence, being  placed  in  command  of  both.  The 
work  had  to  be  done,  of  course,  within  range  of 
the  hostile  batteries,  which,  through  some  culpable 
negligence,  failed  to  molest  it.  The  Pinola  carried 
an  electrician  with  a  petard,  by  which  it  was  hoped 
to  shatter  the  chains.  This  attempt,  however,  failed, 
owing  to  the  wires  of  the  electrical  battery  parting 
before  the  charge  could  be  exploded.  The  Itasca, 
on  the  other  hand,  ran  alongside  one  of  the  schooners 
and  slipped  the  chains ;  but,  unfortunately,  as  the 
hulk  was  set  adrift  without  Captain  Caldwell  being 
notified,  and  the  engines  of  the  gunboat  were  going 
ahead  with  the  helm  a-port,  the  two  vessels  turned 


THE   NEW   ORLEANS  EXPEDITION.  133 

inshore  and  ran  aground  under  fire  of  the  forts.     In 
this  critical  position  the  Itasca  remained  for  some 
time,  until  the  Pinola  could  be  recalled  to  her  assist- 
ance; and  then  several  attempts  had  to  be  made  be- 
fore she  finally  floated.     Caldwell   then   did  an  ex- 
ceedingly   gallant    thing,  the   importance   of   which 
alone  justified,  but  amply  justified,  its  temerity.    In- 
stead of  returning  at  once  to  the  squadron,  satisfied 
with  the  measure  of  success  already  attained,  he  de- 
liberately headed   up   the  river  ;   and    then,  having 
gained  sufficient  ground  in  that  direction  to  insure 
a  full  development  of  his  vessel's  speed,  he  turned 
and  charged  full  upon  the  line  of  hulks.     As  she 
met  the  chains,  the  little  vessel  rose  bodily  three  or 
four  feet  from  the  water,  sliding  up  on  them  and 
dragging   the   hulks   down    with    her.      The   chains 
stood  the  strain  for  an  instant,  then   snapped,  and 
the    Itasca,  having   wrought  a   practicable    breach, 
sped  down  to  the  fleet. 

While    these  various   accessory  operations  were 
going   on,  Admiral   Farragut's   mind  was   occupied 
with  the  important  question  of  carrying  out  the  ob- 
ject of  his  mission.     The  expedient  of  reducing  or 
silencing  the  fire  of  the  enemy's   forts,  in  which  he 
himself  had  never  felt  confidence,  was  in  process  of 
being  tried ;  and  the  time  thus  employed  was  being 
utilized  by  clearing  the  river  highway  and  preparing 
the  ships  to  cut  their  way  through  without  delay,  in 
case  that  course  should  be  adopted.    Much  had  been 
done  while  at  the   Head  of  the  Passes,  waiting  for 
the  Pensacola  to  cross  the  bar;  but  the  work  was 
carried  on  unremittingly  to  the  last  moment.     The 
loftier  and  lighter  spars  of  all  the  vessels  had  al- 
ready been  sent  ashore,  together  with  all  unneces- 


134 


ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 


sary  encumbrances,  several  of  the  gunboats  having 
even  unstepped  their  lower  masts  ;  and  the  various 
ordinary  precautions,  known  to  seamen  under  the 
name  of  "  clearing  ship  for  action,"  had  been  taken 
with  reference  to  fighting  on  anchoring  ground. 
These  were  particularized  in  a  general  order  issued 
by  the  admiral,  and  to  them  he  added  special  instruc- 
tions, rendered  necessary  by  the  force  of  the  current 
and  its  constancy  in  the  same  direction.  "  Mount 
one  or  two  guns  on  the  poop  and  top-gallant  fore- 
castle," he  said ;  "  in  other  words,  be  prepared  to 
use  as  many  guns  as  possible  ahead  and  astern  to 
protect  yourself  against  the  enemy's  gunboats  and 
batteries,  bearing  in  mind  that  you  will  always  have 
to  ride  head  to  the  current,  and  can  only  avail  your- 
self of  the  sheer  of  the  helm  to  point  a  broadside 
gun  more  than  three  points  (thirty-four  degrees) 
forward  of  the  beam.  .  .  .  Trim  your  vessel  also  a 
few  inches  by  the  head,  so  that  if  she  touches  the 
bottom  she  will  not  swing  head  down  the  river," 
which,  if  the  stern  caught  the  bottom,  would  infal- 
libly happen,  entailing  the  difficult  manoeuvre  and 
the  perilous  delay  of  turning  round  under  the 
enemy's  fire  in  a  narrow  river  and  in  the  dark.  The 
vessels  generally  had  secured  their  spare  iron  cables 
up  and  down  their  sides  in  the  line  of  the  boilers  and 
engines ;  and  these  vital  parts  were  further  protected 
by  piling  around  them  hammocks,  bags  of  sand  or 
ashes,  and  other  obstructions  to  shot.  The  outsides 
of  the  hulls  were  daubed  over  with  Mississippi  mud, 
to  be  less  easily  discerned  in  the  dark  ;  while  the 
decks  were  whitewashed,  so  as  to  throw  in  stronger 
relief  articles  lying  upon  them  which  needed  to  be 
quickly  seen. 


THE    NEW  ORLEANS   EXPEDITION.  135 

Having  given  his  general  instructions,  the  flag 
officer  could  intrust  the  details  of  preparation  to 
his  subordinates  ;  but  no  one  could  relieve  him  of 
the  momentous  decision  upon  which  the  issues  of  the 
campaign  must  turn.  The  responsibility  of  rejecting 
one  course  of  action  and  adopting  another  was  his 
alone  ;  and  as  has  already  been  remarked,  the  word- 
ing of  the  department's  order,  literally  understood, 
imposed  upon  him  the  task  of  reducing  the  forts  be- 
fore approaching  the  city.  The  questions  involved 
were  essentially  the  same  as  those  presented  to 
every  general  officer  when  the  course  of  a  cam- 
paign has  brought  him  face  to  face  with  a  strong 
position  of  the  enemy.  Shall  it  be  carried  by  direct 
attack,  and,  until  so  subdued,  arrest  the  progress  of 
the  army  ?  or  can  it  be  rendered  impotent  or  un- 
tenable by  severing  its  communications  and  by 
operations  directed  against  the  district  in  its  rear, 
which  it  protects,  and  upon  which  it  also  depends? 
The  direct  attack  may  be  by  assault,  by  investment, 
or  by  regular  siege  approaches;  but  whatever  the 
method,  the  result  is  the  same— the  assailant  is  de- 
tained for  a  longer  or  shorter  time  before  the  po- 
sition. During  such  detention  the  post  fulfills  its 
mission  of  securing  the  region  it  covers,  and  permits 
there  the  uninterrupted  prosecution  of  the  military 
efforts  of  every  character  which  are  designed  to  im- 
pede the  progress  of  the  invader. 

To  such  cases  no  general  rule  applies ;  each  turns 
upon  particular  conditions,  and,  although  close  simi- 
larities may  exist  between  various  instances,  probably 
no  two  are  entirely  identical.  It  is  evident,  however, 
that  very  much  will  depend  upon  the  offensive  power 
shut  up  in  the  position  under  consideration.     If  it  be 


136  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

great  walled  town,  such  as  are  found  on  the  Continent 
of  Europe,  behind  whose  defenses  are  sheltered  nu- 
merous troops,  the  assailant  who  advances  beyond  it 
thereby  exposes  his  communications  to  attack ;  and, 
to  guard  against  this  danger,  must  protect  them  by 
a..force  adequate  to  hold  the  garrison  in  check.  If, 
again,  there  be  but  a  single  line  by  which  the  com- 
munications can  be  maintained,  by  which  supplies 
and  re-enforcements  can  go  forward,  and  that  line 
passes  close  under  the  work  and  is  commanded  by 
it,  the  garrison  may  be  small,  incapable  of  external 
action,  and  yet  may  vitally  affect  the  future  opera- 
tions of  the  venturesome  enemy  who  dares  to  leave 
it  unsubdued  behind  him.  Such,  to  some  extent,  was 
the  Fort  of  Bard,  in  the  narrow  pass  of  the  Dora 
Baltea,  to  Napoleon's  crossing  of  the  St.  Bernard  in 
1800;  and  such,  to  some  extent,  would  be  Forts 
Jackson  and  St.  Philip  to  Farragut's  fleet  after  it 
had  fought  its  way  above.  The  Mississippi  was  the 
great  line  of  communication  for  the  fleet ;  no  other 
was  comparable  to  it — except  as  a  by-path  in  a 
mountain  is  comparable  to  a  royal  highway — and 
the  forts  commanded  the  Mississippi.  Their  own 
offensive  power  was  limited  to  the  range  of  their 
guns ;  their  garrisons  were  not  fitted,  either  by  their 
number  or  their  aptitudes,  for  offensive  action  upon 
the  water;  but  so  long  as  their  food  and  ammu- 
nition lasted,  though  an  occasional  vessel  might  run 
by  them,  no  steady  stream  of  supplies,  such  as  every 
armed  organization  needs,  could  pass  up  the  Missis- 
sippi. Finally,  though  the  garrison  could  not  move, 
there  lay  behind  or  under  the  forts  a  number  of  armed 
vessels,  whose  precise  powers  were  unknown,  but  con- 
cerning which  most  exaggerated  rumors  were  current. 


THE   NEW  ORLEANS   EXPEDITION. 


137 


The  question,  therefore,  looming  before  Farragut 
was  precisely  that  which  had  been  debated  before 
the  President  in  Washington ;  precisely  that  on 
which  Fox  had  differed  from  Porter  and  Barnard. 
It  was,  again,  closely  analogous  to  that  which  divided 
Sherman  and  Grant  when  the  latter,  a  year  after 
Farragut  ran  by  the  forts,  made  his  famous  decision 
to  cut  adrift  from  his  communications  by  the  upper 
Mississippi,  to  march  past  Vicksburg  by  the  west 
bank  of  the  river,  to  cross  below  the  works,  and  so 
cut  off  the  great  stronghold  of  the  Mississippi  from 
the  country  upon  which  it  depended  for  food  and  re- 
enforcements.*    But  as  Grant's  decision  rested  upon 

*  The  following  is  Grant's  account  of  a  matter  which,  but  for 
Sherman's  own  zeal  in  proclaiming  the  merits  of  his  commander- 
in-chief,  would  probably  have  always  remained  unknown.  It 
would  be  difficult  to  find  a  closer  parallel  to  the  difference  of 
judgment  existing  between  Farragut  and  Porter  at  New  Orleans : 
"  When  General  Sherman  first  learned  of  the  move  I  proposed  to 
make,  he  called  to  see  me  about  it.  I  was  seated  on  the  piazza, 
engaged  in  conversation  with  my  staff,  when  he  came  up.  After 
a  few  moments'  conversation,  he  said  he  would  like  to  see  me 
alone.  We  passed  into  the  house  together  and  shut  the  door  after 
us.  Sherman  then  expressed  his  alarm  at  the  move  I  had  ordered, 
saying  that  I  was  putting  myself  voluntarily  in  a  position  which 
an  enemy  would  be  glad  to  manoeuvre  a  year — or  a  long  time — to 
get  me  in.  I  was  going  into  the  enemy's  country,  with  a  large 
river  behind  me,  and  the  enemy  holding  points  strongly  fortified 
above  and  below.  He  said  that  it  was  an  axiom  in  war  that 
when  any  great  body  of  troops  moved  against  an  enemy  they 
should  do  so  from  a  base  of  supplies  which  they  would  guard  as 
the  apple  of  the  eye,  etc.  He  pointed  out  all  the  difficulties  that 
might  be  encountered  in  the  campaign  proposed,  and  stated  in 
turn  what  would  be  the  true  campaign  to  make.  This  was,  in 
substance,  to  go  back  until  high  ground  could  be  reached  on  the 
east  bank  of  the  river,  fortify  there  and  establish  a  depot  of  sup- 
plies, and  move  from  there,  being  always  prepared  to  fall  back 
10 


^8  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

a  balance  of  arguments  applicable  to  the  problem 
before  him,  so  did  Farragut's  upon  a  calculation  of 
the  risks  and  advantages  attendant,  respectively, 
upon  the  policy  of  waiting  for  the  forts  to  fall,  or  of 
speeding  by  them  to  destroy  the  resources  upon 
which  they  depended. 

The  reasons  in  favor  of  waiting  for  the  fall  of  the 
works  were  ably  presented  by  Commander  Porter  in 
a  paper  which  he  asked  to  have  read  in  a  council  of 
commanding  officers  of  the  fleet,  assembled  on  board 
the  flag-ship  on  the  third  day  of  the  bombardment, 
April  20.  Farragut  was  already  familiar  with  the 
arguments  on  both  sides,  and  Porter's  paper  can  be 
regarded  only  as  an  expression  of  views  already  ut- 
tered, but  now  invested  with  a  formality  becoming 
the  seriousness  of  the  occasion.  In  its  finality  it 
has  somewhat  the  character  of  a  protest,  though  in- 
direct and  couched  in  perfectly  becoming  language, 
against  a  decision  which  Farragut  had  now  reached 
and  which  Porter  had  always  combated.     The  latter 

upon  it  in  case  of  disaster.  I  said  this  would  take  us  back  to 
Memphis.  Sherman  then  said  that  was  the  very  place  he  should 
go  to,  and  would  move  by  railroad  from  Memphis  to  Granada. 
To  this  I  replied,  the  country  is  already  disheartened  over  the 
lack  of  success  on  the  part  of  our  armies,  .  .  .  and  if  we  went 
back  so  far  as  Memphis,  it  would  discourage  the  people  so  much 
that  bases  of  supplies  would  be  of  no  use  ;  neither  men  to  hold 
them  nor  supplies  to  put  in  them  would  be  furnished.  The  prob- 
lem was  to  move  forward  to  a  decisive  victory,  or  our  cause  was 
lost.  .  .  .  Sherman  wrote  to  my  adjutant-general  embodying  his 
views  of  the  campaign  that  should  be  made,  and  asking  him  to 
advise  me  at  least  to  get  the  views  of  my  generals  upon  the  sub- 
ject. Rawlins  showed  me  the  letter,  but  I  did  not  see  any  rea- 
sons for  changing  my  plans." — Personal  Memoirs  of  U.  S.  Grant, 
vol.  i,  p.  542  (note). 


THE   NEW  ORLEANS  EXPEDITION. 


139 


does  not  appear  to  have  doubted  the  ability  of  the 
fleet  to  pass  the  works,  but  he  questioned  the  utility 
and  expediency  of  so  doing.  His  words  were  as 
follows  :  * 

"The  objections  to  running  by  the  forts  are 
these:  It  is  not  likely  that  any  intelligent  enemy 
would  fail  to  place  chains  across  above  the  forts,  and 
raise  such  batteries  as  would  protect  them  against 
our  ships.  Did  we  run  the  forts  we  should  leave  an 
enemy  in  our  rear,  and  the  mortar  vessels  would 
have  to  be  left  behind.  We  could  not  return  to 
bring  them  up  without  going  through  a  heavy  and 
destructive  fire.  If  the  forts  are  run,  part  of  the 
mortars  should  be  towed  along,  which  would  render 
the  progress  of  the  vessels  slow  against  the  strong 
current  at  that  point.  If  the  forts  are  first  captured, 
the  moral  effect  would  be  to  close  the  batteries  on 
the  river  and  open  the  way  to  New  Orleans  ;  where- 
as, if  we  don't  succeed  in  taking  them,  we  shall  have 
to  fight  our  way  up  the  river.  Once  having  posses- 
sion of  the  forts,  New  Orleans  would  be  hermetically 
sealed,  and  we  could  repair  damages  and  go  up  on 
our  own  terms  and  in  our  own  time.  .  .  .  Nothing 
has  been  said  about  a  combined  attack  of  army  and 
navy.  Such  a  thing  is  not  only  practicable,  but,  if 
time  permitted,  should  be  adopted.  Fort  St.  Philip 
can  be  taken  with"  two  thousand  men  covered  by  the 
ships,  the  ditch  can  be  filled  with  fascines,  and  the 
wall  is  easily  to  be  scaled  with  ladders.  It  can  be 
attacked  in  front  and  rear." 

In  summoning  his  captains  to  meet  him  on  this 
occasion,  Farragut  had  no  idea  of  calling  a  council- 

*  The  paper  being  long,  only  those  parts  are  quoted  which 
convey  the  objections  to  running  by. 


140  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

of-war  in  the  sense  which  has  brought  that  name 
into  disrepute.  He  sent  for  them,  not  because  he 
wanted  to  make  up  his  mind,  but  because  it  was 
made  up,  and  he  wished  at  once  to  impart  to  them 
his  purposes  and  receive  the  benefit  of  any  sugges- 
tion they  might  make.  Bell,  the  chief-of-staff,  who 
was  present,  has  left  a  memorandum  of  what  passed, 
which  is  interesting  as  showing  that  the  members 
were  not  called  to  express  an  opinion  as  to  the  pro- 
priety of  the  attack,  but  to  receive  instructions  as  to 
the  method,  on  which  they  could  suggest  improve- 
ments. 

"  April  20,  10  a.  m.  Signal  was  made  for  all  cap- 
tains commanding  to  repair  on  board  the  flag-ship. 
All  being  present  except  the  three  on  guard  to-day, 
viz.,  Commander  De  Camp  and  Lieutenants-Com- 
manding Nichols  and  Russell,  the  flag-officer  un- 
folded his  plan  of  operations,  assigning  the  places  for 
every  vessel  in  the  fleet  in  the  attack,  and  exhibited  his 
charts  of  the  river  and  of  the  forts.  Some  discussion 
was  had  thereupon,  and  Commander  Alden  read 
a  written  communication  to  the  flag-officer  from 
Commander  Porter  at  his  request,  expressing  his 
views  as  to  the  operation  against  the  forts.  Having 
read  them,  Commander  Alden  folded  up  the  paper 
and  returned  it  to  his  pocket,  whereupon  I  suggested 
the  propriety  of  the  document  being  left  with  the 
flag-officer,  and  the  paper  was  accordingly  left  in  his 
hands.  It  was  therein  stated  that  the  boom  being  a 
protection  to  the  mortars  against  attacks  of  all  kinds 
from  above,  the  boom  should  not  be  destroyed  until 
the  forts  were  reduced.  Upon  this  the  flag-officer 
remarked  that  the  commander  had  this  morning  as- 
sented to  the  propriety  of  the  boom  being  broken  to' 


THE    NEW  ORLEANS   EXPEDITION. 


141 


night — which  I  heard — and,  again,  that  the  fleet 
should  not  go  above  the  forts,  as  the  mortar  fleet 
would  be  left  unprotected.  The  flag-officer  thought 
the  mortars  would  be  as  well  protected  above  as  be- 
low the  forts,  and  that  co-operation  with  the  army, 
which  entered  into  the  plans  of  both  parties,  could 
not  be  effectual  unless  some  of  the  troops  were  intro- 
duced above  the  forts  at  the  same  time  that  they  are 
below.  Once  above,  he  intended  to  cover  their  land- 
ing at  Quarantine,  five  miles  above,  they  coming  to 
the  river  through  the  bayou  there.  Once  above,  the 
forts  were  cut  off  and  his  propellers  intact  for  as- 
cending the  river  to  the  city.  And  in  passing  the 
forts,  if  he  found  his  ships  able  to  cope  with  them, 
he  should  fight  it  out.  Some  of  the  captains  and 
commanders  considered  it  a  hazardous  thing  to  go 
above,  as  being  out  of  the  reach  of  supplies.  To 
this  it  may  be  said  that  the  steamers  can  pass  down 
at  the  rate  of  twelve  miles  an  hour.  The  flag-officer 
remarked  that  our  ammunition  is  being  rapidly  con- 
sumed without  a  supply  at  hand,  and  that  something 
must  be  done  immediately.  He  believed  in  celerity. 
It  was  proposed  by  myself  and  assented  to  by  the 
flag-officer,  that  three  steamers  should  go  up  the 
river  shortly  after  dark,  under  my  own  guidance,  to 
break  the  boom." 

It  appears  from  this  account,  supported  by  the 
general  order  issued  immediately  after  it  and  given 
a  few  pages  further  on,  that  Farragut  had  definitely 
determined  not  to  await  the  reduction  of  the  forts, 
because  the  bombardment  so  far  did  not  indicate 
any  probability  of  effectual  results.  It  was  his  de- 
liberate opinion  that  the  loss  of  time  and  the  waste 
of  effort  were  entailing  greater  risks  than  would  be 


142 


ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 


caused  by  cutting  adrift  from  his  base  and  severing 
his  own  communications  in  order  to  strike  at  those 
of  the  enemy.  It  is  commonly  true  that  in  the  ef- 
fort to  cut  the  communications  of  an  opponent  one 
runs  the  risk  of  exposing  his  own  ;  but  in  this  case 
the  attacking  force  was  one  pre-eminently  qualified 
to  control  the  one  great  medium  of  communication 
throughout  that  region — that  is,  the  water.  Also, 
although  in  surrendering  the  river  Farragut  gave 
up  the  great  line  of  travel,  he  kept  in  view  that  the 
bayou  system  offered  an  alternative,  doubtless  greatly 
inferior,  but  which,  nevertheless,  would  serve  to 
plant  above  the  forts,  under  the  protection  of  the 
navy,  such  troops  as  should  be  deemed  necessary; 
and  that  the  combined  efforts  of  army  and  navy 
could  then  maintain  a  sufficient  flow  of  supplies 
until  the  forts  fell  from  isolation.  Finally,  a  fleet 
is  not  so  much  an  army  as  a  collection  of  floating 
fortresses,  garrisoned,  provisioned,  and  mobile.  It 
carries  its  communications  in  its  hulls,  and  is  not  in 
such  daily  dependence  upon  external  sources  as  is  the 
sister  service. 

In  deciding,  therefore,  against  awaiting  the  re- 
duction of  the  forts  by  direct  attack,  and  in  favor  of 
attempting  the  same  result  by  striking  at  the  inter- 
ests they  defended  and  the  base  on  which  they  rested, 
Farragut  was  guided  by  a  calculation  of  the  com- 
parative material  risks  and  advantages  of  the  two 
courses,  and  not  mainly  by  consideration  of  the 
moral  effect  produced  upon  the  defenders  by  a  suc- 
cessful stroke,  as  has  been  surmised  by  Lord  Wolse- 
ley.  This  eminent  English  authority  attributes  the 
success  of  the  expedition  against  New  Orleans  to 
three  causes.     "  First,  the  inadequate  previous  prep- 


THE   NEW  ORLEANS   EXPEDITION.  143 

aration  of  the  naval  part  of  the  New  Orleans  de- 
fenses ;  second,  the  want  of  harmonious  working  be- 
tween the  Confederate  naval  and  military  forces; 
and,  lastly,  Farragut's  clear  appreciation  of  the  ip.oral 
effect  he  would  produce  by  forcing  his  way  past  the 
defenses  of  Fort  Jackson  and  Fort  St.  Philip,  and  by 
his  appearance  before  New  Orleans.  For,  after  all, 
the  forts  were  never  captured  by  actual  attack.  .  . 
This  brilliant  result  is  a  striking  instance  of  the  due 
appreciation  by  a  commander  of  the  effect  which 
daring  achievements  exert  on  men's  minds,  although, 
as  in  this  case,  those  daring  acts  do  not  actually,  directly, 
or  materially  make  certain  the  end  or  surrender  they 
may  have  secured."  And,  again,  in  another  place : 
"  Admiral  Farragut's  success  was  mainly  due  to  the 
moral  effect  produced  by  his  gallant  passage  of  the 
forts.  ...  He  never  reduced  the  forts,  and  seems  to 
have  done  them  but  little  harm."* 

The  moral  effect  produced  in  war  upon  men's 
minds,  and  through  the  mind  upon  their  actions,  is 
undeniable,  and  may  rightly  count  for  much  in  the 
calculations  of  a  commander;  but  when  it  becomes 
the  sole,  or  even  the  chief  reliance,  as  in  Bonaparte's 
advance  into  Carinthia  in  1797,  the  spirit  displayed 
approaches  closely  to  that  of  the  gambler  who 
counts  upon  a  successful  bluff  to  disconcert  his  op- 
ponent. The  serious  objection  to  relying  upon 
moral  effect  alone  to  overcome  resistance  is  that 
moral  forces  do  not  admit  of  as  close  knowledge 
and  measurement  as  do  material  conditions.  The 
insight  and  moral  strength  of  the  enemy  may  be 
greater  than   you   have  means  of   knowing,  and  to 

*  Lord  Wolseley  in  North  American  Review,  vol.  cxlix,  pp.  32- 
34,  597.     The  italics  are  the  author's. 


144 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


assume  that  they  are  less  is  to  fall  into  the  danger- 
ous error  of  despising  your  enemy.  To  attribute  to 
so  dubious  a  hope,  alone,  the  daring  act  of  Admiral 
Farragut  in  passing  the  forts  and  encountering  the 
imperfectly  known  dangers  above,  is  really  to  de- 
tract from  his  fame  as  a  capable  as  well  as  gallant 
leader.  That  there  were  risks  and  accidents  to  be 
met  he  knew  full  well ;  that  he  might  incur  disaster 
he  realized;  that  the  dangers  above  and  the  power 
of  the  enemy's  vessels  might  exceed  his  expectations 
was  possible  ;  war  can  not  be  stripped  of  hazard,  and 
the  anxiety  of  the  doubtful  issue  is  the  penalty 
the  chieftain  pays  for  his  position.  But  Farragut 
was  convinced  by  experience  and  reflection  that  his 
fleet  could  force  its  passage ;  and  he  saw  that  once 
above  the  material  probabilities  were  that  army  and 
navy  could  be  combined  in  such  a  position  of  van- 
tage as  would  isolate  the  forts  from  all  relief,  and  so 
"  actually,  directly,  and  materially  make  certain  their 
surrender,"  and  secure  his  end  of  controlling  the 
lower  Mississippi.  There  was  only  one  road  practi- 
cable to  ships  to  pass  above,  and  that  led  openly  and 
directly  under  the  fire  of  the  forts ;  but  having  passed 
this,  they  were  planted  across  the  communications  as 
squarely  as  if  they  had  made  a  circuit  of  hundreds 
of  miles,  with  all  the  secrecy  of  Bonaparte  in  1800 
and  in  1805.  Are  strongholds  never  "captured  "  un- 
less by  "  actual  attack  "  ?  Did  Ulm  and  Mantua 
yield  to  blows  or  to  isolation  ? 

Such,  certainly,  was  the  opinion  of  the  able  offi- 
cers who  conducted  the  Confederate  defense,  and 
whose  conduct,  except  in  matters  of  detail,  was 
approved  by  the  searching  court  of  inquiry  that 
passed  upon  it.     "In  my  judgment,"  testified  Gene- 


THE  NEW  ORLEANS  EXPEDITION. 


145 


ral  M.  L.  Smith,  who  commanded  the  interior  line 
of  works  and  was  in  no  way  responsible  for  the 
fall  of  Forts  St.  Philip  and  Jackson,  "  the  forts 
were  impregnable  so  long  as  they  were  in  free  and 
open  communication  with  the  city.  This  communica- 
tion was  not  endangered  while  the  obstruction  ex- 
isted. The  conclusion,  then,  is  briefly  this:  While  the 
obstruction  existed  the  city  was  safe ;  when  it  was 
swept  away,  as  the  defenses  then  existed,  it  was  in 
the  enemy's  power."*  General  Lovell,  the  com- 
mander-in-chief of  the  military  department,  stated 
that  he  had  made  preparations  to  evacuate  New  Or- 
leans in  case  the  fleet  passed  the  fort  by  sending  out 
of  the  city  several  hundred  thousand  rations  and 
securing  transport  steamers.  He  continued:  "In 
determining  upon  the  evacuation  of  the  city  I  neces- 
sarily, as  soon  as  the  enemy's  fleet  had  passed  the 
forts,  regarded  the  position  the  same  as  if  both  their 
army  and  navy  were  present  before  the  city,  making  due 
allowance  simply  for  the  time  it  would  take  them  to 
transport  their  army  up.  Inasmuch  as  their  ships 
had  passed  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip,  they  could 
at  once  place  themselves  in  open  and  uninterrupted  com- 
munication with  their  army  at  points  from  six  to  twenty 
miles  above  the  forts  through  various  small  water  com- 
munications from  the  Gulf,  made  more  available  by  the 
extraordinary  height  of  the  river,  and  which,  while 
they  (we  ?)  were  in  possession  of  the  latter,  I  had 
easily  and  without  risk  defended  with  launches  and 
part  of  the  river-defense  fleet.  I  had  also  stationed 
Szymanski's  regiment  at  the  Quarantine  for  the  same 
object.     These  were,  however,  all  destroyed  or  capt- 


*  Official  Records  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion.     Series  I,  vol. 
vi,  p.  583. 


I46  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

ured  by  the  enemy's  fleet  after  they  got  possession 
of  the  river  between  the  forts  and  the  city."  * 
Colonel  Szymanski  testified :  "  After  the  forts  had 
been  passed,  it  was  practicable  for  the  enemy  to 
transport  his  army  through  the  bayous  and  canals  to 
New  Orleans,  without  encountering  the  forts.  A 
portion  of  the  enemy  did  come  that  way.  I  have  for 
many  years  owned  a  plantation  fifteen  miles  below 
the  city,  and  am  very  familiar  with  the  whole 
country.  I  have  never  known  the  river  as  high  as  it 
was  in  1862.  Also,  above  English  Turn  (five  miles 
below  the  city)  there  is  water  communication  through 
Lake  Borgne  with  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  by  other 
bayous  and  canals  of  the  same  character."  f 

It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  competent  military 
men  on  the  spot,  and  in  full  possession  of  all  the 
facts,  considered,  as  did  Farragut,  that  with  the 
passage  of  the  forts  by  the  fleet  the  material  proba- 
bilities of  success  became  in  favor  of  the  United 
States  forces.  The  only  moral  effect  produced  was 
the  mutiny  of  the  half-disciplined  alien  troops  that 
garrisoned  the  forts ;  and  surely  it  will  not  be  con- 
tended that  any  such  wild  anticipation  as  of  that 
prompted  Farragut's  movement.  The  officers  of  the 
forts  were  trained  and  educated  soldiers,  who  knew 
their  duty  and  would  not  be  crushed  into  submission 
by  adverse  circumstances.  They  would  doubtless 
have  replied,  as  did  the  commander  of  Fort  Mor- 
gan two  years  later,  that  they  looked  upon  the 
United  States  fleet  above  them  as  their  prisoners, 
and  they  would  have  held  out  to  the  bitter  end;  but 
the  end  was  certain  as  soon  as  the  fleet  passed  above 


*  Official  Records  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion.     Series  I,  vol.  vi, 
p.  566.  f  Ibid.,  p.  578. 


THE   NEW  ORLEANS   EXPEDITION.  147 

them.     They  had  provisions  for  two  months ;  then, 
if  not  reduced  by  blows,  they  must  yield  to  hunger. 

Immediately  after  the  conference  with  his  cap- 
tains, Farragut  issued  the  following  general  order, 
from  which  it  appears  that,  while  his  opinion  re- 
mained unchanged  as  to  the  expediency  of  running 
by  the  forts,  he  contemplated  the  possibility,  though 
not  the  probability,  of  their  being  subdued  by  the 
fire  of  the  fleet,  and  reserved  to  himself  freedom  to 
act  accordingly  by  prescribing  a  simple  signal,  which 
would  be  readily  understood,  and  would  convert  the 
attempt  to  pass  into  a  sustained  and  deadly  effort  to 

conquer : 

"  United  States  Flag-ship  Hartford, 

Mississippi  River,  April  20,  1862. 

"The  flag-officer,  having  heard  all  the  opinions 
expressed  by  the  different  commanders,  is  of  the 
opinion  that  whatever  is  to  be  done  will  have  to  be 
done  quickly,  or  we  shall  be  again  reduced  to  a 
blockading  squadron,  without  the  means  of  carrying 
on  the  bombardment,  as  we  have  nearly  expended 
all  the  shells  and  fuses  and  material  for  making  car- 
tridges. He  has  always  entertained  the  same  opinions 
which  are  expressed  by  Commander  Porter— that  is, 
there  are  three  modes  of  attack,*  and  the  question 
is,  which  is  the  one  to  be  adopted  ?  His  own  opin- 
ion is  that  a  combination  of  two  should  be  made, 
viz.,  the  forts  should  be  run,  and  when  a  force  is  once 
above  the  forts  to  protect  the  troops  they  should  be  landed 
at  Quarantine  from  the  Gulf  side  by  bringing  them 
through  the  bayou,  and  then  our  forces  should  move 

*  Those  three  were  :  First,  a  direct  naval  attack  upon  the 
works  ;  second,  running  by  the  works ;  third,  a  combined  attack 
by  army  and  navy. 


I48  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

up  the  river,  mutually  aiding  each  other  as  it  can  be 
done  to  advantage. 

"  When  in  the  opinion  of  the  flag-officer  the  pro- 
pitious time  has  arrived,  the  signal  will  be  made  to 
weigh  and  advance  to  the  conflict.  If,  in  his  opin- 
ion, at  the  time  of  arriving  at  the  respective  positions 
of  the  different  divisions  of  the  fleet  we  have  the  ad- 
vantage, he  will  make  the  signal  for  close  action, 
No.  8,  and  abide  the  result — conquer  or  be  conquered 
— drop  anchor  or  keep  under  way,  as  in  his  opinion 
is  best. 

"  Unless  the  signal  above  mentioned  is  made,  it  will 
be  understood  that  the  first  order  of  sailing  will  be 
formed  after  leaving  Fort  St.  Philip,  and  we  will  pro- 
ceed up  the  river  in  accordance  with  the  original  opinion 
expressed. 

"  The  programme  of  the  order  of  sailing  accom- 
panies this  general  order,  and  the  commanders  will 
hold  themselves  in  readiness  for  the  service  as  indi- 
cated. D.  G.  Farragut, 

Flag-officer  Western  Gulf  Blockading  Squadron." 

Nothing  can  be  clearer  than  that  the  opinion  ex- 
pressed and  maintained  by  the  flag-officer  from  the 
beginning  was  the  one  carried  out,  resulting  in  a 
complete  success. 

The  bombardment  by  the  mortar  flotilla  was  con- 
tinued three  days  longer,  at  the  end  of  which  time 
the  provision  of  bombs  immediately  obtainable  was 
becoming  exhausted.  Enough,  however,  remained  to 
sustain  a  very  vigorous  fire  during  the  period  of  the 
passage,  and  as  the  cover  of  darkness  was  desired 
the  delay  was  not  without  its  advantages,  for  the 
waning  moon  grew  daily  less  and  rose  an  hour  later 


THE   NEW  ORLEANS  EXPEDITION.  149 

each  succeeding  night.  On  the  23d  notice  was  given 
to  the  ships  that  the  attempt  to  pass  would  be  made 
that  night,  and  that,  as  half-past  three  was  the  hour 
of  moon-rise,  the  signal,  two  red  lights,  would  be 
hoisted  at  2  a.  m.  During  that  afternoon  Farragut 
personally  visited  each  ship,  in  order  to  know  pos- 
itively that  each  commander  understood  his  orders 
for  the  attack,  and  to  see  that  all  was  in  readi- 
ness. 

The  original  intention  of  the  flag-officer  was  to 
attack  in  two  parallel  columns,  a  more  compact  for- 
mation than  one  long  one,  less  liable  to  straggling, 
and  in  which  the  heavy  batteries  of  the  larger  ships 
would  more  effectually  cover  the  lighter  vessels  by 
keeping  down  the  fire  of  the  enemy.  In  this  ar- 
rangement, which  remained  unaltered  until  the  23d, 
the  second  in  command,  Captain  Theodorus  Bailey, 
whose  divisional  flag  was  flying  in  the  gunboat 
Cayuga,  would  have  had  the  right  column,  and  the 
flag-officer  himself  the  left  in  the  Hartford.  The 
latter  was  to  be  followed  by  the  Brooklyn  and  Rich- 
mond, and  upon  these  three  heavy  ships  would  fall 
the  brunt  of  the  engagement  with  Fort  Jackson,  the 
more  powerful  of  the  enemy's  works.  The  right  col- 
umn also  had  its  heaviest  ships  in  the  lead ;  the  ex- 
ceptional station  of  the  Cayuga  being  due  to  some 
natural  unwillingness  on  the  part  of  other  command- 
ing officers  to  receive  on  board,  as  divisional  com- 
mander and  their  own  superior,  an  officer  whose  po- 
sition in  the  fleet  was  simply  that  of  captain  of  a 
single  ship.*     The  Cayuga  led,  not  in  virtue  of  her 

*  Captain  Bailey  commanded  the  Colorado  frigate,  which  drew 
too  much  water  to  cross  the  bar.  Anxious  to  share  in  the  fight, 
he  obtained  from  the  flag-officer  the  divisional  appointment. 


150  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

armament,  but  because  she  bore  on  board  the  com- 
mander of  one  column. 

On  the  23d  Farragut,  considering  the  narrowness 
of  the  opening  in  the  obstructions  through  which  the 
fleet  must  pass,  decided  that  the  risk  of  collision 
with  the  hulks  on  either  side,  or  between  the  columns 
themselves,  would  be  too  great  if  he  adhered  to  his 
written  programme  ;  and  he  accordingly  gave  a  verbal 
order  that  the  right  column  should  weigh  first,  and 
be  followed  closely  by  the  other  under  his  own 
guidance.  To  facilitate  the  departure  and  avoid 
confusion,  the  ships  of  the  right  shifted  their  berth 
after  dark  to  the  east  side  of  the  river,  anchoring  in 
the  order  prescribed  to  them. 

As  some  doubts  had  been  expressed  as  to  the 
actual  rupture  of  the  chains  between  the  hulks  on 
either  side  the  breach,  although  they  had  evidently 
been  dragged  from  their  position  by  the  efforts  made 
on  the  night  of  the  20th,  Lieutenant  Caldwell  was 
again  chosen,  at  his  own  request,  to  make  an  exami- 
nation of  the  actual  conditions.  This  he  did  in  the 
early  part  of  the  night,  before  the  ships  got  under 
way ;  and  it  is  a  singular  confirmation  of  the  slack- 
ness and  inefficiency  that  has  been  charged  against 
the  water  service  of  the  Confederates  that  he  effected 
this  duty  thoroughly  and  without  molestation.  Twice 
he  pulled  above  the  hulks  and  thence  allowed  his 
boat  to  drift  down  between  them,  a  heavy  lead  with 
sixty  feet  of  line  hanging  from  her  bows.  As  this 
line  caught  on  nothing  it  was  clear  that  within  the 
narrow  limits  of  the  breach  no  impediment  to  the 
passage  of  a  vessel  existed.  By  n  p.  m.  Caldwell 
was  on  his  return  with  this  decisive  and  encouraging 
report. 


THE   NEW  ORLEANS   EXPEDITION.  151 

At  2  a.  m.  the  appointed  signal  was  made,  and  at 
once  was  heard  in  every  direction  the  clank-clank  of 
the  chains  as  the  seamen  hove  the  anchors  to  the 
bows.  The  strength  of  the  current  and  the  tenacity 
of  the  bottom  in  some  spots  made  this  operation 
longer  than  had  been  expected,  and  not  till  half-past 
three  did  the  leading  vessel  reach  the  line  of  hulks, 
followed  closely  by  the  rest  of  her  division.  There 
is  something  singularly  impressive  in  the  thought  of 
these  moments  of  silent  tension,  following  the  act- 
ive efforts  of  getting  under  way  and  preceding  the 
furious  strife,  for  whose  first  outburst  every  heart  on 
board  was  waiting ;  and  the  impression  is  increased  by 
the  petty  size  of  the  little  vessel  in  the  lead,  which 
thus  advanced  with  steady  beating  of  the  engines  to 
bear  the  first  blast  of  the  storm.  Favored  partly  by 
her  size,  and  yet  more  by  the  negligence  of  those 
among  the  enemy  whose  duty  it  was  to  have  kept 
the  scene  alight  with  the  numerous  fire-rafts  pro- 
vided for  that  very  purpose,  the  Cayuga  passed  the 
hulks  and  was  well  on  her  way  up  river  before  she 
was  seen.  "Although  it  was  a  starlight  night," 
wrote  Lieutenant  Perkins,  who  by  her  commander's 
direction  was  piloting  the  ship,  "  we  were  not  dis- 
covered until  well  under  the  forts  ;  then  they  opened 
upon  us  a  tremendous  fire."  It  was  the  prelude  to  a 
drama  of  singular  energy  and  grandeur,  for  the  Con- 
federates in  the  forts  were  fully  on  their  guard,  and 
had  anticipated  with  unshaken  courage,  but  with 
gloomy  forebodings,  an  attack  during  that  very 
night.  "  There  will  be  no  to-morrow  for  New  Or- 
leans," had  said  the  undaunted  commander  of  Fort 
Jackson  the  day  before,  "  if  the  navy  does  not  at 
once  move  the  Louisiana  to  the  position  assigned  to 


jc2  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

her,"  close  to  the  obstructions.  The  Louisiana  was 
a  powerful  ironclad  battery,  not  quite  complete 
when  Farragut  entered  the  river.  She  had  been 
hurried  down  to  the  forts  four  days  before  the  pas- 
sage of  the  fleet,  but  her  engines  could  not  drive  her, 
and  the  naval  commander  refused  to  take  up  the 
position,  asked  of  him  by  the  military  authorities, 
below  St.  Philip,  where  he  would  have  a  cross  fire 
with  the  forts,  a  close  command  of  the  line  of  ob- 
structions, and  would  greatly  prolong  the  gantlet 
of  fire  through  which  the  fleet  must  run.  To  sup- 
port the  movement  of  the  latter  by  drawing  the  fire 
and  harassing  the  gunners  of  the  enemy,  Com- 
mander Porter  moved  up  with  the  steamers  of  the 
mortar  flotilla  to  easy  range  of  the  water  battery 
under  Fort  Jackson,  which  he  engaged;  while  the 
mortar  schooners,  as  soon  as  the  flash  of  the 
enemy's  guns  showed  that  the  head  of  the  column 
had  been  discovered,  opened  a  furious  bombardment, 
keeping  two  shells  constantly  in  the  air.  Except  for 
the  annoyance  of  the  bombs,  the  gunners  of  the  forts 
had  it  much  their  own  way  until  the  broadsides  of 
the  Pensacola,  which  showed  eleven  heavy  guns  on 
either  side,  drew  up  abreast  of  them.  "  The  Cayuga 
received  the  first  fire,"  writes  Perkins,  "  and  the  air 
was  filled  with  shells  and  explosives  which  almost 
blinded  me  as  I  stood  on  the  forecastle  trying  to  see 
my  way,  for  I  had  never  been  up  the  river  before. 
I  soon  saw  that  the  guns  of  the  forts  were  all  aimed 
for  midstream,  so  I  steered  close  under  the  walls  of 
Fort  St.  Philip  ;  and  although  our  masts  and  rigging 
got  badly  shot  through  our  hull  was  but  little  dam- 
aged." Small  as  she  was — five  hundred  tons — and 
with   the   scanty   top   hamper    of    a    schooner,   the 


THE   NEW  ORLEANS   EXPEDITION. 


153 


Cayuga   was    struck    forty  -  two    times,    below   and 
aloft. 

"After  passing  the  last  battery,"  continues  Per- 
kins, "  and  thinking  we  were  clear,  I  looked  back 
for  some  of  our  vessels,  and  my  heart  jumped  up 
into  my  mouth  when  I  found  I  could  not  see  a  single 
one.  I  thought  they  all  must  have  been  sunk  by  the 
forts."  This  seeming  desertion  was  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  heavy  ships— the  Pensacola,  Mississippi,  and 
Oneida— had  been  detained  by  the  resolute  manner  in 
which  the  first  stopped  to  engage  Fort  St.  Philip. 
Stopping  to  fire,  then  moving  slowly,  then  stopping 
again,  the  reiterated  broadsides  of  this  big  ship,  de- 
livered at  such  close  range  that  the  combatants  on 
either  side  exchanged  oaths  and  jeers  of  defiance, 
beat  down  the  fire  of  the  exposed  barbette  batteries, 
and  gave  an  admirable  opportunity  for  slipping  by 
to  the  light  vessels,  which  brought  up  the  rear  of 
the  column  and  were  wholly  unfit  to  contend  with 
the  forts.  The  Mississippi  and  Oneida  keeping  close 
behind  the  Pensacola  and  refusing  to  pass  her,  the 
Cayuga  was  thus  separated  from  all  her  followers. 

The  isolation  of  the  Cayuga  was  therefore  caused 
by  her  anomalous  position  at  the  head  of  the  col- 
umn, a  post  proper  only  to  a  heavy  ship.  It  was 
impossible  for  her  petty  battery  of  two  guns  to  pause 
before  the  numerous  pieces  of  the  enemy  ;  it  was 
equally  impossible  for  the  powerful  vessels  following 
her  to  hasten  on,  leaving  to  the  mercy  of  the  Con- 
federates the  gunboats  of  the  same  type  that  suc- 
ceeded them  in  the  order.  That  the  Cayuga  was 
thus  exposed  arose  from  the  amiable  desire  of  the 
admiral  to  gratify  Bailey's  laudable  wish  to  share  in 
the  battle,  without  compelling  an  officer  of  the  same 


11 


154 


ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 


grade,  and  junior  only  in  number,  to  accept  a  su- 
perior on  his  own  quarter-deck  in  the  day  of  battle, 
when  the  harvest  of  distinction  is  expected  to  repay 
the  patient  sowing  of  preparation.  The  commander 
of  the  Cayuga,  who  was  only  a  lieutenant,  had  rec- 
onciled these  conflicting  claims  by  volunteering  to 
carry  Bailey's  divisional  flag.  As  there  is  no  reason 
to  suppose  that  Farragut  deliberately  intended  to 
offer  the  gunboat  up  as  a  forlorn  hope  by  draw- 
ing the  first  fire  of  the  enemy,  always  the  most 
deadly,  and  thus  saving  the  more  important  vessels, 
the  disposition  of  her  constitutes  the  only  serious 
fault  in  his  tactical  arrangements  on  this  occasion — 
a  fault  attributable  not  to  his  judgment,  but  to  one 
of  those  concessions  to  human  feelings  which  cir- 
cumstances at  times  extort  from  all  men.  His  first 
intention,  an  advance  in  two  columns,  the  heavy 
ships  leading  and  closely  engaging  the  forts  with 
grape  and  canister,  while  the  two-gun  vessels 
slipped  through  between  the  columns,  met  the  tac- 
tical demands  of  the  proposed  operation.  The  de- 
cision to  abandon  this  order  in  favor  of  one  long, 
thin  line,  because  of  the  narrowness  of  the  opening, 
can  not  be  challenged.  This  formation  was  distinctly 
weaker  and  more  liable  to  straggling,  but  nothing 
could  be  so  bad  as  backing,  collision,  or  stoppage 
at  the  obstructions.  In  such  an  attack,  however,  as 
in  all  of  Farragut's  battles,  it  seems  eminently  fit- 
ting that  the  commander  of  the  column  should  lead. 
The  occasion  is  one  for  pilotage  and  example ;  and 
inasmuch  as  the  divisional  commander  can  not  con- 
trol, except  by  example,  any  ship  besides  the  one 
on  board  which  he  himself  is,  that  ship  should  be 
the  most  powerful  in  his  command.     These  conclu- 


THE   NEW  ORLEANS   EXPEDITION.  jet 

sions  may  hereafter  be  modified  by  conditions  of 
submarine  warfare,  though  even  under  them  it  seems 
likely  that  in  forcing  passage  into  a  harbor  the  van 
ship  should  carry  the  flag  of  the  officer  commanding 
the  leading  division  ;  but  under  the  circumstances 
of  Farragut's  day  they  may  be  accepted  as  repre- 
senting his  own  convictions,  first  formed  by  the 
careful  deliberation  of  a  man  with  a  genius  for 
war,  and  afterward  continually  confirmed  by  his 
ever-ripening  experience. 

Left  thus  unsupported  by  the  logical  results  of 
her  false  position,  the  Cayuga  found  herself  exposed 
to  an  even  greater  danger  than  she  had  already  run 
from  the  guns  of  the  stationary  works.  "  Looking 
ahead,"  says  Perkins's  letter,  already  quoted,  "  I  saw 
eleven  of  the  enemy's  gunboats  coming  down  upon 
us,  and  it  seemed  as  if  we  were  'gone*  sure."  The 
vessels  thus  dimly  seen  in  the  darkness  of  the  night 
were  a  heterogeneous,  disorganized  body,  concerning 
which,  however,  very  imperfect  and  very  exaggerated 
particulars  had  reached  the  United  States  fleet. 
They  were  freely  spoken  of  as  ironclad  gunboats 
and  ironclad  rams,  and  the  Confederates  had  done 
all  in  their  power  to  increase  the  moral  effect  which 
was  attendant  upon  these  names,  then  new  to  mari- 
time warfare.  None  of  them  had  been  built  with 
any  view  to  war.  Three  only  were  sea-going,  with 
the  light  scantling  appropriate  to  their  calling  as 
vessels  for  freight  and  passenger  traffic.  Another 
had  been  a  large  twin-screw  tugboat  that  began  her 
career  in  Boston,  and  thence,  shortly  before  the  war, 
had  been  sent  to  the  Mississippi.  After  the  out- 
break of  hostilities  she  had  been  covered  with  an 
arched  roof  and  three-quarter-inch  iron  ;  a  nine-inch 


i56 


ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 


gun,  capable  only  of  firing  directly  ahead,  had  been 
mounted  in  her  bows,  and,  thus  equipped,  she  passed 
into  notoriety  as  the  ram  Manassas.  With  the  mis- 
erable speed  of  six  knots,  to  which,  however,  the 
current  of  the  river  gave  a  very  important  addition, 
and  with  a  protection  scarcely  stronger  than  the 
buckram  armor  of  the  stage,  the  Manassas,  by  her 
uncanny  appearance  and  by  the  persistent  trump- 
eting of  the  enemy,  had  obtained  a  very  formidable 
reputation  with  the  United  States  officers,  who  could 
get  no  reliable  information  about  her. 

The  remainder  of  the  force  were  river  steam- 
boats, whose  machinery  was  protected  with  cotton, 
and  their  stems  shod  with  one-inch  iron,  clamped  in 
place  by  straps  of  the  same  material  extending  a  few 
feet  aft.  Thus  strengthened,  it  was  hoped  that  with 
the  sharpness  of  their  bows  and  the  swiftness  of  the 
current  they  could,  notwithstanding  the  exceeding 
lightness  of  their  structure,  penetrate  the  hulls  of 
the  United  States  ships.  Resolutely  and  vigorously 
handled,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  they  might 
have  sunk  one  or  two  of  their  assailants;  but  there  is 
no  probability  that  they  could  under  all  the  circum- 
stances have  done  more.  The  obscurity  of  the  night, 
the  swiftness  of  the  stream,  and  the  number  of  actors 
in  the  confusing  drama  being  played  between  the 
two  banks  of  the  Mississippi,  would  have  introduced 
into  the  always  delicate  fencing  of  the  ram  extraor- 
dinary difficulties,  with  which  the  inexperience  of 
their  commanders  was  in  no  degree  qualified  to  deal. 
The  generally  steady  approach,  bows  on,  of  the 
United  States  ships,  presented  the  smallest  target  to 
their  thrust  and  gave  to  the  threatened  vessel  the 
utmost   facilities  for  avoiding  the  collision  or  con- 


THE   NEW  ORLEANS   EXPEDITION. 


157 


verting  it  into  a  glancing  blow;  while,  as  for  round- 
ing-to,  to  ram  squarely  on  the  beam  of  a  ship  stem- 
ming the  current,  the  assailant,  even  if  he  displayed 
the  remarkable  nicety  of  judgment  required,  was  not 
likely  to  find  the  necessary  room. 

These  difficulties  received  illustration  by  the  ca- 
reer of  the  Manassas  that  night.     Her  commander, 
Lieutenant  Warley,  was  a  former  officer  of  the  United 
States  Navy,  and  he  handled  her  with  judgment  and 
the  utmost  daring.    Rushing  nearly  bows  on  upon  the 
Pensacola,  the  thrust  was  wholly  avoided  by  the  quick 
moving  of  the  latter's  helm,  which  Warley  character- 
ized as  beautiful ;  while  the  attempt  made  immediately 
afterward  upon  the  Mississippi  resulted  in  a  merely 
glancing  blow,  which  took  a  deep  and  long  shaving 
out  of  the  enemy's  quarter,  but  did  no  serious  damage. 
Not  till  a  much  later  period  of  the  action  did  the 
Manassas  find  an  opportunity  to  charge  squarely  upon 
the  beam  of  the  Brooklyn.     She  did  so  across  the  cur- 
rent, striking  therefore  only  with  her  own  speed  of  six 
knots.    But  little  shock  was  felt  on  board  the  rammed 
ship,  and    no  apprehension  of    damage  was  experi- 
enced ;  but  it  was  afterward  found  that  the  enemy's 
stem  had  entered  between  two  frames,  and  crushed 
both  the  outer  and  inner  planking.     A  few  moments 
earlier  the  Brooklyn  had  been  thrown  across  the  cur- 
rent by  the  chances  of  the  night.     Had  the  ram  then 
struck  her  in  the  same  place,  carrying  the  four  knots 
additional  velocity  of  the  current,  it  is  entirely  pos- 
sible that  the  mortification  of  the  Confederate  defeat 
would  have  derived  some  consolation  from  the  sink- 
ing of  one  of  Farragut's  best  ships.     Such  were  the 
results  obtained  by  a  man  of  singular  and  resolute 
character,  who  drove  his  tiny  vessel   through   the 


158  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

powerful  broadsides  of  the  hostile  fleet,  and  dared 
afterward  to  follow  its  triumphant  course  up  the 
river,  in  hopes  of  snatching  another  chance  from  the 
jaws  of  defeat. 

Another  example,  equally  daring  and  more  suc- 
cessful, of  the  power  of  the  ram,  was  given  that 
same  night  by  Kennon,  also  an  ex-officer  of  the 
United  States  Navy  ;  but  the  other  ram  command- 
ers did  not  draw  from  their  antecedent  training  and 
habits  of  thought  the  constancy  and  pride,  which 
could  carry  their  frail  vessels  into  the  midst  of  ships 
that  had  thus  victoriously  broken  their  way  through 
the  bulwarks  of  the  Mississippi.  The  River-Defense 
Fleet,  as  it  was  called,  was  a  separate  organization, 
which  owned  no  allegiance  and  would  receive  no 
orders  from  the  navy;  and  its  absurd  privileges  were 
jealously  guarded  by  a  government  whose  essential 
principle  was  the  independence  of  local  rights  from 
all  central  authority.  Captains  of  Mississippi  River 
steamboats,  their  commanders  held  to  the  full  the 
common  American  opinion  that  the  profession  of 
arms  differs  from  all  others  in  the  fact  that  it  requires 
no  previous  training,  involves  no  special  habits  of 
thought,  is  characterized  by  no  moral  tone  which 
only  early  education  or  years  of  custom  can  impart. 
Rejecting  all  suggestion  and  neglecting  all  prepara- 
tion, they  cherished  the  most  inordinate  confidence 
in  the  raw  native  valor  which  they  were  persuaded 
would  inspire  them  at  the  critical  moment ;  and,  in- 
credible as  it  would  seem,  some  of  the  men  who  in 
the  battle  could  find  no  other  use  for  their  boats  but 
to  run  them  ashore  and  burn  them,  ventured  to  tell 
Warley  the  night  before  that  their  mission  was  to 
show  naval  officers  how  to  fight.     They  did  not  lack 


THE   NEW   ORLEANS   EXPEDITION.  159 

courage,  but  that  military  habit  upon  whose  influence 
Farragut  had  so  acutely  remarked  when  a  youth,  re- 
turning in  1820  from  the  European  station.*  "Had 
regular  naval  officers,"  said  Kennon  bitterly,  "  in- 
stead of  being  kept  in  the  mud  forts  on  the  creeks  in 
Virginia,  and  in  the  woods  of  Carolina  cutting  tim- 
bers to  build  ironclads,  been  sent  to  command  these 
vessels,  even  at  the  eleventh  hour,  they  would  have 
proved  very  formidable." 

Steaming  into  the  midst  of  such  as  these,  the 
peril  of  the  Cayuga,  real  enough,  was  less  than  it 
seemed ;  but  she  had  to  do  at  once  with  Warley's 
Manassas  and  with  the  Governor  Moore,  the  ves- 
sel that  Kennon  commanded,  and  which  afterward 
sunk  the  Varuna.  "Three  made  a  dash  to  board 
us,"  records  Lieutenant  Perkins,  agreeing  therein 
with  the  official  reports  of  Captain  Bailey  and  of 
his  own  commander,  Lieutenant  Harrison ;  "  but  a 
heavy  charge  from  our  eleven-inch  gun  settled 
the  Governor  Moore,  which  was  one  of  them.  A 
ram,  the  Manassas,  in  attempting  to  butt  us  just 
missed  our  stern,  and  we  soon  settled  the  third  fel- 
low's '  hash.'  Just  then  some  of  our  gunboats  which 
had  passed  the  forts  came  up,  and  then  all  sorts  of 
things  happened."  This  last  expression  is  probably 
as  terse  and  graphic  a  summary  of  a  melee,  which  to 
so  many  is  the  ideal  of  a  naval  conflict,  as  ever  was 
penned.  "  There  was  the  wildest  excitement  all 
round.  The  Varuna  fired  a  broadside  into  us  instead 
of  into  the  enemy.  Another  of  our  gunboats  at- 
tacked one  of  the  Cayuga's  prizes;  I  shouted  out, 
'Don't    fire   into    that    ship,    she  has   surrendered.' 

*  See  page  62. 


!6o  '  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

Three  of  the  enemy's  ships  had  surrendered  to  us 
before  any  of  our  vessels  appeared;  but  when  they 
did  come  up  we  all  pitched  in,  and  settled  the  eleven 
rebel  vessels  in  about  twenty  minutes."  Besides  the 
eleven  armed  boats  known  to  have  been  above,  there 
were  several  unarmed  tugs  and  other  steamers,  some 
of  which  probably  shared  in  this  wild  confusion. 
One  at  least  came  into  conflict  with  the  Hartford. 

The  second  column,  led  by  the  flag-ship,  was 
promptly  away  and  after  the  first ;  following,  indeed, 
so  closely  that  the  head  of  the  one  lapped  the  rear 
of  the  other.  The  Brooklyn  and  Richmond,  close 
behind  the  Hartford,  formed  with  her  a  powerful 
"  body  of  battle,"  to  use  the  strong  French  expres- 
sion for  the  center  of  a  fleet.  Though  called  sloops- 
of-war,  the  tonnage  and  batteries  of  these  ships  were 
superior  to  those  of  the  medium  ships-of-the-line  of 
the  beginning  of  this  century,  with  which  Nelson 
fought  his  celebrated  battles.  As  the  flag-ship 
reached  the  hulks  the  night,  which,  though  very 
dark,  was  fairly  clear,  had  become  obscured  by  the 
dense  clouds  of  smoke  that  an  almost  breathless  at- 
mosphere suffered  to  settle  down  upon  the  water. 
Only  twenty  minutes  had  elapsed  since  the  forts 
opened  upon  the  Cayuga,  when  Farragut's  flag  en- 
tered the  battle.  Soon  after  passing  the  obstructions, 
and  when  about  to  sheer  in  toward  Fort  Jackson, 
upon  which  was  to  be  concentrated  her  own  battery 
and  that  of  her  two.  formidable  followers,  a  fire-raft 
was  observed  coming  down  the  river  in  such  a  way 
as  to  make  contact  probable  if  the  course  were  not 
changed.  Heading  across  the  river,  and  edged  grad- 
ually over  by  the  raft  continuing  to  work  toward 
her,  the  ship  took  the  ground  a  little  above  Fort 


THE   NEW  ORLEANS   EXPEDITION.  ^i 

St.  Philip,  but  still  under  its  batteries.  While  in 
this  dangerous  position,  the  raft,  whose  movements 
proved  to  be  controlled  not  by  the  current  but  by  a 
small  tugboat,  was  pushed  against  her  port  quarter. 
The  flames  caught  the  side  of  the  ship,  spread  swiftly 
along  it,  leaped  into  the  rigging  and  blazed  up  to- 
ward the  tops.  The  danger  was  imminent,  and  ap- 
peared even  more  so  than  it  was ;  for  the  body  of 
heat,  though  great,  was  scarcely  sufficient  to  account 
for  such  a  rapid  spread  of  the  flames,  which  was 
probably  due  mainly  to  the  paint.  The  thoroughly 
organized  fire  department  soon  succeeded  in  quench- 
ing the  conflagration,  its  source  being  removed  by 
training  some  of  the  after-guns  upon  the  daring 
pygmy,  which  with  such  reckless  courage  had  well- 
nigh  destroyed  the  commander-in-chief  of  her  enemy's 
fleet.  The  tug  received  a  shot  in  her  boilers  and 
sunk.  The  Hartford  backed  clear,  but  in  so  doing 
fell  off  broadside  to  the  stream,  thereby  affording  an- 
other chance  to  the  hostile  rams,  had  there  been  one 
prepared  to  dare  the  hazard.  Watson,  the  flag-lieu- 
tenant, remarks  that  the  flag-officer  stood  during  this 
critical  period  giving  his  orders  and  watching  the 
ship  slowly  turn,  referring  occasionally  to  a  little 
compass  which  was  attached  to  his  watch-chain. 
During  most  of  the  engagement,  however,  he  was 
forward  observing  the  conflict. 

The  Brooklyn  and  Richmond,  with  the  Sciota  and 
the  Iroquois,  which  followed  immediately  after  them, 
fought  their  way  through  with  more  "or  less  of  ad- 
venture, but  successfully  reached  the  river  above  the 
forts.  It  is  to  be  observed,  however,  that  these,  as 
well  as  the  Hartford,  suffered  from  the  embarrass- 
ment of  the  smoke,  which  had  inconvenienced  the 


!62  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

ships  of  the  first  column  to  a  much  less  degree. 
This  was  to  be  expected,  and  doubtless  contributed 
to  the  greater  loss  which  they  suffered,  by  delaying 
their  progress  and  giving  uncertainty  to  their  aim ; 
the  result  of  the  latter  being  naturally  to  intensify 
the  action  of  the  hostile  gunners.  Four  gunboats 
brought  up  the  rear  of  the  column,  of  which  but  one 
got  through,  and  she  with  a  loss  greater  than  any 
vessel  of  her  class.  The  three  last  failed  to  pass. 
Blinded  by  smoke  and  further  delayed  by  the  tend- 
ency to  open  out,  which  is  observable  in  all  long  col- 
umns, they  came  under  the  fire  of  the  forts  at  a  time 
when,  the  larger  vessels  having  passed,  they  were  no 
longer  covered  or  supported  by  their  fire,  and  when 
day  was  about  to  break.  The  Itasca,  commanded 
by  the  gallant  Caldwell,  who  had  so  nobly  broken 
through  the  obstructions,  opposing  only  her  puny 
battery  to  the  concentrated  wrath  of  the  forts,  was 
knocked  about  by  them  at  will,  received  a  shot 
through  her  boiler  and  drifted  down  the  river  out  of 
action.  The  Winona  likewise  encountered  almost 
alone,  or  perhaps  in  company  with  the  Itasca,  the 
fire  of  the  enemy.  After  nearly  running  ashore  in 
the  smoke,  daylight  surprised  her  while  still  under 
fire  below  the  works ;  and  her  commander  very  prop- 
erly decided  not  to  risk  the  total  destruction  and 
possible  capture  of  his  vessel  for  the  sake  of  adding 
her  insignificant  force  to  that  above.  Admirably  as 
the  gunboats  were  officered,  perhaps  their  most  use- 
ful service  on  this  night  was  to  demonstrate  again 
the  advantage  of  big  ships,  as  of  big  battalions. 

Thirteen  out  of  his  seventeen  vessels  having  ral- 
lied around  his  flag  above  the  forts,  and  the  three 
below  being  of  the  least  efficient  type,  the  flag-officer 


THE   NEW  ORLEANS   EXPEDITION.  163 

could  congratulate  himself  upon  a  complete  victory, 
won  with  but  little  loss.     One  vessel  only  was  sacri- 
ficed, and  she  to  that  inconsiderate  ardor  which  in  so 
many  cases  of  pursuit  leads  men,  without  any  neces- 
sity, out  of  reach  of  support.     The  Varuna,  the  fifth 
in   the  order,  and  the  only  merchant-built  vessel  in 
the  fleet,  after  clearing  the  forts  had  steamed  rapidly 
through  the  Confederate  flotilla,  firing  right  and  left, 
but  not  stopping.     She  soon   passed  above  it,  and 
getting  sight  of  a  small   steamer  heading  for  New 
Orleans,  sped  away  after  her.     Kennon,  in  the  Gov- 
ernor Moore,  happened  to  have  noticed  this  move- 
ment ;  and,  finding  by  the  rapid  accessions  to  the 
number  of  his  enemies  that  he  was  likely  to  be  soon 
overwhelmed,  he  determined  to  follow  this  one  which, 
whatever  her  strength,  he  might  tackle  alone.    Steal- 
ing out  of  the  mclce  he  started  up  the  river,  hoisting 
lights  similar  to  those  he  had  observed  the  enemy's 
ships  to   carry.     Deceived  by  this  ruse,  the  Varuna 
at  the  first  paid  no  attention  to    her   pursuer,  some 
distance  behind  whom  followed  one  of  the   River- 
'  Defense  boats,  the  Stonewall  Jackson.     When  Ken- 
non at  last  opened  fire,  the  Varuna,  having  by  then 
run  down  her  steam  in  her  headlong  speed,  was  being 
rapidly  overtaken.    The  second  shot  from  the  Moore 
raked    the   Varuna's    deck,    killing    and    wounding 
twelve  men.     The  Union  vessel's  helm  was  then  put 
hard-a-port,  swinging  her  broadside  to    bear   upon 
her  approaching  foe,  who  was  naturally  expected  to 
imitate  the  movement,  opposing  side  to  side  to  avoid 
being   raked.      Instead    of   so    doing  Kennon   kept 
straight  on,  and,  while  receiving  a  deadly  raking  fire 
from   his   antagonist's  battery,  which  struck    down 
many  of  his  men,  he  succeeded  in  driving  the  sharp 


164  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

stem  of  the  Moore  through  the  side  of  the  Varuna. 
A  few  moments  after  the  Stonewall  Jackson  coming 
up  also  rammed  the  disabled  enemy,  whose  com- 
mander then  drove  her  ashore  on  the  east  side  of 
the  river,  where  she  sank.  By  this  time  the  corvette 
Oneida  had  made  out  the  state  of  the  case.  Steam- 
ing rapidly  ahead,  she  overhauled  the  Confederate 
vessels ;  which,  finding  they  could  not  escape,  ran 
ashore,  the  Jackson  on  the  west  bank,  the  Moore  on 
the  east,  and  in  those  positions  they  were  surren- 
dered. 

Farragut  had  undertaken  this  daring  exploit  with 
the  expectation  that,  after  passing  the  forts,  he  could 
obtain  the  co-operation  of  the  army,  and  that  the 
action  of  the  two  services,  combined  in  mutual  sup- 
port, would  suffice  to  force  the  way  to  New  Orleans. 
The  occupation  of  the  land  by  the  army,  and  of  the 
water  by  the  navy,  interposing  by  the  nature  of  their 
operations  between  the  city  and  the  forts,  would  ef- 
fectually isolate  the  latter.  In  accordance  with  this 
plan  he  at  once  sent  Captain  Boggs,  of  the  Varuna, 
through  the  Quarantine  Bayou  with  messages  to 
Commander  Porter  and  General  Butler.  The  latter 
was  notified  that  the  way  was  now  clear  to  land  his 
troops  through  the  bayou,  in  accordance  with  the 
previous  arrangements,  and  that  gunboats  would  be 
left  there  to  protect  them  against  those  of  the 
enemy,  of  which  three  or  four  were  seen  to  be  still 
at  the  forts.  Boggs  passed  successfully  through  the 
country  and  streams  which  a  day  before  had  been  in 
quiet  possession  of  the  enemy,  though  it  took  him 
twenty-six  hours  to  do  so ;  but  General  Butler, 
who  from  a  transport  below  had  witnessed  the  suc- 
cess of  the  fleet,  had  waited  for  no  further  tidings. 


THE   NEW  ORLEANS   EXPEDITION.  165 

Hurrying  back  to  his  troops,  he  collected  them  at 
Sable  Island,  twelve  miles  in  rear  of  Fort  St.  Philip, 
whence  they  were  transported  and  landed  at  a  point 
on  the  river  five  miles  above  the  work,  where  the 
Kineo  and  Wissahickon  awaited  them. 

During  the  remainder  of  the  24th  the  fleet  stayed 
at  anchor  off  the  Quarantine  station,  to  repose  the 
crews  after  the  excessive  labor  and  excitement  of 
the  previous  night.  Early  the  next  morning  all  got 
under  way  except  the  two  gunboats  left  to  support 
Butler's  troops,  and  moved  up  stream ;  but  slowly, 
owing  to  the  indifferent  speed  of  some  and  to  want 
of  knowledge  of  the  river.  At  half-past  ten  they 
reached  English  Turn,  five  miles  below  the  city ;  the 
point  where  the  British  forces  had  in  1815  been  so 
disastrously  repelled  in  their  assault  upon  the  earth- 
works held  by  Jackson's  riflemen.  The  Confederates 
had  fortified  and  armed  the  same  lines  on  both  sides 
of  the  Mississippi,  as  part  of  the  interior  system  of 
defenses  to  New  Orleans ;  the  exterior  line  being  con- 
stituted by  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip,  together 
with  several  smaller  works  at  different  points,  com- 
manding the  numerous  subsidiary  approaches  through 
the  Mississippi  delta.  The  interior  lines  at  English 
Turn,  known  as  the  Chalmette  and  McGehee  bat- 
teries, were,  however,  intended  only  to  check  an  ap- 
proach of  troops  from  down  the  river.  Their  gen- 
eral direction  was  perpendicular  to  the  stream;  and 
along  its  banks  there  ran  only  a  short  work  on  either 
side  to  protect  the  main  entrenchments  from  an  en- 
filading fire  by  light  vessels,  which  might,  in  com- 
pany with  an  invading  army,  have  managed  to  turn 
the  lower  forts  by  passing  through  the  bayous. 
These   river    batteries,  mounting  respectively  nine 


1 66  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

and  five  guns,  were  powerless  to  resist  the  ships  that 
had  successfully  passed  the  main  defenses  of  the 
city.  After  a  few  shots,  fired  rather  for  the  honor  of 
the  flag  than  in  any  hope  of  successful  result,  the 
guns  were  forsaken  ;  and  both  lines  of  entrenchments, 
being  turned  and  taken  in  the  rear,  were  abandoned. 
Meanwhile,  in  New  Orleans  a  scene  of  fearful 
confusion  was  growing  hourly  more  frenzied.  What- 
ever the  fears  of  the  military  commanders  as  to  the 
result  of  the  attack  upon  the  forts,  they  had  very 
properly  concealed  them  from  the  inhabitants ;  and 
these,  swayed  by  the  boastful  temper  common  to 
mobs,  had  been  readily  led  to  despise  the  efforts  of 
the  enemy  and  to  trust  implicitly  in  the  power  of 
their  defenses.  General  Lovell,  commanding  the  de- 
partment, had  gone  down  to  the  forts  the  evening 
before  the  attack,  and  was  still  there  when  the  United 
States  fleet  was  breaking  its  way  through  ;  he  was, 
in  fact,  on  board  the  little  steamer,  the  pursuit  of 
which  lured  the  Varuna  into  the  isolation  where  she 
met  her  fate.  The  news  of  the  successful  forcing  of 
the  exterior  and  principal  defenses  thus  reached  the 
city  soon  after  it  was  effected ;  and  at  the  same  time 
Lovell,  satisfied  from  the  first  that  if  the  forts  were 
passed  the  town  was  lost,  prepared  at  once  to  evac- 
uate it,  removing  all  the  Government  property.  This 
in  itself  was  a  service  of  great  difficulty.  New  Or- 
leans is  almost  surrounded  by  water  or  marsh ;  the 
only  exit  was  to  the  northward  by  a  narrow  strip  of 
dry  land,  not  over  three  quarters  of  a  mile  wide, 
along  the  river  bank,  by  which  passed  the  railroad  to 
Jackson,  in  the  State  of  Mississippi.  As  has  already 
been  said,  Lovell  had  by  this  road  been  quietly  re- 
moving  army   rations   for   some  time,  but  had  ab- 


THE    NEW  ORLEANS   EXPEDITION.  167 

stained  from  trying  to  carry  off  any  noticeable  ar- 
ticles by  which  his  apprehensions  would  be  betrayed 
to  the  populace.  The  latter,  roused  from  its  slum- 
ber of  security  with  such  appalling  suddenness,  gave 
way  to  an  outburst  of  panic  and  fury  ;  which  was  the 
less  controllable  because  so  very  large  a  proportion 
of  the  better  and  stronger  element  among  the  men 
had  gone  forth  to  swell  the  ranks  of  the  Confederate 
army.  As  in  a  revolution  in  a  South  American  city, 
the  street  doors  were  closed  by  the  tradesmen  upon 
the  property  in  their  stores  ;  but  without  began  a 
scene  of  mad  destruction,  which  has  since  been  for- 
cibly portrayed  by  one,  then  but  a  lad  of  fourteen 
years,  who  witnessed  the  sight. 

Far  down  the  stream,  and  throughout  their  ascent, 
the  ships  were  passing  through  the  wreckage  thus 
made.  Cotton  bales,  cotton-laden  ships  and  steamers 
on  fire,  and  working  implements  of  every  kind  such 
as  are  used  in  ship-yards,  were  continually  encount- 
ered. On  the  piers  of  the  levees,  where  were  huge 
piles  of  hogsheads  of  sugar  and  molasses,  a  mob,  com- 
posed of  the  scum  of  the  city,  men  and  women,  broke 
and  smashed  without  restraint.  Toward  noon  of  the 
25th,  as  the  fleet  drew  round  the  bend  where  the  Cres- 
cent City  first  appears  in  sight,  the  confusion  and  de- 
struction were  at  their  height.  "  The  levee  of  New 
Orleans,"  says  Farragut  in  his  report,  "  was  one  scene 
of  desolation.  Ships,  steamers,  cotton,  coal,  etc., 
were  all  in  one  common  blaze,  and  our  ingenuity  was 
much  taxed  to  avoid  the  floating  conflagration.  The 
destruction  of  property  was  awful."  Upon  this  pan- 
demonium, in  which  the  fierce  glare  of  burning  prop- 
erty lit  up  the  wild  passions  and  gestures  of  an  in- 
furiated people,  the  windows  of  heaven  were  opened 


1 68  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

and  a  drenching  rain  poured  down  in  torrents.  The 
impression  produced  by  the  ships  as  they  came  in 
sight  around  the  bend  has  been  graphically  described 
by  the  boy  before  mentioned,  who  has  since  become 
so  well-known  as  an  author — Mr.  George  W.  Cable. 
"  I  see  the  ships  now,  as  they  come  slowly  round 
Slaughter  House  Point  into  full  view,  silent,  grim, 
and  terrible ;  black  with  men,  heavy  with  deadly 
portent,  the  long-banished  Stars  and  Stripes  flying 
against  the  frowning  sky.  Oh  !  for  the  Mississippi ! 
for  the  Mississippi ! "  (an  iron-clad  vessel  nearly 
completed,  upon  which  great  hopes  had  been  based 
by  the  Confederates).  "  Just  then  she  came  down. 
But  how  ?     Drifting  helplessly,  a  mass  of  flames. 

"  The  crowds  on  the  levee  howled  and  screamed 
with  rage.  The  swarming  decks  answered  never  a 
word ;  but  one  old  tar  on  the  Hartford,  standing 
lanyard  in  hand  beside  a  great  pivot  gun,  so  plain  to 
view  that  you  could  see  him  smile,  silently  patted  its 
big  black  breech  and  blandly  grinned.  And  now 
the  rain  came  down  in  torrents." 

That  same  morning,  as  though  with  the  purpose 
of  embarrassing  the  victor  whom  he  could  not  op- 
pose, the  Mayor  of  New  Orleans  had  ordered  the 
State  flag  of  Louisiana  to  be  hoisted  upon  the  City 
Hall.  His  secretary,  who  was  charged  with  this 
office,  waited  to  fulfill  it  until  the  cannonade  at 
English  Turn  had  ceased,  and  it  was  evident  the 
fleet  had  passed  the  last  flimsy  barrier  and  would 
within  an  hour  appear  before  the  city.  The  flag  was 
then  run  up;  and  the  Mayor  had  the  satisfaction  of 
creating  a  position  of  very  unnecessary  embarrass- 
ment for  all  parties  by  his  useless  bravado. 

To  Captain  Bailey,  the  second  in  command,  who 


THE   NEW  ORLEANS   EXPEDITION.  169 

had  so  gallantly  led  both  in  the  first  assault  and  in 
the  attack  at  Chalmette,  was  assigned  the  honor  of 
being  the  first  to  land  in  the  conquered  city  and  to 
demand  its  surrender.  It  was  no  barren  honor,  but 
a  service  of  very  sensible  personal  danger  to  which 
he  was  thus  called.  General  Lovell  having  to  devote 
his  attention  solely  to  his  military  duties,  the  city 
which  had  so  long  been  under  martial  law  was  es- 
caping out  of  the  hands  of  the  civil  authorities  and 
fast  lapsing  into  anarchy.  Between  one  and  two  in 
the  afternoon  Bailey  landed,  accompanied  by  Per- 
kins, the  first  lieutenant  of  the  Cayuga;  who,  having 
shared  his  former  perils,  was  permitted  to  accompany 
him  in  this  one  also.  "  We  took  just  a  boat  and  a 
boat's  crew,"  writes  Perkins,  "  with  a  flag  of  truce, 
and  started  off.  When  we  reached  the  wharf  there 
were  no  officials  to  be  seen  ;  no  one  received  us,  al- 
though the  whole  city  was  watching  our  movements, 
and  the  levee  was  crowded  in  spite  of  a  heavy  rain- 
storm. Among  the  crowd  were  many  women  and 
children,  and  the  women  were  shaking  rebel  flags 
and  being  rude  and  noisy.  They  were  all  shouting 
and  hooting  as  we  stepped  on  shore.  ...  As  we  ad- 
vanced the  mob  followed  us  in  a  very  excited  state. 
They  gave  three  cheers  for  Jeff  Davis  and  Beau- 
regard and  three  groans  for  Lincoln.  Then  they 
began  to  throw  things  at  us,  and  shout  '  Hang  them ! ' 
'  Hang  them  ! '  We  both  thought  we  were  in  a  bad 
fix,  but  there  was  nothing  for  us  to  do  but  just  to  go 
on."  Mr.  Cable  has  given  his  description  of  the 
same  scene :  "  About  one  or  two  in  the  afternoon,  I 
being  in  the  store  with  but  one  door  ajar,  came  a 
roar  of  shoutings  and  imprecations  and  crowding 
feet  down  Common  Street.  '  Hurrah  for  Jeff  Davis!' 
12 


170 


ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 


'  Shoot  them  ! '  *  Kill  them  ! '  '  Hang  them  ! '  I  locked 
the  door  of  the  store  on  the  outside  and  ran  to  the 
front  of  the  mob,  bawling  with  the  rest,  '  Hurrah  for 
Jeff  Davis  ! '  About  every  third  man  had  a  weapon 
out.  Two  officers  of  the  United  States  navy  were 
walking  abreast,  unguarded  and  alone,  not  looking 
to  the  right  or  left,  never  frowning,  never  flinching, 
while  the  mob  screamed  in  their  ears,  shook  cocked 
pistols  in  their  faces,  cursed,  crowded,  and  gnashed 
upon  them.  So  through  those  gates  of  death  those 
two  men  walked  to  the  City  Hall  to  demand  the 
town's  surrender.  It  was  one  of  the  bravest  deeds  I 
ever  saw  done." 

Farragut's  demand,  made  through  Bailey,  was 
that  the  flag  of  Louisiana  should  be  hauled  down 
from  the  City  Hall,  and  that  of  the  United  States 
hoisted  over  the  buildings  which  were  its  property, 
namely,  the  Custom  House,  Post  Office,  and  Mint. 
This  the  Mayor  refused  to  do  ;  and,  as  Farragut  had 
no  force  with  which  to  occupy  the  city,  it  became  a 
somewhat  difficult  question  to  carry  on  an  argument 
with  the  authorities  of  a  town  protected  by  the  pres- 
ence of  so  many  women  and  children.  The  situation 
was  for  three  days  exceedingly  critical,  from  the 
temper  and  character  of  the  mob  and  from  the  ob- 
stinacy and  powerlessness  of  the  officials.  It  was 
doubtless  as  much  as  the  life  of  any  citizen  of  the 
place  was  worth  to  comply  with  the  admiral's  de- 
mands. On  the  other  hand,  while  there  could  be  no 
difficulty  in  hoisting  the  United  States  flag,  there 
would  be  much  in  protecting  it  from  insult  with  the 
means  at  the  flag-officer's  disposal ;  for  to  open  fire 
upon  a  place  where  there  were  so  many  helpless 
creatures,  innocent  of  any  greater  offense  than  be- 


THE   NEW  ORLEANS   EXPEDITION. 


171 


having  like  a  set  of  spoiled  children,  was  a  course 
that  could  not  be  contemplated  unless  in  the  last 
necessity,  and  it  was  undesirable  to  provoke  acts 
which  might  lead  to  any  such  step.  The  United 
States  officers  who  were  necessarily  sent  to  commu- 
nicate with  the  authorities  did  so,  in  the  opinion  of 
the  authorities  themselves,  at  the  peril  of  their  lives 
from  a  mob  which  no  one  on  shore  could  control. 
On  the  28th  of  April,  however,  Forts  Jackson  and 
St.  Philip  surrendered  to  Commander  Porter  in  con- 
sequence of  a  mutiny  in  their  garrisons,  which  re- 
fused to  fight  any  longer,  saying  further  resistance 
was  useless ;  and  the  following  day  Farragut  sent 
ashore  a  body  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  marines  with 
two  howitzers  manned  by  seamen  from  the  Hartford, 
the  whole  under  the  command  of  the  fleet-captain, 
Captain  Henry  H.  Bell.  The  force  was  formally 
drawn  up  before  the  City  Hall,  the  howitzers  pointing 
up  and  down  the  street,  which  was  thronged  with 
people.  Fearing  still  that  some  rash  person  in  the 
crowd  might  dare  to  fire  upon  the  men  who  were 
hauling  down  the  flag,  the  Mayor  took  his  stand  be- 
fore one  of  the  howitzers;  a  sufficient  intimation  to 
the  mob  that  were  murder  done  he  would  be  the 
first  victim  to  fall  in  expiation.  The  United  States 
flag  was  then  hoisted  over  the  Custom  House,  and 
left  flying  under  the  protection  of  a  guard  of  ma- 
rines. 

Thus  was  timely  and  satisfactorily  completed  an 
act,  by  which  Farragut  signalized  and  sealed  the  fact 
that  the  conquest  of  New  Orleans  and  of  its  de- 
fenses, from  the  original  conception  of  the  enterprise 
to  its  complete  fulfillment  by  the  customary  tokens  of 
submission   and  taking  possession,  was  wholly  the 


172 


ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 


work  of  the  United  States  Navy  ;  of  which  he,  by  his 
magnificent  successes,  became  the  representative 
figure.  It  was  a  triumph  won  over  formidable  diffi- 
culties by  a  mobile  force,  skillfully  directed  and  gal- 
lantly fought.  By  superior  promptitude  and  a  cor- 
rect appreciation  of  the  true  strategic  objective  had 
been  reduced  to  powerlessness  obstacles  not  to  be 
overcome  by  direct  assault,  except  by  a  loss  of  time 
which  would  have  allowed  the  enemy  to  complete 
preparations  possibly  fatal  to  the  whole  undertaking. 
Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip,  which  the  fleet  could 
not  have  reduced  by  direct  attack,  fell  by  the  sev- 
erance of  their  communications. 

It  is  not  to  be  questioned  that  the  moral  effect 
of  the  passage  of  the  forts,  succeeded,  as  it  was, 
by  the  immediate  fall  of  the  great  city  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi, was  very  great ;  but  it  was  not  upon  the 
forts  themselves,  nor  in  the  unexpected  mutiny  of 
the  garrison,  that  that  effect  was  chiefly  manifested. 
Great  as  was  the  crime  of  the  men,  they  showed  by 
their  act  a  correct  appreciation  of  those  results  to 
the  forts,  from  the  passage  of  the  fleet,  which  some 
have  sought  to  ignore — results  physical,  undeniable, 
fatal.  It  was  not  moral  effect,  but  indisputable  rea- 
soning which  sapped  the  further  resistance  of  men 
— brave  till  then — to  whom  were  wanting  the  habit 
of  discipline  and  the  appreciation  of  the  far-reach- 
ing effects  upon  the  fortunes  of  a  campaign  pro- 
duced by  a  prolonged,  though  hopeless,  resistance. 
They  saw  that  the  fate  of  the  forts  was  sealed, 
and  beyond  that  they  recognized  no  duties  and  no 
advantages.  On  the  scene  of  his  exploit  Farragut 
reaped  the  material  fruits  of  the  celerity  in  which 
he  believed  ;  and  which  he  had  reluctantly  for  a  space 


THE   NEW  ORLEANS  EXPEDITION. 


173 


postponed,  at  the  bidding  of  superior  authority,  in 
order  to  try  the  effect  of  slower  methods.  These 
being  exhausted,  he  owed  to  the  promptness  of  his 
decision  and  action  that  the  Louisiana,  on  whose  re- 
pairs men  were  working  night  and  day,  did  not  take 
the  advantageous  position  indicated  to  her  by  the 
officers  of  the  forts;  and  that  the  Mississippi,  the 
ironclad  upon  which  not  only  the  designers,  but 
naval  officers,  founded  extravagant  hopes,  was  neither 
completed  nor  towed  away,  but  burned  where  she  lay. 
The  flaming  mass,  as  it  drifted  hopelessly  by  the 
Hartford,  was  a  striking  symbol  of  resistance 
crushed — of  ascendency  established  over  the  mighty 
river  whose  name  it  bore  ;  but  it  was  a  symbol  not 
of  moral,  but  of  physical  victory. 

It  was  elsewhere,  far  and  wide,  that  were  felt  the 
moral  effects  which  echoed  the  sudden,  unexpected 
crash  with  which  the  lower  Mississippi  fell — through 
the  length  and  breadth  of  the  South  and  in  the  cabi- 
nets of  foreign  statesmen,  who  had  believed  too  readi- 
ly, as  did  their  officers  on  the  spot,  that  the  barrier 
was  not  to  be  passed — that  the  Queen  City  of  the 
Confederacy  was  impregnable  to  attack  from  the  sea. 
Whatever  may  have  been  the  actual  purposes  of  that 
mysterious  and  undecided  personage,  Napoleon  III, 
the  effect  of  military  events,  whether  on  sea  or 
shore,  upon  the  question  of  interference  by  foreign 
powers  is  sufficiently  evident  from  the  private  corre- 
spondence which,  a  few  months  after  New  Orleans, 
passed  between  Lords  Palmerston  and  Russell,  then 
the  leading  members  of  the  British  Cabinet.*  For- 
tunately for  the  cause   of  the  United  States,  France 

*  See  Walpole's  Life  of  Lord  John  Russell,  vol.  ii,  pp.  349-35 1. 


!74  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

and  Great  Britain  were  not  of  a  mind  to  combine 
their  action  at  the  propitious  moment ;  and  the  moral 
effect  of  the  victory  at  New  Orleans  was  like  a  cold 
plunge  bath  to  the  French  emperor,  at  the  time  when 
he  was  hesitating  whether  to  act  alone.  It  produced 
upon  him  even  more  impression  than  upon  the  Brit- 
ish Government;  because  his  ambitions  for  French 
control  and  for  the  extension  of  the  Latin  races  on 
the  American  continent  were  especially  directed  to- 
ward Louisiana,  the  former  colony  of  France,  and 
toward  its  neighbors,  Texas  and  Mexico. 

The  sympathies,  however,  of  the  classes  from 
whom  were  chiefly  drawn  the  cabinets  of  the  two 
great  naval  States  were  overwhelmingly  with  the 
South  ;  and  the  expressions  alike  of  the  emperor  and 
of  his  principal  confidants  at  this  time  were  design- 
edly allowed  to  transpire,  both  to  the  Southern  com- 
missioners and  to  the  British  Government.  On  the 
very  day  that  Porter's  mortar  schooners  opened  on 
Fort  Jackson,  Louis  Napoleon  unbosomed  himself  to 
a  member  of  the  British  Parliament,  who  visited  him 
as  an  avowed  partisan  of  the  Confederate  cause.  He 
said  that  while  he  desired  to  preserve  a  strict  neu- 
trality, he  could  not  consent  that  his  people  should 
continue  to  suffer  from  the  acts  of  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment. He  thought  the  best  course  would  be  to 
make  a  friendly  appeal  to  it,  either  alone  or  concur- 
rently with  England,  to  open  the  ports ;  but  to  accom- 
pany the  appeal  with  a  proper  demonstration  of  force 
upon  our  coasts,  and,  should  the  appeal  seem  likely 
to  be  ineffectual,  to  back  it  by  a  declaration  of  his 
purpose  not  to  respect  the  blockade.  The  taking  of 
New  Orleans,  which  he  did  not  then  anticipate, 
might  render  it  inexpedient  to  act;  that  he  would 


THE   NEW  ORLEANS   EXPEDITION. 


175 


not  decide  at  once,  but  would  wait  some  days  for 
further  intelligence.*  Similar  semi-official  assurances 
came  from  different  persons  about  the  emperor  ;  and 
the  members  of  the  Cabinet,  with  a  single  exception, 
showed  little  reserve  in  their  favorable  expressions 
toward  the  Confederacy. 

A  few  weeks  later  Mr.  Slidell  had  a  conversation 
with  M.  Billault,  the  minister  sans  portefcuille,  one  of 
the  most  conservative  and  cautious  men  in  the  Cabi- 
net, who  represented  the  Government  in  the  Chambers 
upon  all  subjects  connected  with  foreign  affairs.  Sli- 
dell read  a  note  which  he  had  received  from  Sir  Charles 
Wood,  a  leading  Southern  sympathizer  in  England,  de- 
nying that  the  British  Government  was  unwilling  to 
act  in  American  affairs — a  denial  to  which  some  color 
is  given  by  the  correspondence  of  Palmerston  and 
Russell  before  mentioned.  In  answer,  M.  Billault  de- 
clared that  the  French  Cabinet,  with  the  possible  ex- 
ception of  M.  Thouvenel,  had  been  unanimously  in 
favor  of  the  South,  and  added  that  if  New  Orleans  had 
not  fallen  its  recognition  would  not  have  been  much 
longer  delayed ;  but,  even  after  that  disaster,  if  de- 
cided successes  were  obtained  in  Virginia  and  Ten- 
nessee, or  the  enemy  were  held  at  bay  for  a  month 
or  two,  the  same  result  would  follow.  After  an  in- 
terview with  M.  Thouvenel,  about  the  same  time, 
Slidell  reported  that,  though  that  minister  did  not  di- 
rectly say  so,  his  manner  gave  fair  reason  to  infer  that 
if  New  Orleans  had  not  been  taken,  and  no  very  serious 
reverses  were  suffered  in  Virginia  and  Tennessee,  rec- 
ognition would  very  soon  have  been  declared. f 

*  North  American  Review,  vol.  cxxix,  p.  347. 
f  Ibid.,  vol.  cxxix,  p.  348. 


!-r6  admiral  farragut. 

In  its  moral  effect,  therefore,  the  fall  of  the  river 
forts  and  of  New  Orleans,  though  not  absolutely  and 
finally  decisive  of  the  question  of  foreign  interven- 
tion, corresponded  to  one  of  those  telling  blows,  by 
which  a  general  threatened  by  two  foes  meets  and 
strikes  down  one  before  the  other  comes  up.  Such 
a  blow  may  be  said  to  decide  a  campaign ;  not  be- 
cause no  chance  is  left  the  enemy  to  redeem  his  mis- 
fortune, but  because  without  the  first  success  the 
weaker  party  would  have  been  overwhelmed  by  the 
junction  of  his  two  opponents.  The  heart-rending 
disasters  to  our  armies  during  the  following  summer 
does  but  emphasize  the  immense  value  to  the  Union 
cause  of  the  moral  effect  produced  by  Farragut's 
victory.  Those  disasters,  as  it  was,  prompted  the 
leaders  of  the  British  ministry  to  exchange  confi- 
dences in  which  they  agreed  on  the  expediency  of 
mediation.  They  did  not  carry  all  their  colleagues 
with  them  ;  but  who  can  estimate  the  effect,  when 
the  scales  were  thus  balancing,  if  the  navy  had  been 
driven  out  of  the  Mississippi  as  the  army  was  from 
Virginia  ? 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE    FIRST    ADVANCE    ON    VICKSBURG. 
1862. 

The  purpose  of  the  Navy  Department,  as  ex- 
pressed in  the  original  orders  to  Farragut,  had  been 
to  send  his  squadron  up  the  river  immediately  after 
the  capture  of  New  Orleans.  The  words  were  :  "  If 
the  Mississippi  expedition  from  Cairo  shall  not  have 
descended  the  river,  you  will  take  advantage  of  the 
panic  to  push  a  strong  force  up  the  river  to  take  all 
their  defenses  in  the  rear."  When  New  Orleans  fell, 
the  Cairo  expedition,  more  commonly  known  as  the 
Mississippi  flotilla,  so  far  from  having  descended  the 
river  to  the  neighborhood  of  New  Orleans,  was  still 
detained  before  Fort  Pillow,  one  of  the  outlying  de- 
fenses of  Memphis,  forty  miles  above  the  latter  city 
and  over  eight  hundred  from  New  Orleans.  It  was 
not  until  the  end  of  May  that  the  evacuation  of 
Corinth  by  the  Confederates  made  Memphis  unten- 
able, leading  to  the  abandonment  of  the  forts  on  the 
4th  of  June  and  the  surrender  of  the  city  on  the  fol- 
lowing day.  It  became  therefore  incumbent  upon 
Farragut,  after  turning  over  the  command  of  New 
Orleans  to  Butler  on  the  1st  of  May,  to  go  up  the 
river  as  soon  as  he  possibly  could. 

Although  the  flag-officer  seems  to  have  acquiesced 


i78 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


in  this  programme  in  the  beginning,  it  was  probably 
with  the  expectation  that  the  advance,  up  river  and 
against  the  current,  required  of  his  heavy-draught  and 
slow-moving  ships  would  not  be  very  far ;  that  the 
Cairo  expedition,  which  at  the  date  of  the  orders 
quoted,  January  20th,  had  not  begun  to  move,  would, 
from  the  character  of  the  vessels  composing  it,  many 
being  ironclad,  and  from  the  advantage  of  the 
current,  have  progressed  very  far  by  the  time  he 
had  taken  New  Orleans.  Moreover,  at  that  date  the 
upper  river  flotilla  was  still  a  branch  of  the  army, 
and  its  prospective  movements  were  to  be  in  combi- 
nation with,  and  a  part  of,  a  great  military  enter- 
prise, securing  control  both  of  the  stream  and  of  the 
land ;  whereas  Farragut's  was  a  purely  naval  opera- 
tion, to  which  the  army  contributed  only  a  force 
sufficient  to  hold  the  points  which  were  first  reduced 
by  the  fleet. 

Under  the  actual  conditions,  the  proposed  ascent 
of  the  river  bore  a  very  different  aspect  to  the  com- 
manding naval  officer  on  the  spot  from  that  which 
presented  itself  to  the  fond  imaginations  of  the  of- 
ficials in  Washington.  The  question  now  was  not 
one  of  fighting  batteries,  for  there  was  no  reason  as 
yet  to  expect  anything  heavier  than  the  fleet  had  al- 
ready overcome  with  ease ;  it  was  the  far  more 
difficult  matter  of  communications,  in  the  broadest 
scope  of  the  word,  to  be  maintained  over  a  long, 
narrow,  tortuous,  and  very  difficult  road,  passing  in 
many  places  close  under  the  guns  of  the  enemy. 
"  As  I  stated  in  my  last  dispatch,"  wrote  Farragut  to 
the  department  after  his  first  visit  to  Vicksburg, 
"  the  dangers  and  difficulties  of  the  river  have  proved 
to  us,  since  we  first  entered  it,  much  greater  impedi- 


THE   FIRST   ADVANCE   ON  VICKSBURG.      179 

ments  to  our  progress,  and  more  destructive  to  our 
vessels,  than  the  enemy's  shot.  Between  getting 
aground,  derangement  of  the  machinery,  and  want 
of  coal,  the  delays  in  getting  up  the  river  are  great." 
To  take  the  defenses  in  the  rear,  and  in  their  then 
state  to  drive  the  enemy  out  of  them,  was  one  thing ; 
but  to  hold  the  abandoned  positions  against  the  re- 
turn of  the  defenders,  after  the  fleet  had  passed  on, 
required  an  adequate  force  which  Butler's  army,  cal- 
culated by  McClellan  for  a  much  narrower  sphere, 
could  not  afford.  Coal  and  supply  ships,  therefore, 
must  either  run  the  gantlet  for  the  four  hundred 
miles  which  separated  Vicksburg  from  New  Orleans, 
or  be  accompanied  always  by  armed  vessels.  The 
former  alternative  was  incompatible  with  the  neces- 
sary security,  and  for  the  latter  the  numbers  of  the 
fleet  were  utterly  inadequate.  In  fact,  to  maintain  the 
proposed  operations,  there  would  be  needed  so  many 
ships  to  guard  the  communications  that  there  would 
be  none  left  for  the  operations  to  which  they  led. 

It  must  also  be  observed  that  not  only  was  this 
line  of  communications  four  times  as  long  as  that 
which  led  from  the  sea  to  New  Orleans,  and  of  far 
more  difficult  pilotage,  but  that  the  natural  character 
of  the  enemy's  positions  upon  it  was  essentially  dif- 
ferent. They  were  as  yet  undeveloped  by  art ;  but 
by  nature  they  were  high  and  commanding  bluffs, 
having  secure  land  communications  with  an  exten- 
sive enemy's  country  in  their  rear  over  which  our 
troops  exercised  no  control  whatever — where  they 
had  not  even  been  seen.  To  speak  of  "  taking  them 
in  the  rear"  was  to  beg  the  question— to  assume 
that  their  front  was  then,  as  in  June,  1863,  toward 
an  enemy  investing  them  on  the  land  side.     New 


i8o 


ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 


Orleans  and  the  region  below,  including  its  defenses 
and  the  communications  therewith,  were  low-lying  and 
intersected  with  numerous  water-courses ;  over  such 
a  navy  naturally  exercises  a  preponderating  control. 
Above  New  Orleans  the  low  delta  of  the  Mississippi 
extends,  indeed,  on  the  west  bank  as  far  as  the  Red 
River,  if  it  may  not  be  said  to  reach  to  Vicksburg 
and  beyond  ;  but  on  the  east  bank  it  ceases  one 
hundred  and  fifty  miles  from  the  city.  From  thence 
to  Vicksburg,  a  distance  of  two  hundred  and  fifty 
miles,  the  stream  is  bordered  by  a  series  of  bluffs 
backing  on  a  firm  country  of  moderate  elevation. 
Such  positions  are  not  to  be  reduced  from  the  water 
alone.  On  the  contrary,  if  the  water  be  a  narrow 
strip  swept  by  their  guns,  they  command  it ;  while, 
from  the  extent  of  country  in  their  rear,  they  are  not 
susceptible  of  isolation  by  fleets  above  and  below, 
as  were  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip. 

This  series  of  bluffs  became,  therefore,  the  line 
upon  which  the  Confederates  based  their  control  of 
the  Mississippi  and  maintained  their  vital  communi- 
cations with  Texas  and  the  Red  River  region.  It 
could  be  reduced  only  by  a  military  force;  and  to 
think  of  subduing  it  by  a  fleet  taking  advantage  of 
the  panic  following  the  fall  of  New  Orleans,  was 
truly  to  rely  upon  moral  effect  without  adequate 
physical  force  to  support  it.  It  is  due  to  the  Navy 
Department  to  say  that  they  expected  the  army 
from  the  North  to  advance  more  rapidly  than  it 
did ;  but,  without  seeking  to  assign  the  blame,  the 
utterly  useless  penetration  of  the  United  States 
fleet  four  hundred  miles  into  the  heart  of  the 
enemy's  country  and  its  subsequent  mortifying 
withdrawal,  when  contrasted  with  the  brilliant  sue- 


THE   FIRST  ADVANCE  ON  VICKSBURG.      181 

cess  resulting  from  Farragut's  dash  by  the  forts, 
afford  a  very  useful  lesson  in  the  adaptation  of 
means  to  ends  and  the  selection  of  a  definite  object- 
ive, upon  compassing  which  something  happens. 
The  object  of  the  United  States  Government  being 
to  control  the  lower  Mississippi,  that  was  effected 
by  means  of  isolating  its  defenses,  which  then  fell. 
When  the  further  object  was  sought  of  controlling 
the  course  of  the  stream  above,  the  mere  perambu- 
lation of  a  body  of  ships  effected  nothing,  because  it 
aimed  at  nothing  in  particular,  and  could  have  no 
effect  upon  the  decisive  points. 

Of  all  these  considerations  Farragut  was  fully 
sensible ;  and,  while  he  obeyed  his  orders,  he  showed 
in  his  dispatches  to  the  Department,  and  in  private 
letters  of  the  same  period,  how  much  against  his 
judgment  were  operations  conceived  on  such  erro- 
neous military  principles  and  undertaken  with  such 
inadequate  force.  The  Department  was  forward  to 
press  him  on,  and  as  early  as  the  17th  of  May  sent  a 
dispatch  intimating  that  he  had  forgotten  his  orders 
on  the  subject ;  and  he  was  urged  and  required  to 
open  up  the  Mississippi  to  Flag-officer  Davis's  com- 
mand (the  Mississippi  flotilla),  then  still  above  Mem- 
phis. This  and  other  letters  of  the  same  date  must 
have  been  peculiarly  exasperating;  for  they  were  re- 
ceived early  in  June,  when  he  had  been  up  the  river 
as  far  as  Vicksburg  and  satisfied  himself  that  with- 
out an  adequate  force  of  troops  nothing  could 
be  accomplished.  "The  Department,"  he  replies, 
"  seems  to  have  considered  my  fleet  as  having  es- 
caped all  injury,  and  that  when  they  arrived  off  New 
Orleans  they  were  in  condition  to  be  pushed  up  the 
river.     This  was  not  the  case ;  but,  the  moment  the 


jg2  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

vessels  could  be  gotten  ready,  the  gunboats  were  all 
sent  up  under  the  command  of  Commander  S.  P. 
Lee,  with  directions  to  proceed  to  Vicksburg,  take 
that  place,  and  cut  the  railroad.  .  .  .  From  all  I 
could  hear  it  was  not  considered  proper,  even  with 
pilots,  to  risk  the  ships  beyond  Natchez.  ...  By  the 
time  Commander  Lee  arrived  at  Vicksburg  (May 
18th)  he  was  satisfied  that  the  force  of  the  enemy 
was  too  great  for  him  to  venture  to  take  the  town, 
or  even  to  pass  it.  The  land  in  the  rear  of  Vicks- 
burg is  about  two  hundred  feet  high,  on  which  are 
placed  some  eight  and  ten  inch  columbiads,  which  are 
perfectly  secure  from  our  fire.  ...  I  determined  to 
get  the  heavy  ships  up  there  if  possible,  which  I  did 
a  day  or  two  after.  General  Williams  arrived  in  the 
mean  time  with  fifteen  hundred  men,  when  I  pro- 
posed to  him,  if  he  could  carry  the  battery  on  the 
hill,  I  would  attack  the  town.  He  made  a  careful 
reconnaissance,  and  returned  to  me  in  the  afternoon, 
when  I  had  all  the  (naval)  commanders  assembled. 
He  reported  that  it  would  be  impossible  for  him  to 
land,  and  that  he  saw  no  chance  of  doing  anything 
with  the  place  so  long  as  the  enemy  were  in  such 
force,  having  at  their  command  thirty  thousand 
men  within  one  hour  by  railroad.  A  large  ma- 
jority of  the  commanders  concurred  with  him  in  the 
opinion." 

Writing  to  his  home  about  this  council,  in  which, 
contrary  to  his  independent  decision  when  below 
Fort  Jackson,  he  yielded  to  the  advice  of  his  cap- 
tains, he  said:  "I  did  not  pass  Vicksburg;  not 
because  it  was  too  strongly  fortified  ;  not  because 
we  could  not  have  passed  it  easily  enough,  but  we 
would  have  been  cut  off  from  our  supplies  of  coal  and 


THE   FIRST   ADVANCE   ON   VICKSBURG.      183 

provisions.  We  would  have  been  placed  between  two 
enemies  (Vicksburg  and  Memphis),  and  so  the  cap- 
tains advised  me  not  to  do  it.  I  was  very  sick  at 
the  time,  and  yielded  to  their  advice,  which  I  think 
was  good ;  but  I  doubt  if  I  would  have  taken  it  had 
I  been  well."  Here  is  seen,  transpiring  vividly 
enough,  the  uncertainty  and  indecision  arising  from 
the  conflict  between  the  orders  of  the  Department 
and  his  own  sounder  judgment.  He  would  fain 
obey  ;  yet  no  orders  could  override,  though  they 
might  cruelly  embarrass,  the  responsibility  of  the 
officer  in  command  on  the  spot.  "  Fighting  is  noth- 
ing," he  adds,  "  to  the  evils  of  the  river — getting  on 
shore,  running  foul  of  one  another,  losing  anchors, 
etc."  "  The  army,"  he  resumes  in  his  dispatch  to 
the  Department,  "  had  been  sent  up  early  with  a  few 
days'  rations,  and  I  was  compelled  to  supply  them 
from  the  squadron,  thereby  reducing  our  own  sup- 
plies, which  were  barely  sufficient  to  bring  the  ships 
back  to  New  Orleans,  making  allowance  for  probable 
delays.  The  river  was  now  beginning  to  fall,  and  I 
apprehended  great  difficulty  in  getting  down  should 
I  delay  much  longer.  In  the  mean  time  coal  vessels 
had  been  towed  up  the  river  just  above-  Natchez  (a 
hundred  miles  below  Vicksburg),  which  vessels  I  was 
obliged  to  bring  down  and  keep  in  company  with  the 
vessels  of  war,  for  fear  of  their  being  captured  by 
the  guerrilla  bands  which  appear  to  infest  almost  the 
entire  banks  of  the  river  wherever  there  are  rapids 
and  bluffs." 

Such  were  some  of  the  difficulties  being  experi- 
enced when  the  Assistant-Secretary  of  the  Navy 
was  writing  :  "  The  only  anxiety  we  feel  is  to  know 
if    you   have    followed    up    your   instructions    and 


1 84 


ADMIRAL    FARRAGUT. 


pushed  a  strong  force  up  the  river  to  meet  the 
Western  flotilla."  "  I  had  no  conception,"  replied 
Farragut,  "  that  the  Department  ever  contemplated 
that  the  ships  of  this  squadron  were  to  attempt  to 
go  to  Memphis,  above  which  the  Western  flotilla 
then  was  ;  nor  did  I  believe  it  was  practicable  for 
them  to  do  so,  unless  under  the  most  favorable  cir- 
cumstances, in  time  of  peace,  when  their  supplies 
could  be  obtained  along  the  river.  The  gunboats 
are  nearly  all  so  damaged  that  they  are  certainly 
not  in  condition  to  contend  with  ironclad  rams 
coming  down  upon  them  with  the  current.  .  .  .  We 
consider  the  advantage  entirely  in  favor  of  the  ves- 
sel that  has  the  current  added  to  her  velocity."  In 
conclusion  he  adds  :  "  I  arrived  in  New  Orleans  with 
five  or  six  days'  provisions  and  one  anchor,  and  am 
now  trying  to  procure  others.  As  soon  as  provisions 
and  anchors  are  obtained  we  will  take  our  departure 
for  up  the  river,  and  endeavor  to  carry  out,  as  far  as 
practicable,  the  orders  conveyed  in  your  different 
dispatches."  Writing  home,  he  expressed  himself 
more  freely  and  unmistakably  :  "  They  will  keep  us 
in  this  river  until  the  vessels  break  down  and  all  the 
little  reputation  we  have  made  has  evaporated.  The 
Government  appears  to  think  that  we  can  do  any- 
thing. They  expect  me  to  navigate  the  Mississippi 
nine  hundred  miles  in  the  face  of  batteries,  ironclad 
rams,  etc.,  and  yet  with  all  the  ironclad  vessels  they 
have  North  they  could  not  get  to  Norfolk  or  Rich- 
mond. .  .  .  Well,  I  will  do  my  duty  to  the  best  of 
my  ability,  and  let  the  rest  take  care  of  itself.  .  .  . 
They  can  not  deprive  me  and  my  officers  of  the  his- 
torical fact  that  we  took  New  Orleans.  Now  they 
expect  impossibilities." 


THE   FIRST   ADVANCE   ON   VICKSBURG.      ^5 

Enough  has  been  quoted  to  show  that  Farragut 
was  in  no  way  responsible  for,  nor  approved  of,  the 
ill-timed  tenacity  with  which  the  Government  held 
to  its  original  plan,  when  the  conditions  had  turned 
out  entirely  different   from   those  at  first  expected. 
The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  at  a  later  date  endeavored 
to  throw  the  blame  of  failure  entirely  upon  the  War 
Department,  which  was  either  unwilling  or  unable  to 
support  the  naval  movement  with  adequate  troops. 
It  is  not  necessary,  in   a  life  of  the  admiral,  to  at- 
tempt to  decide    upon    the  degree  of  remissness,  if 
any,  shown  by  the   military  service,  nor  upon  whose 
shoulders  it  falls.      It  is  sufficient  to  point  out  that 
the  Navy  Department  required  of  Farragut  to  go  up 
to  meet  the  Western  flotilla  when  it  was  near  nine 
hundred  miles  from    the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi, 
for  no  better  reason,  apparently,  than  that  it  had  de- 
termined upon   the  junction  at  a  time  when  it  sup- 
posed it  would  be  effected  much  lower  down.     In  so 
doing  it  left  nothing  to  the  judgment  of  the  officer 
commanding  on  the  spot.     "  I  think,"  said  Farragut 
quietly,  "that  more  should  have  been  left  to  my  dis- 
cretion ;  but  I  hope  for  the  best,  and  pray  God  to 
protect  our  poor  sailors  from  harm."     His  own  opin- 
ion  was  that   Mobile   should  be  the  next  point  at- 
tacked.    The  difficulties  there  were  not  so  great  as 
those  encountered  at  the  Mississippi  forts  ;  and  his 
success  at  the  latter  might  not  improbably  have  con- 
siderable moral  effect  upon  the  other  works,  whose 
position  had  some  strong  features  of  resemblance  to 
those  already  subdued,  and  which  were  not  yet  in  the 
strong  state  of  defense  which  they  afterward  reached. 
The  blockade  of  the  coast  was  part  of  his  charge; 
and  in  no  way  did  he  think  it  could  be  so  thoroughly 
13 


lS6  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

maintained  as  by  occupying  the  harbors  themselves, 
or  their  entrances. 

In  obedience  to  his  peremptory  orders  Farragut 
again  started  up  the  river,  with  the  apprehension 
that  if  he  once  got  above  Vicksburg  he  would  not  be 
able  to  return  before  the  next  spring  rise ;  for  the 
season  of  lowest  water  in  the  Mississippi  was  now  at 
hand.  The  Hartford  did  run  ashore  on  the  way  up, 
and  remained  hard  and  fast  for  the  better  part  of 
twenty-four  hours.  "  It  is  a  sad  thing  to  think  of 
having  your  ship  on  a  mud  bank,  five  hundred  miles 
from  the  natural  element  of  a  sailor,"  wrote  the  flag- 
officer  ;  "  but  I  knew  that  I  had  done  all  I  could  to  pre- 
vent her  being  up  the  river  so  high,  and  was  com- 
manded to  go."  She  had  to  take  out  her  coal  and 
shot,  and  had  even  removed  two  guns  before  she 
floated. 

On  the  1 8th  of  June  the  squadron  was  assembled 
just  below  Vicksburg,  having  in  company  also  seven- 
teen schooners  of  the  mortar  flotilla,  still  under 
Porter's  command.  These  were  placed  as  rapidly 
as  possible  in  suitable  positions  on  the  two  sides 
of  the  river,  opened  fire  on  the  26th,  and  con- 
tinued it  through  the  27th.  Upon  the  evening  of  the 
latter  day  Porter  notified  the  flag-officer  that  he  was 
ready  to  cover,  by  a  steady  bombardment,  the  in- 
tended passage  of  the  fleet  before  the  batteries. 

Vicksburg  is  situated  on  the  first  high  land  met 
on  the  east  bank  of  the  Mississippi  after  leaving 
Memphis,  from  which  it  is  four  hundred  miles  dis- 
tant. The  position  was  one  of  peculiar  strength  and 
importance  for  commanding  the  navigation  of  the 
river.  Not  only  was  it  exceptionally  lofty,  and  on 
one  flank  of  that  series  of  bluffs  which  has  before 


J 


FORTS 

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RAIL  ROADS 

LEV  EELS 

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HARTFORD. 

9b 

RICHMOND. 

j;c 

tiROOHLYN. 

%, 

/SO^t/O/S. 

ONEIDA . 

WISSAHICKON 

«+ 

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«5 

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n  5 

PIN  OLA 

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ponreirs  guh  ours 

as 

MORTAR  BOATS. 

Passage  of  Vicksburg  Batteries,  June  28,  1862. 
Order  of  Attack. 


THE   FIRST  ADVANCE  ON   VICKSBURG.      18; 

been  mentioned  as  constituting  the  line  upon  which 
the  Confederate  grip  of  the  stream  was  based,  but 
the  tortuous  character  of  the  channel  gave  particular 
facilities  for  an  enfilading  fire  on  vessels  both  before 
and  after  they  came  abreast  the  works.  They  were 
thus  exposed  to  a  longer  and  more  dangerous  can- 
nonade than  is  the  case  where  the  stream  flows 
straight  past  the  front  of  a  battery.  The  channel 
has  now  changed  ;  but  in  1862  the  river,  which  from 
Memphis  had  pursued  its  winding  course  through 
an  alluvial  country,  made  when  abreast  of  Vicksburg 
a  sharp  turn  to  the  northeast,  as  though  determined 
to  reach  the  bluffs  but  four  miles  distant.  As  it 
neared  them  it  swung  round  with  a  sharp  turn  to 
the  southwest,  parallel  to  its  recent  direction,  flow- 
ing for  the  most  part  close  to  the  foot  of  the  hills. 
Between  the  two  reaches,  and  formed  by  them,  im- 
mediately opposite  the  town,  there  was  a  low  tongue 
of  land,  or  promontory,  four  miles  long  and  less 
than  one  wide.  The  squadron,  being  below,  had  to 
steam  up  through  the  lower  reach  against  the  cur- 
rent, make  the  sharp  turn  at  the  bend,  and  then  pass 
through  the  upper  reach.  In  the  bend  it  was  fol- 
lowed by  a  fire  from  the  highest  part  of  the  bluffs, 
to  which  it  could  make  no  reply. 

At  2  a.  m.  of  June  28th  the  signal  was  given,  and 
at  three  the  squadron  was  under  way — eleven  ves- 
sels, of  which  three  were  the  heavy  ships  Hartford, 
Richmond,  and  Brooklyn  ;  two,  the  corvettes  Iroquois 
and  Oneida ;  and  six  gunboats.  At  four,  the  ships  in 
their  slow  progress,  stemming  the  current,  had  passed 
the  mortar  schooners  ;  and  the  latter  then  opened 
fire,  as  did  the  steamers  connected  with  them,  which 
were  not  to  attempt  the  passage.     Owing  to  a  mis- 


1 88  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

understanding,  the  three  vessels  which  formed  the 
rear  of  the  column,  the  Brooklyn  and  two  gunboats, 
did  not  get  by.  The  others,  at  6  a.  m.,  anchored 
above  Vicksburg.  Though  exposed  much  of  the 
time  to  a  raking  fire,  to  which  they  were  not  able  to 
reply,  the  vessels  suffered  less  than  would  have  been 
expected,  owing  to  the  enemy  falling  into  the  com- 
mon mistake  of  giving  too  much  elevation  to  his 
guns.  Having  thus  accomplished  his  instructions, 
Farragut  reported  coldly  to  the  Department  that,  in 
obedience  to  the  orders  "  and  the  command  of  the 
President,  I  proceeded  up  to  Vicksburg  with  the 
Brooklyn,  Richmond,  and  Hartford,  with  the  deter- 
mination to  carry  out  my  instructions  to  the  best  of 
my  ability.  .  .  .  The  Department  will  perceive  from 
this  report  that  the  forts  can  be  passed,  and  we  have 
done  it,  and  can  do  it  again  as  often  as  may  be  required 
of  us.  It  will  not,  however,  be  an  easy  matter  for 
us  to  do  more  than  silence  the  batteries  for  a  time, 
as  long  as  the  enemy  has  a  large  force  behind  the 
hills  to  prevent  our  landing  and  holding  the  place." 
"I  am  satisfied,"  he  says  again,  "  it  is  not  possible 
to  take  Vicksburg  without  an  army  of  twelve  or 
fifteen  thousand  men.  General  Van  Dorn's  division 
(Confederate)  is  here,  and  lies  safely  behind  the  hills. 
The  water  is  too  low  for  me  to  go  over  twelve  or 
fifteen  miles  above  Vicksburg."  The  last  sentence 
reveals  clearly  enough  the  madness  of  attempting  to 
take  three  of  the  best  ships  of  the  navy  to  the  upper 
river  in  falling  water.  Fortunately  the  insufficient 
depth  now  was  above — not  below — them,  and  they 
were  not  utterly  cut  off  from  the  sea.  Commander 
Porter,  however,  who  started  down  river  a  week  later, 
in  compliance  with  orders  summoning  him  to  Wash- 


THE  FIRST  ADVANCE   ON   VICKSBURG.      189 

ington,  and  than  whom  the  navy  had  no  more  active 
nor  enterprising  officer,  wrote  back  to  the  flag-officer 
that  if  the  big  ships  did  not  soon  return  he  feared 
they  would  have  to  remain  till  next  year. 

Three  days  after  Farragut  passed  the  batteries  of 
Vicksburg,  on  the  1st  of  July,  the  Mississippi  flotilla, 
under  the  command  of  Flag-officer  Charles  H.  Davis, 
joined  him  from  above ;  having  left  Memphis  only 
two  days  before,  but  favored  in  their  voyage  by  the 
current,  by  competent  pilots,  and  by  a  draught  suited 
to  the  difficulties  of  river  navigation.  The  united 
squadrons  continued  together  until  the  15th  of  July, 
lying  at  anchor  near  the  neck  of  the  promontory  op- 
posite Vicksburg;  with  the  exception  of  the  Brook- 
lyn and  the  two  gunboats  which  had  not  passed  up 
on  the  28th  of  June.  These  remained  below  the 
works,  and  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  promontory. 

The  position  of  the  two  flag-officers  was  about 
four  miles  below  the  mouth  of  the  Yazoo  River,  a 
tributary  of  the  Mississippi,  which  enters  the  main 
stream  on  the  east  side  not  far  above  Vicksburg.  It 
was  known  to  them  that  there  was  somewhere  in  the 
Yazoo  an  ironclad  ram  called  the  Arkansas  ;  which, 
more  fortunate  than  the  Mississippi  at  New  Orleans, 
had  been  hurried  away  from  Memphis  just  before 
that  city  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  United  States 
forces.  She  was  a  vessel  of  between  eight  hundred 
and  a  thousand  tons  burden,  carrying  ten  guns, 
which  were  protected  by  three  inches  of  railroad 
iron,  backed  by  bales  of  compressed  cotton  firmly 
braced.  Her  most  dangerous  weapon,  however,  was 
her  ram ;  but,  owing  to  the  lightness  and  bad  con- 
struction of  the  engines,  this  was  not  as  formidable  as 
it  otherwise  might  have  been  to  the  enemy's  ships. 


IoO  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

So  little  injury  had  thus  far  been  done  to  the 
United  States  vessels  by  the  rams  of  the  Confed- 
erates that  the  two  flag-officers  were  probably  lulled 
into  a  state  of  over-security,  and  they  allowed  their 
squadrons  to  lie  with  too  low  fires.  To  this  doubt- 
less contributed  the  more  powerful  motive  of  the 
difficulty  to  the  coal  supply  incurred  by  the  excess- 
ively long  line  of  exposed  communications,  im- 
posed upon  both  squadrons  by  the  stubborn  persist- 
ence of  the  Navy  Department  in  hurrying  the  fleets 
far  in  advance  of  any  support  by  the  army.  Beyond 
the  reach  of  their  guns  they  could  not  control  the 
river  banks  ;  and,  unless  they  could  be  present  every- 
where along  the  eight  hundred  miles  which  separated 
Memphis  from  New  Orleans,  even  the  narrow  strip 
on  either  side  swept  by  their  cannon  was  safe  at  any 
point  only  while  they  were  abreast  it.  The  moral 
effect  of  their  promenade  up  and  down  and  of  their 
meeting  at  Vicksburg  was  accurately  weighed  by  the 
enemy;  and,  however  it  may  have  imposed  upon  the 
Northern  people,  did  nothing  to  insure  the  safety 
of  the  unarmed  vessels  upon  which  supplies  de- 
pended. This  essentially  vicious  military  situation 
resulted  necessarily  in  a  degree  of  insecurity  which 
could  have  but  one  issue — a  retreat  by  both  squad- 
rons toward  their  respective  bases,  which  soon  after 
followed. 

Convinced  of  the  inutility  of  his  own  presence  at 
Vicksburg,  and  preoccupied  with  the  risks  threatening 
his  squadron  from  the  unguarded  state  of  the  river 
and  its  dangerous  navigation,  it  is  not  wonderful 
that  Farragut,  who  was  the  senior  of  the  two  flag- 
officers,  thought  little  of  the  single  ironclad  vessel 
in  his  neighborhood.     He  was  not  prone  to  exag- 


THE   FIRST   ADVANCE   ON  VICKSBURG.      191 

gerate  danger,  and  his  experience  had  not  led  him 
to  entertain  any  high  opinion  of  the  enemy's  rams. 
To  these  circumstances  he  owed  one  of  the  most 
mortifying  incidents  of  his  career. 

On  the  15th  of  July  a  reconnoitering  expedition 
was  sent  into  the  Yazoo,  composed  of  two  vessels 
of  Davis's  squadron,  accompanied  by  one  of  the 
rams  which  at  that  time  formed  an  independent  or- 
ganization upon  the  upper  Mississippi  under  the 
command  of  Colonel  Ellet.  It  was  a  fortunate 
move,  for  to  this  circumstance  was  due  that  the 
squadrons  had  any  notice  of  the  approach  of  the 
Arkansas.  The  detached  vessels  met  her  about  six 
miles  within  the  Yazoo,  when  a  running  fight  ensued 
between  her  and  the  Carondelet,  to  the  disadvantage 
of  the  United  States  vessel ;  but  the  sustained  can- 
nonade attracted  betimes  the  attention  of  the  fleet, 
and  the  Tyler,  a  small  unarmored  boat,  after  sup- 
porting the  Carondelet  to  the  best  of  her  ability 
through  the  action,  preceded  the  combatants  down 
stream,  bringing  tidings  of  the  ram's  approach. 
There  was  not  time  to  raise  steam — only  to  cast 
loose  the  guns  for  action.  When  the  Arkansas 
reached  the  fleet  her  smoke-stack  had  been  so  often 
perforated  by  the  Carondelet's  shot  that  her  boilers 
could  scarcely  supply  any  steam.  Her  speed  was 
thereby  reduced  to  one  knot,  powerless  to  ram  and 
scarcely  sufficient  to  steer.  At  that  rate,  with  the 
favor  also  of  the  current,  she  passed  through  the 
United  States  vessels,  suffering  from  their  successive 
fires  much  injury,  though  not  of  a  vital  kind,  and 
took  refuge  under  the  guns  of  Vicksburg.  It  was 
a  most  gallant  exploit,  fairly  comparable  in  dar- 
ing to  the  passage  of  the  Mississippi  forts,  but  re- 


jq2  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

suiting    in    no   decisive   effect   upon   the   issues   of 

the  war. 

It  became  immediately  advisable  for  Farragut  to 
rejoin  the  three  ships  which  lay  below  the  town,  and 
were  consequently  in  a  condition  favoring  an  attack 
by  the  ram,  whose  apparent  immunity  under  the 
fire  of  the  two  squadrons  showed  her  an  enemy  not 
to  be  despised.  He  determined  to  follow  her  down 
at  once,  again  passing  the  batteries,  and  endeavor- 
ing to  destroy  her  with  the  guns  of  his  squadron  as 
it  went  by.  The  execution  of  the  plan  was  set 
for  the  late  afternoon,  and  the  Mississippi  flotilla 
took  up  a  position  to  support  the  movement  by  en- 
gaging the  upper  batteries.  Unfortunately,  time 
was  lost  in  forming  the  order  of  battle,  and  the  pas- 
sage was  effected  in  the  dark.  The  uncertainty  of 
aim  thus  caused  was  increased  by  the  precaution  of 
the  enemy,  who  shifted  his  position  after  nightfall. 
Two  shots  only  found  her,  injuring  several  of  her 
people  and  setting  fire  to  the  cotton  bulwarks.  Be- 
yond this  she  received  no  injury  at  this  time,  but 
she  had  been  severely  shaken  by  the  hammering  of 
the  morning.  A  week  later,  on  the  2 2d  of  July, 
Davis  sent  down  the  Essex,  one  of  his  heavy  iron- 
clads, accompanied  by  one  of  Ellet's  rams,  to  attack 
the  Arkansas  at  her  moorings.  The  effort  was  un- 
successful, although  the  enemy's  vessel  received 
some  further  injury.  The  ram  rejoined  the  upper 
squadron  ;  but  the  Essex,  from  her  indifferent  speed, 
was  unable  to  return  against  the  current,  exposed 
unsupported  to  the  fire  of  all  the  batteries.  She 
therefore  became  thenceforth  a  member  of  the  lower 
squadron,  together  with  a  ram  called  the  Sumter, 
which  had  run  down  with  Farragut  on  the  15th. 


THE   FIRST   ADVANCE   ON   VICKSBURG. 


193 


On  the  20th  of  the  month  Farragut  had  received 
orders  from  the  Navy  Department,  dated  July  14th, 
directing  him  to  get  the  part  of  his  fleet  above  Vicks- 
burg  below  that  place  with  as  little  injury  and  loss 
of  life  as  possible.  The  circumstances  that  have 
been  narrated  caused  him  to  receive  this  dispatch 
below  the  town  ;  and  on  the  24th,  two  days  after  the 
descent  of  the  Essex,  he  departed  for  New  Orleans. 
Davis  assured  him  that  the  Essex  and  Sumter  should 
look  out  for  the  river  between  Vicksburg  and  Baton 
Rouge.  To  them  were  joined  three  of  Farragut's 
gunboats  ;  and  the  five  vessels  took  an  active  part  in 
supporting  the  garrison  of  Baton  Rouge  when  an  at- 
tack was  made  upon  the  place  by  the  Confederates 
on  the  5th  of  August.  In  this  the  Arkansas  was  to 
have  co-operated  with  the  enemy's  troops,  and  she 
left  Vicksburg  on  the  3d  for  that  purpose;  but  her 
machinery  broke  down,  and  while  lying  helpless 
against  the  river  bank  the  Essex  came  in  sight.  Re- 
sistance in  her  then  plight  was  hopeless.  She  was 
set  on  fire  by  her  commander,  the  crew  escaping  to 
the  shore.  Farragut  himself  reached  Baton  Rouge 
shortly  after  this  happened.  He  had  with  much 
difficulty  succeeded  in  getting  the  heavier  ships  to 
New  Orleans  on  the  28th  of  July  ;  and  there  he  had 
lingered,  unwilling  to  leave  the  river,  though  desirous 
of  doing  so,  until  affairs  seemed  on  a  reasonably  se- 
cure basis.  The  chief  element  of  anxiety  was  the 
Arkansas,  concerning  whose  power  to  harm  quite 
exaggerated  notions  prevailed.  While  thus  lying  be- 
fore New  Orleans  word  was  brought  him  of  the  at- 
tack on  Baton  Rouge,  and  he  at  once  retraced  his 
steps  with  the  Hartford,  Brooklyn,  and  some  smaller 
ships.     On  the  7th  he  reached  the  scene  of  action, 


i94 


ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 


and  learned  the  destruction  of  the  Confederate  ves- 
sel. The  same  day  he  wrote  to  the  Department :  "  It 
is  one  of  the  happiest  moments  of  my  life  that  I  am 
enabled  to  inform  the  Department  of  the  destruction 
of  the  ram  Arkansas  ;  not  because  I  held  the  iron- 
clad in  such  terror,  but  because  the  community  did." 
It  must  have  been  an  additional  element  of  satisfac- 
tion to  him  that  the  disappearance  from  the  waters 
of  the  Mississippi  of  the  last  hostile  vessel  capable 
of  offensive  action  released  him  from  the  necessity 
of  remaining  himself,  or  of  keeping  a  large  force 
there,  during  the  unhealthy  season. 

Before  leaving  Vicksburg  the  crews  of  the  fleet 
had  suffered  severely  from  the  sickness  common  in 
that  climate.  The  Brooklyn  had  sixty-eight  sick  out 
of  a  total  of  three  hundred;  and  as  this  proportion 
was  less  than  in  the  upper  river  flotilla,  where  the 
sick  numbered  forty  per  cent  of  the  total  force,  it  is 
probable  that  it  fairly  represents  the  general  con- 
dition of  Farragut's  ships.  Among  the  troops  ac- 
companying the  expedition  there  were  but  eight  hun- 
dred fit  for  duty  out  of  over  three  thousand.  It  was 
not  considered  well  to  maintain  for  a  longer  time  in 
Baton  Rouge  the  small  garrison  hitherto  stationed 
there.  It  had  honorably  repulsed  the  enemy's  at- 
tack ;  but,  in  the  general  cessation  of  offensive  move- 
ments by  the  United  States  army,  the  Confederates 
were  continually  strengthening  their  forces  on  the 
line  of  bluffs  south  of  Vicksburg,  to  the  importance 
of  which  their  attention,  never  entirely  diverted,  had 
been  forcibly  drawn  by  the  advance  of  the  fleet  in 
the  previous  months.  Fruitless  as  that  ill-judged 
advance  had  been,  it  reminded  the  enemy  of  the 
serious  inconvenience  they  would  suffer  if  the  United 


THE  FIRST   ADVANCE   ON  VICKSBURG.      195 

States  ships  could  freely  patrol  that  part  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi, and  impressed  upon  them  the  necessity  of 
securing  a  section  of  it,  by  which  they  could  have 
undisturbed  communication  between  the  two  shores. 
This  could  be  done  by  fortifying  two  points  in  such 
strength  that  to  pass  them  from  either  direction 
would  involve  a  risk  too  great  to  be  lightly  under- 
taken. The  points  chosen  were  Vicksburg  and  Port 
Hudson,  two  hundred  miles  apart,  and  embracing 
between  them  the  mouth  of  the  Red  River.  The 
latter  is  the  great  artery  of  the  region  west  of  the 
Mississippi,  and  also,  by  means  of  the  Atchafalaya 
Bayou,  offers  direct  communication  for  light-draught 
vessels  with  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  Port  Hudson  being 
less  than  twenty  miles  from  Baton  Rouge,  the  pres- 
ence in  the  latter  of  a  small  garrison,  which  could 
undertake  no  offensive  movement  and  which  there 
were  no  troops  to  re-enforce,  became  purposeless.  On 
the  16th  of  August,  1862,  the  post  was  abandoned, 
and  the  troops  occupying  it  withdrew  to  New  Or- 
leans. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE   BLOCKADE    AND    PORT    HUDSON. 
1862-1863. 

Operations  in  the  Mississippi  having  now  tem- 
porarily ceased,  Farragut  was  at  liberty  to  give  his 
undivided  attention  for  a  time  to  the  coast  block- 
ade. The  important  harbor  of  Pensacola  had  been 
evacuated  by  the  Confederates  in  May,  less  than  a 
month  after  the  capture  of  New  Orleans.  Its  aban- 
donment was  due  to  want  of  troops  to  garrison  it 
properly  ;  the  pressure  of  the  United  States  armies 
in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  after  the  fall  of  Fort 
Donelson  in  the  previous  February,  having  necessi- 
tated the  withdrawal  of  all  men  that  could  be  spared 
from  other  points.  Before  the  war  Pensacola  had 
been  the  seat  of  a  well-equipped  navy  yard  with  a 
good  dry-dock,  the  only  naval  station  of  the  United 
States  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  At  the  time  of  the 
evacuation  the  buildings  in  the  yard  had  been  de- 
stroyed and  the  dry-dock  injured;  but  the  fine  har- 
bor, the  depth  of  water — twenty-two  feet — that  could 
be  carried  over  the  bar,  and  the  nearness  of  the  port 
to  Mobile,  the  most  important  center  of  blockade 
running,  all  combined  to  make  it  the  headquarters  of 
the  fleet  for  repairs  and  supplies.  Farragut  arrived 
there  on  the  20th  of  August.     Just  before  leaving 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND  PORT  HUDSON. 


I97 


New  Orleans  he  received  his  commission  as  rear 
admiral,  dated  July  16,  1862.  Three  other  officers 
were  promoted  at  the  same  time  to  the  active  list  of 
this  grade,  which  had  never  before  existed  in  the 
United  States;  but  as  Farragut  was  the  senior  in 
rank  of  the  four,  he  may  be  said  to  have  been  the 
first  officer  of  the  navy  to  hoist  an  admiral's  flag. 

The  admiral  remained  in  Pensacola  for  three 
months,  superintending  from  there  the  affairs  of  his 
squadron.  During  this  period  the  harbors  of  Gal- 
veston and  of  various  other  smaller  ports  on  the 
coast  of  Texas  and  Lousiana  were  occupied  by  de- 
tachments of  vessels,  as  the  surest  way  of  enforcing 
the  blockade.  The  admiral  had  early  announced 
that  he  should  carry  on  the  blockade  as  far  as  pos- 
sible inside ;  and  these  successes  enabled  him  to  say 
in  December,  1862,  that  he  now  held  the  whole  coast 
except  Mobile.  During  his  stay  in  Pensacola  he  re- 
ceived a  visit  from  his  son,  who  found  him  in  the 
best  of  spirits,  all  having  gone  well  on  the  coast ; 
the  only  mishap  having  been  the  success  of  a  Con- 
federate cruiser,  the  Oreto,  in  running  into  Mobile. 
She  had  availed  herself  of  her  close  resemblance  to 
some  of  the  British  cruisers  in  the  Gulf  to  hoist  the 
British  flag ;  and  as  visits  of  these  vessels  to  the  block- 
aded ports  were  authorized  and  not  infrequent,  the 
ruse  induced  the  United  States  ship  that  overhauled 
her  to  withhold  its  fire  for  a  few  critical  moments. 
During  these  the  Oreto  gained  so  far  on  the  other 
that,  although  struck  three  times  by  heavy  project- 
iles, she  received  no  vital  injury  and  succeeded  in 
gaining  the  shelter  of  the  forts. 

The  period  of  the  admiral's  stay  in  Pensacola  was 
one  of  the  deepest  depression  to  the  Union  cause, 


198 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


and  his  letters  bear  evidence  of  the  anxiety  which  he 
shared  with  all  his  fellow-countrymen  in  that  time  of 
distress.  The  reverses  of  McClellan  in  the  penin- 
sula, followed  by  the  withdrawal  of  his  army  from 
thence  and  its  transference  to  northern  Virginia,  the 
defeats  suffered  by  Pope,  and  the  first  invasion  of 
Maryland,  occurred  either  immediately  before  or 
during  the  time  that  Farragut  was  in  Pensacola.  His 
own  bootless  expedition  up  the  Mississippi  and  sub- 
sequent enforced  retirement  conspired  also  to  swell 
the  general  gloom ;  for,  although  thinking  military 
men  could  realize  from  the  first  that  the  position 
into  which  the  fleet  was  forced  was  so  essentially 
false  that  it  could  not  be  maintained,  the  unreflecting 
multitude  saw  only  the  conversion  into  repulse  and 
disaster  of  a  substantial  success,  of  a  conquest  as 
apparently  real  as  it  was  actually  phantasmal.  In 
the  West,  Grant  was  so  stripped  of  troops  that  he 
feared  the  possibility  of  the  Union  forces  being 
obliged  to  withdraw  behind  the  Ohio,  as  they  had  in 
the  Eastrecrossed  the  Potomac.  "The  most  anxious 
period  of  the  war  to  me,"  he  afterward  wrote,  "was 
during  the  time  the  army  of  the  Tennessee  was 
guarding  the  territory  acquired  by  the  fall  of  Cor- 
inth and  Memphis,  and  before  I  was  sufficiently 
re-enforced  to  take  the  offensive" — from  July  15  to 
October  15,  1862. 

The  Confederate  forces  which  confronted  Grant 
in  northern  Mississippi  during  these  anxious  months 
interposed  between  him  and  Vicksburg,  and  belonged 
to  the  department  charged  with  the  defenses  of  the 
Mississippi  river.  As  they  touched  Grant,  therefore, 
on  the  one  side,  on  the  other  they  were  in  contact 
with  Farragut's  command.    The  summer  passed  in 


THE  BLOCKADE   AND   PORT   HUDSON.       199 

various  movements  by  them,  threatening  Grant's 
position  at  Corinth,  which  culminated  on  the  3d  of 
October  in  an  attack  in  force.  This  was  repulsed 
after  hard  fighting,  and  re-enforcements  to  Grant 
beginning  to  come  in,  the  Confederates  themselves 
were  thrown  on  the  defensive.  The  approach  of 
winter,  bringing  with  it  higher  water  and  healthier 
weather  on  the  line  of  the  Mississippi,  warned  them 
also  that  the  time  was  at  hand  when  they  might  have 
to  fight  for  the  control  of  the  water  communications, 
upon  which  they  no  longer  had,  nor  could  hope  to 
have,  a  naval  force.  Reports  therefore  began  to 
reach  the  admiral  in  Pensacola,  from  the  senior 
naval  officer  in  the  river,  that  the  Confederates  were 
with  renewed  energy  building  batteries  above  Baton 
Rouge  and  strongly  fortifying  Port  Hudson. 

As  there  seemed  no  speedy  prospect  of  obtaining 
the  land  force,  without  whose  co-operation  an  attack 
upon  Mobile  would  be  a  fruitless  enterprise,  Farra- 
gut  felt  his  proper  position  was  now  in  the  Missis- 
sippi itself.  Important  as  was  the  blockade  service, 
it  was  of  a  character  safely  to  be  trusted  to  a  subor- 
dinate ;  whereas  the  strictly  military  operations  of 
the  approaching  campaign,  whatever  shape  they 
might  finally  take,  would  be  for  the  control  of  the 
river.  It  therefore  behooved  the  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  naval  forces  to  be  at  hand,  ready  to 
support  in  any  way  that  might  offer  the  effort  to 
obtain  control  of  a  region  of  which  the  water  com- 
munications were  so  characteristic  a  feature.  To 
push  far  up  a  narrow  and  intricate  river  a  force  of 
ships,  whose  numbers  are  insufficient  even  to  protect 
their  own  communications  and  insure  their  coal  sup- 
plies, is  one  thing;  it  is  quite  another  to  repair  to 


200  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

the  same  scene  of  action  prepared  to  support  the 
army  by  controlling  the  water,  and  by  establishing 
in  combined  action  a  secure  secondary  base  of  opera- 
tions from  which  further  advances  can  be  made  with 
reasonable  certainty  of  holding  the  ground  gained. 
There  was  no  inconsistency  between  Farragut's  re- 
luctance of  the  spring  and  his  forwardness  in  the 
autumn.  The  man  who,  to  secure  New  Orleans  and 
compass  the  fall  of  the  forts,  had  dared  to  cut  adrift 
from  his  base  and  throw  his  communications  to  the 
winds,  because  he  had  an  object  adequate  to  the 
risk,  was  the  same  who,  six  weeks  later,  had  testified 
his  anxiety  about  communications  stretched  too  far 
and  to  no  purpose ;  and  now,  half  a  year  after  that 
reluctant  ascent  of  the  river  against  his  better  judg- 
ment, we  find  him  eagerly  planning  to  go  up  again, 
establishing  under  the  protection  of  the  army  an 
advanced  base,  from  which,  with  the  supplies  accu- 
mulated at  it,  further  movements  may  be  contem- 
plated with  a  good  chance  of  final  success. 

On  the  14th  of  November  Farragut  reported  to 
the  Navy  Department  his  return  to  New  Orleans.  The 
Government,  however,  had  taken  warning  by  the 
fiasco  of  the  previous  season  ;  and,  far  from  urging 
the  admiral  on,  now  sought  to  impress  him  with  the 
need  for  caution.  As  the  great  object  of  opening  the 
Mississippi  and  obtaining  control  of  it  remained,  and 
necessarily  must  remain,  the  first  of  the  Govern- 
ment's aims  in  the  Southwest,  the  result  of  these  in- 
structions was  to  give  Farragut  the  discretion  which 
had  before  been  denied  him.  He  retained  fully  his  con- 
victions of  the  summer.  "I  am  ready  for  anything," 
he  writes  to  the  Department,  "but  desire  troops 
to  hold  what  we  get.     General  Butler  urges  me  to 


THE   BLOCKADE   AND   PORT   HUDSON.       2OI 

attack  Port  Hudson  first,  as  he  wishes  to  break  up 
that  rendezvous  before  we  go  outside.  It  will  take 
at  least  five  thousand  men  to  take  Port  Hudson." 
In  the  same  spirit  he  writes  home,  "  I  am  still  doing 
nothing  but  waiting  for  the  tide  of  events,  and  doing 
all  I  can  to  hold  what  I  have  ";  and  again,  a  week 
later,  "As  Micawber  says,  I  am  waiting  for  some- 
thing to  turn  up,  and  in  the  mean  time  having 
patience  for  the  water  to  rise."  Readiness  to 
act,  but  no  precipitation  ;  waiting  for  circum- 
stances, over  which  he  had  no  control,  to  justify 
acting,  may  be  described  as  his  attitude  at  this 
moment. 

On  the  16th  of  December  the  arrival  from  the 
north  of  General  Banks  to  relieve  General  Butler — 
an  event  which  took  Farragut  much  by  surprise — 
gave  him  the  opportunity  to  show  at  cnce  his  own 
ideas  of  the  proper  military  steps  to  be  taken.  Banks 
had  brought  re-enforcements  with  him  ;  and  three 
days  after  his  coming  the  admiral  writes  to  the  De- 
partment: "  I  have  recommended  to  General  Banks 
the  occupation  of  Baton  Rouge.  ...  It  is  only 
twelve  or  fifteen  miles  from  Port  Hudson,  and  is 
therefore  a  fine  base  of  operations.  He  has  ap- 
proved of  the  move,  and  ordered  his  transports  to 
proceed  directly  to  that  point.  I  ordered  Commander 
James  Alden,  in  the  Richmond,  with  two  gunboats, 
to  accompany  them  and  cover  the  landing."  Baton 
Rouge  is  on  the  southernmost  of  the  bluffs  which  in 
rapid  succession  skirt  the  Mississippi  below  Vicks- 
burg.  With  an  adequate  garrison  it  became  a  base 
of  operations  from  which  the  army  could  move 
against  Port  Hudson  when  the  time  came  ;  and  under 
its  protection  the  colliers  and  supplies  necessary  for 
H 


202  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

the  naval  vessels   in   the  advance  could  safely  re- 
main. 

While  waiting  for  the  new  commander  of  the 
army  to  get  fairly  settled  to  work  and  ready  for  the 
combined  movement  which  Farragut  was  eager  to 
make,  the  latter  was  called  upon  to  endure  some 
sharp  disappointments.  On  the  ist  of  January,  1863, 
the  military  forces  in  Galveston  were  attacked  by 
Confederate  troops,  and  the  naval  vessels  by  a  num- 
ber of  river  steamboats  barricaded  with  cotton  to 
resist  shells  fired  against  them,  and  loaded  with  rifle- 
men. The  garrison  was  captured,  one  of  the  gun- 
boats blown  up  by  her  own  officers,  and  another  sur- 
rendered after  her  captain  and  first  lieutenant  had 
been  killed  on  her  decks.  The  other  vessels  aban- 
doned the  harbor.  The  affair  was  not  only  a  dis- 
aster ;  it  was  attended  with  discreditable  circum- 
stances, which  excited  in  the  admiral  indignation  as 
well  as  regret.  Shortly  afterward,  two  sailing  ves- 
sels of  the  squadron,  charged  with  the  blockade  of 
Sabine  Pass,  were  also  taken  by  cotton-clad  steamers ; 
which  to  attack  availed  themselves  of  a  calm  day, 
when  the  ships  were  unable  to  manoeuvre.  An  un- 
successful attempt  was  made  after  this  to  take  Sabine 
Pass  ;  but  both  that  place  and  Galveston  remained 
in  the  power  of  the  enemy,  and  were  not  regained 
until  the  final  collapse  of  the  Confederacy.  Farragut 
dispatched  one  of  his  most  trusted  and  capable  of- 
ficers, Commodore  Henry  H.  Bell,  formerly  his  chief- 
of-staff,  to  re-establish  the  blockade  of  Galveston. 
Arriving  off  the  port  toward  night,  Bell  sent  one  of 
his  detachment,  the  Hatteras,  a  light  side-wheel  iron 
steamer  bought  from  the  merchant  service,  to  over- 
haul a  sail  in  the  offing.    Unfortunately,  the  stranger 


THE   BLOCKADE   AND    PORT    HUDSON. 


203 


proved  to  be  the  Confederate  steamer  Alabama,  far 
superior  in  force  to  the  Hatteras,  and  after  a  short 
engagement  the  latter  was  sunk. 

All  this  bad  news  came  in  rapid  succession,  and 
was  closely  followed  by  tidings  of  the  escape  from 
Mobile  of  the  Oreto,  which  a  few  months  before  had 
eluded  the  blockading  squadron  through  the  daring 
ruse  practiced  by  her  commander.  Known  now  as 
the  Florida,  and  fitted  as  a  Confederate  cruiser,  she 
ran  out  successfully  during  the  night  of  January  15th. 
Here  again,  though  the  discredit  was  less  than  at 
Galveston,  the  annoyance  of  the  admiral  was  in- 
creased by  the  knowledge  that  carelessness,  or,  at  the 
best,  bad  judgment,  had  contributed  to  the  enemy's 
success.  From  a  letter  written  home  at  this  time  by 
his  son,  who  had  not  yet  returned  from  the  visit  begun 
at  Pensacola,  it  appears  that  in  the  intimacy  of  family 
life  he  admitted,  and  showed  by  his  manner,  how 
keenly  he  felt  the  discredit  to  his  command  from 
these  events.  Though  conscious  that  they  were  not 
due  to  failure  on  his  part  to  do  his  utmost  with  the 
force  given  to  him,  and  seeing  in  the  escape  of  the 
Oreto  a  further  justification  of  his  own  opinion  that 
the  lower  harbor  of  Mobile  should  have  been  early 
seized,  he  nevertheless  was  "  very  much  worried." 
This  inside  view  of  the  effect,  visible  to  those  from 
whom  he  had  no  concealments,  is  supplemented  by 
the  description  of  the  admiral's  bearing  under  these 
reverses  given  by  Captain  (now  Rear-Admiral)  Jen- 
kins, who  at  this  time  became  his  chief-of-staff. 
"  These  disasters,"  he  writes,  "  were  sore  trials  to  the 
admiral,  and  a  less  well-poised  man  would  have  given 
way ;  but  they  seemed  only  to  give  him  greater 
strength  of  will  and  purpose.  ...  I  myself  had  the 


204 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


misfortune,  after  months  of  watching,  to  see  the 
Oreto  run  out  the  first  night  after  I  had  been  re- 
lieved of  the  command  of  the  Oneida  and  ordered 
to  report  to  the  admiral  as  his  fleet-captain.  I  had 
to  bear  him  these  bad  tidings.  Though  no  stoic, 
he  bore  the  news  as  one  accustomed  to  misfortune." 
It  may  seem,  indeed,  that  these  events,  considered 
individually,  were  but  instances  of  the  hard  knocks 
to  be  looked  for  in  war,  of  which  every  general  of- 
ficer in  every  campaign  must  expect  to  have  his 
share  ;  and  this  view  is  undoubtedly  true.  Never- 
theless, occurring  in  such  rapid  succession,  and  all 
in  that  part  of  his  extensive  command,  the  blockade, 
to  which  at  that  moment  it  seemed  impossible  to 
give  his  principal  attention,  the  effect  was  naturally 
staggering.  His  first  impulse  was  to  leave  the  river 
and  repair  in  person  to  the  scene  of  disaster  in  Texas ; 
but  reflection  soon  convinced  him  that,  however  un- 
fortunate the  occurrences  that  had  taken  place  there 
and  elsewhere  on  the  coast,  they  had  not  the  same 
vital  bearing  on  the  issues  of  the  war  as  the  control 
of  the  Mississippi,  and  therefore  not  an  equal  claim 
upon  the  commander-in-chief. 

At  the  same  time,  the  effect  was  to  intensify  the 
desire  to  act — to  redeem  by  success  the  blot  which 
failures  had  brought  upon  his  command;  and  the 
state  of  affairs  elsewhere  on  the  river  was  becoming 
such  as  to  justify  enterprise  by  the  reasonable  hope 
of  substantial  results.  A  series  of  circumstances 
which  have  been  often  narrated,  and  nowhere  in  a 
more  interesting  manner  than  by  General  Grant  in 
his  personal  memoirs,  had  led  to  the  abandonment  of 
the  movement  by  land  upon  Vicksburg  by  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee,  following  the  Mississippi  Central 


THE   BLOCKADE   AND   PORT    HUDSON.      205 

Railroad.    Instead  of  this  original  plan  of  campaign, 
the  Mississippi  River  was  now  adopted  as  the  line  of 
advance  and  of    communications.     The   first  move 
along  this  new  line  had  been  made  by  General  Sher- 
man, who  brought  with  him  32,000  troops,  and  on 
the  26th  of  December,  1862,  had  landed  on  the  low 
ground  between  the  mouth  of  the  Yazoo  and  Vicks- 
burg.     On  the  29th  the  army  assaulted  the  works  on 
the  hills  before  them,  but  were  repulsed.     Sherman, 
satisfied  that  the  position  there  was  too  strong  to  be 
carried,  had  determined  to  change  his  point  of  attack 
to  the  extreme  right  of  the  enemy's  line,  higher  up 
the  Yazoo  ;  but  the  heavy  rains  which  characterized 
the  winter  of  i862-'63  in  the  Mississippi  Valley  made 
untenable  the  ground  on  which  the  troops  were,  and 
it  became  necessary  to  re-embark  them.     The  trans- 
ports were  then    moved    out    into    the    Mississippi, 
where  they  were  joined  by  General  McClernand,  the 
senior  general  officer  in  the  department  under  Grant 

himself. 

McClernand  now  decided  to  attack  Arkansas 
Post,  on  the  Arkansas  River,  which  enters  the  Mis- 
sissippi from  the  west  about  two  hundred  miles 
above  Vicksburg.  The  Post  was  primarily  intended 
to  close  the  Arkansas  and  the  approach  to  the  capital 
of  the  State  of  the  same  name  ;  but  although  fifty 
miles  from  the  mouth  of  the  river,  it  was,  by  the 
course  of  the  stream,  but  fifteen  by  land  from  the 
Mississippi.  The  garrison,  being  five  thousand 
strong,  was  thus  dangerously  placed  to  threaten  the 
communications  by  the  latter  river,  upon  which  the 
army  was  to  depend  during  the  approaching  cam- 
paign ;  and  it  had  already  given  evidence  of  the  fact 
by  the  capture  of  a  valuable  transport.     This  post 


206  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

was  reduced  on  the  nth  of  January,  and  McClernand 
next  day  started  troops  up  the  White  River,  a  tribu- 
tary of  the  Arkansas.  From  this  ex-centric  move- 
ment, which  seemed  wholly  to  ignore  that  Vicksburg 
and  the  Mississippi  were  the  objective  of  the  cam- 
paign, McClernand  was  speedily  and  peremptorily 
recalled  by  Grant.  The  latter,  having  absolutely  no 
confidence  in  the  capacity  of  his  senior  subordinate, 
could  dispossess  him  of  the  chief  command  only  by 
assuming  it  himself.  This  he  accordingly  did,  and 
on  the  30th  of  January  joined  the  army,  which  was 
then  encamped  on  the  levees  along  the  west  bank  of 
the  river  above  Vicksburg. 

Serious  action  on  the  part  of  the  army,  directed 
by  a  man  of  whose  vigorous  character  there  could 
be  no  doubt,  though  his  conspicuous  ability  was  not 
yet  fully  recognized,  was  evidently  at  hand ;  and 
this  circumstance,  by  itself  alone,  imparted  a  very 
different  aspect  to  any  naval  enterprises,  giving  them 
reasonable  prospect  of  support  and  of  conducing 
substantially  to  the  great  common  end.  Never  in 
the  history  of  combined  movements  has  there  been 
more  hearty  co-operation  between  the  army  and 
navy  than  in  the  Vicksburg  campaign  of  1863,  under 
the  leadership  of  Grant  and  Porter.  From  the  nature 
of  the  enemy's  positions  their  forcible  reduction  was 
necessarily  in  the  main  the  task  of  the  land  forces ; 
but  that  the  latter  were  able  to  exert  their  full 
strength,  unweakened,  and  without  anxiety  as  to 
their  long  line  of  communications  from  Memphis  to 
Vicksburg,  was  due  to  the  incessant  vigilance  and 
activity  of  the  Mississippi  flotilla,  which  grudged 
neither  pains  nor  hard  knocks  to  support  every 
movement.     But,  besides  the  care  of  our  own  com- 


THE  BLOCKADE   AND   PORT    HUDSON.      207 

munications,  there  was  the  no  less  important  service 
of  harassing  or  breaking  up  those  of  the  enemy.  Of 
these,  the  most  important  was  with  the  States  west  of 
the  Mississippi.  Not  to  speak  of  cereals  and  sugar, 
Texas  alone,  in  the  Southwest,  produced  an  abun- 
dance of  vigorous  beef  cattle  fit  for  food  ;  and  from 
no  other  part  of  the  seceded  States  could  the  armies 
on  the  east  banks  of  the  Mississippi  be  adequately- 
supplied.  Bordering,  moreover,  upon  Mexico,  and 
separated  from  it  only  by  a  shoal  river  into  which  the 
United  States  ships  could  not  penetrate,  there  poured 
across  that  line  quantities  of  munitions  of  war,  which 
found  through  the  Mexican  port  of  Matamoras  a 
safe  entry,  everywhere  else  closed  to  them  by  the 
sea-board  blockade.  For  the  transit  of  these  the 
numerous  streams  west  of  the  Mississippi,  and 
especially  the  mighty  Red  River,  offered  peculiar 
facilities.  The  principal  burden  of  breaking  up  these 
lines  of  supply  was  thrown  upon  the  navy  by  the 
character  of  the  scene  of  operations — by  its  numer- 
ous water-courses  subsidiary  to  the  great  river  itself, 
and  by  the  overflow  of  the  land,  which,  in  its  del- 
uged condition  during  the  winter,  effectually  pre- 
vented the  movement  of  troops.  Herein  Farragut 
saw  his  opportunity,  as  well  as  that  of  the  upper 
river  flotilla.  To  wrest  the  control  of  the  Missis- 
sippi out  of  the  enemy's  hands,  by  reducing  his  po- 
sitions, was  the  great  aim  of  the  campaign  ;  until  that 
could  be  effected,  the  patrol  of  the  section  between 
Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson  would  materially  con- 
duce to  the  same  end. 

Over  this  Farragut  pondered  long  and  anxiously. 
He  clearly  recognized  the  advantage  of  this  service, 
but  he  also  knew  the  difficulties  involved  in   main- 


2q8  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

taining  his  necessary  communications,  and,  above 
all,  his  coal.  At  no  time  did  the  enemy  cease  their 
annoyance  from  the  river  banks.  Constant  brushes 
took  place  between  their  flying  batteries  and  the  dif- 
ferent gunboats  on  patrol  duty ;  a  kind  of  guerrilla 
warfare,  which  did  not  cease  even  with  the  fall  of 
Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson,  but  naturally  attained 
its  greatest  animation  during  the  months  when  their 
fate  was  hanging  in  the  balance.  The  gunboats 
could  repel  such  attacks,  though  they  were  often 
roughly  handled,  and  several  valuable  officers  lost 
their  lives;  but  not  being  able  to  pursue,  the  mere 
frustration  of  a  particular  attack  did  not  help  to 
break  up  a  system  of  very  great  annoyance.  Only 
a  force  able  to  follow — in  other  words,  troops — could 
suppress  the  evil.  "You  will  no  doubt  hear  more," 
the  admiral  writes  on  the  ist  of  February,  1863,  "  of 
'Why  don't  Farragut's  fleet  move  up  the  river?' 
Tell  them,  Because  the  army  is  not  ready.  Farragut 
waits  upon  Banks  as  to  when  or  where  he  will  go." 

Still,  even  while  thus  dancing  attendance  upon  a 
somewhat  dilatory  general,  his  plans  were  maturing; 
so  that  when  occasion  arose  he  was,  as  always,  ready 
for  immediate  action— had  no  unforeseen  decision  to 
make.  "  The  evening  of  the  day  (about  January 
20th)  that  I  reported  to  him  at  New  Orleans,"  writes 
Admiral  Jenkins,  "he  sent  everybody  out  of  the 
cabin,  and  said :  '  I  wish  to  have  some  confidential 
talk  with  you  upon  a  subject  which  I  have  had  in  mind 
for  a  long  time.  ...  I  have  never  hinted  it  to  any 
one,  nor  does  the  department  know  anything  of  my 
thoughts.  The  first  object  to  be  accomplished,  which 
led  me  to  think  seriously  about  it,  is  to  cripple  the 
Southern  armies  by  cutting  off  their  supplies  from 


THE   BLOCKADE   AND   PORT    HUDSON.       209 

Texas.  Texas  at  this  time  is,  and  must  continue  to 
.the  end  of  the  war  to  be,  their  main  dependence  for 
beef  cattle,  sheep,  and  Indian  corn.  If  we  can  get  a 
few  vessels  above  Port  Hudson  the  thing  will  not  be 
an  entire  failure,  and  I  am  pretty  confident  it  can  be 
done.'"  Jenkins  naturally  suggested  that  the  co- 
operation of  the  army  by  an  active  advance  at  the 
same  time  would  materially  assist  the  attempt.  To 
this,  of  course,  the  admiral  assented,  it  being  in  en- 
tire conformity  with  his  own  opinion ;  and  several 
interviews  were  held,  without,  however,  their  lead- 
ing to  any  definite  promise  on  the  part  of  General 
Banks. 

Meantime  Admiral  Porter,  who  after  leaving  the 
mortar  flotilla  had  been  appointed  to  the  command 
of  the  Mississippi  squadron,  with  the  rank  of  acting 
rear-admiral,  realized  as  forcibly  as  Farragut  the 
importance  of  placing  vessels  in  the  waters  between 
Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson.  In  the  middle  of  De- 
cember he  was  before  Vicksburg,  and  had  since  then 
been  actively  supporting  the  various  undertakings 
of  the  land  forces.  Three  days  after  Grant  joined 
the  army,  on  the  2d  of  February,  the  ram  Queen  of 
the  West  ran  the  Vicksburg  batteries  from  above, 
and  successfully  reached  the  river  below.  Ten  days 
later,  Porter  sent  on  one  of  his  newest  ironclads,  the 
Indianola,  which  made  the  same  passage  under  cover 
of  night  without  being  even  hit,  although  twenty 
minutes  under  fire.  The  latter  vessel  took  with  her 
two  coal  barges ;  and  as  the  experiment  had  already 
been  successfully  tried  of  casting  coal  barges  loose 
above  the  batteries,  and  trusting  to  the  current  to 
carry  them  down  to  the  Queen  of  the  West,  the 
question  of   supplies  was   looked  upon   as   settled. 


2i0  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

The  Indianola  was  very  heavily  armed,  and  both  the 
admiral  and  her  commander  thought  her  capable  of 
meeting  any  force  the  enemy  could  send  against  her. 

Unfortunately,  on  the  14th  of  February,  two  days 
only  after  the  Indianola  got  down,  the  Queen  of  the 
West  was  run  ashore  under  a  battery  and  allowed  to 
fall  alive  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  The  latter  at 
once  repaired  the  prize,  and,  when  ready,  started  in 
pursuit  of  the  Indianola  with  it  and  two  other  steamers ; 
one  of  which  was  a  ram,  the  other  a  cotton-protected 
boat  filled  with  riflemen.  There  was  also  with  them 
a  tender,  which  does  not  appear  to  have  taken  part 
in  the  fight.  On  the  night  of  February  24th  the  pur- 
suers overtook  the  Indianola,  and  a  sharp  action 
ensued ;  but  the  strength  of  the  current  and  her  own 
unwieldiness  placed  the  United  States  vessel  at  a 
disadvantage,  which  her  superior  armament  did  not,  in 
the  dim  light,  counterbalance.  She  was  rammed  six 
or  seven  times,  and,  being  then  in  a  sinking  condition, 
her  commander  ran  her  on  the  bank  and  surrendered. 
This  put  an  end  to  Porter's  attempts  to  secure  that 
part  of  the  river  by  a  detachment.  The  prospect, 
that  had  been  fair  enough  when  the  Queen  of  the 
West  was  sent  down,  was  much  marred  by  the  loss 
of  that  vessel ;  and  the  subsequent  capture  of  the  In- 
dianola transferred  so  much  power  into  the  hands  of 
the  Confederates,  that  control  could  only  be  con- 
tested by  a  force  which  he  could  not  then  afford  to 
risk. 

The  up-river  squadron  having  failed  to  secure  the 
coveted  command  of  the  river,  and,  besides,  trans- 
ferred to  the  enemy  two  vessels  which  might  become 
very  formidable,  Farragut  felt  that  the  time  had  come 
when  he  not  only  might  but  ought  to  move.     He 


THE   BLOCKADE  AND   PORT   HUDSON.      21 1 

was  growing  more  and  more  restless,  more  and  more 
discontented  with  his  own  inactivity,  when  such"  an 
important  work  was  waiting  to  be  done.     The  news 
of  the  Queen  of  the  West's  capture  made  him  still 
more  uneasy ;  but  when  that  was  followed  by  the  loss 
of  the   Indianola,  his   decision  was  taken  at  once. 
"The  time  has  come,"  he  said  to  Captain  Jenkins; 
" there  can  be  no  more  delay.     I  must  go— army  or 
no  army."     Another  appeal,  however,  was  made  to 
Banks,  representing  the  assistance  which  the  squadron 
would  derive  in  its  attempt  to  pass  the  batteries  from 
a  demonstration  made  by  the  army.     The  permanent 
works  at  Port  Hudson  then  mounted  nineteen  heavy 
cannon,  many  of  them  rifled  ;  but  there  were  reported 
to  be  in  addition  as  many  as  thirty-five  field-pieces, 
which,  at  the  distance  the  fleet  would  have  to  pass, 
would  be  very  effective.    If  the  army  made  a  serious 
diversion  in  the  rear,  many  of  these  would  be  with- 
drawn, especially  if  Farragut's  purpose   to  run  by 
did  not  transpire.     The  advantage  to  be  gained  by 
this  naval  enterprise  was  so  manifest  that  the  gen- 
eral could  scarcely  refuse,  and  he  promised  to  make 
the  required  demonstration  with  eight  or  ten  thou- 
sand troops. 

On  the  1 2th  of  March,  within  a  fortnight  after 
hearing  of  the  Indianola  affair,  Farragut  was  off 
Baton  Rouge.  On  the  14th  he  anchored  just  above 
Profit's  Island,  seven  miles  below  Port  Hudson, 
where  were  already  assembled  a  number  of  the  mor- 
tar schooners,  under  the  protection  of  the  ironclad 
Essex,  formerly  of  the  upper  squadron.  The  ad- 
miral brought  with  him  seven  vessels,  for  the  most 
part  essentially  fighting  ships,  unfitted  for  blockade 
duty  by  their  indifferent  speed,  but  carrying  heavy 


2I2  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

batteries.  If  the  greater  part  got  by,  they  would 
present  a  force  calculated  to  clear  the  river  of  every 
hostile  steamer  and  absolutely  prevent  any  consider- 
able amount  of  supplies  being  transferred  from  one 
shore  to  the  other. 

For  the  purpose  of  this  passage  Farragut  adopted 
a  somewhat  novel  tactical  arrangement,  which  he 
again  used  at  Mobile,  and  which  presents  particular 
advantages  when  there  are  enemies  only  on  one  side 
to  be  engaged.  Three  of  his  vessels  were  screw 
steamers  of  heavy  tonnage  and  battery  ;  three  others 
comparatively  light.  He  directed,  therefore,  that 
each  of  the  former  should  take  one  of  the  latter  on 
the  side  opposite  to  the  enemy,  securing  her  well 
aft,  in  order  to  have  as  many  guns  as  possible,  on 
the  unengaged  side,  free  for  use  in  case  of  necessity. 
In  this  way  the  smaller  vessels  were  protected  with- 
out sacrificing  the  offensive  power  of  the  larger. 
Not  only  so ;  in  case  of  injury  to  the  boilers  or  en- 
gines of  one,  it  was  hoped  that  those  of  her  consort 
might  pull  her  through.  To  equalize  conditions,  to 
the  slowest  of  the  big  ships  was  given  the  most 
powerful  of  the  smaller  ones.  A  further  advantage 
was  obtained  in  this  fight,  as  at  Mobile,  from  this 
arrangement  of  the  vessels  in  pairs,  which  will  be 
mentioned  at  the  time  of  its  occurrence.  The  sev- 
enth ship  at  Port  Hudson,  the  Mississippi,  was  a  very 
large  side-wheel  steamer.  On  account  of  the  incon- 
venience presented  by  the  guards  of  her  wheel- 
houses,  she  was  chosen  as  the  odd  one  to  whom  no 
consort  was  assigned 

Going  up  the  river  toward  Port  Hudson  the  course 
is  nearly  north  ;  then  abend  is  reached  of  over  ninety 
degrees,  so  that  after  making  the  turn  the  course 


Order  of  Attack  on  Batteries  at  Port  Hudson-,  March  14,  1863. 

A.  Hartford  (flagship),  Captain  James  S.  Palmer,    a.  Albatross.  Lieut.-Com.  John 

E.  Hart.  B.  Richmond,  Commander  James  Alden.  b.  Genesee.  Commander  W.  H.  Ma- 
comb. C.  Monongahela,  Captain  J.  P.  McKinstry.  c.  Kineo,  Lieut.-Com.  John  Waters. 
D.  Mississippi.  Captain  Melancton  Smith.    E.  Essex,  Commander  C.  H.  B.  Caldwell. 

F.  Sachem,  Act.  Vol.  Lieut.  Amos  Johnson.  O.  (J.  Mortar  schooners.  H.  Spot  where 
Mississippi  grounded. 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND   PORT   HUDSON.      213 

for  some  distance  is  west-southwest.  The  town  is 
on  the  east  side,  just  below  the  bend.  From  it  the 
batteries  extended  a  mile  and  a  half  down  the  river, 
upon  bluffs  from  eighty  to  a  hundred  feet  high. 
Between  the  two  reaches,  and  opposite  to  the  town, 
is  a  low,  narrow  point,  from  which  a  very  dangerous 
shoal  makes  out.  The  channel  runs  close  to  the  east 
bank. 

The  squadron  remained  at  its  anchorage  above 
Profit's  Island  but  a  few  hours,  waiting  for  the  cover 
of  night.  Shortly  before  10  p.  m.  it  got  under  way, 
ranged  as  follows :  Hartford,  Richmond,  Mononga- 
hela,  each  with  her  consort  lashed  alongside,  the 
Mississippi  bringing  up  the  rear.  Just  as  they  were 
fairly  starting  a  steamer  was  seen  approaching  from 
down  the  river,  flaring  lights  and  making  the  loud 
puffing  of  the  high-pressure  engines.  The  flag-ship 
slowed  down,  and  the  new  arrival  came  alongside 
with  a  message  from  the  general  that  the  army  was 
then  encamped  about  five  miles  in  rear  of  the  Port 
Hudson  batteries.  Irritated  by  a  delay,  which  served 
only  to  attract  the  enemy's  attention  and  to  assure 
himself  that  no  diversion  was  to  be  expected  from 
the  army,  the  admiral  was  heard  to  mutter:  "He 
had  as  well  be  in  New  Orleans  or  at  Baton  Rouge  for 
all  the  good  he  is  doing  us."  At  the  same  moment 
the  east  bank  of  the  river  was  lit  up,  and  on  the  op- 
posite point  huge  bonfires  kindled  to  illumine  the 
scene — a  wise  precaution,  the  neglect  of  which  by 
the  enemy  had  much  favored  the  fleet  in  the  passage 
of  the  lower  forts. 

The  ships  now  moved  on  steadily,  but  very 
slowly,  owing  to  the  force  of  the  current.  At  11 
p.  m.   the  Hartford  had   already   passed   the   lower 


214  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

batteries,  when  the  enemy  threw  up  rockets  and 
opened  fire.  This  was  returned  not  only  by  the  ad- 
vancing ships,  but  also  by  the  ironclad  Essex  and 
the  mortar  schooners,  which  had  been  stationed  to 
cover  the  passage.  The  night  was  calm  and  damp, 
and  the  cannonade  soon  raised  a  dense  smoke  which 
settled  heavily  upon  the  water,  covering  the  ships 
from  sight,  but  embarrassing  their  movements  far 
more  than  it  disconcerted  the  aim  of  their  opponents. 
The  flag-ship,  being  in  the  advance,  drew  somewhat 
ahead  of  the  smoke,  although  even  she  had  from 
time  to  time  to  stop  firing  to  enable  the  pilot  to  see. 
Her  movements  were  also  facilitated  by  placing  the 
pilot  in  the  mizzen-top,  with  a  speaking  tube  to  com- 
municate with  the  deck,  a  precaution  to  which  the 
admiral  largely  attributed  her  safety  ;  but  the  vessels 
in  the  rear  found  it  impossible  to  see,  and  groped 
blindly,  feeling  their  way  after  their  leader.  Had 
the  course  to  be  traversed  been  a  straight  line,  the 
difficulty  would  have  been  much  less  ;  but  to  make 
so  sharp  a  turn  as  awaited  them  at  the  bend  was  no 
easy  feat  under  the  prevailing  obscurity.  As  the 
Hartford  attempted  it  the  downward  current  caught 
her  on  the  port  bow,  swung  her  head  round  toward 
the  batteries,  and  nearly  threw  her  on  shore,  her 
stem  touching  for  a  moment.  The  combined  powers 
of  her  own  engine  and  that  of  the  Albatross,  her  con- 
sort, were  then  brought  into  play  as  an  oarsman  uses 
the  oars  to  turn  his  boat,  pulling  one  and  backing  the 
other ;  that  of  the  Albatross  was  backed,  while  that 
of  the  Hartford  went  ahead  strong.  In  this  way  their 
heads  were  pointed  up  stream  and  they  went  through 
clear  ;  but  they  were  the  only  ones  who  effected  the 
passage. 


THE   BLOCKADE   AND   PORT    HUDSON.       215 

The  Richmond,  which  followed  next,  had  reached 
the   bend    and    was   about    to  turn    when  a    plung- 
ing shot  upset  both  safety  valves,  allowing  so  much 
steam   to    escape    that    the   engines   could    not    be 
efficiently  worked.     Thinking  that  the  Genesee,  her 
companion,  could  not  alone  pull   the  two  vessels  by, 
the  captain  of   the    Richmond   turned   and    carried 
them  both  down   stream.     The   Monongahela,  third 
in  the  line,  ran  on  the  shoal   opposite  to  the   town 
with    so    much    violence    that    the    gunboat    Kineo, 
alongside   of   her,   tore    loose    from  the    fastenings. 
The  Monongahela  remained  aground  for  twenty-five 
minutes,  when  the  Kineo  succeeded   in  getting  her 
off.     She  then  attempted  again  to  run  the  batteries, 
but  when  near  the  turn  a  crank-pin   became  heated 
and  the  engines  stopped.    Being  now  unmanageable, 
she  drifted  down  stream  and  out  of  action,  having 
lost  six  killed  and  twenty-one  wounded.     The  Mis- 
sissippi also  struck  on  the  shoal,  close  to  the  bend, 
when  she  was  going    very  fast,   and    defied    every 
effort  to  get  her  off.     After  working  for  thirty-five 
minutes,  finding  that  the  other  ships  had  passed  off 
the  scene  leaving  her  unsupported,  while  three  bat- 
teries   had    her   range   and    were    hulling  her    con- 
stantly,  the  commanding  officer  ordered  her  to  be 
set  on  fire.     The  three  boats  that  alone   were    left 
capable  of  floating  were  used    to  land  the  crew  on 
the  west  bank ;  the   sick  and  wounded    being   first 
taken,  the  captain  and  first   lieutenant   leaving  the 
ship    last.     She    remained    aground    and    in    flames 
until  three   in  the    morning,  when    she   floated  and 
drifted  down  stream,  fortunately  going  clear  of  the 
vessels  below.     At  half-past  five  she  blew  up.    Out 
of   a  ship's  company  of  two   hundred  and  ninety- 


2I5  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT 

seven,  sixty-four  were  found  missing,  of  whom 
twenty-five  were  believed  to  be  killed. 

In  his  dispatch  to  the  Navy  Department,  written 
the  second  day  after  this  affair,  the  admiral  lamented 
that  he  had  again  to  report  disaster  to  a  part  of 
his  command.  A  disaster  indeed  it  was,  but  not  of 
the  kind  which  he  had  lately  had  to  communicate, 
and  to  which  the  word  "  again  "  seems  to  refer  ;  for 
there  was  no  discredit  attending  it.  The  stern 
resolution  with  which  the  Hartford  herself  was 
handled,  and  the  steadiness  with  which  she  and  her 
companion  were  wrenched  out  of  the  very  jaws  of 
destruction,  offer  a  consummate  example  of  profes- 
sional conduct ;  while  the  fate  of  the  Mississippi,  de- 
plorable as  the  loss  of  so  fine  a  vessel  was,  gave  rise 
to  a  display  of  that  coolness  and  efficiency  in  the 
face  of  imminent  danger  which  illustrate  the  annals 
of  a  navy  as  nobly  as  do  the  most  successful  deeds  of 
heroism. 

Nevertheless,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  failure 
to  pass  the  batteries,  by  nearly  three  fourths  of  the 
force  which  the  admiral  had  thought  necessary  to 
take  with  him,  constituted  a  very  serious  check  to 
the  operations  he  had  projected.  From  Port  Hud- 
son to  Vicksburg  is  over  two  hundred  miles  ;  and 
while  the  two  ships  he  still  had  were  sufficient  to 
blockade  the  mouth  of  the  Red  River— the  chief  line 
by  which  supplies  reached  the  enemy — they  could  not 
maintain  over  the  entire  district  the  watchfulness 
necessary  wholly  to  intercept  communication  between 
the  two  shores.  Neither  could  they  for  the  briefest 
period  abandon  their  station  at  the  river's  mouth, 
without  affording  an  opportunity  to  the  enemy  ;  who 
was  rendered  vigilant  by  urgent  necessities  which 


THE   BLOCKADE   AND   PORT    HUDSON. 


217 


forced  him  to  seize  every  opening  for  the  passage  of 
stores.  From  the  repulse  of  five  out  of  the  seven 
ships  detailed  for  the  control  of  the  river,  it  resulted 
that  the  enemy's  communications,  on  a  line  abso- 
lutely vital  to  him,  and  consequently  of  supreme 
strategic  importance,  were  impeded  only,  not  broken 
off.  It  becomes,  therefore,  of  interest  to  inquire 
whether  this  failure  can  be  attributed  to  any  over- 
sight or  mistake  in  the  arrangements  made  for  forc- 
ing the  passage — in  the  tactical  dispositions,  to  use 
the  technical  phrase.  In  this,  as  in  every  case,  those 
dispositions  should  be  conformed  to  the  object  to  be 
attained  and  to  the  obstacles  which  must  be  over- 
come. 

The  purpose  which  the  admiral  had  in  view  was 
clearly  stated  in  the  general  order  issued  to  his  cap- 
tains :  "  The  captains  will  bear  in  mind  that  the  ob- 
ject is  to  run  the  batteries  at  the  least  possible  damage  to 
our  ships,  and  thereby  secure  an  efficient  force  above, 
for  the  purpose  of  rendering  such  assistance  as  may 
be  required  of  us  to  the  army  at  Vicksburg,  or,  if  not 
required  there,  to  our  army  at  Baton  Rouge."  Such 
was  the  object,  and  the  obstacles  to  its  accomplish- 
ment were  twofold,  viz.,  those  arising  from  the  diffi- 
culties of  the  navigation,  and  those  due  to  the  prep- 
arations of  the  enemy.  To  overcome  them,  it  was 
necessary  to  provide  a  sufficient  force,  and  to  dis- 
pose that  force  in  the  manner  best  calculated  to  in- 
sure the  passage,  as  well  as  to  entail  the  least  ex- 
posure. Exposure  is  measured  by  three  principal 
elements — the  size  and  character  of  the  target  offered, 
the  length  of  time  under  fire,  and  the  power  of  the 
enemy's  guns ;  and  the  last,  again,  depends  not 
merely  upon  the  number  and  size  of  the  guns,  but 


2I8  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

also  upon  the  fire  with  which  they  are  met.  In  this 
same  general  order  Farragut  enunciated,  in  terse  and 
vigorous  terms,  a  leading  principle  in  warfare,  which 
there  is  now  a  tendency  to  undervalue,  in  the 
struggle  to  multiply  gun-shields  and  other  defensive 
contrivances.  It  is  with  no  wish  to  disparage  de- 
fensive preparations,  nor  to  ignore  that  ships  must 
be  able  to  bear  as  well  as  to  give  hard  knocks,  that 
this  phrase  of  Farragut's,  embodying  the  experience 
of  war  in  all  ages  and  the  practice  of  all  great  cap- 
tains, is  here  recalled,  "  The  best  protection  against 
the  enemy's  fire  is  a  well-directed  fire  from  our  own 
guns." 

The  disposition  adopted  for  the  squadron  was 
chiefly  a  development  of  this  simple  principle,  com- 
bined with  an  attempt  to  form  the  ships  in  such  an 
order  as  should  offer  the  least  favorable  target  to 
the  enemy.  A  double  column  of  ships,  if  it  presents 
to  the  enemy  a  battery  formidable  enough  to  subdue 
his  fire,  in  whole  or  in  part,  shows  a  smaller  target 
than  the  same  number  disposed  in  a  single  column ; 
because  the  latter  order  will  be  twice  as  long  in 
passing,  with  no  greater  display  of  gun-power  at  a 
particular  point.  The  closer  the  two  columns  are  to- 
gether, the  less  chance  there  is  that  a  shot  flying 
over  the  nearer  ship  will  strike  one  abreast  her ; 
therefore,  when  the  two  are  lashed  side  by  side  this 
risk  is  least,  and  at  the  same  time  the  near  ship  pro- 
tects the  off  one  from  the  projectile  that  strikes  her- 
self. These  remarks  would  apply,  in  degree,  if  all  the 
ships  of  the  squadron  had  had  powerful  batteries ; 
the  limitation  being  only  that  enough  guns  must  be 
in  the  near  or  fighting  column  to  support  each  other, 
and  to  prevent  several  of  the  enemy's  batteries  being 


THE   BLOCKADE   AND   PORT    HUDSON.      219 

concentrated  on  a  single  ship— a  contingency  depend- 
ent upon  the  length  of  the  line  of  hostile  guns  to  be 
passed.  But  when,  as  at  Port  Hudson,  several  of  the 
vessels  are  of  feeble  gun-power,  so  that  their  pres- 
ence in  the  fighting  column  would  not  re-enforce  its 
fire  to  an  extent  at  all  proportionate  to  the  risk  to 
themselves,  the  arrangement  there  adopted  is  doubly 
efficacious. 

The  dispositions  to  meet  and  overcome  the  dif- 
ficulties imposed  by  the  enemy's  guns  amounted, 
therefore,  to  concentrating  upon  them  the  batteries 
of  the  heavy  ships,  supporting  each  other,  and  at  the 
same  time  covering  the  passage  of  a  second  column 
of  gunboats,  which  was  placed  in  the  most  favorable 
position  for  escaping  injury.  In  principle  the  plan 
was  the  same  as  at  New  Orleans — the  heavy  ships 
fought  while  the  light  were  to  slip  by  ;  but  in  appli- 
cation, the  circumstances  at  the  lower  forts  would 
not  allow  one  battery  to  be  masked  as  at  Port  Hud- 
son, because  there  were  enemy's  works  on  both  sides. 
For  meeting  the  difficulties  of  the  navigation  on  this 
occasion,  Farragut  seems  not  to  have  been  pleased 
with  the  arrangement  adopted.  "  With  the  excep- 
tion of  the  assistance  they  might  have  rendered  the 
ships,  if  disabled,  they  were  a  great  disadvantage," 
he  wrote.  The  exception,  however,  is  weighty  ;  and, 
taken  in  connection  with  his  subsequent  use  of  the 
same  order  at  Mobile,  it  may  be  presumed  the  sen- 
tence quoted  was  written  under  the  momentary 
recollection  of  some  inconvenience  attending  this 
passage.  Certainly,  with  single-screw  vessels,  as 
were  all  his  fleet,  it  was  an  inestimable  advantage, 
in  intricate  navigation  or  in  close  quarters,  to  have 
the  help  of  a  second  screw  working  in  opposition  to 


220  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

the  first,  to  throw  the  ship  round  at  a  critical  instant. 
In  the  supreme  moment  of  his  military  life,  at  Mobile, 
he  had  reason  to  appreciate  this  advantage,  which  he 
there,  as  here,  most  intelligently  used. 

Thus  analyzed,  there  is  found  no  ground  for  ad- 
verse criticism  in  the  tactical  dispositions  made  by 
Farragut  on  this  memorable  occasion.  The  strong 
points  of  his  force  were  utilized  and  properly  com- 
bined for  mutual  support,  and  for  the  covering  of 
the  weaker  elements,  which  received  all  the  protec- 
tion possible  to  give  them.  Minor  matters  of  detail 
were  well  thought  out,  such  as  the  assignment  to  the 
more  powerful  ship  of  the  weaker  gunboat,  and  the 
position  in  which  the  small  vessels  were  to  be  se- 
cured alongside.  The  motto  that  "  the  best  protection 
against  the  enemy's  fire  is  a  well-directed  fire  by  our 
own  guns  "  was  in  itself  an  epitome  of  the  art  of 
war  ;  and  in  pursuance  of  it  the  fires  of  the  mortar 
schooners  and  of  the  Essex  were  carefully  combined 
by  the  admiral  with  that  of  the  squadron.  Com- 
mander Caldwell,  of  the  Essex,  an  exceedingly  cool 
and  intelligent  officer,  reported  that  "the  effect  of 
the  mortar  fire  (two  hundred  bombs  being  thrown  in 
one  hundred  and  fifty  minutes,  from  eleven  to  half- 
past  one)  seemed  to  be  to  paralyze  the  efforts  of  the 
enemy  at  the  lower  batteries  ;  and  we  observed  that 
their  fire  was  quite  feeble  compared  to  that  of  the 
upper  batteries."  Nor  had  the  admiral  fallen  into 
the  mistake  of  many  general  officers,  in  trusting  too 
lightly  to  the  comprehension  of  his  orders  by  his 
subordinates.  Appreciating  at  once  the  high  impor- 
tance of  the  object  he  sought  to  compass,  and  the 
very  serious  difficulties  arising  from  the  enemy's  po- 
sition at  Port  Hudson  and  the  character  of  the  navi- 


THE   BLOCKADE   AND   PORT   HUDSON.      22I 

gation,  he  had  personally  inspected  the  ships  of  his 
command  the  day  before  the  action,  and  satisfied 
himself  that  the  proper  arrangements  had  been  made 
for  battle.  His  general  order  had  already  been 
given  to  each  commanding  officer,  and  he  adds : 
"  We  conversed  freely  as  to  the  arrangements,  and  I 
found  that  all  my  instructions  were  well  understood 
and,  I  believe,  concurred  in  by  all.  After  a  free 
interchange  of  opinions  on  the  subject,  every  com- 
mander arranged  his  ship  in  accordance  with  his  own 
ideas." 

In  this  point  the  admiral  appears  to  have  made 
a  mistake,  in  not  making  obligatory  one  detail 
which  he  employed  on  board  the  flag-ship.  "  I  had 
directed  a  trumpet  fixed  from  the  mizzen-top  to  the 
wheel  on  board  this  ship,  as  I  intended  the  pilot  to 
take  his  station  in  the  top,  so  that  he  might  see  over 
the  fog,  or  smoke,  as  the  case  might  be.  To  this 
idea,  and  to  the  coolness  and  courage  of  my  pilot, 
Mr.  Carrell,  I  am  indebted  for  the  safe  passage  of 
this  ship  past  the  forts."  It  may  be  that  the  admiral 
counted  upon  the  vessels  being  so  closed  up  that  the 
flag-ship  would  practically  serve  as  the  pilot  for  all. 
If  so,  he  reckoned  without  his  host,  and  in  this  small 
oversight  or  error  in  judgment  is  possibly  to  be  found 
a  weak  point  in  his  preparations  ;  but  it  is  the  only 
one.  The  failure  of  the  Richmond,  his  immediate 
follower,  was  not  in  any  way  due  to  pilotage,  but  to 
the  loss  of  steam  by  an  accidental  shot ;  and  it  is 
still  a  matter  of  doubt  whether  the  Genesee,  her  con- 
sort, might  not  have  pulled  her  by.  The  third  in  the 
order,  the  Monongahela,  also  failed  finally  from  the 
heating  of  a  bearing;  but  as  this  occurred  after 
being  aground  for  half  an  hour,  with  the  vigorous 


222  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

working  of  the  engines  that  naturally  ensues  under 
such  circumstances,  it  seems  as  if  her  failure  must 
ultimately  be  traced  to  the  smoke.  "The  firing  had 
so  filled  the  atmosphere  with  smoke,"  wrote  her  cap- 
tain, "  as  to  prevent  distinguishing  objects  near  by." 
The  loss  of  the  Mississippi  was  due  entirely  to  an 
error  of  the  pilot,  whatever  may  have  been  the 
cause. 

The  effect  of  the  appearance  above  Port  Hudson 
of  the  Hartford  and  Albatross  is  abundantly  testified 
in  the  correspondence  of  the  day,  both  Union  and 
Confederate,  and  justifies  beyond  dispute  this  fine 
conception  of  Farragut's  and  the  great  risk  which  he 
took  entirely  upon  his  own  responsibility.  He  found, 
indeed,  a  ground  for  his  action  in  an  order  of  the 
Department  dated  October  2,  1862,*  directing  him 
"  to  guard  the  lower  part  of  the  Mississippi,  es- 
pecially where  it  is  joined  by  the  Red   River,"  until 

*  The  full  text  of  this  order  was  as  follows.  It  committed  the 
department  to  nothing. 

"  Navy  Department,  October  2,  1862. 
"Sir:  While  the  Mississippi  River  continues  to  be  blockaded 
at  Vicksburg,  and  until  you  learn  from  Commander  D.  D.  Porter, 
who  will  be  in  command  of  the  Mississippi  squadron,  that  he  has, 
in  conjunction  with  the  army,  opened  the  river,  it  will  be  necessary 
for  you  to  guard  the  lower  part  of  that  river,  especially  where  it  is 
joined  by  the  Red  River,  the  source  of  many  of  the  supplies  of  the 
enemy.  I  am  respectfully,  etc., 

"Gideon  Welles, 

"  Secretary  of  the  Navy." 

That  five  months  elapsed  between  the  date  of  this  order  and 
Farragut's  action,  without  anything  more  definite,  shows  clearly 
that  the  department  took  no  responsibility.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
is  right  to  say  that  it  showed  a  generous  appreciation  of  the  effort, 
and  did  not  complain  about  the  losses. 


THE  BLOCKADE  AND   PORT   HUDSON.      223 

he  heard  from  Admiral  Porter  that  the  latter,  in  con- 
junction with  the  army,  had  opened  the  river;  but 
he  distrusted  the  consent  of  the  Secretary  to  his 
running  the  great  risk   involved  in  the  passage  of 
Port  Hudson.     As  Grant  was  ordered  to  take  Vicks- 
burg,  so  was  Farragut  ordered  to  blockade  the  Red 
River ;  and  as  Grant  did  not  notify  the  commander- 
in-chief  of  his  final  great  resolve  to  cut  loose  from 
his  base,  until  it  was  too  late  to  stop  him,  so  did 
Farragut  keep  within  his  own  breast  a  resolve  upon 
which  he   feared  an  interdict.     For  even  after  two 
years  of  war   the  department  was   embarrassed  for 
ships,  and  the  policy  of  economy,  of  avoiding  risks, 
the  ever  fatal  policy  of  a  halting  warfare,  was  forced 
upon  it— an  impressive  illustration  of  the  effect  ex- 
erted by  inadequate  preparation  upon  the  operations 
of  war.     For  lack  of  ships,  Mobile  was  in  1863   still 
in  the  hands  of  the  enemy.     "I  would  have  had  it 
long  since  or  been  thrashed  out  of  it,"  wrote  Farra- 
gut six  weeks  before  Port  Hudson.    "  I  feel  no  fears 
on  the  subject ;  but  they  do  not  wish  their  ships  risked, 
for  fear  we  might  not  be  able  to  hold  the  Mississippi:' 
A  similar  reluctance  might  be  anticipated  to  expose 
such  valuable  vessels  as  attacked  Port  Hudson,  when 
their  loss  was  so  hard  to  repair;  for  only  men  of  the 
temper  of  Farragut  or  Grant — men  with  a  natural 
genius  for  war  or  enlightened  by  their  knowledge  of 
the  past — can  fully  commit  themselves  to  the  hazard 
of  a  great  adventure — can  fully  realize  that  a  course 
of  timid  precaution  may  entail  the  greatest  of  risks. 
"  Your   services  at  Red  River,"   wrote  Admiral 
Porter  to  Farragut  upon  hearing  of  his  arrival  above 
Port  Hudson,  "will  be  a  godsend  ;  it  is  worth  to  us 
the  loss  of  the  "Mississippi,"  and  is  at  this  moment 


224  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

the  severest  blow  that  could  be  struck  at  the  South. 
They  obtain  all  their  supplies  and  ammunition  in 
that  way.  .  .  .  The  great  object  is  to  cut  off  supplies. 
For  that  reason  I  sent  down  the  Queen  of  the  West 
and  the  Indianola.  I  regret  that  the  loss  of  the 
Indianola  should  have  been  the  cause  of  your  present 
position."  These  utterances,  which  bespeak  the  re- 
lief afforded  him  at  the  moment  by  Farragut's  bold 
achievement,  are  confirmed  by  the  words  written 
many  years  later  in  his  History  of  the  Navy.  "Far- 
ragut  in  the  Hartford,  with  the  Albatross,  reached 
the  mouth  of  the  Red  River,  and  Port  Hudson  was 
as  completely  cut  off  from  supplies  as  if  fifty  gun- 
boats were  there.  ...  It  was  soon  seen  that  the  ob- 
ject aimed  at  had  been  gained — the  works  at  Port 
Hudson  were  cut  off  from  supplies  and  the  fate  of 
the  garrison  sealed."  "  I  look  upon  it  as  of  vast 
importance,"  wrote  General  Grant,  "  that  we  should 
hold  the  river  securely  between  Vicksburg  and  Port 
Hudson  "  ;  and  he  undertook  to  contribute  anything 
that  the  army  could  furnish  to  enable  vessels  from 
above  to  run  by  Vicksburg,  and  so  supply  to  Farra- 
gut  the  numbers  he  needed  through  the  repulse  of 
his  own  ships. 

"  The  Mississippi  is  again  cut  off,"  wrote  to 
Richmond  the  Confederate  General  Pemberton,  who 
commanded  the  district  in  which  are  Vicksburg 
and  Port  Hudson,  "  neither  subsistence  nor  ord- 
nance can  come  or  go " ;  and  the  following  day, 
March  20th,  the  sixth  after  Farragut's  passage, 
he  sends  word  to  General  Richard  Taylor,  on  the 
west  shore,  "  Port  Hudson  depends  almost  entirely 
for  supplies  upon  the  other  side  of  the  river." 
"  Great  God  !  how  unfortunate  !  "  writes,  on   March 


THE   BLOCKADE   AND   PORT   HUDSON. 


225 


17th,  a  Confederate  commissary  in  Taylor's  depart- 
ment. "  Four  steamers  arrived  to-day  from  Shreve- 
port.  One  had  300,000  pounds  of  bacon ;  three 
others  are  reported  coming  down  with  loads.  Five 
others  are  below  with  full  cargoes  designed  for  Port 
Hudson,  but  it  is  reported  that  the  Federal  gunboats 
are  blockading  the  river."  As  to  passing  by  other 
points,  "  it  is  doubtful  whether  many  cattle  ever  get 
through  the  swamps  and  bayous  through  which  they 
are  required  to  pass  on  this  side.  As  the  water  de- 
clines, I  think  likely  cattle  in  large  quantities  can  be 
crossed  by  swimming,  but  at  present  your  prospect  of 
getting  supplies  from  this  side  is  gloomy  e  no  ugh."  "Early 
in  February,"  writes  Pemberton  again,  "  the  enemy 
succeeded  in  passing  two  of  his  gunboats  by  our 
batteries  at  Vicksburg  "  (the  Indianola  and  Queen  of 
the  West).  "  This  at  once  rendered  the  navigation  of 
the  Mississippi  and  Red  River  dangerous,  and  from 
that  time  it  was  only  by  watching  opportunities,  and 
at  great  risk  of  capture,  that  supplies  could  be 
thrown  into  Port  Hudson  and  Vicksburg.  Never- 
theless, large  amounts  were  successfully  introduced 
into  both  places." 

This  success,  partial  as  it  was,  was  due,  first,  to 
the  capture  of  Porter's  detachment,  which  opened  the 
river  again  until  Farragut  came  ;  and,  secondly,  to  the 
repulse  of  so  large  a  portion  of  the  latter's  squadron. 
The  Hartford  and  Albatross,  though  they  could  close 
the  Red  River,  could  not  multiply  themselves  to  cover 
the  great  stretch  which  the  admiral  had  purposed  to 
occupy  with  seven  vessels.  Neither  was  the  Albatross 
of  sufficient  force  to  be  left  by  herself  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Red  River.  Farragut  therefore  moved  slowly 
up  the  Mississippi,  destroying  a  quantity  of  stores 


226  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

accumulated  upon  the  levees  awaiting  transportation, 
as  well  as  a  number  of  flat-boats;  and  on  the  after- 
noon of  the  19th  of  March  he  anchored  twelve  miles 
below  Vicksburg.  The  following  day  he  moved  fur- 
ther up  and  communicated  with  General  Grant,  in- 
forming him  of  the  events  that  had  just  befallen  him 
and  offering  any  assistance  in  the  power  of  the  two 
ships.  If  not  needed,  he  purposed  returning  to  Red 
River,  and  asked  for  coal  from  either  army  or  navy. 
Porter  was  then  absent  on  the  Deer  Creek  expedi- 
tion, an  attempt  to  get  the  Mississippi  gunboats 
through  the  bayou  of  that  name  into  the  Yazoo; 
whereby,  if  successful,  the  Confederate  position  at 
Vicksburg  would  be  turned.  Grant  accordingly  un- 
dertook to  send  down  coal,  which  was  done  by  turn- 
ing adrift  in  the  current  of  the  Mississippi  a  barge 
carrying  some  four  hundred  tons.  This  floated  by 
night  clear  of  the  enemy's  positions,  and  was  picked 
up  by  boats  from  the  Hartford. 

Farragut  had  written  to  Porter  of  his  wish  to  re- 
ceive some  vessels  from  above,  specifying  two  rams 
and  an  ironclad,  with  which  and  his  own  two  vessels 
he  could  better  carry  out  his  purpose  of  closing  the 
whole  stretch  in  which  he  was.  He  intimated  this  wish 
to  Grant,  who  highly  approved  of  it.  "I  see  by 
Southern  papers  received  yesterday,"  he  wrote  to  Far- 
ragut, "  that  Vicksburg  must  depend  upon  Louisiana, 
or  west  of  the  Mississippi,  for  supplies.  Holding  Red 
River  from  them  is  a  great  step  in  the  direction  of  pre- 
venting this,  but  it  will  not  entirely  accomplish  the 
object.  New  Carthage  (twenty  miles  below  Vicks- 
burg, on  the  west  bank)  should  be  held,  and  it  seems 
to  me  that  in  addition  we  should  have  sufficient  ves- 
sels below  to  patrol  the  whole  river  from  Warrenton 


THE   BLOCKADE   AND   PORT    HUDSON.      227 

(ten  miles  below  Vicksburg)  to  the  Red  River.  I  will 
have  a  consultation  with  Admiral  Porter  on  this  sub- 
ject. I  am  happy  to  say  the  admiral  and  myself 
have  never  yet  disagreed  upon  any  policy."  In  the 
absence  of  Porter,  General  Ellet  determined  to  send 
down  two  of  the  Ellet  rams,  which  made  their  dash 
on  the  morning  of  March  25,  displaying  all  the  dar- 
ing, but  unfortunately  also  much  of  the  recklessness, 
which  characterized  that  remarkable  family.  Start- 
ing near  dawn,  on  a  singularly  clear  night,  they  were 
surprised  by  daylight  still  under  fire.  One,  being 
very  rotten,  was  shattered  to  pieces  by  a  shell  ex- 
ploding her  boilers.  The  other  was  disabled,  also 
by  a  shell  in  the  boilers,  but,  being  stronger,  drifted 
down  with  the  current  and  reached  Farragut  safely. 
She  was  soon  repaired,  and  was  an  addition  to  his 
force. 

While  lying  below  Vicksburg  the  admiral  trans- 
ferred to  Porter's  care,  for  passage  north  by  the 
Mississippi  River,  his  son  and  only  child,  who  had 
been  with  him  since  the  summer  stay  in  Pensacola. 
They  had  passed  the  batteries  at  Port  Hudson  to- 
gether, the  bearing  of  the  boy  in  that  hot  contest 
approving  itself  to  the  father,  who,  despite  his  anx- 
iety, could  not  bring  himself  to  accept  the  surgeon's 
suggestion  to  send  him  below,  out  of  harm's  way. 
"  I  am  trying  to  make  up  my  mind  to  part  with 
Loyall,"  he  wrote  to  his  wife,  "  and  to  let  him  go 
home  by  way  of  Cairo.  I  am  too  devoted  a  father 
to  have  my  son  with  me  in  troubles  of  this  kind. 
The  anxieties  of  a  father  should  not  be  added  to 
those  of  the  commander." 

On  the  27th  of  March  the  Hartford  started  again 
down  river,  accompanied  by  the  Albatross  and  the 


228  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

Ellet  ram  Switzerland.  On  the  2d  of  April  the  little 
squadron  anchored  off  the  mouth  of  the  Red  River, 
having  on  its  passage  down  again  destroyed  a  number 
of  skiffs  and  flat-boats  used  for  transporting  stores. 
Warned  by  the  fate  of  the  Indianola,  the  admiral 
left  nothing  undone  to  ensure  the  absolute  safety  of 
the  flag-ship ;  for,  though  her  powerful  armament 
and  numerous  crew  gave  her  a  great  superiority  over 
any  number  of  river  vessels,  granting  her  room  to 
manoeuvre,  the  difficulties  of  the  river  and  the  great- 
ness of  the  stake  to  both  parties  made  it  imperative 
to  take  no  needless  risks.  As  a  protection  against 
rams,  large  cypress  logs  were  hung  around  the  ship 
about  a  foot  above  the  water  line,  where  they  would 
both  resist  penetration  and  also  give  time  for  the 
elasticity  of  the  frame  of  a  wooden  vessel  to  take  up 
the  blow.  Against  boarding,  elaborate  preparations 
were  made,  which  would  prevent  a  steamer  attempt- 
ing it  from  getting  nearer  than  twenty  feet  to  the 
side,  where  she  would  remain  an  easy  victim  to  the 
shell  and  grape  of  the  Hartford's  guns. 

From  the  2d  to  the  30th  of  April  Farragut  re- 
mained in  the  neighborhood  of  the  Red  River,  be- 
tween its  mouth  and  Port  Hudson.  Cut  off  by  the 
batteries  of  the  place,  and  by  the  prevalence  of  guer- 
rillas on  the  west  bank,  from  all  usual  means  of  com- 
munication with  General  Banks  and  his  own  squad- 
ron, he  contrived  to  get  a  letter  down  by  the  daring 
of  his  secretary,  Mr.  Edward  C.  Gabaudan ;  who  was 
set  adrift  one  night  in  a  skiff  ingeniously  covered 
with  drift  brush,  and,  thus  concealed,  floated  undis- 
covered past  the  enemy's  guards.  The  small  number 
of  his  vessels  prevented  his  extending  his  blockade 
as  far  as  he  wished ;  but  in  closing  the  Red  River  he 


THE   BLOCKADE   AND   PORT    HUDSON. 


22^ 


deprived  the  enemy  of  by  far  the  best  line  they 
possessed,  and  he  destroyed  a  quantity  of  stores  and 
boats. 

In  the  mean  time  diverse  and  important  events 
were  concurring  to  release  him  from  his  position  of 
isolation.  Toward  the  end  of  March  General  Grant, 
who  had  for  some  time  abandoned  all  expectation  of 
turning  Vicksburg  by  its  right  flank,  began  the  cele- 
brated movement  down  the  west  side  of  the  Missis- 
sippi ;  whence  he  crossed  to  the  east  bank  at  Bruins- 
burg,  and  fought  the  campaign  which  ended  by  shut- 
ting up  Pemberton  and  his  army  within  the  lines  of 
the  place.  In  furtherance  of  this  plan,  Porter  him- 
self, with  a  large  body  of  his  ships,  ran  the  batteries 
at  Vicksburg  on  the  night  of  April  16.  The  fleet 
then  kept  pace  with  the  necessarily  slow  progress 
of  the  army,  encumbered  with  trains,  through  the 
roads  heavy  with  the  mire  of  the  recent  overflow. 
On  the  29th  of  April  the  Mississippi  squadron  fought 
a  sharp  engagement  with  the  Confederate  batteries 
at  Grand  Gulf,  which  they  could  not  reduce ;  and 
the  following  day  Grant's  army  crossed  the  river. 

While  these  events  were  bringing  the  Mississippi 
squadron  into  that  part  of  the  river  which  Farragut 
had  aimed  to  control,  other  movements  were  leading 
to  his  assistance  some  of  the  lighter  vessels  of  his 
own  command.  After  the  naval  action  at  Port  Hud- 
son, Banks  had  temporarily  abandoned  his  designs 
upon  that  post  in  favor  of  operations  west  of  the 
Mississippi  by  the  Bayous  Teche  and  Atchafalaya, 
the  latter  of  which  communicates  with  the  Red  River 
a  few  miles  above  its  mouth.  This  movement  was 
accompanied  by  a  force  of  four  gunboats,  under  the 
command  of  Lieutenant-Commander  A.  P.  Cooke,  of 


23q  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

the  Estrella,  which  captured  a  post  on  the  Atchafa- 
laya  called  Butte  a  la  Rose,  on  the  20th  of  April, 
the  same  day  that  Opelousas,  sixty  miles  from  Alex- 
andria, was  entered  by  the  army.  The  latter  pressed 
on  toward  Alexandria,  while  the  gunboats  pushed 
their  way  up  the  Atchafalaya.  On  the  first  of  May 
two  of  them,  the  Estrella  and  Arizona,  passed  into 
the  Red  River,  and  soon  afterward  joined  the  Hart- 
ford. 

Three  days  later  Admiral  Porter  arrived  with 
several  of  his  fleet  and  communicatee  with  Farragut. 
The  next  day,  May  5th,  Porter  went  up  the  Red 
River  and  pushed  rapidly  toward  Alexandria,  which 
was  evacuated,  its  stores  being  removed  to  Shreve- 
port,  three  hundred  and  fifty  miles  farther  up. 

Farragut  now  felt  that  his  personal  presence 
above  Port  Hudson  was  no  longer  necessary.  The 
Mississippi  was  ultimately  to  become  the  command 
of  Porter,  whose  vessels  were  especially  fitted  for  its 
waters  ;  and  that  admiral  was  now  at  liberty  to  give 
his  full  attention  below  Vicksburg.  On  the  other 
hand,  his  own  squadron  in  the  lower  river  and  on  the 
blockade  demanded  a  closer  attention  than  he  could 
give  from  his  isolated  station.  Accordingly,  on  the 
6th  of  May  he  transferred  the  command  to  Commo- 
dore Palmer,  of  the  Hartford,  with  whom  he  left  the 
Albatross,  Estrella,  and  Arizona  to  intercept  com- 
munications between  the  two  banks  of  the  Mississippi 
below  Red  River;  while  he  himself  returned  by  one 
of  the  bayous  to  New  Orleans,  reaching  there  on 
the  nth. 

Thus  ended  Farragut's  brilliant  strategic  move- 
ment against  the  communications  of  Vicksburg  and 
Port  Hudson,  and  through  them  against  the  inter- 


THE   BLOCKADE   AND   PORT   HUDSON.      23 1 

course  of  the  Confederacy  with  its  great  Western 
storehouse,  over  which  the  two  fortresses  stood 
guard.  It  was  a  movement  which,  though  crippled 
from  the  beginning  by  a  serious  disaster  on  the 
battle-field,  was  conceived  in  accordance  with  the 
soundest  principles'  of  the  art  of  war.  Its  signifi- 
cance has  been  obscured  and  lost  in  the  great  enter- 
prise initiated  a  month  later  by  General  Grant,  and 
solidly  supported  by  the  navy  under  Porter;  whose 
co-operation,  Grant  avows,  was  absolutely  essential 
to  the  success — nay,  even  to  the  contemplation  of 
such  an  undertaking.*  In  this  combined  movement, 
identical  in  principle  with  that  of  .Farragut,  Porter, 
in  executing  his  part,  had  the  current  with  instead  of 
against  him.  Had  circumstances  delayed  or  pre- 
vented Grant's  advance  by  the  west  bank  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi— had  he,  for  instance,  been  enabled  by  one 
of  the  abortive  bayou  expeditions  to  penetrate  north 
of  Vicksburg — Farragut's  action  would  have  been  no 
more  sound  nor  bold,  but  its  merits  would  have  been 
far  more  perceptible  to  the  common  eye.  Re-enforce- 
ments must  have  been  sent  him  ;  and  around  his  flag- 
ship would  have  centered  a  force  that  would  have 
choked  the  life  out  of  Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson. 

Because  rightly  aimed,  this  daring  campaign  was 
not  frustrated  even  by  the  disasters  of  the  night 
action.  It  is  distinguished  from  the  unhappy  fiasco  of 
the  year  before  by  all  the  difference  between  a  fitting 
and  an  unfitting  time — by  all  that  separates  a  clear 
appreciation  of  facts  from  a  confused  impression  of 
possibilities.  In  1862  Farragut  was  driven  up  the 
river  against  his  own  judgment,  seeing  no  prospect 

*  Personal  Memoirs  of  U.  S.  Grant,  vol.  i,  p.  461. 


232 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


of  tangible  or  permanent  results.  In  1863  he  went 
on  his  own  responsibility,  because  he  saw  that  in  the 
then  condition  of  affairs,  with  the  armies  gathering  at 
both  ends  of  the  line,  the  movement  he  made  would 
not  only  be  successful  in  itself,  but  would  materially 
conduce  to  the  attainment  of  the  common  end.  It 
is  significant  of  his  true  military  insight  that  neither 
depreciation  nor  disaster  shook  his  clear  convictions 
of  the  importance  of  his  work.  "  Whether  my  get- 
ting by  Port  Hudson  was  of  consequence  or  not," 
he  wrote  chamngly  in  reference  to  some  slighting 
comments  in  a  Southern  newspaper,  "  if  Pollard's 
stomach  were  as  tightly  pinched  for  food  as  theirs 
at  Port  Hudson  and  Vicksburg  have  been  since  I 
shut  up  Red  River,  he  would  know  how  to  value 
a  good  dinner  and  a  little  peace."  In  soberer  style 
he  wrote  to  his  home :  "  We  have  done  our  part  of 
the  work  assigned  to  us,  and  all  has  worked  well. 
My  last  dash  past  Port  Hudson  was  the  best  thing  I  ever 
did,  except  taking  New  Orleans.  It  assisted  materi- 
ally in  the  fall  of  Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson." 

Farragut  remained  but  a  short  time  in  New  Or- 
leans, and  was  soon  again  at  the  front ;  joining  the 
vessels  of  his  squadron  lying  near,  but  below,  Port 
Hudson.  After  entering  Alexandria  on  the  7th  of 
May,  General  Banks  moved  down  with  his  army  to 
the  Mississippi,  which  he  crossed  five  or  six  miles 
above  Port  Hudson.  General  Augur,  of  his  com- 
mand, at  the  same  time  moved  up  from  Baton  Rouge, 
the  two  divisions  meeting  on  the  23d  of  May,  and 
immediately  investing  Port  Hudson.  An  assault  was 
made  on  the  27th  ;  but  proving  unsuccessful,  regular 
siege  operations  were  begun.  The  mortar  schooners 
and  the  Essex  supported  them  by  constant  bombard- 


THE   BLOCKADE   AND   PORT    HUDSON.       233 

ment,  and  the  navy  furnished  and  manned  a  battery 
of  four  nine-inch  Dahlgren  guns. 

While  contributing  thus  conspicuously  to  the  im- 
mediate furtherance  of  the  siege,  the  most  essential 
work  of  the  navy,  here  as  in  the  upper  Mississippi,  was 
in  the  maintenance  of  the  communications,  which  were 
wholly  by  the  river,  as  well  as  in  assuring  the  safety 
of  New  Orleans,  then  stripped  of  all  the  troops  that 
could   be   spared.     The  danger   of  two   points  like 
Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson,  both  of  such  vital  im- 
portance, and  both  being  besieged  at  the  same  time, 
.aroused  every    latent   energy    of   the   Confederacy, 
and   set   in    motion   every  armed   man    of   whom  it 
could  dispose.    To  divert  and  distract  the  attention 
of  the  Union  generals,  to  induce  them  to  abandon 
their  efforts  or  diminish  the  forces  at  the  front,  no 
means  were  so  ready  nor  so  sure  as  an  attack  upon 
their  communications,  or  a  threat  directed  against 
their  base.    To  make  these  insecure,  is  like  mining  the 
foundations  of  a  building.     Here  the  navy  removed 
every  substantial  cause  of  anxiety  by  its  firm  support, 
and  by  the  rapidity  with  which  its  heavy  guns  were 
brought   to   sustain    every  point    attacked.      Under 
such  diligent  guardianship  the  barrier  of  the  Missis- 
sippi remained  impassable;    and  although  a   trans- 
port might  now  and  again  be  arrested  and  forced  to 
surrender,  such  an  occasional  annoyance  could  not 
by  the  most  uneasy  general  be  magnified  into  a  seri- 
ous menace  to  his  communications.    The  active  Con- 
federate general,  Richard  Taylor,  in  command  of  the 
district  west  of  the  river,  stripped  all   his  posts  to 
concentrate  an  effort  along  the  right  bank,  which,  by 
disturbing  Banks,  might  make  a  favorable  diversion 
for  Port  Hudson  ;  and  loud  talk  was  made  of  an  at- 
16 


234 


ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 


tack  upon  New  Orleans  itself,  favored  by  a  rising 
among  the  citizens,  still  heartily  attached  to  the 
Southern  cause.  The  powerful  vessels  kept  before 
the  city  by  Farragut  effectually  disposed  of  any 
chance  of  such  an  attempt,  although  much  anxiety 
was  felt  by  General  Emory,  in  command  of  the 
station,  and  confident  expectation  was  plainly  dis- 
cernible on  the  faces  of  the  towns-people.  The  Con- 
federates, however,  did  for  a  season  control  the  west 
side  of  the  river,  appearing  before  Donaldsonville 
and  Plaquemine,  where  were  posts  of  United  States 
troops.  These  were  saved  by  the  prompt  appearance 
of  gunboats,  which  followed  the  movements  of  the 
enemy  ;  but  the  report  of  them  brought  Farragut 
down  in  person,  and  elicited  from  him  a  remonstrance 
to  Banks  for  leaving  upon  the  west  bank,  inadequately 
sustained,  heavy  guns  which,  if  they  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  Confederates,  might  convert  a  menace 
into  a  serious  embarrassment.  A  few  days  later,  at 
midnight  of  June  27th,  the  enemy  attacked  Donald- 
sonville in  force.  The  storming  party  succeeded  in 
entering  the  works,  but  the  three  gunboats  which 
Farragut  had  stationed  there  opened  so  heavy  a  fire 
upon  the  supports  that  these  broke  and  fled ;  and 
those  in  advance,  being  unsustained,  were  made  pris- 
oners. 

A  few  days  later  Farragut  summoned  his  chief-of- 
staff,  Captain  Thornton  A.  Jenkins,  to  relieve  him  at 
Port  Hudson,  as  he  felt  his  own  presence  necessary 
at  New  Orleans.  Jenkins  started  up  in  the  Monon- 
gahela,  a  heavy  corvette  commanded  by  Captain 
Abner  Read,  having  in  company  two  small  trans- 
ports with  needed  supplies.  The  enemy,  despite  the 
repulse  at  Donaldsonville,  remained  in  the  neighbor- 


THE   BLOCKADE   AND  PORT   HUDSON. 


235 


hood,  and  had  established  a  battery  of  field-guns  a 
few  miles  below  at  a  bend  in  the  river.  By  these 
the  Monongahela  was  attacked  and  pretty  severely 
handled  for  a  few  moments.  Her  captain,  an  officer 
of  distinguished  courage  and  enterprise,  was  mortally 
wounded,  and  Captain  Jenkins  slightly  so.  These 
two  affairs  sufficiently  indicate  the  character  of  the 
enemy's  operations  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Missis- 
sippi at  this  time.  They  did  not  in  the  least  succeed 
in  shaking  the  grip  of  the  Union  army  before  Port 
Hudson,  nor  did  they  entirely  cease  with  the  sur- 
render of  the  place.  That  they  did  so  little  harm, 
with  the  enemy  in  nearly  undisputed  command  in 
the  regions  west  of  the  river,  was  due  to  the  navy, 
whose  mobility  exceeded  that  of  their  troops. 

Vicksburg  surrendered  on  the  4th  of  July,  1863, 
and  its  fall  was  followed  by  that  of  Port  Hudson  on 
the  9th  of  the  same  month.  Farragut  then  wrote  to 
Porter,  and  turned  over  to  him  the  command  in  all  the 
Mississippi  Valley  above  New  Orleans.  On  the  istof 
August  Porter  himself  arrived  off  the  city  in  his  flag- 
ship, and  the  two  admirals  had  an  interview  on  the 
scene  of  their  former  exploits.  The  same  afternoon 
Farragut  sailed  in  the  Hartford  for  the  North,  to 
enjoy  a  brief  respite  from  his  labors  during  the  ener- 
vating autumn  months  of  the  Gulf  climate.  Though 
now  sixty-two  years  old,  he  retained  an  extraordinary 
amount  of  vitality,  and  of  energy  both  physical  and 
moral ;  but  nevertheless  at  his  age  the  anxieties  and 
exposure  he  had  to  undergo  tell,  and  had  drawn  from 
him,  soon  after  his  return  from  above  Port  Hudson, 
the  expressive  words,  "  I  am  growing  old  fast,  and 
need  rest."  On  the  10th  of  August  the  flag-ship  an- 
chored in  New  York,  after  a  passage  of  nine  days. 


236  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

The  admiral  remained  in  the  North  until  the 
first  of  the  following  year.  His  own  ship,  and  her 
powerful  sisters,  the  Richmond  and  Brooklyn,  were 
in  need  of  extensive  repairs  before  they  could  be 
considered  again  fit  for  winter  service  in  the  Gulf. 
The  Hartford  was  in  better  condition  than  the  other 
two,  being  uninjured  below  the  water  line,  but  the 
severe  actions  through  which  she  had  passed  were 
proved  by  the  scars,  two  hundred  and  forty  in  num- 
ber, where  she  had  been  struck  by  shot  or  shell. 


CHAPTER  X. 

MOBILE. 
1864. 

By  the  fall  of  the  last  and  most  powerful  of  the 
Confederate  strongholds  upon  the  Mississippi,  and 
the  consequent  assertion  of  control  by  the  United 
States  Government  over  the  whole  of  the  great  water 
course,  was  accomplished  the  first  and  chief  of  the 
two  objects  toward  which  Farragut  was  to  co- 
operate. After  manifold  efforts  and  failures,  the 
combined  forces  of  the  United  States  had  at  last 
sundered  the  Confederacy  in  twain  along  the  prin- 
cipal one  of  those  natural  strategic  lines  which  inter- 
sected it,  and  which  make  the  strength  or  the  weak- 
ness of  States  according  as  they  are  able  or  unable  to 
hold  them  against  an  enemy.  Of  the  two  fragments, 
the  smaller  was  militarily  important  only  as  a  feeder 
to  the  other.  Severed  from  the  body  to  which  they 
belonged,  the  seceded  States  west  of  the  Mississippi 
sank  into  insignificance;  the  fire  that  had  raged 
there  would  smoulder  and  die  of  itself,  now  that  a 
broad  belt  which  could  not  be  passed  interposed  be- 
tween it  and  the  greater  conflagration  in  the  East. 

It  next  became  the  task  of  the  Union  forces  to 
hold  firmly,  by  adequate  defensive  measures,  the  line 
they  had  gained  ;  while  the  great  mass  of  troops  here- 


2^8  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

tofore  employed  along  the  Mississippi  in  offensive 
operations  were  transferred  farther  east,  to  drive  yet 
another  column  through  a  second  natural  line  of 
cleavage  from  Nashville,  through  Georgia,  to  the  Gulf 
or  to  the  Atlantic  seaboard.  How  this  new  work  was 
performed  under  the  successive  leadership  of  Rose- 
crans,  Grant,  and  Sherman,  does  not  fall  within  the 
scope  of  the  present  work.  Although  the  light 
steamers  of  the  Mississippi  squadron  did  good  and 
often  important  service  in  this  distant  inland  region, 
the  river  work  of  Farragut's  heavy  sea-going  ships 
was  now  over.  In  furtherance  of  the  great  object  of 
opening  the  Mississippi,  they  had  left  their  native 
element,  and,  braving  alike  a  treacherous  navigation 
and  hostile  batteries,  had  penetrated  deep  into  the 
vitals  of  the  Confederacy.  This  great  achievement 
wrought,  they  turned  their  prows  again  seaward. 
The  formal  transfer  to  Admiral  Porter  of  the  com- 
mand over  the  whole  Mississippi  and  its  tributaries, 
above  New  Orleans,  signalized  the  fact  that  Farra- 
gut's sphere  of  action  was  to  be  thenceforth  on  the 
coast;  for  New  Orleans,  though  over  a  hundred 
miles  from  the  mouth  of  a  tideless  river,  whose 
waters  flow  ever  downward  to  the  sea,  was  neverthe- 
less substantially  a  sea-coast  city. 

As  the  opening  of  the  Mississippi  was  the  more 
important  of  the  two  objects  embraced  in  Farragut's 
orders,  so  did  it  also  offer  him  the  ampler  field  for 
the  display  of  those  highest  qualities  of  a  general 
officer  which  he  abundantly  possessed.  The  faculty 
of  seizing  upon  the  really  decisive  points  of  a  situa- 
tion, of  correctly  appreciating  the  conditions  of  the 
problem  before  him,  of  discerning  whether  the  proper 
moment  for  action  was  yet  distant  or  had  already 


MOBILE.  239 

arrived,  and  of  moving  with  celerity  and  adequate 
dispositions  when  the  time  did  come— all  these  dis- 
tinctive gifts  of  the  natural  commander-in-chief  had 
been  called  into  play,  by  the  difficult  questions  arising 
in  connection  with  the  stupendous  work  of  breaking 
the  shackles  by  which  the  Confederates  held  the 
Mississippi  chained.  The  task  that  still  remained 
before  him,  the  closing  of  the  Confederate  seaports 
within  the  limits  of  his  command,  though  arduous 
and  wearisome,  did  not  make  the  same  demand  upon 
these  more  intellectual  qualities.  The  sphere  was 
more  contracted,  more  isolated.  It  had  fewer  rela- 
tions to  the  great  military  operations  going  on  else- 
where, and,  being  in  itself  less  complex,  afforded  less 
interest  to  the  strategist.  It  involved,  therefore,  less 
of  the  work  of  the  military  leader  which  was  so  con- 
genial to  his  aptitudes,  and  more  of  that  of  the 
administrator,  to  him  naturally  distasteful. 

Nevertheless,  as  the  complete  fulfilment  of  his 
orders  necessitated  the  reduction  of  a  fortified  sea- 
port, he  found  in  this  undertaking  the  opportunity  for 
showing  a  degree  of  resolution  and  presence  of  mind 
which  was  certainly  not  exceeded — perhaps  not  even 
equaled — in  his  previous  career.  At  Mobile  it  was 
the  tactician,  the  man  of  instant  perception  and 
ready  action,  rather  than  he  of  clear  insight  and 
careful  planning,  that  is  most  conspicuous.  On  the 
same  occasion,  with  actual  disaster  incurred  and 
imminent  confusion  threatening  his  fleet,  combined 
with  a  resistance  sturdier  than  any  he  had  yet  en- 
countered, the  admiral's  firmness  and  tenacity  rose 
equal  to  the  highest  demand  ever  made  upon  them. 
In  the  lofty  courage  and  stern  determination  which 
plucked  victory  out  of  the  very  jaws  of  defeat,  the 


2AO  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

battle  of  Mobile  Bay  was  to  the  career  of  Farragut 
what  the  battle  of  Copenhagen  was  to  that  of 
Nelson.  Perhaps  we  may  even  say,  borrowing  the 
words  of  an  eloquent  French  writer  upon  the  latter 
event,  the  battle  of  Mobile  will  always  be  in  the  eyes 
of  seamen  Farragut's  surest  claim  to  glory.* 

Up  to  the  time  of  Farragut's  departure  for  the 
North,  in  August,  1863,  the  blockade  of  the  Gulf 
sea-coast  within  the  limits  of  his  command,  though 
technically  effective,  had  for  the  most  part  only  been 
enforced  by  the  usual  method  of  cruising  or  anchor- 
ing off  the  entrances  of  the  ports.  Such  a  watch, 
however,  is  a  very  imperfect  substitute  for  the  iron 
yoke  that  is  imposed  by  holding  all  the  principal 
harbors,  the  gateways  for  communication  with  the 
outer  world.  This  was  clearly  enough  realized ;  and 
the  purpose  of  Farragut,  as  of  his  Government,  had 
been  so  to  occupy  the  ports  within  his  district.  At 
one  time,  in  December,  1862,  he  was  able  to  say 
exultingly  that  he  did  so  hcfld  the  whole  coast,  ex- 
cept Mobile;  but  the  disasters  at  Galveston  and 
Sabine  Pass  quickly  intervened,  and  those  ports  re- 
mained thenceforth  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  On 
the  Texas  coast,  however,  blockade-running  properly 
so  called — the  entrance,  that  is,  of  blockaded  Confed- 
erate harbors — was  a  small  matter  compared  with  the 
nourishing  contraband  trade  carried  on  through  the 
Mexican  port  Matamoras  and  across  the  Rio  Grande. 
When  Farragut's  lieutenant,  Commodore  Henry  H. 

*  "  The  campaign  of  the  Baltic  will  always  be  in  the  eyes  of 
seamen  Nelson's  fairest  claim  to  glory.  He  alone  was  capable  of 
displaying  such  boldness  and  such  perseverance  ;  he  alone  could 
face  the  immense  difficulties  of  that  enterprise  and  triumph  over 
them." — Jurien  de  la  Graviere,  Guerres  Maritimes, 


MOBILE.  24I 

Bell,  visited  this  remote  and  ordinarily  deserted  spot 
in  May,  1863,  he  counted  sixty-eight  sails  at  anchor 
in  the  offing  and  a  forest  of  smaller  craft  inside  the 
river,  some  of  which  were  occupied  in  loading  and 
unloading  the  outside  shipping;  to  such  proportions 
had  grown  the  trade  of  a  town  which  neither  pos- 
sessed a  harbor  nor  a  back  country  capable  of  sus- 
taining such  a  traffic.  Under  proper  precautions  by 
the  parties  engaged,  this,  though  clearly  hostile,  was 
difficult  to  touch;  but  it  also  became  of  compara- 
tively little  importance  when  the  Mississippi  fell. 

Not  so  with  Mobile.  As  port  after  port  was 
taken,  as  the  lines  of  the  general  blockade  drew  closer 
and  closer,  the  needs  of  the  Confederacy  for  the  ap- 
proaching death-struggle  grew  more  and  more  cry- 
ing, and  the  practicable  harbors  still  in  their  hands 
became  proportionately  valuable  and  the  scenes  of 
increasing  activity.  After  the  fall  of  New  Orleans 
and  the  evacuation  of  Pensacola,  in  the  spring  of 
1862,  Mobile  was  by  far  the  best  port  on  the  Gulf 
coast  left  to  the  Confederates.  Though  admitting 
a  less  draught  of  water  than  the  neighboring  harbor 
of  Pensacola,  it  enjoyed  the  advantage  over  it  of 
excellent  water  communications  with  the  interior; 
two  large  rivers  with  extensive  tributary  systems 
emptying  into  its  bay.  Thanks  to  this  circumstance, 
it  had  become  a  place  of  very  considerable  trade, 
ranking  next  to  New  Orleans  in  the  Gulf ;  and  its 
growing  commerce,  in  turn,  reacted  upon  the  com- 
munications by  promoting  the  development  of  its 
railroad  system.  The  region  of  which  Mobile  was 
the  natural  port  did  not  depend  for  its  importance 
only  upon  agricultural  products;  under  somewhat 
favorable  conditions  it  had  developed  some  manu- 


242 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


facturing  interests  in  which  the  Southern  States  were 
generally  very  deficient,  and  which  afterward  found 
active  employment  in  the  construction  of  the  Ten- 
nessee, the  most  formidable  ironclad  vessel  built  by 
the  Confederates. 

For  all  these  reasons  the  tenure  of  Mobile  be- 
came a  matter  of  serious  consequence  to  the  enemy  ; 
and,  as  Farragut  had  from  the  first  foreseen,  they 
made  active  use  of  the  respite  afforded  them  by 
the  unfortunate  obstinacy  of  the  Navy  Department 
in  refusing  him  permission  to  attack  after  New  Or- 
leans fell.  The  enterprise  then  was  by  no  means 
as  difficult  as  the  passage  of  the  Mississippi  forts 
just  effected;  and  once  captured,  the  holding  of 
the  harbor  would  require  only  the  small  number  of 
troops  necessary  to  garrison  the  powerful  masonry 
fort  which  commanded  the  main  ship  channel,  sup- 
ported by  a  naval  force  much  less  numerous  than 
that  required  to  blockade  outside.  The  undertaking 
was  therefore  not  open  to  the  objection  of  unduly 
exposing  the  troops  and  ships  placed  in  unfortified 
or  poorly  fortified  harbors,  which  received  such  a 
sad  illustration  at  Galveston  ;  but  it  was  dropped, 
owing,  first,  to  the  preoccupation  of  the  Government 
with  its  expectations  of  immediately  reducing  the 
Mississippi,  and  afterward  to  the  fear  of  losing  ships 
which  at  that  time  could  not  be  replaced.  Hesitation 
to  risk  their  ships  and  to  take  decisive  action  when 
seasonable  opportunity  offers,  is  the  penalty  paid  by 
nations  which  practise  undue  economy  in  their  prepa- 
rations for  war.  When  at  last  it  became  urgent  to 
capture  Mobile  before  the  powerful  ironclad  then 
building  was  completed,  the  preparations  of  the  de- 
fense were  so  far  advanced  that  ironclad  vessels  were 


MOBILE. 


243 


needed  for  the  attack  ;  and  before  these  could  be,  or 
at  least  before  they  were,  supplied,  the  Tennessee, 
which  by  rapid  action  might  have  been  forestalled 
like  the  similar  vessel  at  New  Orleans,  was  ready  for 
battle.  Had  she  been  used  with  greater  wisdom  by 
those  who  directed  her  movements,  she  might  have 
added  very  seriously  to  the  embarrassment  of  the 
United  States  admiral. 

When  Farragut,  after  an  absence  of  nearly  six 
months,  returned  to  his  station  in  January,  1864,  it 
was  with  the  expectation  of  a  speedy  attack  upon 
Mobile.  On  his  way  to  New  Orleans  he  stopped  off 
the  bar,  and  on  the  20th  of  January  made  a  recon- 
naissance with  a  couple  of  gunboats,  approaching  to 
a  little  more  than  three  miles  from  the  forts  com- 
manding the  entrance.  He  then  reported  to  the  de- 
partment that  he  was  satisfied  that,  if  he  had  one 
ironclad,  he  could  destroy  the  whole  of  the  enemy's 
force  in  the  bay,  and  then  reduce  the  forts  at  leisure 
with  the  co-operation  of  about  five  thousand  troops. 
"  But  without  ironclads,"  he  added,  "  we  should  not 
be  able  to  fight  the  enemy's  vessels  of  that  class  with 
much  prospect  of  success,  as  the  latter  would  lie  on 
the  flats,  where  our  ships  could  not  get  at  them.  By 
reference  to  the  chart  you  will  see  how  small  a  space 
there  is  for  the  ships  to  manoeuvre.  Wooden  vessels 
can  do  nothing  with  the  ironclads,  unless  by  getting 
within  one  or  two  hundred  yards,  so  as  to  ram  them 
or  pour  in  a  broadside."  He  repeats  the  informa- 
tion given  by  a  refugee,  that  the  ironclad  Nashville 
would  not  be  ready  before  March,  and  that  the  Con- 
federate admiral  announced  that  when  she  was  he 
would  raise  the  blockade.  "  It  is  depressing,"  he 
adds,  "  to  see  how  easily  false  reports  circulate,  and 


244 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


in  what  a  state  of  alarm  the  community  is  kept  by 
the  most  absurd  rumors.  If  the  Department  could 
get  one  or  two  ironclads  here,  it  would  put  an  end  to 
this  state  of  things  and  restore  confidence  to  the 
people  of  the  ports  now  in  our  possession.  I  feel  no 
apprehension  about  Buchanan's  raising  the  blockade  ; 
but,  with  such  a  force  as  he  has  in  the  bay,  it  would 
be  unwise  to  take  in  our  wooden  vessels  without  the 
means  of  fighting  the  enemy  on  an  equal  footing." 
Having  made  this  reconnaissance,  he  went  on  to  New 
Orleans,  arriving  there  January  22d. 

It  appears,  therefore,  that,  regarded  as  a  naval 
question,  Farragut  considered  the  time  had  gone  by 
for  an  attempt  to  run  the  forts  of  Mobile  Bay,  and 
that  it  would  not  return  until  some  ironclads  were 
furnished  him  by  the  Department.  The  capture  of 
the  forts  he  at  no  time  expected,  except  by  the  same 
means  as  he  had  looked  to  for  the  reduction  of  those 
in  the  Mississippi — that  is,  by  a  combined  military 
and  naval  operation.  In  both  cases  the  navy  was 
to  plant  itself  across  the  enemy's  communications, 
which  it  could  do  by  running  the  gantlet  of  his  guns. 
It  then  remained  for  the  land  forces  either  to  com- 
plete the  investment  and  await  their  fall  by  the  slow 
process  of  famine,  or  to  proceed  with  a  regular  siege 
covered  by  the  fleet.  Without  the  protection  of  the 
ships  in  the  bay,  the  army  would  be  continually 
harassed  by  the  light  gunboats  of  the  enemy,  and 
very  possibly  exposed  to  attack  by  superior  force. 
Without  the  troops,  the  presence  of  the  ships  inside 
would  be  powerless  to  compel  the  surrender  of  the 
works,  or  to  prevent  their  receiving  some  supplies. 
But  in  the  two  years  that  had  very  nearly  elapsed 
since   Farragut,   if  permitted   his   own  wish,   would 


MOBILE. 


245 


have  attacked,  the  strengthening  of  the  works  and 
the  introduction  of  the  ironclads  had  materially 
altered  the  question.  He  was,  it  is  true,  misinformed 
as  to  the  readiness  of  the  latter.  The  vessels  that 
were  dignified  by  that  name  when  he  first  returned 
to  his  station,  took  no  part  in  the  defense,  either  of 
the  bay  or,  later,  of  the  city.  He  was  deceived, 
probably,  from  the  fact  that  the  Confederates  them- 
selves were  deceived,  with  the  exception  of  a  few 
who  had  more  intimate  knowledge  of  their  real 
value ;  and  consequently  the  reports  that  were 
brought  off  agreed  in  giving  them  a  character  which 
they  did  not  deserve. 

An  attack  upon  Mobile  had  been  a  cherished 
project  with  General  Grant  after  the  fall  of  Vicks- 
burg.  It  was  to  that — and  not  to  the  unfortunate 
Red  River  expedition  of  1864 — that  he  would  have 
devoted  Banks's  army  in  the  Southwest ;  moving  it, 
of  course,  in  concert  with,  so  as  to  support  and  be 
supported  by,  the  other  great  operations  which  took 
place  that  year — Sherman's  advance  upon  Atlanta 
and  his  own  against  Richmond.  It  was  to  Mobile, 
and  not  to  Savannah,  that  he  first  looked  as  the 
point  toward  which  Sherman  would  act  after  the 
capture  of  Atlanta;  the  line  from  Atlanta  to  Mobile 
would  be  that  along  which,  by  the  control  of  the 
intervening  railroad  systems,  the  Confederacy  would 
again  be  cleft  in  twain,  as  by  the  subjugation  of  the 
Mississippi.  For  this  reason  chiefly  he  had,  while 
still  only  commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee, 
and  before  he  succeeded  to  the  lieutenant-generalship 
and  the  command  of  all  the  armies,  strenuously  op- 
posed the  Red  River  expedition ;  which  he  looked 
upon  as  an  ex-centric  movement,  tending  rather  to 


246  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

keep  alive  the  war  across  the  Mississippi,  which 
would  fade  if  left  alone,  and  likely  to  result  in  the 
troops  engaged  not  getting  back  in  time  or  in  con- 
dition to  act  against  Mobile. 

As  Grant  feared,  so  it  happened.  The  expedi- 
tion being  already  organized  and  on  the  point  of 
starting  when  he  became  commander-in-chief,  he 
allowed  it  to  proceed;  but  it  ended  in  disaster,  and 
was  the  cause  of  forty  thousand  good  troops  being 
unavailable  for  the  decisive  operations  which  be- 
gan two  months  later.  Not  until  the  end  of  July 
could  a  force  be  spared  even  for  the  minor  task  of 
reducing  the  Mobile  forts ;  and  until  then  Farra- 
gut  had  to  wait  in  order  to  attack  to  any  purpose. 
By  the  time  the  army  in  the  Southwest,  in  the 
command  of  which  General  Canby  relieved  Banks 
on  the  20th  of  May,  was  again  ready  to  move,  Sher- 
man had  taken  Atlanta,  Hood  had  fallen  upon  his 
communications  with  Chattanooga,  and  the  famous 
march  to  the  sea  had  been  determined.  Farragut's 
battle  in  Mobile  Bay  therefore  did  not  prove  to 
be,  as  Grant  had  hoped,  and  as  his  passage  of  the 
Mississippi  forts  had  been,  a  step  in  a  series  of  grand 
military  operations,  by  which  the  United  States 
forces  should  gain  control  of  a  line  vital  to  the  Con- 
federacy, and  again  divide  it  into  two  fragments.  It 
remained  an  isolated  achievement,  though  one  of 
great  importance,  converting  Mobile  from  a  mari- 
time to  an  inland  city,  putting  a  stop  to  all  serious 
blockade-running  in  the  Gulf,  and  crushing  finally 
the  enemy's  ill-founded  hopes  of  an  offensive  move- 
ment by  ironclads  there  equipped. 

The  city  of  Mobile  is  itself  some  thirty  miles 
from  the  Gulf,  near  the  head  of  a  broad  but  gener- 


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MOBILE. 


247 


ally  shallow  bay  which  bears  the  same  name.  The 
principal  entrance  from  the  Gulf  is  between  Mobile 
Point — a  long,  narrow,  sandy  beach  which  projects 
from  the  east  side  of  the  bay — and  Dauphin  Island, 
one  of  a  chain  which  runs  parallel  to  the  coast  of 
Mississippi  and  encloses  Mississippi  Sound.  At  the 
end  of  Mobile  Point  stands  Fort  Morgan,  the  prin- 
cipal defense  of  the  bay,  for  the  main  ship  channel 
passes  close  under  its  guns.  At  the  eastern  end  of 
Dauphin  Island  stood  a  much  smaller  work,  called 
Fort  Gaines.  Between  this  and  Fort  Morgan  the 
distance  is  nearly  three  miles;  but  a  bank  of  hard 
sand  making  out  from  the  island  prevents  vessels  of 
any  considerable  size  approaching  it  nearer  than  two 
miles.  Between  Dauphin  Island  and  the  mainland 
there  are  some  shoal  channels,  by  which  vessels  of 
very  light  draft  can  pass  from  Mississippi  Sound  into 
the  bay.  These  were  not  practicable  for  the  fighting 
vessels  of  Farragut's  fleet ;  but  a  small  earthwork 
known  as  Fort  Powell  had  been  thrown  up  to  com- 
mand the  deepest  of  them,  called  Grant's  Pass. 

The  sand  bank  off  Dauphin  Island  extends 
south  as  well  as  east,  reaching  between  four  and 
five  miles  from  the  entrance.  A  similar  shoal 
stretches  out  to  the  southward  from  Mobile  Point. 
Between  the  two  lies  the  main  ship  channel,  varying 
in  width  from  seven  hundred  and  fifty  yards,  three 
miles  outside,  to  two  thousand,  or  about  a  sea  mile, 
abreast  Fort  Morgan.  Nearly  twenty-one  feet  can 
be  carried  over  the  bar;  and  after  passing  Fort 
Morgan  the  channel  spreads,  forming  a  hole  or 
pocket  of  irregular  contour,  about  four  miles  deep 
by  two  wide,  in  which  the  depth  is  from  twenty  to 
twenty-four  feet.     Beyond  this  hole,  on   either  side 


248 


ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 


the  bay  and  toward  the  city,  the  water  shoals  grad- 
ually but  considerably,  and  the  heavier  of  Farra- 
gut's  ships  could  not  act  outside  of  its  limits.  The 
Confederate  ironclad  Tennessee,  on  the  contrary, 
drawing  but  fourteen  feet,  had  a  more  extensive  field 
of  operations  open  to  her,  and,  from  the  gradual 
diminution  of  the  soundings,  was  able  to  take  her 
position  at  a  distance  where  the  most  formidable  of 
her  opponents  could  neither  follow  her  nor  penetrate 
her  sides  with  their  shot. 

Between  the  city  and  the  lower  bay  there  were 
extensive  flats,  over  which  not  even  the  fourteen 
feet  of  the  Tennessee  could  be  taken;  and  these  in 
one  part,  called  Dog  River  Bar,  shoaled  to  as  little 
as  nine  feet.  To  bring  the  Tennessee  into  action 
for  the  defense  of  the  entrance  and  of  the  lower 
bay,  it  was  necessary  to  carry  her  across  these  flats 
— an  undertaking  requiring  both  time  and  mechani- 
cal appliances,  neither  of  which  would  be  availa- 
ble if  an  enemy  were  inside  to  molest  the  opera- 
tions. As  the  Tennessee  was  distinctly  the  most 
formidable  element  in  the  dangers  Farragut  had 
to  encounter,  and  as  the  character  of  the  sound- 
ings gave  her  a  field  of  action  peculiarly  suited  to 
utilize  her  especial  powers,  which  consisted  in  the 
strength  of  her  sides  and  the  long  range  of  her 
heavy  rifled  guns,  it  was  particularly  desirable  to 
anticipate  her  crossing  the  upper  bar  by  the  fleet 
itself  crossing  the  lower.  That  done,  the  Tennessee 
was  reduced  to  impotence.  It  was  not  done,  for 
two  reasons.  First,  the  Navy  Department  did  not 
send  the  ironclads  which  Farragut  demanded  ;  and 
second,  the  army  in  the  Southwest,  having  wasted 
its  strength  in    a  divergent    operation,  was  unable 


MOBILE.  249 

to  supply  the  force  necessary  to  reduce  Fort  Mor- 
gan. That  the  delay  was  not  productive  of  more 
serious  consequences  was  due  to  the  impatience  or 
recklessness  of  the  Confederate  admiral,  and  to  the 
energy  with  which  Farragut  seized  the  opportunity 
afforded  by  his  mistake. 

Six  months  passed   before  the  moment   for  de- 
cisive  action   arrived.      Though  devoid  of  military 
interest,  they  were  far  from  being  months  of  idleness 
or  enjoyment.    The  administrative  duties  of  so  large 
a  command  drew  heavily  upon  the  time  and  energies 
of  the  admiral,  and,  as  has  been  said,  they  were  not 
congenial  to  him.     When  the  Tennessee  crossed  Dog 
River  Bar,  which  she  did  on  the  18th  of  May,  Farra- 
gut felt  that  he   must  be  on  the  spot,  in  case  she 
attempted  to  execute  her  threat  of  coming  out  to 
break  up  the  blockade ;  but  up  to  that  time  he  was 
moving  actively  from  point  to  point  of  his  command, 
between  New  Orleans  on  the  one  side,  and  Pensacola, 
now  become  his   principal  base,  on  the  other.     From 
time  to  time  he  was  off  Mobile,  and   for  more  than 
two  months  preceding  the  battle  of  the  Bay  he  lay 
off  the  port  in  all  the  dreary  monotony  of  blockade 
service.     The  clerical  labor  attaching  to  the    large 
force  and  numerous  interests  entrusted  to  him  was 
immense.     Every  mail  brought  him,  of  course,  nu- 
merous communications   from  the  Department.     "  I 
received    your   letter    last  evening,"  he  writes  to  a 
member    of    his  family,  "but  at  the  same  time  re- 
ceived so  many  from  the  Department  that  my  eyes 
were  used  up  before  I  came  to  yours,  so  that  mine 
to    you    will  be  short  and  badly  written."     A  very 
large   part  of  this  correspondence  consisted  of  let- 
ters from  United  States  consuls  abroad,  forwarded 
17 


250 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


through  the  State  Department,  giving  particulars 
of  vessels  fitting  or  loading  for  the  Confederacy  or 
to  break  the  blockade.  "  Nearly  all  my  clerical 
force  is  broken  down,"  he  writes  on  another  occa- 
sion. "  The  fact  is,  I  never  saw  so  much  writing ; 
and  yet  Drayton,  who  does  as  much  as  any  of 
them,  says  it  is  all  necessary.  So  I  tell  them  to  go 
on.  I  do  not  mind  signing  my  name.  Although 
I  write  all  my  own  letters,  some  one  has  to  copy 
them.  My  fleet  is  so  large  now  that  it  keeps  us  all 
at  work  the  whole  time." 

But  while  he  spoke  thus  lightly  of  his  own  share 
in  these  labors,  the  confinement,  the  necessary  at- 
tention to  and  study  of  larger  details,  even  while  he 
intrusted  the  minor  to  others,  and  the  unavoidable 
anxieties  of  a  man  who  had  so  many  important  irons 
in  the  fire,  and  at  the  same  time  was  approaching  his 
sixty-fourth  year,  told  upon  him.  To  this  he  bore 
witness  when,  after  the  capture  of  the  Mobile  forts, 
the  Department  desired  him  to  take  command  of  the 
North  Atlantic  fleet,  with  a  view  to  the  reduction  of 
Wilmington,  North  Carolina.  "  They  must  think  I 
am  made  of  iron,"  he  wrote  home.  "  I  wrote  the 
Secretary  a  long  letter,  telling  him  that  my  health 
was  not  such  as  to  justify  my  going  to  a  new  station 
to  commence  new  organizations ;  that  I  must  have 
rest  for  my  mind  and  exercise  for  my  body ;  that  I 
had  been  down  here  within  two  months  of  five  years, 
out  of  six,  and  recently  six  months  on  constant  block- 
ade off  this  port,  and  my  mind  on  the  stretch  all  the  time; 
and  now  to  commence  a  blockade  again  on  the  At- 
lantic coast !  Why,  even  the  routine  of  duty  for  a 
fleet  of  eighty  sail  of  vessels  works  us  all  to  death ; 
and  but  that  I  have  the  most  industrious  fleet-captain 


MOBILE.  251 

and  secretary,  it  would  never  be  half  done.  It  is  dif- 
ficult to  keep  things  straight."  "  I  know,"  he  writes 
on  another  occasion,  "  that  few  men  could  have  gone 
through  what  I  have  in  the  last  three  years,  and  no 
one  ever  will  know  except  yourself  perhaps.  .  .  . 
What  the  fight  was  to  my  poor  brains,  neither  you 
nor  any  one  else  will  ever  be  able  to  comprehend. 
Six  months  constantly  watching  day  and  night  for 
an  enemy ;  to  know  him  to  be  as  brave,  as  skilful, 
and  as  determined  as  myself ;  who  was  pledged  to 
his  Government  and  the  South  to  drive  me  away  and 
raise  the  blockade,  and  free  the  Mississippi  from  our 
rule.  While  I  was  equally  pledged  to  my  Govern- 
ment that  I  would  capture  or  destroy  the  rebel." 

Besides  his  labors  and  the  official  anxieties  due  to 
his  individual  command,  he  again,  as  in  1862,  felt 
deeply  the  misfortunes  with  which  the  general  cam- 
paign of  1864  opened,  and  especially  in  the  South- 
west. There  was  continually  present  to  the  minds 
of  the  leaders  of  the  United  States  forces  during  the 
war  the  apprehension  that  the  constancy  of  the 
people  might  fail;  that  doubtful  issues  might  lead 
to  a  depression  that  would  cause  the  abandonment 
of  the  contest,  in  which  success  was  nevertheless  as- 
sured to  perseverance  and  vigor.  Grant's  memoirs 
bear  continual  testimony  to  the  statesmanlike  regard 
he  had,  in  planning  his  greater  military  operations,  to 
this  important  factor  in  the  war,  the  vacillation 
under  uncertainty  of  that  popular  support  upon 
which  success  depended.  The  temperament  of  Far- 
ragut  reflected  readily  the  ups  and  downs  of  the 
struggle,  and  was  saddened  by  the  weaknesses  and 
inconsistencies  of  his  own  side,  which  he  keenly  ap- 
preciated.    "  I  am  depressed"  he  writes,  "  by  the  bad 


252  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

news  from  every  direction.  The  enemy  seem  to  be 
bending  their  whole  soul  and  body  to  the  war  and 
whipping  us  in  every  direction.  What  a  disgrace 
that,  with  their  slender  means,  they  should,  after 
three  years,  contend  with  us  from  one  end  of  the 
country  to  the  other!  .  .  .  I  get  right  sick,  every  now 
and  then,  at  the  bad  news."  "The  victory  of  the 
Kearsarge  over  the  Alabama,"  on  a  more  auspicious 
occasion,  "  raised  me  up.  I  would  sooner  have 
fought  that  fight  than  any  ever  fought  on  the 
ocean  "  ;  and  his  exultation  was  the  greater  that  the 
first  lieutenant  of  the  Kearsarge  had  been  with  him 
in  the  same  capacity  when  the  Hartford  passed  the 
Mississippi  forts. 

But,  while  thus  sensitive  to  the  vicissitudes  of  his 
country's  fortunes,  he  did  not  readily  entertain  the 
thought  of  being  himself  defeated.  "  As  to  being 
prepared  for  defeat,"  he  wrote  before  New  Orleans, 
"  I  certainly  am  not.  Any  man  who  is  prepared  for 
defeat  would  be  half  defeated  before  he  commenced. 
I  hope  for  success ;  shall  do  all  in  my  power  to  se- 
cure it,  and  trust  to  God  for  the  rest."  And  again: 
"  The  officers  say  I  don't  believe  anything.  I  cer- 
tainly believe  very  little  that  comes  in  the  shape  of 
reports.  They  keep  everybody  stirred  up.  I  mean 
to  be  whipped  or  to  whip  my  enemy,  and  not  to  be 
scared  to  death."  "I  hope  for  the  best  results,"  he 
wrote  a  week  before  forcing  the  passage  into  Mobile 
Bay,  "  as  I  am  always  hopeful ;  put  my  shoulder  to 
the  wheel  with  my  best  judgment,  and  trust  to  God 
for  the  rest  "  ;  or,  in  more  homely  language:  "Every- 
thing has  a  weak  spot,  and  the  first  thing  I  try  to 
do  is  to  find  out  where  it  is,  and  pitch  into  it  with 
the  biggest  shell  or  shot  that   I  have,  and  repeat 


MOBILE.  253 

the  dose  until  it  operates."  "  The  Confederates  at 
Fort  Morgan  are  making  great  preparations  to  re- 
ceive us.  That  concerns  me  but  little  " — words  used 
not  in  a  spirit  of  mere  light-heartedness,  but  because 
it  was  a  condition  he  had  from  the  first  accepted, 
and  over  which  he  hoped  to  triumph  ;  for  he  con- 
tinues, "  I  know  they  will  do  all  in  their  power  to 
destroy  us,  and  we  will  reciprocate  the  compliment. 
I  hope  to  give  them  a  fair  fight  if  once  I  get  inside. 
I  expect  nothing  from  them  but  that  they  will  try  to 
blow  me  up  if  they  can." 

Amid  such  cares  and  in  such  a  spirit  were  spent 
the  six  months  of  monotonous  outside  blockade  pre- 
ceding   the    great  victory  that   crowned   his  active 
career.      The    only    relief   to    its   weariness  was   a 
bombardment    of    Fort    Powell,  undertaken   by  the 
light-draft  steamers  of  the  squadron  from  Mississippi 
Sound  in  February,  to  create  a  diversion  in  favor  of 
Sherman's  raid  from  Vicksburg  upon  Meridian,  which 
was   then    in    progress.     The   boats  could   not   get 
nearer  to  the   work  than  four  thousand  yards,  and 
even  then  were   aground;  so  that  no   very  serious 
effect  was  produced.     A  greater  and  more  painful 
excitement  was   aroused  by  the  misfortunes  of  the 
Red  River  expedition  in  April  and  May.     Begun  on 
unsound  military  principles,  but  designed  politically 
to  assert  against  French   intrigues  the  claim  of  the 
United  States  to  Texas,  that   ill-omened  enterprise 
culminated  in  a  retreat  which  well-nigh  involved  the 
Mississippi  squadron   in  an  overwhelming   disaster. 
The  Red  River  was  unusually  low  for  the  season, 
and  falling  instead  of  rising.     There  was  not,  when 
the  army  retired,  water  enough  to  enable  the  gun- 
boats which  had  ascended  the  river  to  repass  the 


254 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


rapids  at  Alexandria.  The  army  could  delay  but 
for  a  limited  time,  at  the  end  of  which,  if  the  boats 
had  not  passed,  they  must  be  left  to  their  fate.  Far- 
ragut,  who  was  in  New  Orleans  when  the  news  ar- 
rived, wrote  bitterly  about  the  blunders  made,  and 
was  sorely  distressed  for  the  issue  to  the  navy.  "  I 
have  no  spirit  to  write,"  he  says.  "  I  have  had  such 
long  letters  from  Porter  and  Banks,  and  find  things 
so  bad  with  them  that  I  don't  know  how  to  help 
them.  I  am  afraid  Porter,  with  all  his  energy,  will 
lose  some  of  his  finest  vessels.  I  have  just  sent  him 
some  boats  to  help  him."  The  boats,  however,  were 
saved  by  the  skill  and  energy  of  Colonel  Joseph  Bailey, 
the  chief-of-engineers  in  Franklin's  corps  of  Banks's 
army ;  by  whom  was  thrown  across  the  river  a  dam, 
which  raised  the  water  on  the  shoals  sufficiently  for 
the  boats  to  cross. 

A  more  pleasant  incident  occurred  to  vary  the 
sameness  of  the  blockade  days,  in  the  presentation 
to  the  admiral,  by  the  Union  League  Club  of  New 
York,  of  a  very  handsome  sword,  with  scabbard  of 
massive  gold  and  silver,  the  hilt  set  in  brilliants. 
The  gift  was  accompanied  by  a  letter  expressive  of 
the  givers'  appreciation  of  the  brilliant  services  ren- 
dered to  the  nation,  and  was  a  grateful  reminder  to 
Farragut,  then  watching  before  Mobile  for  his  last 
grapple  with  the  enemy  in  his  front,  that  his  fellow- 
countrymen  in  their  homes  were  not  wanting  in 
recognition  of  the  dangers  he  had  incurred,  nor  of 
those  he  was  still  facing  on  their  behalf. 

The  time  was  now  close  at  hand  when  the  weary 
and  anxious  waiting,  which  the  admiral  afterward  so 
feelingly  described,  was  to  be  exchanged  for  the 
more  vigorous  action  he  had  so  long  desired.     The 


MOBILE.  255 

co-operation  of  a  division  from  Canby's  army  was 
assured  toward  the  end  of  July;  and  at  the  same 
time  the  long-promised,  long-delayed  monitor  iron- 
clads began  to  arrive.  As  the  want  of  these  and  the 
presence  of  the  enemy's  ironclads  had  been  the  rea- 
sons which,  in  Farragut's  opinion,  had  made  neces- 
sary the  postponement  of  the  purely  naval  part  of 
the  combined  operation,  a  short  description  of  the 
vessels  which  formed  so  potent  an  element  in  his  cal- 
culations will  not  be  out  of  place. 

The  idea  of  the  monitor  type  of  ironclads,  which 
was  then  the  prevalent  one  in  the  United  States 
Navy,  was  brought  by  John  Ericsson  from  his  home 
in  Sweden,  where  it  had  been  suggested  to  him  by 
the  sight  of  the  rafts  with  a  house  upon  them  cross- 
ing the  waters  with  which  he  was  familiar.     In  its 
conception,  the  monitor  was   simply  a   round  fort, 
heavily  plated  with  iron,  resting  upon  a  raft  nearly 
flush  with  the  water,  and  provided  with  the  motive 
power  of  steam.     The  forts,  or  turrets,  as  they  are 
commonly  called,  might  be  one  or  more  in  number ; 
and  each  carried  usually  two  heavy  guns,  standing 
side  by  side  and  pointing  in  exactly  the  same  direc- 
tion, so  that  if  discharged  together  the  projectiles 
would  follow  parallel  courses.     Within  the  turret  the 
guns  could  be  turned  neither  to  the  right  nor  to  the 
left ;  if  such  a  change  of  aim  were  wished,  the  turret 
itself  was  revolved  by  steam  machinery  provided  for 
the  purpose.     When  loading,  the  port  through  which 
the  gun  was  fired  was  turned  away  from  the  enemy ; 
so  that  if  a  shot  happened  to  strike  at  that  time  it 
fell  on  the  solid  armor.     Above  the  gun-turret  there 
was  a  second  of  much  smaller  diameter,  which  did 
not  revolve.  It  was  also  heavily  plated  and  designed 


256  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

to  shelter  the  commanding  officer  and  those  charged 
with  the  steering  of  the  ship.  So  much  inconven- 
ience was,  however,  experienced  from  smoke  and  from 
concussion  when  these  steering  turrets  were  struck, 
and  their  dimensions  were  so  contracted,  that  many- 
captains  preferred  to  remain  outside,  where  they 
could  see  better,  their  orders  being  transmitted  to 
the  helmsmen  through  the  sight-holes  pierced  in  the 
armor.  Of  these  ironclads,  four  accompanied  Farra- 
gut  in  his  attack  upon  Mobile  Bay.  Two,  the  Te- 
cumseh  and  Manhattan,  came  from  the  Atlantic 
coast,  and  were  sea-going  monitors.  They  had  each 
but  one  turret,  in  which  they  carried  two  fifteen-inch 
guns,  the  heaviest  then  in  use  afloat.  The  other  two 
were  river  monitors,  built  at  St.  Louis  for  service  in 
the  Mississippi.  They  were  consequently  of  light 
draught,  so  much  so  that  to  obtain  the  necessary  mo- 
tive power  they  each  had  four  screw  propellers  of 
small  diameter,  and  they  carried  four  eleven-inch 
guns  in  two  turrets.  Their  names  were  the  Winne- 
bago and  the  Chickasaw.  The  armor  of  the  two 
single-turreted  monitors  was  ten  inches  thick,  and 
that  of  the  river  monitors  eight  and  a  half  inches. 

The  Tennessee,  to  which  these  were  to  be  op- 
posed, was  a  vessel  of  different  type,  and  one  to 
which  the  few  ironclads  built  by  the  Confederates 
for  the  most  part  conformed — called  commonly  the 
broadside  ironclad,  because  the  guns,  like  those  of 
ships-of-war  generally,  were  disposed  chiefly  along 
the  sides.  Her  hull  was  built  at  Selma,  on  the  Ala- 
bama River,  and  thence  towed  to  Mobile  to  be  plated ; 
it  being  desirable  to  take  her  down  the  river  while 
as  light  as  possible.  She  was  two  hundred  and  nine 
feet  long  and  forty-eight  feet  wide,  drawing,  as  has 


MOBILE.  257 

been   said,  fourteen  feet  when   loaded.    Upon   her 
deck,  midway  between  the  bow  and  the  stern,  was  a 
house  seventy-nine  feet  long,  whose  sides  and  ends 
sloped  at  an  angle  of  thirty-four  degrees  and  were 
covered  with   iron  plating,  six  inches  thick  on  the 
forward  end  and  five  inches  thick  on  the  other  end 
and  the  sides.     With  the  inclination  given,  a  cannon 
ball  striking  would  be  likely  to  be  turned  upward  by 
the  iron  surface,  instead  of   penetrating.     The  slop- 
ing sides  of  the  house  were  carried  down  beyond  the 
point  where  they  met  those  of  the  vessel,  until  two 
feet  below  the  water.     There  they  turned  and  struck 
in  at  the  same  angle  toward    the  hull,  which  they 
again  met  six  or  seven  feet  under  water.     Thus  was 
formed  all  round  the  ship  a  knuckle,  which,  being 
filled  in  solid  and  covered  with  iron,  was  a  very  per- 
fect protection   against  any  but  the  most  powerful 
ram.     The  Tennessee  herself  was  fitted  with  a  beak 
and  intended  to  ram,  but,  owing  to  the  slender  re- 
sources of   the  Confederacy,  her  engines  were   too 
weak  to  be  effective  for  that  purpose.     She  could 
only  steam  six  knots.     Her  battery,  however,  was 
well  selected  and   powerful.      She  carried  on   each 
side  two  six-inch  rifles,  and  at  each  end  one  seven- 
inch  rifle— six  guns  in  all.     There  were,  besides  the 
Tennessee,   three  wooden    gunboats,   and    Farragut 
was  informed  that  there  were  also  four  ironclads; 
but  this,  as  regards  the  lower  bay  at  least,  was  a  mis- 
take. 

It  will  be  seen  from  this  account,  and  from  the 
description  before  given  of  Mobile  Bay,  that  the  ad- 
vantages of  the  Tennessee  were  her  great  protective 
strength,  a  draught  which  enabled  her  to  choose  her 
own  position  relatively  to  the  heaviest  of  the  enemy's 


258 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


ships,  and  the  superior  range  and  penetrative  power 
of  her  guns,  being  rifles;  for  while  there  were  can- 
non of  this  type  in  the  United  States  fleet,  the  great 
majority  of  them  were  smooth  bores.  The  ironclads 
opposed  to  her  had  only  smooth-bore  guns,  incapable 
of  penetrating  her  side,  and  therefore  only  able  to 
reduce  her  by  a  continued  pounding,  which  might 
shake  her  frame  to  pieces.  The  chief  defects  of  the 
Tennessee  as  a  harbor-defense  ship,  for  which  she 
was  mainly  intended,  were  her  very  inferior  speed, 
and  the  fact  that,  by  an  oversight,  her  steering  chains 
were  left  exposed  to  the  enemy's  shot.  This  com- 
bination of  strong  and  weak  points  constituted  her 
tactical  qualities,  which  should  have  determined  the 
use  made  of  her  in  the  impending  battle. 

Although  the  ironclads  were,  as  Farragut  es- 
teemed them,  the  controlling  factors  in  the  defense 
and  attack,  the  Tennessee  was  by  no  means  the  only 
very  formidable  obstacle  in  the  way  of  his  success. 
Except  the  ironclads,  the  fleet  he  carried  into  Mobile 
Bay  was  not  substantially  stronger  than  that  with 
which  he  fought  his  way  up  the  Mississippi ;  but 
since  that  time  the  enemy  had  done  much  to 
strengthen  the  works  which  he  now  had  to  en- 
counter. The  number  of  heavy  guns  in  Fort  Morgan 
bearing  upon  the  channel  was  thirty-eight.  In  Fort 
Jackson,  excluding  the  obsolete  caliber  of  twenty- 
four  pounders,  there  were  twenty-seven,  and  in  St. 
Philip  twenty-one — total,  forty-eight ;  but  in  caliber 
and  efficiency  those  of  Morgan  were  distinctly  su- 
perior to  those  of  the  river  forts,  and  it  may  be  con- 
sidered an  advantage  that  the  power  was  here  con- 
centrated in  a  single  work  under  a  single  hand.  The 
gunners  of  Fort  Morgan,  moreover,  had  not   been 


MOBILE. 


259 


exposed  to  the  exhausting  harassment  of  a  most 
efficient  bombardment,  extending  over  the  six  days 
prior  to  the  final  demand  upon  their  energies.  They 
came  fresh  to  their  work,  and  suffered  during  its  con- 
tinuance from  no  distraction  except  that  caused  by 
the  fire  of  the  fleet  itself.  While,  therefore,  Fort 
Gaines  could  not  be  considered  to  support  Morgan 
by  any  deterrent  or  injurious  influence  upon  the 
United  States  fleet,  the  latter  work  was  by  itself  su- 
perior in  offensive  power  to  the  two  Mississippi 
forts. 

To  the  general  defense  the  Confederates  had 
here  brought  two  other  factors,  one  of  a  most  im- 
portant and  as  yet  unknown  power.  As  the  sand 
bank  extending  eastward  from  Dauphin  Island  was 
to  some  extent  passable  by  light  gunboats,  a  line  of 
piles  was  driven  in  the  direction  of  Fort  Morgan 
nearly  to  the  edge  of  the  channel.  Where  the  piles 
stopped  a  triple  line  of  torpedoes  began,  following 
the  same  general  course,  and  ending  only  at  a  hun- 
dred yards  from  Fort  Morgan,  where  a  narrow 
opening  was  left  for  the  passage  of  friendly  vessels 
— blockade  runners  and  others.  Had  the  electrical 
appliances  of  the'Confederacy  been  at  that  time  more 
highly  developed,  this  narrow  gap  would  doubtless 
also  have  been  filled  with  mines,  whose  explosion  de- 
pended upon  operators  ashore.  As  it  was,  the  torpedo 
system  employed  at  Mobile,  with  some  few  possible 
exceptions,  was  solely  mechanical ;  the  explosion 
depended  upon  contact  by  the  passing  vessel  with 
the  mine.  To  insure  this,  the  line  was  triple;  those 
in  the  second  and  third  rows  not  being  in  the  align- 
ment of  the  first,  but  so  placed  as  to  fill  the  inter- 
stices  and    make   almost    impracticable   the   avoid- 


26o  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

ance  of  all  three  torpedoes  belonging  to  the  same 
group. 

These  arrangements  were  sufficiently  well  known 
to  Farragut  through  information  brought  by  refu- 
gees or  deserters.  They — the  power  of  the  works, 
the  disposition  of  the  torpedoes,  the  Tennessee  and 
her  companions — constituted  the  elements  of  the 
problem  which  he  had  to  solve  to  get  his  fleet  safely 
past  the  obstacles  into  the  bay.  Although  not  dis- 
posed to  lay  as  much  stress  as  others  upon  the  tor- 
pedoes, which  were  then  but  an  imperfectly  devel- 
oped weapon,  prudence  dictated  to  him  the  necessity 
of  passing  between  them  and  the  fort ;  and  this  was 
fortunately  in  accordance  with  the  sound  policy 
which  dictates  that  wooden  vessels  engaging  per- 
manent works,  less  liable  than  themselves  to  pene- 
tration, should  get  as  close  as  possible  to  the  enemy, 
whose  fire  they  may  then  beat  down  by  the  rapidity 
of  their  own.  There  were  certain  black  buoys  float- 
ing across  the  channel,  between  the  piles  and  Fort 
Morgan,  and  it  was  understood  that  these  marked 
the  position  of  the  torpedoes.  The  admiral's  flag- 
lieutenant,  Lieutenant  (now  Captain)  John  C.  Wat- 
son, had  examined  these  buoys  in  several  nightly 
reconnaissances;  but,  although  he  had  not  been  able 
to  discover  any  of  the  mines,  the  assurances  of  their 
existence  could  not  be  disregarded.  His  examina- 
tion doubtless  had  some  effect  upon  the  admiral's 
instant  determination,  in  the  unforeseen  emergency 
that  arose  during  the  action,  to  pass  over  the  spot 
where  the  hidden  dangers  were  said  to  lie  ;  but  in  the 
dispositions  for  battle  the  order  was  given  for  the 
fleet  to  pass  eastward  of  the  easternmost  buoy,  where 
no  torpedoes  would  be  found. 


MOBILE.  26l 

The  closeness  of  this  approach,  however,  and  the 
fact  that  the  line  of  the  channel  led  in  at  right  angles 
to  the  entrance,  had  the  disadvantage  of  obstructing 
the  fire  of  the  broadside  wooden  vessels,  in  which  the 
offensive  strength  of  the  fleet,  outside  the  monitors, 
consisted.     The  guns  of  those  ships,  being  disposed 
along  the  sides,  were  for  the  most  part  able  to  bear 
only  upon  an  enemy  abreast  of  them,  with  a  small 
additional  angle  of  train  toward  ahead  or  astern.    It 
was  not,  therefore,  until  nearly  up  with  the  fort  that 
these  numerous  cannon  would  come   into  play,  and 
exercise  that  preponderating  effect  which  had  driven 
off   the  gunners  at    Forts   St.   Philip    and   Jackson. 
This  inconvenience  results  from  the  construction  of 
such  ships,  and  can  only  be  overcome  by  a  move- 
ment of  the  helm  causing  the  ship  to  diverge  from 
her  course;  a  resort  which  led  a  witty  Frenchman  to 
say  that  a  ship-of-war  so  situated  is  like  a  shark, 
that  can   only   bite   by   turning  on  its   back.     The 
remedy,  however  applicable  under  certain   circum- 
stances and  in  the  case  of  a  single  ship,  causes  de- 
lay, and  therefore  is  worse  than  the  evil  for  a  fleet 
advancing  to   the  attack  of  forts,  where  the  object 
must  be  to  close  as  rapidly  as  possible.     There  are, 
however,  on  board  such  vessels  a  few  guns,  mounted 
forward    and   called    chase   guns,    which,    from   the 
rounding  of  the  bows,  bear  sooner  than  the  others 
upon  the  enemy  toward  whom  they  are  moving.    To 
support  these  and  concentrate  from  the  earliest  mo- 
ment as  effective  a  fire  as  possible  upon  the  works, 
Farragut  brought  his  ironclads  inside  of  the  wooden 
vessels,  and  abreast  the  four  leaders  of  that  column. 
The  heavy  guns  of  the  monitors  could  fire  all  around 
the  horizon,  from  right  ahead  to  right  astern ;  and 


262  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

the  disposition  had  the  additional  great  advantage 
that,  in  the  critical  passage  inside  the  torpedo  buoys, 
these  all-important  vessels  would  be  on  the  safer 
side,  the  wooden  ships  interposing  between  them  and 
the  sunken  dangers,  which  threatened  an  injury  far 
more  instantaneous  and  vital  than  any  to  be  feared 
from  the  enemy's  shot  and  shell. 

The  position  of  the  ironclads  being  determined 
by  these  considerations,  the  arrangement  of  the 
wooden  ships  for  the  attack  conformed  to  the  ad- 
miral's principle,  that  the  greatest  security  was  to  be 
found  in  concentrating  upon  the  enemy  the  heaviest 
fire  attainable  from  his  own  guns.  As  at  Port  Hud- 
son, a  large  proportion  of  the  fourteen  vessels  he 
purposed  to  take  in  with  him  were  of  the  gunboat 
class,  or  a  little  above  it.  Resort  was  accordingly 
again  had  to  the  double  column  adopted  there;  the 
seven  ships  that  had  the  most  powerful  batteries 
forming  the  right  column  to  engage  Fort  Morgan. 
The  lighter  ones  were  distributed  in  the  other  col- 
umn, and  lashed  each  to  one  of  the  heavier  ships,  in 
an  order  probably  designed,  though  it  is  not  ex- 
pressly so  stated,  to  make  the  combined  steam  power 
of  the  several  pairs  as  nearly  equal  as  possible. 
Among  the  gunboats  there  were  three  that  had  side- 
wheel  engines,  the  machinery  of  which  is  necessarily 
more  above  water,  and  so  more  exposed  than  that  of 
a  screw — a  condition  which,  although  their  batteries 
were  powerful  for  their  tonnage,  emphasized  the  ne- 
cessity of  sheltering  them  behind  other  ships  during 
the  furious  few  minutes  of  passing  under  the  guns  of 
the  fort. 

The  sum  of  these  various  considerations  thus 
resulted   in   the   fleet    advancing    into   action   in   a 


MOBILE.  263 

column  of  pairs,  in  which  the  heaviest  ships  led  in 
the  fighting  column.     To  this  the  admiral  was  prob- 
ably induced  by  the  reflection  that  the  first  broad- 
sides are  half  the  battle,  and  the  freshest  attack  of 
the  enemy  should  be  met   by  the  most  vigorous  re- 
sistance on  his  own  part  ;  but   it  is   open  to  doubt 
whether    one  of   these    powerful   vessels  would  not 
have  been  better  placed  in  the  rear.     Upon   a  reso- 
lute enemy,  the  effect  of  each  ship  is  simply  to  drive 
him  to  cover  while  she  passes,  to  resume  his  activity 
when  relieved  from   the  pressure  of    her  fire.     The 
case  is  not  strictly  similar  to  the  advance  of  a  column 
of  troops  upon  a  fortified   position,  where  the  head 
does  the  most  of  the  fighting,  and   the  rear  mainly 
contributes  inertia  to  the  movement  of  the  mass.     It 
is  at  least  open  to  argument  that  a  fire  progressively 
diminishing  from  van  to  rear  is  not,  for  the  passage 
of   permanent  works,  a   disposition    as    good   as   a 
weight  of  battery  somewhat  more  equally  distributed, 
with,  however,  a  decided  preponderance  in  the  van. 
The  last  of  the  ships  in  this  column  received  a  shot 
in  the  boiler,  which  entirely  disabled  her— an  acci- 
dent that  may  have  been  purely  fortuitous,  and  to 
which  any  one  of  her  predecessors  was  in  a  degree 
liable,  but  also  possibly  due  to  the  greater  activity 
of  the  enemy  when  no  longer  scourged  by  the  more 
powerful  batteries   which  preceded.     She  was  saved 
from  the  more  serious  results  of  this  disaster,  and 
the  squadron  spared  the  necessity  of  rallying  to  her 
support,  by  the  other  admirable  precautions  dictated 
by  Farragut's  forethought. 

Subjected  thus  to  analysis,  there  seems  much  to 
praise  and  very  little  to  criticise  in  the  tactical  dis- 
positions made  by  the  admiral  on  this  momentous 


264 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


occasion.  But  the  tactical  dispositions,  though  most 
important,  are  not  the  only  considerations;  it  is  the 
part  of  the  commander-in-chief  to  take  advantage  of 
any  other  circumstances  that  may  make  in  his 
favor.  Until  the  forts  were  passed  the  character  of 
the  bottom  left  Farragut  no  choice  as  to  the  direc- 
tion of  his  attack.  There  was  but  one  road  to 
take,  and  the  only  other  question  was  the  order  in 
which  to  arrange  his  ships.  But  there  were  two 
conditions  not  entirely  within  his  control,  yet  sure 
to  occur  in  time,  which  he  considered  too  advan- 
tageous to  be  overlooked.  He  wanted  a  flood  tide, 
which  would  help  a  crippled  vessel  past  the  works ; 
and  also  a  west  wind,  which  would  blow  the  smoke 
from  the  scene  of  battle  and  upon  Fort  Morgan, 
thereby  giving  to  the  pilots,  upon  whom  so  much  de- 
pended, and  to  the  gunners  of  the  ships,  the  advan- 
tage of  clearer  sight.  The  time  of  the  tide,  in  most 
quarters  a  matter  of  simple  calculation,  is  in  the 
Gulf  often  affected  by  the  wind.  The  wind,  on  the 
other  hand,  in  the  summer  months,  blows  from  the 
south  during  the  early  morning,  and  then  works 
round  to  the  westward ;  so  that  the  chances  were  in 
favor  of  his  obtaining  his  wishes. 

The  dispositions  taken  by  the  Confederates  to 
meet  the  assault  which  they  saw  to  be  impending  were 
more  simple ;  they  having  but  a  small  mobile  force, 
and  their  fortifications  being  tied  to  their  places.  A 
seaport  liable  to  attack  is  a  battle-field,  in  utilizing 
whose  natural  features,  so  as  to  present  the  strongest 
tactical  combination  against  entrance  or  subjection 
by  an  enemy,  the  skill  of  the  engineer  is  shown  ; 
but,  unlike  battle-fields  in  general,  much  time  and 
study  is  allowed  to  develop  his  plans.     In  the  case 


MOBILE.  265 

of  Mobile  Bay,  the  narrow  and  direct  character  of 
the  approach  by  the  main  ship  channel  left  little  op- 
portunity for  skill  to  display  itself.  To  place  at  the 
end  of  Mobile  Point  the  heaviest  fort,  enfilading  the 
channel,  and  to  confine  the  latter  to  the  narrowest 
bed,  compelling  the  assailant  into  the  most  unfavor- 
able route,  were  measures  too  obvious  to  escape  the 
most  incapable.  To  obtain  the  utmost  advantage 
from  this  approach  of  the  enemy,  the  little  naval 
force  was  advanced  from  Mobile  Point,  so  as  to 
stretch  at  right  angles  across  the  channel  just  within 
the  torpedo  line.  There,  without  being  incommoded 
by  the  fire  of  the  fort,  or  in  any  way  embarrassing  it, 
they  secured  a  clear  sweep  for  their  guns,  raking 
their  opponents;  who,  being  for  the  time  unable  to 
deviate  from  their  course,  could  not  reply  to  this 
galling  attack.  By  gradually  retiring,  the  Confed- 
erate gunboats  could  retain  this  superiority  during 
the  advance  of  their  foes,  until  the  latter  reached 
the  wide  hole  within,  where  there  was  room  to  ma- 
noeuvre. This  position  and  the  subsequent  course  of 
action  described  comprise  the  tactical  management 
of  the  Southern  vessels  during  the  engagement.  It 
was  well  devised,  and  made  probably  the  best  use  of 
the  advantages  of  the  ground  possible  to  so  inferior 
a  force.  The  Tennessee  took  position  with  them, 
but  her  after  action  was  different. 

As  the  day  of  the  last  and,  with  the  exception  of 
the  Essex  fight  of  his  boyhood,  the  most  desperate 
battle  of  his  life  drew  near,  a  certain  solemnity — one 
might  almost  say  depression — is  perceptible  in  the 
home  letters  of  the  admiral.  Had  the  action  proved 
fatal  to  him  it  could  scarcely  have  failed  to  attract 
the    attention    which    is   similarly    arrested   by   the 


266  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

chastened  tone  of  Nelson's  life  and  writing  immedi- 
ately before  Trafalgar ;  and  although  there  is  cer- 
tainly none  of  that  outspoken  foreboding  which 
marked  the  last  day  of  the  English  hero,  Farragut's 
written  words  are  in  such  apparent  contrast  to  the 
usual  buoyant,  confident  temper  of  the  man,  that 
they  would  readily  have  been  construed  into  one  of 
those  presentiments  with  which  military  annals 
abound.  "  With  such  a  mother,"  he  writes  to  his  son 
a  week  before  the  battle,  "  you  could  not  fail  to  have 
proper  sentiments  of  religion  and  virtue.  I  feel  that 
I  have  done  my  duty  by  you  both,  as  far  as  the 
weakness  of  my  nature  would  allow.  I  have  been 
devoted  to  you  both,  and  when  it  pleases  God  to 
take  me  hence  I  shall  feel  that  I  have  done  my 
duty.  I  am  not  conscious  of  ever  having  wronged 
any  one,  and  have  tried  to  do  as  much  good  as  I 
could.  Take  care  of  your  mother  if  I  should  go,  and 
may  God  bless  and  preserve  you  both  !  "  The  day 
before  the  action  he  wrote  the  following  letter  to  his 
wife,  which,  as  his  son  remarks  in  his  Life  of  the 
admiral,  shows  that  he  appreciated  the  desperate 
work  before  him : 

"  Flag-ship  Hartford, 

"Off  Mobile,  August  4,  1864. 

"  My  dearest  Wife  :  I  write  and  leave  this  letter 
for  you.  I  am  going  into  Mobile  in  the  morning,  if 
God  is  my  leader,  as  I  hope  he  is,  and  in  him  I  place 
my  trust.  If  he  thinks  it  is  the  proper  place  for  me 
to  die,  I  am  ready  to  submit  to  his  will  in  that  as  in 
all  other  things.  My  great  mortification  is  that  my 
vessels,  the  ironclads,  were  not  ready  to  have  gone 
in  yesterday.     The  army  landed  last  night,  and  are 


MOBILE.  267 

in  full  view  of  us  this  morning,  and  the  Tecumseh 
has  not  yet  arrived  from  Pensacola. 

"  God  bless  and  preserve  you,  my  darling,  and 
my  dear  boy,  if  anything  should  happen  to  me ;  and 
may  his  blessings  also  rest  upon  your  dear  mother, 
and  all  your  sisters  and  their  children. 

"  Your  devoted  and  affectionate  husband,  who 
never  for  one  moment  forgot  his  love,  duty,  or 
fidelity  to  you,  his  devoted  and  best  of  wives, 

"  D.  G.  Farragut." 

A  more  touching  and  gratifying  testimony  of  un- 
wavering attachment,  after  more  than  twenty  years 
of  marriage,  no  wife  could  desire.  It  was  an  attach- 
ment also  not  merely  professed  in  words,  but  evi- 
denced by  the  whole  course  of  his  life  and  conduct. 
Infidelity  or  neglect  of  a  wife  was,  in  truth,  in  the 
estimation  of  Admiral  Farragut,  one  of  the  most 
serious  of  blots  upon  a  man's  character,  drawing  out 
always  his  bitterest  condemnation. 

A  pleasing  glimpse  is  at  this  same  period  afforded 
of  his  relations  to  the  surviving  members  of  his 
father's  family,  who  still  remained  in  or  near  New 
Orleans,  and  from  whom  by  the  conditions  of  his  pro- 
fession he  had  been  separated  since  his  childhood. 
"  My  dear  sister,"  he  writes,  "  has  sent  me  a  Holy 
Virgin  like  the  one  Rose  gave  me.  She  said  it  was 
blessed  by  the  archbishop,  who  said  I  was  good  to 
the  priests.  I  only  tell  you  this,"  adds  the  admiral 
dryly,  "  to  show  you  that  they  did  not  succeed  in 
impressing  the  bishop  with  the  idea  that  I  had 
robbed  the  church  at  Point  Coupee."  This  is  not 
the  only  mention  of  his  sister  during  this  time,  and 
it  is  evident  that  two  years'  occupation  of  New  Or- 


268  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

leans  by  the  Union  forces  had  done  much  to  mollify 
public  sentiment ;  for  immediately  after  the  sur- 
render he  had  written  home,  "  It  is  a  strange  thought 
that  I  am  here  among  my  relatives,  and  yet  not  one 
has  dared  to  say  '  I  am  happy  to  see  you.'  " 

On  the  8th  of  July  General  Canby,  accompanied 
by  General  Granger,  who  was  to  have  immediate 
charge  of  the  land  operations  against  the  Mobile 
forts,  had  called  upon  the  admiral  to  make  the  pre- 
liminary arrangements.  Somewhat  later  Canby  sent 
word  that  he  could  not  spare  men  enough  to  invest 
both  Gaines  and  Morgan  at  the  same  time ;  and  at 
Farragut's  suggestion  it  was  then  decided  to  land 
first  upon  Dauphin  Island,  he  undertaking  to  send  a 
gunboat  to  cover  the  movement.  Granger  visited 
him  again  on  the  ist  of  August,  and  as  the  admiral 
then  had  reason  to  expect  the  last  of  his  monitors  by 
the  4th,  that  day  was  fixed  for  the  attack  and  land- 
ing. Granger  was  up  to  time,  and  his  troops  were 
put  ashore  on  the  evening  of  the  3d;  but  the  Te- 
cumseh  had  not  arrived  from  Pensacola.  The  other 
three  had  been  on  hand  since  the  ist,  anchored 
under  the  shelter  of  Sand  Island,  three  miles  from 
Fort  Morgan. 

To  Farragut's  great  mortification  he  was  unable 
to  carry  out  his  part  of  the  programme ;  but  on  the 
evening  of  the  4th  the  Tecumseh  arrived,  together 
with  the  Richmond,  which  had  been  for  a  few  days 
at  Pensacola  preparing  for  the  fight.  "  I  regret  to 
have  detained  you,  admiral,"  said  Craven,  the  com- 
mander of  the  monitor,  "  but  had  it  not  been  for 
Captain  Jenkins  (of  the  Richmond),  God  knows 
when  I  should  have  been  here.  When  your  order 
came  I  had  not  received  an  ounce  of  coal."     In  his 


MOBILE.  269 

report  of  the  battle,  Farragut  warmly  acknowledged 
the  zeal  and  energy  of  Jenkins,  to  which  he  owed 
the  seasonable  arrival  of  this  important  re-enforce- 
ment. "He  takes,"  he  said,  "as  much  interest  in  the 
fleet  now  as  formerly  when  he  was  my  chief-of-staff. 
He  is  also  commanding  officer  of  the  second  division 
of  my  squadron,  and  as  such  has  shown  ability  and 
the  most  untiring  zeal.  ...  I  feel  I  should  not  be 
doing  my  duty  did  I  not  call  the  attention  of  the 
Department  to  an  officer  who  has  performed  all  his 
various  duties  with  so  much  zeal  and  fidelity."  Far- 
ragut has  been  charged  with  failure  to  notice  ade- 
quately the  services  of  those  under  him;  but  the 
foregoing  words,  which  are  not  by  any  means  un- 
paralleled in  his  dispatches,  show  that  he  could 
praise  cordially  when  he  saw  fitting  occasion. 

The  night  of  August  4th  was  quiet,  the  sea 
smooth,  with  a  light  air  just  rippling  the  surface  of 
the  water.  At  sundown  it  had  been  raining  hard, 
but  toward  midnight  cleared  off,  the  weather  be- 
coming hot  and  calm.  Later  on  a  light  air  again 
sprang  up  from  the  southwest.  The  admiral  was  not 
well,  and  slept  restlessly.  About  three  in  the  morn- 
ing he  called  his  servant  and  sent  him  to  find  out 
how  the  wind  was.  Learning  that  it  was  from  the 
quarter  he  wished,  he  said,  "  Then  we  will  go  in  in 
the  morning."  Between  four  and  five  the  lighter  ves- 
sels got  under  way  and  went  alongside  those  to 
which  they  were  to  be  lashed.  When  daybreak  was 
reported  Farragut  was  already  at  breakfast  with  the 
captain  of  the  Hartford,  Percival  Drayton,  and  the 
fleet-surgeon,  Dr.  James  C.  Palmer,  who  had  left  his 
usual  post  at  the  hospital  in  Pensacola  to  superin- 
tend the  care  of  those  wounded  in  the  approaching 


270 


ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 


battle.  It  was  then  about  half-past  five  ;  the  couples 
were  all  formed,  and  the  admiral,  still  sipping  his 
tea,  said  quietly,  "  Well,  Drayton,  we  might  as  well 
get  under  way."  The  signal  was  made  and  at  once 
acknowledged  by  the  vessels,  which  had  all  been 
awaiting  it,  and  the  seamen  began  to  heave  round 
on  the  cables.  The  taking  their  assigned  positions 
in  the  column  by  the  different  pairs  consumed  some 
time,  during  which  the  flag-ship  crossed  the  bar,  at 
ten  minutes  past  six.  At  half-past  six  the  column  of 
wooden  vessels  was  formed,  and  the  monitors  were 
standing  down  from  Sand  Island  into  their  stations, 
in  gaining  which  some  little  further  delay  was 
caused.  At  this  time  all  the  ships  hoisted  the  United 
States  flag,  not  only  at  the  peak  where  it  commonly 
flies,  but  at  every  mast-head  as  well. 

It  had  been  the  intention  of  the  admiral  to  lead 
the  column  of  wooden  vessels  with  his  own  ship  ;  but 
at  the  earnest  request  of  many  officers,  who  thought 
the  fleet  should  not  incur  the  greater  risk  consequent 
upon  having  its  commander  in  so  exposed  a  position, 
he  reluctantly  consented  to  waive  his  purpose,  and 
the  Brooklyn  was  appointed  to  this  post  of  honor. 
To  this  selection  contributed  also  the  fact  that  the 
Brooklyn  had  more  than  the  usual  number  of  chase 
guns,  the  advantage  of  which  has  been  explained, 
and  also  an  arrangement  for  picking  up  torpedoes. 
Bitterly  afterward  did  Farragut  regret  his  yielding 
on  this  occasion.  "  I  believe  this  to  be  an  error," 
he  wrote  in  his  official  report  of  the  battle;  "for, 
apart  from  the  fact  that  exposure  is  one  of  the 
penalties  of  rank  in  the  navy,  it  will  always  be  the 
aim  of  the  enemy  to  destroy  the  flag-ship,  and,  as 
will  appear  in  the   sequel,  such   attempt  was  very 


MOBILE. 


271 


persistently  made."  "  The  fact  is,"  he  said  in  one 
of  his  letters  home,  "  had  I  been  the  obstinate  man 
you  sometimes  think  me,  I  would  have  led  in  the 
fleet  and  saved  the  Tecumseh  " — meaning,  doubtless, 
that,  by  interposing  between  that  important  vessel 
and  the  buoy  which  marked  the  torpedo  line,  he 
would  have  prevented  the  error  which  caused  her 
loss.  Some  notes  upon  the  action  found  afterward 
among  his  papers  contain  the  same  opinion,  more 
fully  and  deliberately  expressed.  "Allowing  the 
Brooklyn  to  go  ahead  was  a  great  error.  It  lost 
not  only  the  Tecumseh,  but  many  valuable  lives,  by 
keeping  us  under  the  fire  of  the  forts  for  thirty  min- 
utes;  whereas,  had  I  led,  as  I  intended  to  do,  I 
would  have  gone  inside  the  buoys,  and  all  would 
have  followed  me."  The  Hartford  took  the  second 
place  in  the  column,  having  secured  on  her  port  or 
off  side  the  side-wheel  gunboat  Metacomet,  Lieu- 
tenant-Commander James  E.  Jouett. 

While  the  monitors  were  taking  their  stations, 
the  Tecumseh,  which  led  their  column,  fired  two 
shots  at  the  fort.  At  five  minutes  before  seven,  the 
order  of  battle  now  being  fully  formed,  the  fleet 
went  ahead.  Ten  minutes  later  Fort  Morgan  opened 
fire  upon  the  Brooklyn,  which  at  once  replied  with 
her  bow  guns,  followed  very  soon  by  those  of  the 
fighting  column  of  wooden  ships;  a  brisk  cannonade 
ensuing  between  them,  the  monitors,  and  the  fort.  In 
order  to  see  more  clearly,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
have  immediately  by  him  the  persons  upon  whom  he 
most  depended  for  governing  the  motions  of  the 
ship,  Farragut  had  taken  his  position  in  the  port 
main-rigging.  Here  he  had  near  him  Captain  Jouett, 
standing  on  the  wheel-house  of  the   Metacomet,  and 


272 


ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 


also  the  pilot,  who,  as  at  Port  Hudson,  had  been  sta- 
tioned aloft,  on  this  occasion  in  the  maintop,  so  as 
to  see  well  over  the  smoke.  As  this  increased  and 
rose  higher,  Farragut  went  up  step  by  step  until  he 
was  close  under  the  maintop.  Here,  without  losing 
touch  with  Jouett,  he  was  very  near  the  pilot,  had 
the  whole  scene  of  battle  spread  out  under  his  eyes, 
and  at  the  same  time,  by  bracing  himself  against  the 
futtock  shrouds,  was  able  to  use  his  spy-glass  more 
freely.  Captain  Drayton,  however,  being  alarmed 
lest  he  might  be  thrown  to  the  deck,  directed  a  sea- 
man to  carry  a  lashing  aloft  and  secure  him  to  the 
rigging,  which  the  admiral,  after  a  moment's  remon- 
strance, permitted.  By  such  a  simple  and  natural 
train  of  causes  was  Farragut  brought  to  and  secured 
in  a  position  which  he,  like  any  other  commander-in- 
chief,  had  sought  merely  in  order  better  to  see  the 
operations  he  had  to  direct ;  but  popular  fancy  was 
caught  by  the  circumstance,  and  to  his  amusement 
he  found  that  an  admiral  lashed  to  the  rigging  was 
invested  with  a  significance  equivalent  to  that  of 
colors  nailed  to  the  mast.  "  The  illustrated  papers 
are  very  amusing,"  he  wrote  home.  "  Leslie  has  me 
lashed  up  to  the  mast  like  a  culprit,  and  says,  '  It  is 
the  way  officers  will  hereafter  go  into  battle,  etc' 
You  understand,  I  was  only  standing  in  the  rigging 
with  a  rope  that  dear  boy  Watson  had  brought  me 
up,"  (this  was  later  in  the  action,  when  the  admiral 
had  shifted  his  position),  "  saying  that  if  I  would  stand 
there  I  had  better  secure  myself  against  falling;  and 
I  thanked  him  for  his  consideration,  and  took  a  turn 
around  and  over  the  shrouds  and  around  my  body 
for  fear  of  being  wounded,  as  shots  were  flying 
rather  thickly." 


MOBILE.  273 

Shortly  after  the  monitors  and  the  bow  guns  of 
the  fleet  began  firing,  the  enemy's  gunboats  and  the 
Tennessee  moved  out  from  behind  Morgan  and  took 
their  position  enfilading  the  channel.  Twenty  min- 
utes later,  through  the  advance  of  the  column,  the 
broadsides  of  the  leading  ships  began  to  bear  upon 
the  fort ;  and  as  these  heavy  batteries  vomited 
their  iron  rain  the  fire  of  the  defense  visibly 
slackened.  Amid  the  scene  of  uproar  and  slaughter, 
in  which  the  petty  Confederate  flotilla,  thanks  to  its 
position  of  vantage,  was  playing  a  deadly  part  quite 
out  of  proportion  to  its  actual  strength,  the  Tecum- 
seh  alone  was  silent.  After  the  first  two  shots  fired 
by  her,  which  were  rather  the  signal  of  warning  than 
the  opening  of  the  battle,  she  had  loaded  her  two 
guns  with  steel  shot,  backed  by  the  heaviest  charge 
of  powder  allowed,  and,  thus  prepared,  reserved  her 
fire  for  the  Tennessee  alone.  "I  believe,"  wrote 
Farragut  in  a  private  letter,  "  that  the  Tecumseh 
would  have  gone  up  and  grappled  with  and  captured 
the  Tennessee.     Craven's  heart  was  bent  upon  it." 

The  two  columns,  of  ironclads  and  of  wooden 
vessels  lashed  together  in  pairs,  were  now  approach- 
ing the  line  of  torpedoes  and  the  narrow  entrance 
through  which  lay  the  path  of  safety  ;  and  the  broad- 
sides of  the  heavy  sloops  which  led— the  Brooklyn, 
the  Hartford,  the  Richmond— supported  by  the  less 
numerous  but  still  powerful  batteries  following,  and 
by  the  guns  of  the  turreted  ironclads,  overbore  the 
fire  of  the  works.  All  promised  fairly,  provided  the 
leaders  of  the  two  columns  pushed  rapidly  and  un- 
hesitatingly in  the  direction  assigned  them.  But 
almost  at  the  same  moment  doubt  seized  them  both, 
and  led  to  a  double  disaster.    As  Craven,  leading  the 


274  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

monitor  column,  and  then  about  three  hundred  yards 
in  advance  of  the  Brooklyn,  drew  up  to  the  buoy,  to 
the  eastward  of  which  he  had  been  directed  to  go, 
he  saw  it  so  nearly  in  line  with  the  point  beyond 
that  he  could  not  believe  it  possible  to  pass.  "It  is 
impossible  that  the  admiral  means  us  to  go  inside 
that  buoy,"  he  said  to  the  pilot ;  "  I  can  not  turn  my 
ship."  Just  then  the  Tennessee  moved  a  little  ahead, 
to  the  westward ;  and  Craven,  under  the  double  im- 
pulse of  his  doubt  and  of  his  fear  lest  the  hostile 
ironclad  should  escape  him,  changed  his  course  to 
the  left  and  pushed  straight  for  her,  the  Tecumseh 
heading  to  pass  the  buoy  on  the  wrong  side. 

The  movement  thus  indicated,  if  followed  by  the 
succeeding  monitors,  would  throw  that  column  across 
the  path  of  the  wooden  ships  if  the  latter  endeavored 
to  obey  their  orders  to  pass  east  of  the  buoy.  At  the 
same  moment  there  were  seen  from  the  Brooklyn,  in 
the  water  ahead,  certain  objects  which  were  taken 
to  be  buoys  for  torpedoes.  The  ship  was  at  once 
stopped  and  backed,  coming  down  upon  the  Hart- 
ford, her  next  astern,  which  also  stopped,  but  did 
not  reverse  her  engines.  The  Richmond  followed 
the  Hartford's  movements,  and  the  two  ships  drifted 
up  with  the  young  flood  tide,  but  with  their  heads 
still  pointed  in  the  right  direction,  toward  the  Brook- 
lyn ;  the  stern  of  the  latter  vessel,  as  she  backed, 
coming  up  into  the  wind  so  that  her  bows  turned 
toward  the  fort.  Fortunately,  the  rear  ships  were 
some  little  distance  off;  but  Farragut,  ignorant  of 
the  cause  of  the  Brooklyn's  action,  saw  his  line  of 
battle  doubling  up  and  threatened  with  an  almost  in- 
extricable confusion,  in  the  most  difficult  and  exposed 
part  of  the  passage,  under  a  cross-fire  from  the  fort 


MOBILE.  275 

and  the  enemy's  vessels.  Immediately  upon  this 
frightful  perplexity  succeeded  the  great  disaster  of 
the  day.  Craven,  pursuing  his  course  across  the  sus- 
pected line  of  danger,  had  reached  within  two  hun- 
dred yards  of  the  Tennessee,  and  the  crews  of  both 
vessels  were  waiting  with  tense  nerves  for  the  ex- 
pected collision,  when  a  torpedo  exploded  under  the 
Tecumseh,  then  distant  a  little  over  five  hundred 
yards  from  the  Hartford.  From  his  elevated  post  of 
observation  Farragut  saw  her  reel  violently  from 
side  to  side,  lurch  heavily  over,  and  then  go  down 
head  foremost,  her  screw  revolving  wildly  in  the  air 
as  she  disappeared.  . 

It  was  the  supreme  moment  of  his  life,  in  which 
the  scales  of  his  fortunes  wavered   in  the  balance. 
All  the  long  years  of  preparation,  of  faithful  devo- 
tion to  obscure  duty  awaiting  the  opportunity  that 
might  never  come-all  the  success  attending  the  two 
brief  years  in  which  his  flag  had  flown-all  the  glories 
of  the  river  fights— on  the  one  side ;  and  on  the  other, 
threatening  to  overbear  and  wreck  all,  a  danger  he 
could  not  measure,  but  whose  dire   reality  had  been 
testified  by  the  catastrophe  just  befallen  under  his 
own  eyes.     Added  to  this  was  the  complication  in 
the  order  of  battle  ahead  of  him,  produced  by  the 
double  movements  of   the  Brooklyn  and  Tecumseh, 
which  no  longer  allowed  him  to  seize  the  one  open 
path   follow  his  own  first  brave  thought,  and  lead  his 
fleet'in  person  through  the  narrow  way  where,  if  at 
all   safety  lay.     The  Brooklyn,  when  she  began  to 
back  was  on  the  starboard  bow  of  the  flag-ship,  dis- 
tant'one  or   two  hundred  yards,  and  falling  off  to 
starboard  lay  directly  in  the  way  athwart  the  chan- 
nel     The  second  monitor,  Manhattan,  of  the  same 


276  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

class  as  the  Tecumseh,  had  passed  ahead;  but  the 
two  light-draughts,  the  Winnebago  and  Chickasaw, 
were  drawing  up  abreast  of  the  three  ships  thus 
massed  together.  As  they  passed,  the  admiration  of 
the  officers  of  the  flag-ship  was  stirred  to  see  Cap- 
tain Stevens,  of  the  Winnebago,  pacing  calmly  from 
turret  to  turret  of  his  unwieldy  vessel,  under  the  full 
fire  of  the  fort ;  while  of  Perkins,  in  the  Chickasaw, 
the  youngest  commander  in  the  fleet,  and  then  about 
twenty-seven  years  of  age,  an  officer  of  high  position 
in  the  flag-ship  says,  "  As  he  passed  the  Hartford  he 
was  on  top  of  the  turret,  waving  his  hat  and  dancing 
about  with  delight  and  excitement." 

But  as  they  went  thus  gallantly  by,  the  position 
of  these  vessels,  combined  with  that  of  the  Brook- 
lyn relatively  to  the  flag-ship,  forbade  the  latter's 
turning  in  that  direction  unless  at  the  risk  of  add- 
ing to  a  confusion  already  sufficiently  perilous.  A 
signal  was  made  and  repeated  to  the  Brooklyn  to 
go  ahead ;  but  that  vessel  gave  no  sign  of  mov- 
ing, her  commander  being  probably  perplexed  be- 
tween his  orders  to  pass  east  of  the  buoy  and  the 
difficulty  of  doing  so,  owing  to  the  position  into 
which  his  ship  had  now  fallen  and  the  situation  of 
the  monitors.  But  to  remain  thus  motionless  and 
undecided,  under  the  fire  of  the  fort  with  the 
other  ships  coming  up  to  swell  the  size  of  the 
target  offered  to  its  gunners  and  to  increase  the 
confusion,  was  out  of  the  question.  To  advance  or 
to  recede  seemed  alike  dangerous.  Ahead  lay  the 
dreaded  line  of  torpedoes;  behind  was  the  possibility 
of  retreat,  but  beaten,  baffled,  and  disastrous.  All 
depended  upon  the  prompt  decision  of  the  admiral. 
If  he   failed  himself,  or  if  fortune  failed  him  now, 


MOBILE. 


277 


his  brilliant  career  of  success  ended  in  the  gloom  of 
a  defeat  the  degree  of  which  could  not  be  foreseen. 
In  later  days,  Farragut  told  that  in  the  confusion  of 
these  moments,  feeling  that  all  his  plans  had  been 
thwarted,  he  was  at  a  loss  whether  to  advance  or  re- 
treat. In  this  extremity  the  devout  spirit  that  ruled 
his  life,  and  so  constantly  appears  in  his  correspond- 
ence, impelled  him  to  appeal  to  Heaven  for  guid- 
ance, and  he  offered  up  this  prayer  :  "  O  God,  who 
created  man  and  gave  him  reason,  direct  me  what  to 
do.  Shall  I  go  on  ? "  "  And  it  seemed,"  said  the 
admiral,  "  as  if  in  answer  a  voice  commanded,  '  Go 


on : 

To  such  a  prompting  his  gallant  temper  and 
clear  intuitions  in  all  matters  relating  to  war  were 
quick  to  respond.  Personal  danger  could  not  deter 
him ;  and  if  it  was  necessary  that  some  one  ship 
should  set  the  example  and  force  a  way  through  the 
torpedo  line  by  the  sacrifice  of  herself,  he  was  pre- 
pared by  all  his  habits  of  thought  to  accept  that 
duty  for  the  vessel  bearing  his  flag.  Describing  the 
spirit  in  which  he  began  an  arduous  enterprise,  after 
once  deciding  that  it  should  be  undertaken,  he  said : 
"  I  calculate  thus :  The  chances  are  that  I  shall  lose 
some  of  my  vessels  by  torpedoes  or  the  guns  of  the 
enemy,  but  with  some  of  my  fleet  afloat  I  shall 
eventually  be  successful.  I  can  not  lose  all.  I  will 
attack,  regardless  of  consequences,  and  never  turn 
back."  To  a  mind  thus  disciplined  and  prepared, 
the  unforeseen  dilemma  presented  before  the  barriers 
of  Mobile  Bay  caused  but  a  passing  perplexity.  Like 
the  Puritan  soldier  who  trusted  in  God  and  kept  his 
powder  dry,  Farragut  met  the  overthrow  of  his  care- 
fully arranged  plans  and  the  sudden  decision  thrust 


278  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

upon  him  with  the  calm  resolution  of  a  man  who  has 
counted  the  cost  and  is  strengthened  by  a  profound 
dependence  upon  the  will  of  the  Almighty.  He  re- 
solved to  go  forward. 

The  Hartford  was  now  too  near  the  Brooklyn 
to  go  clear  by  a  simple  movement  of  her  helm. 
Backing  hard,  therefore,  the  wheels  of  the  Meta- 
comet,  while  turning  her  own  screw  ahead,  her 
bows  were  twisted  short  round,  as  in  a  like  strait 
they  had  been  pointed  fair  under  the  batteries  of 
Port  Hudson ;  then,  going  ahead  fast,  the  two  ships 
passed  close  under  the  stern  of  the  Brooklyn  and 
dashed  straight  at  the  line  of  the  buoys.  As  they 
thus  went  by  the  vessel  which  till  then  had  led,  a 
warning  cry  came  from  her  that  there  were  tor- 
pedoes ahead.  "Damn  the  torpedoes!"  shouted 
the  admiral,  in  the  exaltation  of  his  high  purpose. 
"  Four  bells  !  *  Captain  Drayton,  go  ahead  !  Jouett, 
full  speed  !  "  The  Hartford  and  her  consort  crossed 
the  line  about  five  hundred  yards  from  Mobile  Point, 
well  to  the  westward  of  the  buoy  and  of  the  spot 
where  the  Tecumseh  had  gone  down.  As  they 
passed  between  the  buoys,  the  cases  of  the  torpe- 
does were  heard  by  many  on  board  knocking  against 
the  copper  of  the  bottom,  and  many  of  the  primers 
snapped  audibly,  but  no  torpedo  exploded.  The 
Hartford  went  safely  through,  the  gates  of  Mobile 
Bay  were  forced,  and  as  Farragut's  flag  cleared  the 
obstructions  his  last  and  hardest  battle  was  virtually 
won.  The  Brooklyn  got  her  head  round,  the  Rich- 
mond supporting  her  by  a  sustained  fire  from  her 

*  The  signal  in  the  United  States  Navy  for  the  engines  to  be 
driven  at  high  speed. 


MOBILE.  279 

heavy  broadside ;  and,  after  a  delay  which  allowed 
the  flag-ship  to  gain  nearly  a  mile  upon  them,  the 
other  ships  in  order  followed  the  Hartford,  "  believ- 
ing," wrote  the  admiral  in  his  dispatch,  "  that  they 
were  going  to  a  noble  death  with  their  commander- 
in-chief." 

After  the  flag-ship  had  passed  the  torpedo  line 
the  enemy's  three  gunboats  began  retreating  slowly 
up  the  bay,  keeping  ahead  and  on  her  starboard 
bow,  where  her  guns  could  not  bear  while  their  own 
raked  her.  The  conditions  of  the  channel  did  not 
yet  allow  her  to  deviate  from  her  course  in  order  to 
return  their  fire.  At  no  period  of  the  battle  did  the 
Hartford  suffer  so  much  as  during  the  fifteen  min- 
utes she  had  to  endure  this  galling  punishment.  The 
Tennessee,  being  inferior  in  speed  to  her  consorts 
as  well  as  to  the  Hartford,  could  not  accompany  this 
movement ;  and,  moreover,  Buchanan,  the  Confed- 
erate admiral,  had  set  his  heart  upon  ramming  the 
vessel  that  bore  the  flag  of  his  old  friend  Farragut. 
The  Tennessee  therefore  stood  toward  the  Hartford, 
but  failed  in  her  thrust,  the  Union  vessel  avoiding  it 
easily  with  a  movement  of  her  helm.  The  ram  then 
fired  two  shots  at  very  short  range,  but  singularly 
enough  both  missed.  "  I  took  no  further  notice  of 
her,"  wrote  Farragut,  "  than  to  return  her  fire."  The 
Tennessee  followed  some  little  distance  up  the  bay, 
and  then,  changing  her  mind,  turned  toward  the 
column  of  wooden  vessels  that  was  now  approach- 
ing, with  the  three  monitors  covering  their  right 
flank  and  somewhat  in  the  rear  ;  these  having  delayed 
to  engage  the  fire  of  the  fort  while  their  more  vul- 
nerable companions  went  by.  The  Confederate  iron- 
clad passed  along  the  column  from  van  to  rear,  ex- 


28o  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

changing  shots  with  most  of  the  vessels  in  it.  The 
Monongahela  attempted  to  ram  her,  but,  being  em- 
barrassed by  the  gunboat  lashed  alongside,  suc- 
ceeded only  in  giving  a  glancing  blow  ;  while  the 
Oneida,  the  ship  on  the  fighting  side  of  the  rear 
couple,  already  completely  disabled  in  her  motive 
power  by  a  shot  through  the  boiler,  received  a  rak- 
ing broadside,  by  which  her  captain,  Mullany,  lost  an 
arm. 

At  the  time  the  Tennessee  went  about  to  en- 
counter the  remaining  vessels  of  the  fleet,  which 
was  about  eight  o'clock,  the  course  of  the  channel 
enabled  the  Hartford  to  turn  sufficiently  to  bring 
her  broadside  to  bear  on  her  puny  assailants.  By 
the  fire  she  then  opened,  one,  the  Gaines,  was  so 
much  injured  as  to  be  with  difficulty  kept  afloat 
until  she  could  take  refuge  under  Fort  Morgan, 
where  she  was  that  night  burned  by  her  commander. 
All  three  retreated  rapidly  toward  the  shoal  water 
on  the  east  side  of  the  bay.  Farragut  then  signaled 
for  the  gunboats  of  his  fleet  to  chase  those  of  the 
enemy.  Jouett,  being  alongside,  received  the  order 
by  word  of  mouth,  and  the  admiral  often  afterward 
spoke  with  enthusiasm  of  the  hearty  "  Ay,  ay,  sir  !  " 
he  received  in  reply,  and  of  the  promptness  with  which 
the  fasts  were  cut,  the  men  being  already  by  them, 
hatchet  in  hand.  The  Metacomet  backed  clear  at 
once  and  started  rapidly  in  pursuit.  The  gunboats 
in  the  rear  followed  as  soon  as  the  signal  was  made 
out ;  but,  both  from  their  position  and  from  the  in- 
evitable delay  in  reading  signals,  they  were  at  a  dis- 
advantage. A  thick  rain  squall  coming  up  soon 
after  hid  both  pursuers  and  pursued  from  each 
other's  sight.     The  Morgan  and  the  Gaines  took  ad- 


MOBILE.  28l 

vantage  of  it  to  change  their  course  for  Fort  Mor- 
gan ;  the  third  Confederate,  the  Selma,  kept  straight 
on,  as  did  the  Metacomet.  When  the  squall  cleared, 
the  latter  found  herself  ahead  of  her  chase.  One 
shot  was  fired,  killing  the  first  lieutenant  and  some 
of  the  crew  of  the  Selma,  whose  flag  was  then  hauled 
down.  The  Morgan  made  good  her  retreat  under 
the  fort,  and  that  night  succeeded  in  escaping  up  the 
bay  to  the  city,  although  she  was  seen  and  fired  upon 
by  several  of  Farragut's  vessels. 

At  half-past  eight  o'clock,  three  hours  after  the 
first  signal  was  made  to  get  under  way  and  an  hour 
and  a  half  after  the  action  began,  the  flag-ship  an- 
chored in  the  upper  part  of  the  deep  pocket  into 
which  the  channel  expands  after  passing  the  en- 
trance. She  was  then  about  four  miles  from  Fort 
Morgan,  and  the  crew  were  sent  to  breakfast.  The 
admiral  had  come  down  from  his  post  in  the  main 
rigging  and  was  standing  on  the  poop,  when  Captain 
Drayton  came  up  to  him  and  said  :  "  What  we  have 
done  has  been  well  done,  sir  ;  but  it  all  counts  for 
nothing  so  long  as  the  Tennessee  is  there  under  the 
guns  of  Morgan."  "  I  know  it,"  replied  Farragut, 
"  and  as  soon  as  the  people  have  had  their  breakfasts 
I  am  going  for  her."  These  words  were  exchanged 
in  the  hearing  of  the  first  lieutenant  of  the  Hartford, 
now  Rear- Admiral  Kimberly,  and  at  present  the  senior 
officer  upon  the  active  list  of  the  United  States 
Navy.  In  writing  home  a  few  weeks  later,  the  ad- 
miral said  :  "  If  I  had  not  captured  the  Tennessee  as 
I  did,  I  should  have  taken  her  that  night  with  the 
monitors,  or  tried  it."  The  latter  undoubtedly  rep- 
resents the  more  deliberate  opinion,  that  would  have 
guided  him  had  Buchanan  not  played  into  his  hands 
19 


282  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

by  attacking  the  fleet ;  for  if  the  Tennessee  had  re- 
mained under  Morgan  and  there  been  sought  by  the 
monitors,  the  fight  would  have  been  at  such  close 
quarters  that  in  the  darkness  the  fort  could  scarcely 
have  joined  without  imminent  risk  of  hurting  friend 
as  well  as  foe. 

As  it  was,  the  Confederate  admiral  seems  never 
to  have  contemplated  any  more  prudent  or  saga- 
cious course  than  a  single-handed  free  fight  with 
the  fleet.  As  soon  as  the  Tennessee  had  passed 
the  rear  of  the  enemy's  column,  Buchanan  said  to 
the  captain  of  the  ram  :  "  Follow  them  up,  Johnston ; 
we  can't  let  them  off  that  way."  In  turning,  the 
Tennessee  took  much  room,  appearing  from  the  fleet 
to  have  gone  back  under  the  guns  of  Fort  Morgan  ; 
and  the  various  ships,  as  they  came  up,  were  anchor- 
ing near  the  Hartford,  expecting  a  few  quiet  hours. 
They  were  soon  undeceived.  The  brief  conversation 
above  reported  between  Farragut  and  his  flag-cap- 
tain had  scarcely  ended  when  the  ram  was  seen  to 
be  moving  out  from  under  the  fort.  Captain  Dray- 
ton reported  the  fact  to  the  admiral,  saying  that  she 
was  going  outside  to  attack  the  United  States  ves- 
sels still  remaining  there.  "  Then,"  said  Farragut, 
"  we  must  follow  him  out."  The  remark  indicates 
an  alternative  to  the  course  actually  adopted  by 
Buchanan,  and  one  whose  issue  would  depend  less 
upon  the  United  States  commander-in-chief  than 
upon  the  conduct  of  the  vessels  outside.  If  these 
were  so  imprudent  as  not  to  retire,  Farragut  might 
have  been  forced  to  run  twice  again  the  gantlet  of 
Fort  Morgan  and  of  the  torpedo  line — once  to  pro- 
tect them,  and  afterward  to  regain  the  position  he 
had  just  achieved. 


MOBILE.  283 

It  must  be  admitted  that  the  question  before  the 
Confederate  admiral,  what  to  do  with  one  unwieldy 
though  powerful  vessel  opposed  to  fourteen  enemies, 
was  hard  to  solve  ;  nor  did  he  have,  in  a  precise 
knowledge  of  the  speed,  battery,  and  other  qualities 
of  his  opponents,  the  data  needed  for  an  accurate 
solution.  In  a  general  way,  however,  he  must  have 
known  that  the  guns  of  the  United  States  fleet  were 
mainly  smooth-bores,  with  but  moderate  penetrative 
power  upon  iron-plating  such  as  the  Tennessee's; 
and  during  the  morning's  encounter  he  had  acquired 
experimental  knowledge  of  their  impotence  against 
her  sides,  unless  by  a  continuous  pounding  such  as 
he  was  now  about  to  invite.  He  knew  also  that  sev- 
eral of  the  hostile  vessels  were  of  too  heavy  draught 
to  take  any  efficient  part,  if  he  refused,  as  was  in  his 
power,  to  enter  the  pocket  in  which  they  were  now 
anchored ;  while  the  general  gentle  shelving  of  the 
bottom  enabled  a  foot's  difference  in  draught  to 
secure  a  very  considerable  separation  in  distance. 
Every  wooden  ship  was  vulnerable  to  him  and  impo- 
tent against  him  at  the  ranges  which  his  rifles  per- 
mitted him  to  use. 

With  the  monitors  Buchanan  had  not  yet  come 
into  collision  ;  but  one  of  the  most  formidable  was 
sunk,  and  until  he  had  learned  something  about  their 
endurance  and  the  power  of  their  guns  relatively 
to  those  of  his  own  vessel,  it  would  seem  that  his 
action,  though  immediate,  should  have  been  only 
tentative.  If  it  proved  on  trial  that  the  speed  of 
the  Tennessee  was  greater  than  that  of  the  moni- 
tors, she  might  yet  prove  master  of  the  situation. 
Despite  the  beak,  which  her  wretched  speed  and 
exposed  steering  chains  rendered  untrustworthy,  her 


284 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


great  defensive  strength  and  the  fact  of  carrying 
rifled  guns  indicated  that  long  range,  and  not  close 
quarters,  was  the  first  game  of  the  Tennessee.  There 
she  could  hurt,  and  she  could  not  be  hurt.  Had  she, 
for  instance,  hovered  at  a  distance,  firing  deliberately 
at  the  Union  vessels,  Farragut  must  have  attacked ; 
and  she  could  then  have  retired  either  into  shoaler 
water,  retaining  her  advantage  in  range,  or  else 
under  the  guns  of  Morgan,  which  would  have 
strongly  re-enforced  her  fight.  The  fact  that  Farra- 
gut, whose  instinct  for  war  was  commonly  accurate, 
proposed  to  attack  her  at  close  quarters  and  by 
night,  is  the  best  argument  that  Buchanan  should 
have  sought  long  range  and  daylight  for  his  action. 
As  it  was,  his  headlong  charge  into  the  Union  fleet 
was  a  magnificent  display  of  inconsiderate  bravery, 
in  which  such  advantages  as  he  had  were  recklessly 
thrown  away.  Its  purpose  is  not  clear.  If,  as  Far- 
ragut thought,  it  was  to  sink  his  flag-ship,  it  can 
only  be  replied  that  an  admiral's  flag  is  not  a  red 
rag  for  a  bull  to  charge.  Had  the  Hartford  been 
sunk  when  the  column  doubled  up  an  hour  or  so 
before,  the  loss  of  the  leader  at  so  critical  a  mo- 
ment might  have  decided  the  day  ;  but  to  sink  her 
in  the  melee  within  would  have  been  a  barren,  though 
brilliant,  feat  of  arms. 

As  soon  as  it  was  ascertained  that  the  Tennessee 
was  really  coming  up  to  attack,  the  mess-gear  was 
hurried  aside  and  the  orders  given  to  get  under  way. 
Some  of  the  fleet  had  not  yet  anchored,  and  the 
monitors  were  not  yet  arrived  at  the  place  where 
the  others  were  gathered.  Dr.  Palmer,  the  fleet 
surgeon,  was  just  leaving  the  flag-ship  in  a  steam- 
launch,  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  round  among 


MOBILE.  285 

the  other  vessels  to  see  to  the  condition  of  their 
wounded.  Farragut  called  him  alongside  and  directed 
him  to  go  to  the  monitors  with  orders  to  attack  the 
Tennessee.  These  Palmer  delivered  in  person  to 
each  ironclad.  "  Happy  as  my  friend  Perkins  (of 
the  Chickasaw)  habitually  is,"  he  wrote  in  his  diary, 
"  I  thought  he  would  turn  a  somersault  overboard 
with  joy  when  1  told  him,  '  The  admiral  wants  you  to 
go  at  once  and  fight  that  Tennessee.'  "  The  wooden 
vessels  at  the  same  time  were  directed  to  charge  the 
ram,  bows  on,  at  full  speed,  as  well  as  to  attack  her 
with  their  guns. 

The  monitors  being,  like  the  Tennessee  herself, 
very  slow,  the  ramming  contest  first  began.  The 
first  to  reach  the  hostile  ironclad  was  the  Monon- 
gahela,  Captain  Strong,  which  struck  her  squarely 
amidships  on  the  starboard  side,  when  she  was  still 
four  hundred  yards  distant  from  the  body  of  the 
fleet.  Five  minutes  later  the  Lackawanna,  Captain 
Marchand,  going  at  full  speed,  delivered  her  blow 
also  at  right  angles  on  the  port  side,  abreast  the 
after  end  of  the  armored  superstructure.  As  they 
swung  round,  both  United  States  vessels  fired  such 
guns  as  would  bear,  but  the  shot  glanced  harmlessly 
from  the  armor ;  nor  did  the  blow  of  the  ships  them- 
selves produce  any  serious  injury  upon  the  enemy, 
although  their  own  stems  were  crushed  in  for  sev- 
eral feet  above  and  below  the  water  line.  Upon 
them  followed  the  Hartford,  approaching,  like  the 
Lackawanna,  on  the  port  side ;  but  toward  her  the 
Tennessee  turned,  so  that  the  two  met  nearly,  though 
not  exactly,  bows  on.  The  Hartford's  anchor,  which 
there  had  not  been  time  to  cat,  was  hanging  at  the 
water's   edge;    it   took  the  brunt  of   the  collision, 


286  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

which  doubled  it  up,  and  the  two  antagonists  scraped 
by,  their  port  sides  touching.  At  that  close  range 
seven  nine-inch  guns  were  discharged  against  the 
sloping  sides  of  the  ironclad,  but  without  effect. 
The  admiral  had  clambered  again  into  the  rigging, 
on  this  occasion  into  the  port  mizzen-rigging,  whence 
he  watched  the  effects  of  this  encounter.  Both  the 
Lackawanna  and  the  Hartford  now  made  a  circuit  to 
get  a  position  whence  they  could  again  charge  the 
enemy ;  but  in  the  midst  of  their  sweep  the  Lacka- 
wanna ran  square  into  the  flag-ship,  striking  near 
where  Farragut  stood,  and  cutting  the  vessel  down 
to  within  two  feet  of  the  water.  The  immediate  im- 
pression among  the  ship's  company  was  that  the 
injury  was  fatal ;  and  the  general  cry  that  arose, 
"  Save  the  admiral  !  Get  the  admiral  on  board  the 
Lackawanna  !  "  by  its  ignoring  of  their  own  danger, 
testified  how  Farragut's  martial  and  personal  quali- 
ties had  won  a  way  into  the  affections  of  his  sub- 
ordinates. With  an  activity  for  which  he  had  been 
remarkable  in  middle  life,  and  retained  even  now 
when  in  his  sixties,  the  admiral  jumped  into  the 
chains  to  ascertain  the  extent  of  the  injury  ;  then, 
finding  that  the  ship  was  in  no  present  danger,  he 
ordered  her  again  to  be  headed  for  the  Tennessee. 

Meanwhile  the  monitors  had  come  up,  and  the 
battle  had  begun  between  them  and  the  enemy.  One 
of  the  Manhattan's  fifteen-inch  guns  had  been  dis- 
abled ;  and  the  slow  firing  of  those  unwieldy 
weapons,  with  the  imperfect  mechanical  appliances 
then  used  for  loading  them,  prevented  her  doing  the 
injury  that  might  have  been  expected.  One  shot 
struck  square,  breaking  through  the  port  side  of  the 
armor ;  but  even  so  the  missile  itself  did  not  enter 


MOBILE.  287 

the  vessel,  a  strong  evidence  of   the  power  of  the 
Tennessee  to  resist  a  single  shot.     But  she  was  not 
equally  invulnerable  to  the  sustained  and  continuous 
hammering  of  even  lighter  projectiles.     The  Winne- 
bago's  turrets,    being   out   of   order,    could  not   be 
turned,  and  consequently  the  guns  could  be  brought 
to  bear  only  by  moving  the   helm;  a  circumstance 
which  materially  reduced  her  fire.     The  Chickasaw, 
however,  was  in  better  case.    Lieutenant-Commander 
Perkins  got  her  into  position  under  the  stern  of  the 
Tennessee  just  after  the  latter's  collision  with  the 
Hartford  ;  and  there  he  stuck  to  the  end,  never  over 
fifty  yards  distant,  and  keeping  up  a  steady  rapping 
of  eleven-inch  shot  upon  the  fabric  which  they  could 
not  at  once  penetrate,  but  which  they  visibly  shook. 
Fifty-two  of  these  projectiles  were  fired  from  the 
Chickasaw  in  the  short  half-hour  of  her  attack.    The 
exposed  rudder-chains  were  shot  away,  and  at  nearly 
the  same  time  the  smoke-stack  came  down.    Admiral 
Buchanan  was  wounded  by  an  iron   splinter,  which 
broke  his  leg  and  otherwise  injured  it  to  such  an  ex- 
tent  that  the   limb  was  with  difficulty  saved.     He 
turned  over  the  command  to  Captain  Johnston,  who 
stood  the  pounding  for  twenty  minutes  longer  and 
then  reported  to  his  superior  that  the  ship  was  help- 
less, could  not  be  steered,  and  that  for  half  an  hour 
he  had  not  been  able  to  bring  a  gun  to  bear.  "  Well," 
replied  Buchanan,  "  if  you  can  not  do  them  any  fur- 
ther damage  you  had  better  surrender." 

The  Tennessee's  flag  had  been  several  times  shot 
away,  and  was  now  flying  from  a  boat-hook.  Not 
being  very  conspicuous,  its  removal  was  not  immedi- 
ately noticed,  and  Johnston  had  to  show  a  white  flag 
to  put  a  stop  to  the  firing.    "  She  was  at  this  time  sore 


288  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

beset,"  said  Farragut  in  his  dispatch  to  the  Navy 
Department;  "the  Chickasaw  was  pounding  away 
at  her  stern,  the  Ossipee  was  approaching  her  at  full 
speed,  and  the  Monongahela,  Lackawanna,  and  Hart- 
ford were  bearing  down  upon  her,  determined  upon 
her  destruction.  Her  smoke-stack  had  been  shot 
away,  her  steering  chains  were  gone,  compelling  a 
resort  to  her  relieving  tackles,  and  several  of  her 
port  shutters  were  jammed.  Indeed,  from  the  time 
the  Hartford  struck  her  until  her  surrender  she 
never  fired  a  gun."  No  stronger  evidence  can  be 
offered  than  this  last  sentence,  which  Johnston's  ac- 
count corroborates,  of  how  completely  Buchanan 
miscalculated,  or  disregarded,  the  capabilities  of  the 
important  vessel  he  controlled.  Great  as  was  her 
power  to  resist  a  single  shot,  or  the  end-on  charge 
of  a  heavy  vessel,  when  she  surrendered  nearly  all 
the  plating  on  the  after  side  of  the  casemate  was 
found  to  be  started,  and  the  after  gun-carriage  was 
disabled ;  there  being  distinct  marks  of  nine  eleven- 
inch  solid  shot  having  struck  within  a  few  square 
feet  of  that  port.  Three  of  her  port  shutters  also 
were  so  damaged  that  their  guns  could  not  be 
fired. 

Thus  ended  the  great  battle  of  Mobile  Bay,  the 
crowning  achievement  of  Farragut's  naval  career ; 
"  one  of  the  hardest-earned  victories  of  my  life," 
to  quote  his  own  words,  "and  the  most  desperate 
battle  I  ever  fought  since  the  days  of  the  old 
Essex."  "  You  may  pass  through  a  long  career  and 
see  many  an  action,"  he  remarked  to  one  of  the 
junior  officers  of  the  Hartford,  in  the  interval  be- 
tween first  anchoring  and  the  conflict  with  the  Ten- 
nessee, "  without  seeing  as  much  bloodshed  as  you 


MOBILE. 


289 


have  this  day  witnessed."  The  loss  of  the  flag-ship 
herself  had  been  twenty-five  killed  and  twenty-eight 
wounded  out  of  a  ship's  company  of  some  three 
hundred  souls.  The  Brooklyn,  a  ship  of  the  same 
force,  had  almost  exactly  the  same  number  of  cas- 
ualties— eleven  killed  and  forty-three  wounded.  Con- 
trasting the  equal  suffering  of  the  latter — delayed 
so  long  under  the  numerous  guns  of  the  fort,  but 
supported  by  the  fire  of  the  other  vessels — with  that 
of  the  flag-ship,  inflicted  by  the  batteries  of  the 
enemy's  gun-boats,  few  in  number,  but  worked  for 
the  time  with  impunity,  we  find  an  excellent  illus- 
tration of  Farragut's  oft-repeated  maxim,  that  "  to 
hurt  your  enemy  is  the  best  way  to  keep  him  from 
hurting  you."  The  total  loss  of  the  United  States 
fleet  in  the  battle  was  three  hundred  and  thirty- 
five;  of  whom  one  hundred  and  thirteen  were  at  the 
bottom  of  the  bay,  coffined  in  the  iron  hull  of  the 
Tecumseh. 

Not  quite  three  hours  elapsed  from  the  time  that 
Morgan  fired  its  first  gun  to  the  moment  when  the 
Tennessee  hauled  down  her  flag  and  confessed  the 
United  States  fleet  mistress  of  the  bay.  The  forts 
still  stood  with  the  Confederate  flag  flying  from 
them  in  defiance ;  and  it  is  reported  that  the  com- 
mander of  Morgan  retorted  to  a  summons  to  sur- 
render, that  he  looked  upon  Farragut's  fleet  as  prac- 
tically prisoners  in  a  port  whose  keys  he  held.  If 
so,  it  was  the  high-hearted  resolve  of  a  man  deter- 
mined to  hold  his  charge  to  the  last,  and  not  the 
sober  conviction  of  a  soldier,  that  spoke.  Like  the 
river  forts  when  Farragut's  fleet  forced  its  way  past 
and  stood  between  them  and  their  base  of  supplies, 
the  defenses  of  Mobile  were  isolated  by  the  results 


290 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


of  the  morning's  fight,  and  their  fall  became  but  a 
question  of  time.  There  was  no  mutiny  of  the  gar- 
rison, as  on  the  former  occasion,  for  the  stern  ex- 
perience of  war  had  better  taught  the  men  the 
business  of  a  soldier;  but  it  was  at  once  practi- 
cable here  to  begin  siege  operations,  which  in  the 
river  would  perhaps  have  been  for  a  time  postponed, 
owing  to  the  overflowed  state  of  the  country.  The 
preparations  for  these  were  pushed  with  vigor,  and 
the  navy  also  took  a  hand  against  the  works.  Four 
hours  after  the  surrender  of  the  Tennessee,  the 
Chickasaw  weighed  her  anchor  and  steamed  down 
toward  Grant's  Pass  to  shell  Fort  Powell.  Built  to 
resist  an  attack  from  Mississippi  Sound,  the  work 
was  weak  in  the  direction  of  the  bay.  "The  iron- 
clad's fire,"  reported  the  officer  in  command,  "  made 
it  impossible  to  man  the  two  guns  in  the  rear,  and 
I  made  no  attempt  to  do  so."  That  night  the  fort 
was  evacuated  and  blown  up.  The  following  day 
the  Chickasaw  threw  some  shells  into  Fort  Gaines, 
in  consequence  of  which,  and  of  the  progress  made 
by  General  Granger  in  his  approaches,  that  work  was 
surrendered  on  the  7th  of  August.  Morgan  still 
standing  out,  the  army  was  transferred  from  Dauphin 
Island  to  Mobile  Point,  batteries  were  constructed, 
and  on  the  17th  a  siege  train  from  New  Orleans  was 
landed.  On  the  22d,  at  daylight,  the  siege  guns,  the 
three  monitors,  the  captured  Tennessee,  and  the  ships, 
both  outside  and  inside  the  bay,  opened  together. 
The  following  day  Fort  Morgan  capitulated. 

A  gratifying  feature  in  these  operations,  as  well 
as  in  all  Farragut's  official  association  with  the  army, 
was  the  cordial  good  feeling  and  co-operation  which 
existed  between  the  two  services,  and  which  were 


MOBILE.  29I 

equally  manifested  in  the  upper  Mississippi  between 
Grant  and  Porter.  General  Butler,  Farragut's  first 
colleague  in  the  Gulf  and  at  New  Orleans,  but  who 
had  long  since  left  the  department,  wrote  him  a 
most  enthusiastic  letter  of  congratulation  upon  re- 
ceiving the  news  of  the  battle  of  Mobile  Bay ;  and 
General  Granger,  in  concluding  his  report  of  the 
siege  operations  against  Gaines  and  Morgan,  said : 
"  I  am  pleased  to  record  the  perfect  harmony  exist- 
ing between  these  two  branches  of  the  service.  For 
my  own  part,  I  can  not  sufficiently  acknowledge  the 
assistance  rendered  by  the  fleet  and  the  admiral  in 
command  in  transporting  and  disembarking  the 
troops,  guns,  and  materials  employed  by  me  in  the 
operations.  In  brief,  during  all  our  relations,  the 
officers  of  the  fleet,  with  their  distinguished  com- 
mander, displayed  in  a  high  degree  those  qualities 
which  mark  their  gallant  service."  To  the  officers 
of  the  navy  the  testimonies  thus  given  can  not  but 
be  most  grateful ;  not  merely  as  acknowledgments 
of  the  important  part  played  by  a  service  whose 
work  is  too  often  ignored  by  historians,  but  chiefly 
as  giving  an  added  lustre  to  the  brilliant  reputation 
of  its  two  most  distinguished  representatives,  who 
successively  filled  the  high  position  of  admiral  of  the 
navy. 

After  the  capitulation  of  the  forts,  Admiral  Far- 
ragut  remained  in  Mobile  Bay  until  the  following 
November.  The  lower  bay  was  cleared  of  torpe- 
does and  reconnoissances  made  toward  Mobile  ;  but 
he  wrote  adversely  to  any  attempt  against  the  city, 
now  that  it  was  sealed  as  a  port  to  blockade  runners. 
"  It  would  be  an  elephant,"  he  wrote,  "and  take  an 
army  to  hold  it.     And  besides,  all  the  traitors  and 


292  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

rascally  speculators  would  flock  to  that  city  and 
pour  into  the  Confederacy  the  wealth  of  New  York." 
He  confesses  also  his  dislike  to  operations  in  very 
shoal  water.  "  I  am  in  no  way  diffident  about  going 
anywhere  in  the  Hartford,  but  when  I  have  to  leave 
her  and  take  to  a  craft  drawing  six  feet  of  water  I 
feel  badly." 

The  admiral's  health  was  now  suffering  much 
from  the  combined  effects  of  his  labors,  his  anxieties, 
and  the  climate.  "  I  am  as  well  as  a  man  can  be 
who  can  neither  sit,  walk,  nor  stand  five  minutes  at  a 
time  on  account  of  Job's  comforters.  But,  thank 
God  (I  have  so  much  to  be  thankful  for  that  I  am 
thanking  him  all  the  time),  I  am  otherwise  in  pretty 
good  condition."  Despite  this  brave  effort  at  cheer- 
fulness, his  letters  from  time  to  time  began  to  show 
symptoms  of  depression,  and  he  longed  for  rest. 
"  This  is  the  last  of  my  work,"  he  said,  "and  I  ex- 
pect a  little  respite."  His  enfeebled  condition  drew 
the  attention  and  excited  the  alarm  of  those  about 
him.  "  I  was  talking  to  the  admiral  to-day,"  wrote 
Perkins,  of  the  Chickasaw,  the  day  after  Morgan  sur- 
rendered, "  when  all  at  once  he  fainted  away.  He  is 
not  very  well  and  is  all  tired  out.  It  gave  me  quite 
a  shock,  and  shows  how  exhausted  he  is,  and  his 
health  is  not  very  good,  any  way.  He  is  a  mighty 
fine  old  fellow."  Captain  Drayton  also  wrote  home 
to  his  family  that,  if  the  admiral  remained  longer  in 
the  Gulf,  he  feared  for  the  consequences. 

Under  these  circumstances  an  order  from  the 
Navy  Department,  dated  the  5th  of  September,  as- 
signing him  to  the  command  of  the  Fort  Fisher  ex- 
pedition, greatly  upset  him.  He  had  about  a  week 
before   written   to   the   Secretary   to   say   that    his 


MOBILE. 


293 


strength  was  almost  exhausted.  "  I  am  willing,"  he 
concluded,  "  to  do  the  bidding  of  the  department  as 
long  as  I  am  able  to  the  best  of  my  abilities.  I  fear, 
however,  that  my  health  is  giving  way.  I  have  now 
been  down  in  the  Gulf  five  years  out  of  six,  with  the 
exception  of  the  short  time  at  home  last  fall;  the 
last  six  months  have  been  a  severe  drag  upon  me, 
and  I  want  rest,  if  it  is  to  be  had." 

To  so  reasonable  a  request,  after  such  distin- 
guished and  valuable  service,  the  department  could 
not  have  closed  its  ears  had  it  been  so  disposed. 
Farragut  was  authorized  to  leave  his  squadron  in 
charge  of  Commodore  James  S.  Palmer,  a  very  gal- 
lant and  efficient  officer,  and  to  come  north  in  the 
Hartford.  On  the  30th  of  November,  1864,  he  sailed 
from  Pensacola,  and  on  the  12th  of  December  the 
flag-ship  again  anchored  in  New  York  Harbor. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

LATER   YEARS    AND    DEATH. 
1864-1870. 

With  the  strong  national  and  patriotic  feeling 
that  had  been  aroused  throughout  the  Northern 
States  by  the  war  of  secession,  Farragut  had  no 
cause  to  complain  of  ingratitude  or  indifference  on 
the  part  either  of  the  Government  or  of  his  fellow- 
countrymen.  As  the  flag-ship  entered  the  Narrows, 
on  his  final  return  from  the  Gulf,  she  was  met  by  a 
representative  committee  from  the  city  officials  and 
citizens  of  New  York.  Enthusiastic  crowds  greeted 
him  as  he  landed  at  the  Battery,  and  a  reception 
given  him  the  same  afternoon  at  the  Custom  House 
was  thronged  by  the  leading  men  of  the  city.  This 
eager  manifestation  of  good-will  and  admiration  was 
followed,  a  few  days  later,  by  a  flattering  request 
that  the  admiral  would  honor  the  city  by  taking  up 
his  abode  in  it  and  becoming  thenceforth  one  of  its 
citizens.  After  reciting  the  deeds  which  had  won 
for  him  universal  applause  and  thankfulness,  the 
committee  said:  "The  citizens  of  New  York  can 
offer  no  tribute  equal  to  your  claim  on  their  grati- 
tude and  affection.  Their  earnest  desire  is  to  receive 
you  as  one  of  their  number,  and  to  be  permitted,  as 
fellow-citizens,  to  share  in  the  renown  you  will  bring 


LATER  YEARS  AND  DEATH. 


295 


to  the  metropolitan  city.  This  desire  is  felt  in 
common  by  the  whole  community." 

This  graceful  tribute  of  words  was  accompanied 
by  the  gift  of  fifty  thousand  dollars,  to  facilitate  Far- 
ragut's  complying  with  the  request.  The  letter  was 
addressed  to  Vice-Admiral  Farragut ;  the  United 
States  Government,  not  to  be  behindhand  in  ac- 
knowledging its  debt  to  its  most  distinguished  sea- 
man, having  created  for  him  that  grade  soon  after 
his  arrival.  The  bill  for  the  purpose  was  introduced 
on  the  22d  of  December,  1864,  immediately  passed 
by  both  houses,  and  became  law  by  the  President's 
signature  the  following  day.  Farragut's  nomination 
and  confirmation  followed  of  course  and  at  once;  so 
that  his  promotion  came  to  him  in  the  Christmas 
holidays.  The  admiral  gratefully  acknowledged  the 
warm  welcome  of  the  New  Yorkers,  while  modestly 
disavowing,  as  far  as  he  could,  his  claim  to  extraor- 
dinary merit  in  the  brilliant  services  which  he  as- 
serted were  but  the  performance  of  his  duty  ;  and  he 
thankfully  accepted,  as  the  spontaneous  offering  of 
his  fellow-countrymen,  the  recompense  which  in  older 
countries  is  the  usual  reward  of  distinguished  mili- 
tary success,  but  conferred  there  through  the  formal 
medium  of  the  central  government. 

Toward  the  end  of  January,  1865,  the  Confed- 
erate vessels  in  the  James  made  an  attempt  to  de- 
scend the  river,  destroy  the  pontoon  bridges  of  the 
United  States  armies,  and  cut  off  both  the  Army  of 
the  James  and  that  of  the  Potomac  from  their  base 
of  supplies  at  City  Point.  Rear-Admiral  David  D. 
Porter,  who  then  commanded  the  North  Atlantic 
Squadron,  was  fully  occupied  at  the  time  with  the 
bombardment  of  Fort  Fisher  and    capture   of  Wil- 


296 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


mington,  North  Carolina ;  and  as  the  hostile  attempt 
threatened  a  very  serious  annoyance  to  the  com- 
munications of  the  army,  Farragut,  who  was  then  in 
Washington,  was  ordered  to  proceed  to  the  spot. 
He  accordingly  hoisted  his  flag  on  a  small  steamer 
and  ran  down  to  the  James;  but,  finding  upon  his 
arrival  that  the  enemy  had  been  repulsed,  and  satis- 
factory measures  taken  to  prevent  a  renewal  of  the 
effort,  he  returned  to  Washington.  This  slight  epi- 
sode concluded  his  active  service  in  the  war. 

When  Richmond  was  evacuated  on  the  2d  of 
April,  1865,  Farragut  was  among  the  first  to  visit  the 
fallen  capital  of  the  Confederacy.  From  there  a  few 
days  later  he  visited  his  old  home  in  Norfolk.  Many 
of  his  former  friends  still  retained  strong  feelings  of 
resentment  against  him,  as  a  Southern  man  who  had 
taken  arms  against  the  South.  The  impression  had 
obtained  among  some  that,  though  leaving  his  old 
home,  he  would  remain  neutral  ;  and  it  was  even  re- 
ported that  he  had  said  he  would  take  no  part  in  the 
war.  That  Farragut  never  passed  through  that 
phase  of  feeling,'  in  the  struggle  between  life-long 
affections  and  the  sense  of  duty,  would  be  too  much 
to  affirm  ;  but  it  was  a  position  in  which  a  man  of 
his  decided  and  positive  character  could  not  have 
stopped  when  civil  strife  was  upon  the  land.  It  was 
inconsistent  with  his  general  habits  of  thought ;  and 
it  is  evident  that,  before  leaving  Norfolk,  his  con- 
victions on  the  particular  crisis  had  already  left  far 
behind  any  such  temporary  halting  place  between 
two  opinions.  When  he  justified  to  his  excited 
neighbors  President  Lincoln's  call  for  troops,  on  the 
ground  that  the  United  States  Government  could  do 
no  less,  when  its  arsenals  and  navy  yards  were  seized 


LATER  YEARS  AND  DEATH.       297 

and  its  flag  fired  upon,  it  is  inconceivable  that  the  man 
who  then  had  such  courage  of  his  opinions  entertained 
any  further  doubt  as  to  his  future  course  ;  though  it 
may  well  be  that  he  did  not  imperil  his  personal  lib- 
erty and  safety  by  any  irritating  avowal  of  his  pur- 
pose     In  a  reception  given  to  him,  when  he  thus  re- 
visited the  place  which  should  no  longer  be  his  home, 
he  recalled  those  days  and  said :  «  I  was  told  by  a 
brother  officer  that  the  State  had  seceded,  and  that 
1  must  either  resign  and  turn  traitor  to  the  Govern- 
ment which  had  supported  me  from  my  childhood,  or 
I  must  leave  this    place.     Thank   God!    I  was  not 
long  in  making  my  decision.     I  have  spent  half  my 
life  in  revolutionary  countries,  and  I  know  the  hor- 
rors of  civil  war,  and  I  told  the  people  what  I  had 
seen  and  what  they  would  experience.  They  laughed 
at  me,  and   called  me  '  granny  *  and  '  croaker  ' ;  and 
I  said  :  *  I  can  not  live  here,  and  will  seek  some  other 
place  where  I  can  live,  and  on  two  hours'  notice.'     I 
suppose  they  said  I  left  my  country  for  my  country's 
good,  and  thank  God  I  did  !     I  was  unwilling  to  be- 
lieve that  this  difficulty  would  not  have  been  settled  ; 
but  it  was  all  in  vain,  and  as  every  man  must  do  in 
a  revolution,  as  he  puts  his  foot  down,  so  it  marks 

his  life." 

In  the  summer  of  1865,  following  the  close  of  the 
war,  Farragut  visited  several  of  the  New  England 
cities,  receiving  everywhere  marks  of  love  and  ad- 
miration similar  to  those  tendered  to  him  in  New 
York ;  but  his  life  for  the  next  two  ^  years  was 
passed  in  comparative  retirement,  seeking  the  re- 
establishment  of  his  health,  which  had  been  severely 
shaken  by  the  exposures  and  anxieties  of  the  war. 
Though  for  the  most  part  unassigned  to  any  special 
20 


298  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

duties,  the  winding  up  of  the  affairs  of  the  West 
Gulf  Squadron  fully  occupied  his  time. 

On  the  25th  of  July,  1866,  Congress  passed  a  law 
creating  the  grade  of  admiral  in  the  United  States 
Navy,  a  position  which  was  of  course  given  at  once 

to  Farragut,  and  has  been  held   by  but  one  other 

the  late  Admiral  David  D.  Porter.  The  following 
year  he  was  appointed  to  command  the  European 
Squadron,  his  flag  being  hoisted  on  board  the  steam 
frigate  Franklin  on  the  17th  of  June,  1867.  Without 
any  request,  and  indeed  without  any  expectation,  on 
his  part,  the  Government  sent  the  admiral  permis- 
sion for  Mrs.  Farragut  and  a  kinswoman  to  accom- 
pany him  during  the  cruise.  On  the  28th  of  June 
the  ship  sailed  from  New  York,*  and  on  the  14th  of 
July  anchored  in  Cherbourg,  France. 

After  passing  a  fortnight  there,  during  which  the 
admiral  visited  Paris  and  dined  with  the  Emperor, 
the  Franklin  sailed  for  the  Baltic,  where  the  months 
of  August  and  September  were  passed  in  visiting  the 
ports  of  Russia,  Sweden,  and  Denmark.  Every- 
where Farragut  was  received  with  the  enthusiasm 
and  distinguished  consideration  that  were  aroused 
among  naval  officers,  by  the  presence  of  the  man  who 
had  bestowed  upon  their  profession  a  lustre  un- 
equaled  by  any  other  deeds  of  that  generation. 
Toward  the  end  of  September  he  arrived  in  England, 
where  a  month  was  spent  in  a  similar  gratifying 
manner  ;  attentions  being  lavished  upon  him  by  men 

*  Before  the  admiral's  departure  from  New  York  he  gave  a 
grand  reception  on  board  the  flag-ship,  which  was  attended  by  the 
President  and  his  Cabinet  and  by  many  of  the  most  prominent 
people  of  the  Metropolis,  including  several  hundred  ladies.— 
Editor. 


LATER  YEARS  AND  DEATH. 


299 


not  only  of  his  own  calling,  but  of  all  positions. 
Here,  as  in  the  Baltic,  every  opportunity  was  given 
Farragut  for  visiting  all  objects  of  general  interest, 
as  well  as  for  examining  the  professional  improve- 
ments of  the  day. 

From  England  the  Franklin  went  to  the  Medi- 
terranean, which  Farragut  had  not  seen  since  the 
flying  trip  made  by  the  Brandywine  in  the  winter  of 
1825,  after  landing  Lafayette  in  France.  Between 
October,  1867,  and  April,  1868,  were  visited  Lisbon, 
Gibraltar,  and  several  ports  of  the  western  Medi- 
terranean belonging  to  Spain,  France,  and  Italy. 
Everywhere  the  same  cordial  welcome  was  extended, 
and  the  most  ample  facilities  enjoyed  for  seeing 
thoroughly  the  points  of  interest  in  which  the  Medi- 
terranean abounds.  At  Nice  he  was  the  object  of 
especial  attentions  from  the  numerous  Americans 
who  throng  that  attractive  winter  resort ;  and  while 
at  Naples  a  special  excavation  was  made  at  Pompeii 
for  his  benefit.  Nowhere,  however,  did  he  have  a 
more  elaborate  and,  from  the  professional  point  of 
view,  more  interesting  reception  than  in  Malta,  the 
great  British  stronghold  in  the  central  Mediter- 
ranean ;  where  the  Mediterranean  fleet,  then  on  the 
point  of  sailing  for  the  Levant,  was  detained  espe- 
cially to  meet  him. 

The  incidents  of  this  cruise  which  most  nearly 
touch  Farragut  himself,  and  have  the  greatest  inter- 
est for  his  biographer,  occurred  in  the  island  of 
Minorca,  where  his  family  originated.  Over  forty 
years  had  passed  since,  as  midshipman  and  lieu- 
tenant, he  had  wintered  at  Port  Mahon.  During 
those  early  visits  he  had  received  messages  from 
persons   living   in    the   interior   of   the    island  who 


2QO  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

claimed  relationship  ;  but  with  boyish  indifference  he 
had  not  responded  to  any  of  these  advances.  Since 
that  time  he  had  become  imbued  with  the  interest 
men  commonly  feel,  in  advancing  years,  in  collecting 
all  traces  of  family  history  which  they  can  find ; 
especially  when,  as  in  his  case,  they  have  been  early 
and  completely  separated  from  the  home  of  their 
childhood  and  of  their  race.  The  late  George  Tick- 
nor  had  sent  him  an  old  Spanish  book,  the  poems  of 
Mossen  Jaime  Febrer,  in  which  he  read  the  account 
of  his  earliest  celebrated  ancestor,  Pedro  Ferragut. 
Among  several  escutcheons  of  the  family  that  have 
been  preserved,  bearing  diverse  ecclesiastical  and 
military  emblems  indicative  of  the  individual's  pro- 
fession, all  contain  the  common  distinguishing  device 
of  a  horseshoe  ;  and  this  the  admiral,  moved  by  the 
feeling  of  kinship,  had  adopted  for  his  plate.  Drawn 
by  these  ties  of  blood  and  by  curiosity,  it  was  a  mat- 
ter of  course  that  Farragut  should  visit  the  famous 
harbor  for  which  British,  French,  and  Spaniards  had 
battled,  and  which  lay  within  the  limits  of  his  com- 
mand. The  renown  of  his  achievements  had  carried 
his  name  to  Ciudadela,  the  remote  inland  city  where 
his  father  was  born  over  a  century  before ;  and  the 
quiet  islanders,  who  had  exulted  in  the  fame  of  one 
sprung  from  their  race,  were  ready  to  greet  him  and 
claim  him  as  their  own.  In  response  to  an  invitation 
given  by  them,  the  admiral,  in  December,  1867,  paid 
a  visit  to  Ciudadela,  of  which  the  following  account 
is  given  by  his  secretary,  Mr.  Montgomery,  who  ac- 
companied him  on  the  trip  : 

"  The  day  after  Christmas  had  been  designated 
by  the  admiral  for  his  promised  visit  to  Ciudadela, 
in  response  to  the  cordial  invitation  of  the  authori- 


LATER  YEARS  AND   DEATH.  30I 

ties  and  people  of  that  city.  The  news  of  this  tour 
of  pleasure  had  spread  rapidly  to  all  parts  of  the 
island,  and  occasioned  a  general  rest  from  labor  and 
a  popular  concentration  upon  the  lines  of  travel.  At 
the  towns  of  Alayor  and  Mercadal  flocks  of  people 
of  both  sexes  had  assembled  on  the  roadside  to  unite 
with  the  authorities  in  tendering  our  naval  chieftain 
a  cordial  welcome,  and  in  expressing  their  delight  at 
his  advent. 

"  Although  unable  to  accept  the  offers  of  hospi- 
tality which  even  in  these  unpretending  villages  were 
showered  upon  him,  the  admiral  heartily  acknowl- 
edged the  gratification  he  felt  at  their  demonstra- 
tions of  personal  regard,  and,  passing  along  the  ex- 
cited lines,  he  underwent  a  siege  of  hand-shaking. 
At  these  points  and  elsewhere  along  the  route  sol- 
diers had  been  stationed  to  pay  him  proper  honors, 
and  to  tender  him  any  assistance  he  might  require 
throughout  his  journey. 

"  On  his  arrival  within   four   miles  of  Ciudadela 
he  was  formally  received  by  the  Alcalde  ;  and  a  large 
committee,  comprising  many  prominent  citizens,  ten- 
dered the  hospitalities  of  the  city,  and  cordially  wel- 
comed him  as  its  guest.     After   a  brief  interchange 
of  courtesies,  he  was  transferred  to  a  very  handsome 
barouche,  and   conducted  forward  in   the  van  of  a 
quite  formidable-looking  procession,  demonstrations 
of    every   kind    increasing    as   he    approached    this 
ancient  capital  of  Minorca,  the  present  residence  of 
many  of  those  who  prefer  the  quiet  seclusion  of  their 
island  home  to  the  more  dazzling  notoriety  incident 
to  many  of  the  older  and    gayer   provinces  of   the 
mainland.     Outside  the  walls  of  the  city  his  appear- 
ance was  no  sooner  heralded  than  masses  of  people 


302  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

of  every  age,  sex,  and  condition  rushed  forward  to 
greet  him,  filling  the  air  with  cheers  and  acclama- 
tions. As  he  passed  the  gates  of  the  city,  the  walls, 
house-tops,  and  balconies  were  crowded  with  anxious 
spectators,  uniting  demonstrations  of  welcome  with 
equally  expressive  shouts  from  the  swaying  multi- 
tude who  had  taken  possession  of  the  principal 
thoroughfares.  One  old  man  of  threescore  years 
and  ten,  with  tears  streaming  down  his  weather- 
beaten  face,  stamped  sincerity  itself  upon  the  nature 
of  the  welcome  by  shouting  aloud:  '  He  is  ours!  he 
is  ours  !  but  I  shall  never  see  him  more.' 

"  The  avenue  leading  to  the  residence  of  Sefior 
Don  Gabriel  Squella,  which  had  been  kindly  placed 
by  that  gentleman  at  the  disposal  of  the  admiral 
and  his  suite,  was  literally  blocked  with  people,  and 
the  excitement  rose  rapidly  to  fever  heat  as  the 
head  of  the  column  appeared  in  view  endeavoring 
to  make  a  breach  in  a  body  absolutely  closed  in 
mass.  It  was  with  no  little  difficulty  that  the  pro- 
cession forced  a  passage;  and  although  policemen 
did  their  utmost,  and  jostled,  and  crowded,  and 
threatened,  accompanying  their  language  with  all 
the  vocabulary  of  Spanish  expletives,  it  was  found 
necessary  to  disembark  at  some  distance  from  the 
hospitable  mansion  and  trust  to  the  humanity  of 
our  entertainers  to  afford  an  entrance  on  foot.  But 
the  temporary  concealment  of  the  admiral  within  the 
delightful  headquarters  which  had  been  assigned 
him  seemed  to  be  the  signal  for  a  renewed  out- 
burst, which  brought  him  to  the  balcony,  upon 
which  he  stood  bowing  his  thanks  and  acknowledg- 
ing in  every  possible  way  his  heartfelt  appreciation 
of   the  cordial  welcome  extended  him,  until  it  ap' 


LATER  YEARS  AND   DEATH.  303 

peared  that  there  was  no  prospect  of  a  cessation  of 
hostilities,  when,  for  the  first  time  in  his  life,  he 
was  persuaded  to  retreat  in  the  face  of  superior 
numbers. 

"  The  excitement  continued  unabated,  however, 
throughout  the  entire  evening,  and  it  was  not  until 
near  midnight  that  the  crowd  slowly  dispersed,  and 
the  peaceful  little  city  of  Ciudadela  resumed  its 
wonted  quiet,  and  its  order-loving  citizens,  unac- 
customed to  all  such  sounds  of  revelry  by  night, 
retired  to  their  own  little  homesteads. 

"  During  this  time  a  fine  band  of  music  was  sta- 
tioned in  the  capacious  vestibule  on  the  first  floor  of 
Senor  Squella's  mansion,  and  almost  all  the  promi- 
nent citizens  of  the  place,  with  their  families,  called 
to  pay  their  respects  to  the  city's  guest,  making  the 
scene  of  excitement  within  as  pleasant  as  that  with- 
out was  tumultuous. 

"  On  the  following  morning  enthusiasm  arose  with 
the  sun,  once  more  took  firm  possession  of  the  street 
fronting  the  headquarters  of  the  admiral,  and  there 
kept  anxious  watch.  I  am  confident  that,  had  there 
been  an  election  that  day  for  Governor  of  the 
Balearic  Islands,  or  for  King  of  Spain  itself,  the  ad- 
miral would  have  been  chosen  without  opposition. 

"  At  an  early  hour,  accompanied  by  his  entire 
suite,  all  surrounded  and  followed  by  an  admiring 
and  excited  throng,  he  was  escorted  by  the  com- 
mittee and  other  citizens  to  all  the  places  of  interest 
in  and  about  the  city,  and  finally  to  the  cathedral, 
in  which  he  had  scarcely  been  seated  before  it  was 
literally  packed  in  every  part  by  people,  their  hun- 
dreds of  eyes  being  riveted  upon  the  pleasant  counte- 
nance of  the  unappalled  admiral,  who  withstood  the 


3<H 


ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 


onslaught  with  as  much  sang  froid  as  if  accustomed 
to  such  trying  ordeals. 

"  Soon  after,  the  great  organ  pealed  forth  our 
own  national  melodies,  recalling  our  far-off  land 
even  to  those  whose  knowledge  of  its  power  and 
glory  was  limited  to  its  history,  and  the  sparse  in- 
formation derived  from  the  few  Americans  who  have 
visited  this  secluded  city." 

After  leaving  the  Mediterranean  in  April,  1868, 
the  Franklin  went  to  Holland  and  Belgium,  and 
thence  made  a  second  visit  to  England,  in  the  course 
of  which  Farragut  was  presented  to  Queen  Victoria, 
and  visited  Scotland  and  the  north  of  England.  In 
July  he  returned  to  the  Mediterranean  and  made  a 
round  of  the  Levant,  visiting  Constantinople;  a  spe- 
cial indulgence  to  anchor  before  the  city  being  ac- 
corded to  the  ship  bearing  the  flag  of  an  admiral, 
whose  exceptional  achievements  made  it  unlikely 
that  the  privilege  would  shortly  be  construed  into  a 
precedent.  After  a  short  stay  in  Athens,  and  a  run 
up  to  Trieste  at  the  head  of  the  Adriatic,  the  Frank- 
lin returned  to  Gibraltar,  and  thence  sailed  for  New 
York,  which  she  reached  on  the  10th  of  November, 
1868;  thus  concluding  a  cruise  which,  from  the  be- 
ginning to  the  end,  had  resembled  a  triumphal  prog- 
ress in  the  enthusiastic  recognition  everywhere  ex- 
tended to  the  hero,  whose  battle-won  blue  flag  she 
carried  at  her  main. 

Less  than  two  years  of  life  remained  to  Admiral 
Farragut  when  he  returned  from  the  Mediterranean. 
The  following  summer  of  1869  he  visited  the  Cali- 
fornia coast,  where  he  had  not  been  since  he  gave 
up  the  command  of  the  Mare  Island  Navy  Yard  in 
1858.  The  welcome  here  accorded  him  was  as  hearty 


LATER  YEARS  AND   DEATH.  305 

as  that  extended  in  foreign  countries,  and  mingled 
with  the  admiration  due  to  the  conquering  admiral 
was  the  recollection  of  warm  mutual  affection 
and  esteem  engendered  by  four  years  of  close 
intercourse.  Returning  from  San  Francisco  to  the 
East,  Farragut  was  seized  at  Chicago  with  a  violent 
illness,  in  which  the  heart  was  affected.  For  some 
days  his  life  was  despaired  of ;  and  although  by  care- 
ful nursing  he  recovered  so  as  to  resume  his  journey, 
it  is  doubtful  whether  he  ever  regained  the  ground 
then  lost.  Several  severe  attacks  followed  this  one  ; 
and  although  he  rallied  with  extraordinary  rapidity, 
thanks  to  a  vigorous  constitution,  it  was  apparent 
that  his  health  was  failing.  A  few  months  later,  in 
the  middle  of  winter,  he  consented  to  take  charge  of 
the  naval  ceremonies  in  honor  of  the  remains  of  Mr. 
George  Peabody,  whose  body  had  been  brought  to 
the  United  States  in  the  British  ship-of-war  Mon- 
arch, in  recognition  of  his  benevolence  to  the  poor 
of  London.  It  was  his  last  official  duty,  and  the  ex- 
posure attendant  upon  funeral  ceremonies  in  that 
bleak  season  was  much  to  be  deprecated  in  a  man  of 
his  years  and  failing  vigor. 

The  following  summer  the  Navy  Department 
placed  at  his  disposal  the  dispatch  steamer  Talla- 
poosa, which  took  him  and  his  family  to  Portsmouth, 
New  Hampshire;  where  he  became  the  guest  of  the 
late  Rear- Admiral  Pennock,  then  commandant  of  the 
Navy  Yard  at  that  place  and  a  connection  by  mar- 
riage of  Mrs.  Farragut.  It  was  his  last  sea  voyage, 
and  he  appeared  to  have  a  presentiment  that  it  was 
so  ;  for  as  the  ship  drew  near  the  yard  he  arose  from 
his  sick  bed  at  the  sound  of  the  salute  being  fired  in 
his  honor,  dressed  himself  in  full  uniform,  and  went 


306  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

on  deck.  Looking  up  with  a  sad  smile  at  his  flag 
flying  from  the  mast-head,  he  said :  "  It  would  be 
well  if  I  died  now,  in  harness."  Shortly  after  his 
arrival,  an  old  sailor  who  had  charge  of  the  sloop-of- 
war  Dale,  then  lying  dismantled  at  the  wharf,  met 
there  the  admiral,  who  had  wandered  on  board.  He 
looked  about  the  ship  and,  as  he  left  her  to  go 
ashore,  said :  "  This  is  the  last  time  I  shall  ever 
tread  the  deck  of  a  man-of-war."  This  prediction 
proved  true.  He  passed  quietly  away  at  the  com- 
mandant's house,  on  the  14th  of  August,  1870,  aged 
sixty-nine  years;  surrounded  by  his  family  and  lov- 
ing friends,  including  many  of  his  old  companions  in 
arms.  The  body  was  laid  temporarily  in  Ports- 
mouth, the  naval  officers  and  citizens  of  the  place 
uniting  to  pay  every  respect  to  his  memory. 

In  September  the  Navy  Department  sent  the 
steam  frigate  Guerriere  to  bring  the  admiral's  body 
to  New  York.  This  ship  running  aground  on  Nan- 
tucket Shoal,  the  remains  were  transferred  to  another 
vessel  and  so  conveyed  to  the  city.  The  final  and 
public  funeral  ceremonies  were  held  on  the  30th  of 
September ;  the  day  being  observed  as  one  of  gen- 
eral mourning,  the  city  edifices  draped,  bells  tolled, 
and  minute  guns  fired.  In  the  procession  was  Gen- 
eral Grant,  then  President  of  the  United  States,  with 
the  members  of  his  Cabinet,  many  military  and  naval 
officers,  ten  thousand  soldiers,  and  a  large  number 
of  societies.  By  these  the  coffin  of  the  admiral  was 
escorted  to  the  railroad  station,  whence  it  was 
transported  to  Woodlawn  Cemetery,  in  Westchester 
County,  where  the  body  now  lies. 

To  his  memory  the  United  States  Government 
has  erected  a  colossal  bronze  statue  in  the  national 


LATER  YEARS  AND  DEATH. 


307 


capital,  in  Farragut  Square,  the  work  of  Miss  Vinnie 
Ream.  A  committee  of  New  York  citizens  have 
placed  a  similar  memorial,  by  Mr.  St.  Gauden,  at  the 
northwest  corner  of  Madison  Square  in  that  city. 
There  is  also  a  mural  tablet,  with  a  likeness  of  the 
admiral,  in  the  Protestant  Episcopal  Church  of  the 
Incarnation ;  of  which  he  was  a  communicant  after 
taking  up  his  residence  in  New  York. 


CHAPTER   XII. 

THE    CHARACTER    OF    ADMIRAL    FARRAGUT. 

The  brilliant  and  victorious  career  which  has 
secured  for  Farragut  a  leading  place  among  the  suc- 
cessful naval  commanders  of  all  time  was  of  brief 
duration,  and  began  at  an  age  when  men  generally 
are  thinking  rather  of  relaxing  their  efforts  than  of 
undertaking  new  and  extraordinary  labors.  The 
two  great  leaders  of  the  United  States  armies  during 
the  civil  war — Grant  and  Sherman — were  not  over 
forty-five  when  the  return  of  peace  released  them 
from  their  cares ;  while  Nelson  and  Napoleon  were 
but  a  year  older  than  these  when  Trafalgar  and 
Waterloo  terminated  their  long  careers.  Farragut 
was  nearly  sixty-one  at  the  time  of  passing  the  Mis- 
sissippi forts,  and  his  command  of  the  Western  Gulf 
Squadron  lasted  not  quite  three  years,  or  rather  less 
than  the  ordinary  duration  of  a  naval  cruise  in  times 
of  peace.  Though  not  unprecedented,  the  display 
of  activity  and  of  sustained  energy  made  by  him  at 
such  an  advanced  period  of  life  is  unusual ;  and  the 
severity  of  the  strain  upon  the  mental  and  physical 
powers  at  that  age  is  evidenced  by  the  prostration  of 
Farragut  himself,  a  man  of  exceptional  vigor  of 
body  and  of  a  mental  tone  which  did  not  increase  his 
burdens  by  an  imaginative  exaggeration  of  difhcul- 


THE  CHARACTER  OF  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT.  309 

ties.  He  never  committed  the  error,  against  which 
Napoleon  cautioned  his  generals,  "  de  se  /aire  un  tab- 
leau." On  the  other  hand,  the  study  of  his  operations 
shows  that,  while  always  sanguine  and  ready  to  take 
great  risks  for  the  sake  of  accomplishing  a  great  re- 
sult, he  had  a  clear  appreciation  of  the  conditions 
necessary  to  success  and  did  not  confound  the  im- 
practicable with  the  merely  hazardous.  Of  this,  his 
reluctance  to  ascend  the  Mississippi  in  1862,  and  his 
insistence  in  1864  upon  the  necessity  of  ironclads, 
despite  his  instinctive  dislike  to  that  class  of  vessel, 
before  undertaking  the  entrance  to  Mobile  Bay,  are 
conspicuous  illustrations ;  and  must  be  carefully  kept 
in  view  by  any  one  desirous  of  adequately  appreciat- 
ing his  military  character. 

As  in  the  case  of  Nelson,  there  is  a  disposition 
to  attribute  Farragut's  successes  simply  to  dash — 
to  going  straight  at  the  enemy  regardless  of  method 
and  of  consequences.  In  the  case  of  the  great 
British  admiral  the  tendency  of  this  view,  which 
has  been  reproduced  in  successive  biographies  down 
to  the  latest,  is  to  sink  one  of  the  first  of  naval 
commanders  beneath  the  level  of  the  pugilist,  who 
in  his  fighting  does  not  disdain  science,  to  that  of 
the  game-cock ;  and  it  is  doubtless  to  be  attributed 
to  the  emphasis  he  himself  laid  upon  that  direct, 
rapid,  and  vigorous  action  without  which  no  mili- 
tary operations,  however  wisely  planned,  can  suc- 
ceed. In  the  want  of  this,  rather  than  of  great  pro- 
fessional acquirements,  will  be  most  frequently  found 
the  difference  between  the  successful  and  the  unsuc- 
cessful general ;  and  consequently  Nelson,  who  had 
seen  so  much  of  failure  arising  from  slowness  and 
over-caution,  placed,  and  rightly  placed,  more  stress 


310  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

upon  vigor  and  rapidity,  in  which  most  are  found 
deficient,  than  upon  the  methods  which  many  under- 
stand, however  ill  they  may  apply  them.  Like  the 
distinguished  Frenchman,  Suffren,  who  is  said  to 
have  stigmatized  tactics  as  "  the  veil  of  timidity," 
yet  illustrated  in  his  headlong  dashes  the  leading 
principles  of  all  sound  tactics,  Nelson  carefully 
planned  the  chief  outlines  of  operations,  in  the  exe- 
cution of  which  he  manifested  the  extremes  of  daring 
and  of  unyielding  firmness.  There  was  in  him  no 
failure  to  comprehend  that  right  direction,  as  well 
as  vigor  and  weight,  is  necessary  to  a  blow  that 
would  tell ;  but  experience  had  taught  him  that  the 
average  man  wants  to  be  much  too  sure  of  success 
before  venturing  to  move,  and  hence  the  insistence 
upon  that  one  among  the  features  of  his  military 
character  which  to  the  superficial  observer  has  grad- 
ually obscured  all  others.  Vigor  even  to  desperate- 
nessof  action  both  Nelson  and  Farragut  on  occasion 
showed — recklessness  never.  Neither  fought  as  one 
who  beateth  the  air ;  and  while  for  neither  can  be 
claimed  an  entire  exemption  from  mistakes,  the 
great  outlines  of  their  action  can  safely  challenge 
hostile  criticism. 

While,  however,  both  in  their  respective  spheres 
illustrated  the  great  leading  principles  of  war,  the 
circumstances  under  which  they  were  called  to  prac- 
tice them  were  too  diverse  to  permit  any  close  com- 
parison, or  parallel,  to  be  instituted  between  their 
actions.  Nelson,  for  the  most  part,  shone  upon  the 
battle-field — by  his  tactical  combinations,  by  the  ra- 
pidity and  boldness  with  which  he  carried  out  plans 
previously  laid,  or,  on  occasion,  by  the  astonishing 
coup    (Tail  and    daring   with   which,   in    unforeseen 


THE   CHARACTER  OF  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT.  311 

crises,   he   snatched   and  secured   escaping  victory. 
Farragut  in  actual  battle  showed  that  careful  adapta- 
tion of  means  to  ends  which  has  a  just  claim  to  be 
considered  tactical  science ;  but  his  great  merit  was 
in  the  clearness  with  which  he   recognized  the  de- 
cisive point  of  a  campaign,  or  of  a  particular  opera- 
tion, and  threw  upon  it  the  force  under  his  direction. 
Nelson  acted  chiefly  against  ships,  against  forces  of 
a  type  essentially  the  same  as  his  own,  and  accessible 
in  all  parts  to  his  attack,  because   belonging  to  the 
same  element;  he  might  therefore  hope  to  overcome 
them  by  the  superior  quality  of  his  crews  or  by  his 
better    tactical    dispositions.       Farragut    contended 
with  fortifications,  whose  military  powers,  offensive 
and  defensive,  were  essentially  different  from  those  of 
a  fleet.     Their  endurance  so  greatly  exceeded  that  of 
his  ships  as  to  exclude  any  hope  of  reducing  them  by 
direct  attack  ;  and  their  advantages  of  position,  de- 
liberately chosen  and  difficult  of  approach,  could  not 
be  outweighed  by  any  tactical  arrangement  open  to 
him  to  adopt.     He  was  therefore  compelled  to  seek 
their  fall  by  indirect  means,  by  turning  and  isolating 
them,    by    acting   against    their    communications — a 
conception  not  tactical,  but  strategic. 

It  is  not  meant  to  imply  that  the  military  talents  of 
either  admiral  were  confined  to  the  particular  field 
ascribed  to  him,  but  simply  that  in  general  they  were 
led  by  circumstances  to  illustrate  that  chiefly.  Nelson 
in  his  fine  campaign  in  the  Baltic  evinced  his  profound 
intuitions  in  the  science  of  strategy ;  and  Farragut, 
as  has  been  said,  showed  no  mean  tactical  ability  in 
the  provisions  made  for  his  several  battles.  The  dis- 
positions to  be  adopted  were  with  him  the  subject  of 
very  careful  consideration ;   and  before  Mobile  he 


312 


ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 


spent  hours  with  his  flag  lieutenant  studying,  by  the 
aid  of  little  wooden  models,  the  different  positions  in 
which  the  ships  might  be  placed.  Afterward  he  had 
the  squadron  get  under  way  several  times  to  practice 
keeping  close  order,  and  changing  formation  and 
course. 

Like  all  men  who  have  achieved  eminence,  the 
secret  of  Admiral  Farragut's  success  is  to  be  found 
in  natural  aptitudes  carefully  improved,  and  in  a 
corresponding  opportunity  for  action.  How  much 
he  was  indebted  to  the  latter,  is  evident  from  the  fact 
that  he  had  passed  his  sixtieth  year  before  his 
great  qualities  were  manifested  to  the  world.  He 
was  fortunate  also,  as  was  Nelson,  in  the  conditions 
which  he  was  called  to  meet.  Great  as  were  the 
difficulties  confronting  each,  and  brilliantly  as  they 
rose  to  the  demand  made  upon  their  energies,  it 
may  safely  be  said  that  more  perfect  preparation 
upon  the  part  of  their  enemies  would  either  have 
detracted  from  the  completeness  of  their  victories; 
or  else,  by  imposing  greater  deliberation  and  more 
methodical  execution,  would  have  robbed  their  ex- 
ploits of  that  thunderbolt  character  which  imparts 
such  dramatic  brilliancy  to  the  Nile  and  Trafalgar, 
to  New  Orleans  and  Mobile  Bay.  A  modern  tor- 
pedo line  would  not  leave  the  gap  by  which  Farra- 
gut  first  meant  to  profit,  nor  would  it  be  crossed 
with  the  impunity  he  found  ;  nor  could  Nelson  in 
his  day,  without  courting  destruction,  have  used 
against  a  thoroughly  efficient  enemy  the  tactics  that 
admirably  suited  the  conditions  in  Aboukir  Bay  and 
off  Cape  Trafalgar.  But  these  considerations  do 
not  diminish  the  credit  of  either  admiral,  though 
they  help    to   explain   the  fullness  of  their  success, 


THE  CHARACTER  OF  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT.  3^ 

and  justify  proceedings  which  under  different  cir- 
cumstances would  be  unjustifiable.  Rather,  it  may 
be  said  that,  in  the  adaptation  of  their  measures  to 
the  conditions  opposed  to  them,  what  would  other- 
wise invite  condemnation  as  rashness,  demands  recog- 
nition as  genius. 

For  Farragut  had  a  natural  genius  for  war,  to 
which  scarcely  any  opening  had  been  offered  before 
the  unexpected  calamity  of  the  great  civil  strife  burst 
upon  the  country.  In  estimating  his  military  char- 
acter and  rightly  apportioning  the  credit  due  to  his 
great  achievements,  much  stress  must  be  laid  upon 
the  constant  effort  for  professional  improvement 
made  by  him  from  his  early  life.  "Without  the  op- 
portunity and  the  environment  which  enabled  him 
to  develop  himself,"  writes  one  who  knew  him  for 
over  forty  years,  "  Farragut  might  have  gone  to  his 
rest  comparatively  unknown  ;  yet  among  his  com- 
rades and  contemporaries  in  the  navy  he  would  have 
been  recognized  as  no  ordinary  man,  no  merely 
routine  naval  officer,  who  kept  his  watch  and  passed 
through  life  as  easily  as  he  could."  "  He  told  me," 
writes  another,  who  first  met  him  after  his  flag  was 
flying,  "  that  there  are  comparatively  few  men  from 
whom  one  could  not  learn  something,  and  that  a 
naval  officer  should  always  be  adding  to  his  knowl- 
edge ;  it  might  enable  him  to  be  more  useful  some 
day  ;  that  it  was  hard  to  say  what  a  naval  officer 
might  not  have  to  do."  Even  after  the  war,  when 
his  reputation  was  at  its  height,  in  visiting  European 
ports  he  never  for  a  moment  lost  sight  of  this  duty 
of  professional  acquirement.  Not  a  harbor  was 
visited  that  he  did  not  observe  critically  its  chances 
for  defense  by  sea  or  land.  "  Who  knows,"  said  he, 
21 


3^  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

"but  that  my  services  may  be  needed  here  some 
day?"  "  Ah,  Mr.  Tucker,"  said  Earl  St.  Vincent  to 
his  secretary  when  planning  an  attack  upon  Brest, 
"  had  Captain  Jervis  *  surveyed  Brest  when  he  visited 
it  in  1774,  in  1800  Lord  St.  Vincent  would  not  have 
been  in  want  of  his  information." 

It  was  not  merely  in  the  acquisition  of  knowl- 
edge, commonly  so  called,  that  this  practice  contrib- 
uted to  prepare  Farragut  for  his  great  mission  as  a 
naval  commander-in-chief,  but  also  in  the  discipline 
of  character  and  in  the  development  of  natural 
capacities  admirably  suited  for  that  position.  It 
should  not  be  overlooked  that  before  the  war,  and 
now  again  in  our  own  day,  the  idea  of  professional 
improvement  in  the  United  States  Navy  has  fastened 
for  its  fitting  subject  upon  the  development  of  the 
material  of  war,  to  the  comparative  exclusion  of  the 
study  of  naval  warfare.  This  naturally  results  from 
the  national  policy,  which  does  not  propose  to  put 
afloat  a  fleet  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word;  and 
whose  ideal  is  a  number,  more  or  less  small,  of 
cruisers  neither  fitted  nor  intended  for  combined 
action.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  details  of 
the  internal  economy  of  the  single  ship  usurp  in  the 
professional  mind  an  undue  proportion  of  the  atten- 
tion which,  in  a  rightly  constituted  navy,  might  far 
better  be  applied  to  the  study  of  naval  tactics,  in  the 
higher  sense  of  that  word,  and  of  naval  campaigns. 
Farragut  could  not  but  feel  the  influence  of  this  ten- 
dency, so  strongly  marked  in  the  service  to  which  he 
belonged  ;  the  more  so,  as  it  is  a  thoroughly  good 

*  Captain  Jervis  and  Earl  St.  Vincent  were  the  same  officer 
under  different  appellations. 


THE  CHARACTER  OF  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT.  315 

tendency  when  not  pushed  to  an  exclusive  extent. 
But  here  the  habit  of  study,  and  stretching  in  every 
direction  his  interest  in  matters  professional,  stood 
him  in  good  stead,  and  prepared  him  unconsciously 
for  destinies  that  could  not  have  been  foreseen.  The 
custom  of  reading  had  made  him  familiar  with  the 
biography  and  history  of  his  profession,  the  school  to 
which  the  great  Napoleon  recommended  all  who 
would  fit  themselves  for  high  military  command; 
and  of  which  a  recent  distinguished  authority  has 
said  that  it  may  be  questioned  whether  a  formulated 
art  of  war  can  be  said  to  exist,  except  as  the  embodi- 
ment of  the  practice  of  great  captains  illustrated  in 
their  campaigns. 

From  these,  with  his  great  natural  aptitudes  for 
war,  Farragut  quickly  assimilated  its  leading  prin- 
ciples, which  he  afterward  so  signally  illustrated  in 
act  and  embodied  in  maxims  of  his  own  that  have 
already  been  quoted.     He  did  not  employ  the  termi- 
nology of  the  art,  which,  though   possibly  pedantic 
in  sound,  is  invaluable  for  purposes  of  discussion; 
but   he    expressed    its   leading   principles    in    pithy, 
homely  phrases  of  his  own,  which  showed  how  accu- 
rate his  grasp  of  it  was.      "  If  once  you   get  in  a 
soldier's  rear,  he  is  gone,"  was  probably  in  part  a  bit 
of  good-natured  chaff  at  the  sister  profession ;  but  it 
sums  up  in  a  few  words  the  significance  and  strategic 
importance  of  his  course  in  passing  the  batteries  of 
the  river  forts,  of  Port  Hudson  and  of  Mobile,  and 
brings  those  brilliant  actions  into  strict  conformity 
with  the  soundest  principles  of  war.     The  phrases, 
whose  frequent   repetition  shows  how  deep  a  hold 
they  had  taken  upon  him — "  The  more  you  hurt  the 
enemy  the  less  he  will  hurt  you  "— "  The  best  protec- 


316  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

tion  against  the  enemy's  fire  is  a  well-directed  fire 
from  our  own  guns  " — sum  up  one  of  the  profoundest 
of  all  military  truths,  easily  confessed  but  with  diffi- 
culty lived  up  to,  and  which  in  these  days  of  armor 
protection  needs  to  be  diligently  recalled  as  a  quali- 
fying consideration.  It  is,  in  fact,  a  restatement  of 
the  oft-admitted,  readily-forgotten  maxim  that  of- 
fense is  the  best  defense.  "  I  believe  in  celerity," 
said  he,  when  announcing  his  determination  soon  to 
pass  the  Mississippi  forts;  and  good  reason  had  he  to 
congratulate  himself  that  this  faith  showed  itself  in 
his  works  below  New  Orleans,  and  to  lament  before 
Mobile  the  failure  of  his  Government  to  observe  the 
maxim  which  all  acknowledge.  "  Five  minutes," 
said  Nelson,  "  may  make  the  difference  between  vic- 
tory and  defeat."  "  False  (circuitous)  routes  and 
lost  moments,"  wrote  Napoleon,  "are  the  determin- 
ing elements  of  naval  campaigns."  All  admit  the 
value  of  time  ;  but  with  what  apathetic  deliberation  is 
often  watched  the  flight  of  hours  which  are  measur- 
ing the  race  between  two  enemies ! 

The  personal  character  of  Admiral  Farragut  af- 
forded the  firm  natural  foundation  upon  which  alone 
a  great  military  character  can  be  built ;  for  while  no 
toleration  should  be  shown  to  the  absurd  belief  that 
military  eminence  leaps  fully  grown  into  the  arena, 
like  Minerva  from  the  head  of  Jupiter — that,  unlike 
every  other  kind  of  perfection,  it  grows  wild  and 
owes  nothing  to  care,  to  arduous  study,  to  constant 
preparation — it  is  still  true  that  it  can  be  developed 
only  upon  great  natural  aptitudes.  The  distinction 
conveyed  by  a  phrase  of  Jomini,  applied  to  Carnot,  the 
great  war  minister  of  the  French  Revolution,  is  one 
that  it  is  well  for  military  and  naval  officers  to  bear 


THE  CHARACTER  OF  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT.  3^ 

constantly  in  mind.  "Carnot,"he  says,  although  a 
soldier  by  profession,  "  was  rather  a  man  with  a 
natural  genius  for  war  than  an  acccomplished  (/'//- 
struit)  officer ;  "  and  to  the  lack  of  that  studious 
preparation  which  marked  Napoleon  he  attributes 
the  mistakes  which  characterized  some  of  Carnot's 
projects,  although  as  a  whole  his  career  showed  pro- 
found intuitions  in  the  conduct  of  war.  It  is  open 
to  many  able  men  to  be  accomplished  and  valuable 
officers  ;  a  few  only — how  few,  the  annals  of  the  past 
show — receive  the  rare  natural  gifts  which  in  their 
perfect  combination  make  the  great  captain  the 
highest  manifestation  of  power  attainable  by  human 
faculties. 

The  acquirements  of  the  accomplished  officer 
may  enable  him  to  see  the  right  thing  to  be  done 
under  given  conditions,  and  yet  fail  to  lift  him  to 
the  height  of  due  performance.  It  is  in  the  strength 
of  purpose,  in  the  power  of  rapid  decision,  of  instant 
action,  and,  if  need  be,  of  strenuous  endurance 
through  a  period  of  danger  or  of  responsibility, 
when  the  terrifying  alternatives  of  war  are  vibrating 
in  the  balance,  that  the  power  of  a  great  captain 
mainly  lies.  It  is  in  the  courage  to  apply  knowledge 
under  conditions  of  exceptional  danger ;  not  merely 
to  see  the  true  direction  for  effort  to  take,  but  to 
dare  to  follow  it,  accepting  all  the  risks  and  all  the 
chances  inseparable  from  war,  facing  all  that  defeat 
means  in  order  thereby  to  secure  victory  if  it  may 
be  had.  It  was  upon  these  inborn  moral  qualities 
that  reposed  the  conduct  which  led  Farragut  to  fame. 
He  had  a  clear  eye  for  the  true  key  of  a  military 
situation,  a  quick  and  accurate  perception  of  the  right 
thing  to  do  at  a  critical  moment,  a  firm  grip  upon 


3i8  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

the  leading  principles  of  war  ;  but  he  might  have  had 
all  these  and  yet  miserably  failed.  He  was  a  man  of 
most  determined  will  and  character,  ready  to  tread 
down  or  fight  through  any  obstacles  which  stood  in 
the  path  he  saw  fit  to  follow.  Of  this  a  conspicuous 
instance  was  given  in  the  firmness  with  which  he 
withstood  the  secession  clamor  of  Norfolk,  his  out- 
spoken defense  of  the  unpopular  Government  meas- 
ures, and  the  promptitude  with  which  he  left  the 
place,  sundering  so  many  associations  at  the  call  of 
duty ;  and  to  this  exhibition  of  strength  of  purpose, 
through  the  impression  made  upon  Mr.  Fox,  was 
largely  due  his  selection  for  command  in  the  Gulf. 

One  of  the  greatest  of  naval  commanders,  whose 
experience  of  men  extended  through  an  unusually 
long  and  varied  career — Earl  St.  Vincent — has  de- 
clared that  the  true  test  of  a  man's  courage  is  his  power 
to  bear  responsibility ;  and  Farragut's  fearlessness  of 
responsibility  in  order  to  accomplish  necessary  ends, 
while  yet  captain  of  a  single  ship,  was  the  subject  of 
admiring  comment  among  his  subordinates,  who  are 
not  usually  prone  to  recognize  that  quality  in  their 
commanders.  "  I  have  as  much  pleasure  in  running 
into  port  in  a  gale  of  wind,"  he  wrote,  "  as  ever  a 
boy  did  in  a  feat  of  skill."  The  same  characteristic 
was  markedly  shown  under  the  weight  of  far  greater 
issues  in  his  determination  to  pass  the  river  forts,  in 
spite  of  remonstrances  from  his  most  able  lieutenant, 
of  cautious  suggestions  from  other  commanding  of- 
ficers, and  with  only  the  ambiguous  instructions  of 
the  Navy  Department  to  justify  his  action.  It  was 
not  that  the  objections  raised  were  trivial.  They 
were  of  the  most  weighty  and  valid  character,  and 
in  disregarding  them  Farragut  showed  not  only  the 


THE  CHARACTER  OF  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


319 


admirable  insight  which  fastened  upon  the  true  mili- 
tary solution,  but  also  the  courage  which  dared  to 
accept  on  his  sole  responsibility  the  immense  risks  of 
disaster  which  had  to  be  taken. 

The  same  moral  force  showed  itself  again,  in  com- 
bination with  the  most  rapid  decision  and  strength  of 
purpose,  when  his  ship  was  nearly  thrown  on  shore 
under  the  batteries  of  Port  Hudson ;  and  yet  more  in 
the  highest  degree  at  that  supreme  moment  of  his  life 
when,  headed  off  from  the  path  he  had  himself  laid 
down,  he  led  his  fleet  across  the  torpedo  line  in  Mobile 
Bay.  To  the  same  quality  must  also  be  attributed  the 
resolution  to  take  his  ships  above  Port  Hudson,  with- 
out orders,  at  the  critical  period  of  the  campaign  of 
1863  ;  and  it  is  to  be  regretted  in  the  interest  of  his 
renown  that  the  merit  of  that  fine  decision,  both  in 
its  military  correctness  and  in  the  responsibility  as- 
sumed, has  not  been  more  adequately  appreciated. 
For  the  power  to  take  these  momentous  decisions, 
Farragut  was  indebted  to  nature.  He  indeed  justi- 
fied them  and  his  general  course  of  action  by  good 
and  sufficient  reasons,  but  the  reasons  carried  instant 
conviction  to  him  because  they  struck  a  kindred 
chord  in  his  breast.  Speaking  on  one  occasion  of 
his  gallant  and  accomplished  fleet  captain,  Percival 
Drayton,  he  said  :  "  Drayton  does  not  know  fear,  and 
would  fight  the  devil  himself,  but  he  believes  in  act- 
ing as  if  the  enemy  can  never  be  caught  unprepared; 
whereas  I  believe  in  judging  him  by  ourselves,  and 
my  motto  in  action,"  he  continued,  quoting  the  cele- 
brated words  of  Danton,  "  is, '  L'audace,  et  encore  de 
l'audace,  et  toujours  de  l'audace.'" 

With  all  his  fearlessness  and  determination,  sever- 
ity was  not  one  of  Admiral  Farragut's  characteristics. 


320 


ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 


He  was  easily  approachable,  entering  readily  into  con- 
versation with  all ;  and  added  much  to  the  labors  of  his 
position  as  commanding  officer  by  his  great  patience 
in  listening  to  matters  to  which  a  subordinate  might 
have  attended.  "  His  kindness  was  what  most  im- 
pressed me,"  says  one  officer  who  was  a  very  young 
man  when  first  reporting  to  him  for  duty.  Another, 
who  as  a  midshipman  saw  much  of  him,  writes  :  "  He 
had  a  winning  smile  and  a  most  charming  manner, 
and  was  jovial  and  talkative.  If  any  officer  or  man 
had  not  spontaneous  enthusiasm,  he  certainly  infused 
it  into  him."  Captain  Drayton,  who  had  many  op- 
portunities of  observing,  once  said  of  him:  "I  did 
not  believe  any  man  could  be  great  if  he  did  not 
know  how  to  say  '  No,'  but  I  see  he  can  ;  for  cer- 
tainly here  is  a  great  man,  and  he  is  too  kind- 
hearted  to  say  '  No '  in  some  cases  where  it  should 
be  said." 

In  person,  Admiral  Farragut  was  not  above  the 
medium  size — about  five  feet  six  and  a  half  inches 
high,  upright  in  carriage,  well-proportioned,  alert  and 
graceful  in  his  movements.  In  early  and  middle  life 
he  was  rather  slight  than  heavy  in  frame ;  and  it  was 
not  until  the  war,  with  the  prolonged  physical  inac- 
tivity entailed  by  the  river  and  blockade  service,  that 
he  took  on  flesh.  Up  to  that  time  his  weight  was 
not  over  one  hundred  and  fifty  pounds.  He  was 
very  expert  in  all  physical  exercises,  and  retained  his 
activity  to  the  verge  of  old  age.  Even  after  his  fifti- 
eth year  it  was  no  unusual  thing  for  him  to  call  up 
some  of  the  crew  of  the  ship  under  his  command  and 
have  a  bout  with  the  single-sticks.  He  felt  great 
confidence  in  his  mastery  of  his  sword,  which  he  in- 
variably wore  ashore ;    and  when  returning   to  the 


THE  CHARACTER  OF  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT.  32 1 

wharves  at  night,  through  low  parts  of  a  town 
where  there  was  danger  of  molestation,  he  relied  upon 
it  to  defend  himself.  "  Any  one  wearing  a  sword," 
he  used  to  say,  "  ought  to  be  ashamed  not  to  be  pro- 
ficient in  its  use." 

For  many  years  it  was  his  habit  on  his  birthday 
to  go  through  certain  physical  exercises,  or,  as  he 
worded   it  to  a  young  officer  of   the   fleet   shortly 
before    passing    the    river   forts,    to   take   a   hand- 
spring ;  until  he  failed  in  doing  this  he  should  not, 
he  said,  feel  that  he  was  growing  old.     This  practice 
he  did  not  discontinue  till   after  he  was  sixty.     A 
junior  officer  of  the  Hartford  writes :  "  When  some 
of  us  youngsters  were  going  through  some  gymnas- 
tic  exercises  (which    he   encouraged),  he  smilingly 
took  hold  of  his  left  foot,  by  the  toe  of  the  shoe,  with 
his  right  hand,  and  hopped  his  right  foot  through  the 
bight  without  letting  go."     The  lightness  with  which 
he  clambered  up  the  rigging  of  the  flag-ship  when 
entering  Mobile  Bay,  and  again  over  the  side  to  see 
the  extent  of  injury  inflicted  by  the  collision  with 
the  Lackawanna,  sufficiently  prove  that  up  to  the 
age  of  sixty-three  he  was  capable  of  showing  upon 
occasion  the  agility  of  a  young  man.      This  bodily 
vigor  powerfully  supported  the  energy  of  his  mind, 
and  carried  him  from  daylight  to  dark,  and  from  ves- 
sel to  vessel  of  his  fleet,  in  seasons  of  emergency,  to 
see  for  himself  that  necessary  work  was  being  done 
without    slackness;    illustrating  the    saying    attrib- 
uted to  Wellington,  that  a  general  was  not  too  old 
when  he  could  visit  the  outposts  in  person  and  on 
horseback. 

The  features  of  the  admiral  can  best  be  realized 
from  the  admirable  frontispiece.     As  a  young  man 


322 


ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 


he  had  the  sallow,  swarthy  complexion  usually  as- 
sociated with  his  Spanish  blood.  His  hair  at  the 
same  period  was  dark  brown,  becoming  in  middle  life 
almost  black.  In  his  later  years  he  was  partially 
bald — a  misfortune  attributed  by  him  to  the  sun- 
stroke from  which  he  suffered  in  Tunis,  and  which 
he  to  some  extent  concealed  by  the  arrangement  of 
the  hair.  The  contour  of  the  face  was  oval,  the 
cheek-bones  rather  prominent,  until  the  cheeks  filled 
out  as  he  became  fleshier  during  the  war ;  the  eyes 
hazel,  nose  aquiline,  lips  small  and  compressed.  At 
no  time  could  he  have  been  called  handsome ;  but 
his  face  always  possessed  the  attraction  given  by  ani- 
mation of  expression  and  by  the  ready  sympathy 
which  vividly  reflected  his  emotions,  easily  stirred  by 
whatever  excited  his  amusement,  anger,  or  sorrow. 
To  conceal  his  feelings  was  to  him  always  difficult, 
and,  when  deeply  moved,  impossible.  The  old  quar- 
termaster who  lashed  him  in  the  rigging  at  Mobile 
Bay  told  afterward  how  the  admiral  came  on  deck 
again  as  the  poor  fellows  who  had  been  killed  were 
being  laid  out  on  the  port  side  of  the  quarter-deck. 
"  It  was  the  only  time  I  ever  saw  the  old  gentleman 
cry,"  he  said,  "  but  the  tears  came  in  his  eyes  like  a 
little  child."  A  casual  but  close  observer,  who  visited 
him  on  board  the  flag-ship  in  New  Orleans,  wrote 
thus:  "  His  manners  are  mild  and  prepossessing,  but 
there  is  nothing  striking  in  his  presence,  and  the  most 
astute  physiognomist  would  scarcely  suspect  the  he- 
roic qualities  that  lay  concealed  beneath  so  simple 
and  unpretending  an  exterior ;  unless,  indeed,  one 
might  chance  to  see  him,  as  we  did  shortly  afterward, 
just  on  receipt  of  the  news  from  Galveston,  or  again 
on  the   eve   of  battle  at  Port  Hudson.     On   such 


THE   CHARACTER   OF   ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT.  323 

occasions  the  flashing  eye  and  passionate  energy 
of  his  manner  revealed  the  spirit  of  the  ancient 
vikings." 

Throughout  his  life,  from  the  time  that  as  a  lad 
still  in  his  teens  he  showed  to  Mr.  Folsom  his  eager- 
ness to  learn,  Farragut  was  ever  diligent  in  the  work 
of  self-improvement,  both  professional  and  general. 
His  eyes  were  weak  from  youth,  but  he  to  some  ex- 
tent remedied  this  disability  by  employing  readers  in 
the  different  ships  on  board  which  he  sailed ;  and  to 
the  day  of  his  death  he  always  had  some  book  on 
hand.     Having  an  excellent  memory,  he  thus  accu- 
mulated a  great  deal  of  information  besides    that 
gained  from  observation  and  intercourse  with  the 
world.     Hobart  Pasha,  a  British  officer  in  the  Turk- 
ish Navy  and  an  accomplished  seaman,  wrote :  "  Ad- 
miral Farragut,  with  whom  I  had  many  conversations, 
was  one  of  the  most  intelligent  naval  officers  of  my 
acquaintance."     He  loved  an  argument,  and,  though 
always  good-tempered  in  it,  was  tenacious  of  his  own 
convictions  when  he  thought  the  facts  bore  out  his 
way  of  interpreting  their  significance.    When  told  by 
a  phrenologist  that  he  had  an   unusual  amount  of 
self-esteem,  he  replied :  "  It  is  true,  I  have ;  I  have 
full  confidence  in  myself  and  in  my  judgment  "—a 
trait  of  supreme  importance  to  a  man  called  to  high 
command.    But  against  the  defects  of  this  quality  he 
was  guarded  by  the  openness  of  mind  which  results 
from  the  effort  to  improve  and  to  keep  abreast  of  the 
times  in  which  one  lives. 

Farragut  was  naturally  conservative,  as  seamen 
generally  tend  to  be;  but  while  averse  to  sudden 
changes,  and  prone  to  look  with  some  distrust  upon 
new  and  untried  weapons  of  war,  he  did   not  re- 


324  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT. 

fuse  them,  nor  did  they  find  in  him  that  prejudice 
which  forbids  a  fair  trial  and  rejects  reasonable 
proof.  Of  ironclads  and  rifled  guns,  both  which 
in  his  day  were  still  in  their  infancy,  he  at  times 
spoke  disparagingly  ;  but  his  objection  appears  to 
have  arisen  not  from  a  doubt  of  their  efficacy — the 
one  for  protection,  the  other  for  length  of  range — but 
from  an  opinion  as  to  their  effect  upon  the  spirit  of 
the  service.  In  this  there  is  an  element  of  truth  as 
well  as  of  prejudice;  for  the  natural  tendency  of  the 
extreme  effort  for  protection  undoubtedly  is  to  ob- 
scure the  fundamental  truth,  which  he  constantly 
preached,  that  the  best  protection  is  to  injure  the 
enemy.  Nor  was  his  instinct  more  at  fault  in  recog- 
nizing that  the  rage  for  material  advance,  though  a 
good  thing,  carries  with  it  the  countervailing  dis- 
position to  rely  upon  perfected  material  rather  than 
upon  accomplished  warriors  to  decide  the  issue  of 
battle.  To  express  a  fear  such  as  Farragut's,  that 
a  particular  development  of  the  material  of  war 
would  injure  the  tone  of  the  service,  sounds  to  some 
as  the  mere  echo  of  Lever's  commissary,  who  rea- 
soned that  the  abolition  of  pig-tails  would  sap  the 
military  spirit  of  the  nation — only  that,  and  nothing 
more.  It  was,  on  the  contrary,  the  accurate  intuition 
of  a  born  master  of  war,  who  feels,  even  without 
reasoning,  that  men  are  always  prone  to  rely  upon 
instruments  rather  than  upon  living  agents — to  think 
the  armor  greater  than  the  man. 

The  self-confidence  which  Farragut  exhibited  in 
his  military  undertakings  was  not  only  a  natural 
trait ;  it  rested  also  upon  a  reasonable  conviction  of 
his  mastery  of  his  profession,  resulting  from  long 
years  of  exclusive  and  sustained  devotion.     He  did 


THE   CHARACTER  OF  ADMIRAL   FARRAGUT.  325 

not  carry  the  same  feeling  into  other  matters  with 
which  he  had  no  familiarity;  and  he  was  jealously 
careful  not  to  hazard  the  good  name,  which  was  the 
honor  of  his  country  as  well  as  of  himself,  by  attach- 
ing it  to  enterprises  whose  character  he  did  not  un- 
derstand, or  to  duties  for  which  he  did  not  feel  fitted. 
Accordingly,  he  refused  a  request  made  to  him  to 
allow  his  name  to  be  used  as  director  of  a  company, 
accompanied  by  an  intimation  that  stock  represent- 
ing one  hundred  thousand  dollars  had  been  placed 
in  his  name  on  the  books.  "  I  have  determined,"  he 
replied,  "  to  decline  entering  into  any  business  which 
I  have  neither  the  time  nor  perhaps  the  ability  to 
attend  to."  In  like  manner  he  refused  to  allow  his 
name  to  be  proposed  for  nomination  as  a  presidential 
candidate.  "  My  entire  life  has  been  spent  in  the 
navy  ;  by  a  steady  perseverance  and  devotion  to  it 
I  have  been  favored  with  success  in  my  profession, 
and  to  risk  that  reputation  by  entering  a  new  career 
at  my  advanced  age,  and  that  career  one  of  which  I 
have  little  or  no  knowledge,  is  more  than  any  one 
has  a  right  to  expect  of  me." 

Farragut  was  essentially  and  unaffectedly  a  re- 
ligious man.  The  thoughtfulness  and  care  with 
which  he  prepared  for  his  greater  undertakings,  the 
courage  and  fixed  determination  to  succeed  with 
which  he  went  into  battle,  were  tempered  and  graced 
by  a  profound  submission  to  the  Almighty  will. 
Though  not  obtruded  on  the  public,  his  home  letters 
evince  how  constantly  the  sense  of  this  dependence 
was  present  to  his  thoughts ;  and  he  has  left  on 
record  that,  in  the  moment  of  greatest  danger  to  his 
career,  his  spirit  turned  instinctively  to  God  before 
gathering  up  its  energies  into  that  sublime  impulse, 


326  ADMIRAL  FARRAGUT. 

whose  lustre,  as  the  years  go  by,  will  more  and  more 
outshine  his  other  deeds  as  the  crowning  glory  of 
them  all — when  the  fiery  admiral  rallied  his  stag- 
gered column,  and  led  it  past  the  hostile  guns  and 
the  lost  Tecumseh  into  the  harbor  of  Mobile. 


INDEX. 


Anecdotes  of  Admiral  Farra- 
gut,  ii,  12,  22,  26,  35,  45-49. 
58,  92,  112,  124,  168-170,  267, 
281,  286,  288,  292,  297,  306, 
313.  3^8,  319.  321,  322,  323. 
325  ;  lashed  in  rigging  at 
Mobile,  272  ;  visit  to  Ciuda- 
dela,  his  father's  birthplace, 
300. 

Arkansas,  Confederate  ironclad, 
description  of,  189  ;  dash 
through  United  States  fleet 
at  Vicksburg,  191  ;  destruc- 
tion of,  193. 

Bailey,  Captain  Theodorus, 
U.  S.  N.,  leads  the  fleet  at 
the  passage  of  Mississippi 
forts,  149,  1 51-15  5  ;  demands 
surrender  of  New  Orleans, 
168  et  seq. 

Banks,  General  Nathaniel  P., 
relieves  Butler  in  command 
in  the  Southwest,  201  ;  move- 
ment in  support  of  Farragut's 
passage  of  Port  Hudson,  211 ; 
operations  west  of  the  Missis- 
sippi, 229,  232  ;  Port  Hudson 
surrenders  to,  235. 

Barnard,  Major  J.  G.,  U.  S.  En- 


gineers, opinion  as  to  effect 
of  passing  Mississippi  forts, 
121. 

Battles  :  Essex  with  Phcebe  and 
Cherub,  38-44 ;  passage  of 
New  Orleans  forts,  149  et  seq. ; 
passage  of  batteries  at  Vicks- 
burg, 187,  192  ;  Port  Hudson, 
211  et  seq.  ;  Mobile  Bay,  269 
et  seq. 

Baudin,  French  admiral,  sketch 
of,  77  ;  attack  on  Vera  Cruz 

by,  79-83- 

Bell,  Commodore  Henry  H., 
U.  S.  N.,  fleet  captain  to  Far- 
ragut  in  1862,  132,  140 ; 
breaking  barrier  below  river 
forts,  132  ;  extract  from  jour- 
nal of,  140 ;  hoists  U.  S.  flag 
over  New  Orleans,  171  ;  at 
Galveston,  202  ;  at  Rio 
Grande,  240. 

Blair,  Montgomery,  account  of 
interview  with  Farragut  con- 
cerning New  Orleans  expe- 
dition, 124. 

Boggs,  Commander  Charles  S., 
U.  S.  N.,  commands  Varuna 
at  passage  of  Mississippi  forts, 
163, 164. 


328 


INDEX. 


Brooklyn,  U.  S.  steamer,  Far- 
ragut  commands,  l8s8-'6o,  in 
Gulf,  103-105. 

Buchanan,  Franklin,  Confeder- 
ate admiral,  at  Mobile,  244, 
279,  281-288. 

Butler,  General  Benjamin  F., 
commands  New  Orleans  ex- 
pedition, 164,  179,  291. 

Caldwell,  Lieut.  C.  H.  B., 
U.  S.  N.f  commands  Itasca 
in  Mississippi  River,  132,  162  ; 
daring  action  in  breaking 
chain  below  forts,  133,  150  ; 
commands  ironclad  Essex  at 
Port  Hudson,  220. 

Craven,  Commander  Tunis  A. 
M.,  U.  S.  N,  commands 
monitor  Tecumseh  at  Mobile, 
268  ;  eagerness  to  engage 
Tennessee,  and  consequent 
error,  273,  274 ;  goes  down 
with  his  ship,  275. 

Drayton,  Captain  Percival,  U.  S. 
N.,  Farragut's  chief  of  staff 
at  Mobile,  98,  250,  269,  270, 
272,  278,  281,  282,  292,  319, 
320. 

Essex,  U.  S.  frigate,  building 
of,  14;  armament,  15  ;  history 
of,  16  ;  cruise  under  Porter, 
17-44  ;  capture  of,  by  Phoebe 
and  Cherub,  44  ;  fate  of,  50. 

Essex,  U.  S.  ironclad,  192,  193, 
2 ir,  220,  232. 

Essex   Junior,   prize   to    Essex,  1 
and  equipped  as  a  tender  to  J 


her,  25  ;  mentioned,  26,  27, 
3°.  32,  33.  34.  36  I  conveys  to 
the  United  States  the  surviv- 
ors of  the  action,  49,  50. 

Farragut,  Admiral  David  G.: 
family  history,  1-6,  300  ; 
birth,  4  ;  appointed  midship- 
man, 8  ;  joins  frigate  Essex, 
11;  cruise  in  Essex,  11-50; 
first  battle,  between  Essex 
and  two  British  ships,  38-44  ; 
returns  to  United  States,  49  ; 
service  in  Mediterranean, 
1815-20,  53-62 ;  returns  to 
United  States,  62  ;  serves  in 
Mosquito  fleet  in  West  Indies, 
1823,  63-67  ;  first  marriage, 
67  ;  promoted  to  lieutenant, 
71  ;  Brazil  station,  i828-'34, 
71-74  ;  witnesses  French  at- 
tack on  Vera  Cruz,  1838,  75- 
88  ;  death  of  first  wife,  88  ; 
promoted  to  commander,  89  ; 
Brazil  station  again,  1841, 
90-94  ;  second  marriage,  94  ; 
Mexican  war,  94-97  ;  ordnance 
duties,  97—98  ;  commandant 
Mare  Island  yard,  99-101 ; 
promoted  to  captain,  101  ; 
commands  Brooklyn  in  Gulf, 
1858-60,  101-105  ;  question 
of  secession,  107-112  ;  aban- 
dons his  home  in  Norfolk  and 
settles  in  New  York,  112; 
chosen  to  command  New  Or- 
leans expedition,  122-125  ; 
appointed  to  command  West 
Gulf  squadron,  December, 
1861,  125  ;  assumes  command 


INDEX. 


329 


at  Ship  Island,  127  ;  opera- 
tions below  Mississippi  forts, 
127-149  ;  passage  of  the  forts, 
149-165  ;  surrender  of  New 
Orleans,  166-176  ;  operations 
above  New  Orleans,  1862, 
177-195  ;  promoted  to  rear- 
admiral,  197  ;  blockade  opera- 
tions, 1862-63,  196-204  ; 
operations  above  New  Or- 
leans, 1863,  203-235  ;  passage 
of  batteries  at  Port  Hudson, 
211-216;  effect  of  this  pas- 
sage, 222-229  '>  relinquishes  to 
Porter  command  above  New 
Orleans,  235  ;  return  North, 
Aug.,  1863,  235  ;  resumes 
command  in  Gulf,  Jan.,  1864, 
243 ;  blockade  duties,  249- 
254 ;  battle  of  Mobile  Bay, 
26S-289 ;  final  return  North, 
293  ;  enthusiastic  reception  in 
New  York,  294 ;  promoted 
to  vice-admiral,  295  ;  tempo- 
rary service  in  James  River, 
296 ;  promoted  to  admiral, 
298 ;  commands  European 
station,  298-304  ;  visit  to  his 
father's  birthplace  in  Mi- 
norca, 299-304 ;  return  to 
United  States,  304 ;  declin- 
ing health,  305 ;  death  and 
obsequies,  306 ;  monuments 
of,  307  ;  analysis  of  charac- 
ter, 308-326. 

Military  characteristics  : 
Personal  courage,  44-46,  61, 
62,  161,  277,  317-319  ;  moral 
courage  in  assuming  responsi- 
bility, 26,  60,  124-126,  135, 
22 


137-140,    144,    147,   222,    223, 

276-280,  318 ;  hopefulness, 
124,  252,  277 ;  strategic  in- 
sight, 137,  138,  141  et  •""?■> 
147,  172,  178-185,  200,  207, 
208,  231,  238,  311,  315  ;  tac- 
tical skill,  149,  150,  154,  217- 
220,  239,  260-263,  311  ;  self- 
reliance,  323  ;  comparison 
with  Nelson,  309-312. 

Personal  characteristics  : 
Appearance  and  bodily 
strength,  51,  60,  320-322  ; 
gratefulness,  5,  52,  60,  67 ; 
self-improvement,  51,  57—59, 
69,  71.  87.  97.  313-315.  323  ; 
habits  of  observation,  57,  69, 
75,  83-88,94,98,99,124,313, 
314;  thoughtfulness  and  de- 
cision, 54,  70,  106  et  seq.,  1 13, 
123,  124,  139-141,  T47.  208, 
211,  2l6,  239,  260,  264,  277; 
family  relations,  65,  74,  88, 
107-109,  227,  265-268  ;  kind- 
liness, 320,  322 ;  religious 
feelings,  252,  266,  277,  292, 
325.     See  also  "  Anecdotes.". 

Farragut,  George,  father  of  Ad- 
miral Farragut  :  birth,  1  ; 
history,  2-5  ;  death,  6. 

Florida,  Confederate  ship  of  war 
(first  called  Oreto).  runs  block- 
ade into  Mobile,  197  ;  escapes, 
203  ;  effect  on  Farragut,  204. 

Folsom,  Chaplain  Charles,  U.  S. 
Navy,  influence  on  Farragut's 
early  life,  57-60. 

Fox,  Gustavus  V.,  assistant  sec- 
retary of  the  navy,  i86i-'65, 
118  ;  relations  to  New  Orleans 


33° 


INDEX. 


expedition,  118-124,  318  ; 
urges  Farragut  to  ascend  the 
Mississippi,  183. 

Gaines,  Fort,  defense  of  Mobile 
Bay,  247,  259,  268  ;  surrender 
of,  290. 

Garibaldi,  services  in  war  be- 
tween Argentine  and  Uruguay, 

93- 

Granger,  United  States  General, 
commands  at  siege  of  Forts 
Gaines  and  Morgan,  268,  290, 
291. 

Grant,  General  Ulysses  S.,  anal- 
ogy between  his  turning  the 
position  of  Vicksburg  and 
Farragut's  turning  the  Mis- 
sissippi forts,  135-138  (and 
note,  137) ;  anxieties  of,  in 
1862,  198  ;  connection  be- 
tween his  command  and  Far- 
ragut's, 198,  199 ;  takes  the 
line  of  the  Mississippi,  205  ; 
takes  chief  command  at  Vicks- 
burg, 206;  responsibility  as- 
sumed in  cutting  loose  from 
his  base  before  Vicksburg, 
223  ;  opinion  as  to  importance 
of  Farragut's  passage  of  Port 
Hudson,  224, 226  ;  begins  turn- 
ing movement  against  Vicks- 
burg, 229  ;  views  as  to  Red 
River  expedition  and  Mobile, 
1864,  245,  246  ;  statesmanlike 
regard  to  political  conditions 
in  military  operations,  137 
(note),  251  ;  present  at  Farra- 
gut's funeral,  306. 

Harrison,    Lieutenant     N.    B-, 


commands  Cayuga,  leading 
fleet  at  passage  of  Mississippi 
forts,  159. 

Hartford,  U.  S.  steamer,  Farra- 
gut's flag-ship,  description  of, 
126. 

Hillyar,  James,  British  naval 
captain,  commands  Phcebe  in 
battle  with  Essex,  38-44  ;  dis- 
regard of  neutral  rights,  32, 
39,  40  ;  relations  with  Porter, 
etc.,  33-37. 

Incident :  Farragut  being  lashed 
in  rigging  at  Mobile,  272. 

Indianola,  U.  S.  iron-clad,  cap- 
ture of,  and  effect  upon  Far- 
ragut's movements,  209-211, 
224. 

Jackson,  Fort,  defense  of  New 
Orleans,  mentioned,  65  ;  de- 
scription of,  119,  127,  258; 
surrender  of,  171  ;  causes  of 
the  fall  of,  141-147. 

Jenkins,  Rear-Admiral  Thorn- 
ton A.,  chief  of  staff  to  Farra- 
gut, 1863,  203,  208,  211,  234  ; 
commands  Richmond  at  battle 
of  Mobile,  268,  269. 

Jouett,  Lieutenant-Command- 
er James  E.  (now  Rear-Ad- 
miral),  commands  Metacomet 
at  battle  of  Mobile  Bay,  271, 
272,  278  ;  captures  Confeder- 
ate gunboat  Selma,  280. 

Kennon,  Beverley,  Lieutenant, 
Confederate  navy,  commands 
Governor  Moore  at  New  Or- 


INDEX. 


331 


leans  and  sinks  U.  S.  steamer 
Varuna,  158,  159,  163. 
Kimberley,  Lieutenant -Com- 
mander Lewis  A.  (now  Rear- 
Admiral),  executive  officer  of 
Farragut's  flag-ship,  281. 

Lovell,  Mansfield,  Confederate 
general,  opinion  as  to  cause 
of  fall  of  Mississippi  forts, 
145- 

Manassas,  Confederate  ram,  de- 
scription of,  156 ;  part  at 
battle  of  New  Orleans,  157, 

159- 

Mare  Island,  Farragut's  com- 
mand of,  1854-58,  99-101  ; 
visit  to,  304. 

Matamoras,  Mexican  port,  im- 
portance to  blockade-running, 
207,  240. 

McClellan,  General  George  B., 
relations  to  New  Orleans  ex- 
pedition, 120,  121. 

Minorca,  Island  of,  birthplace 
of  George  Farragut,  1  ;  Far- 
ragut's visits  to,  56,  57,  300  ; 
enthusiastic  reception  given 
to    Admiral    Farragut,    300- 

304- 

Mississippi  River,  importance 
of,  in  civil  war,  11 5-1 17, 
199,  200,  207,  222,  223,  237, 
238. 

Mobile,  Farragut's  wish  to  at- 
tack, in  1862,  185  ;  blockade 
of,  196,  197,  203,  204,  249, 
250  ;  importance  of,  241,  242  ; 
description  of  approaches  to, 


from  the  sea,  and  defenses  of, 
246-248,  258,  259,  260,  264, 
265  ;  battle  of  Mobile  Bay, 
269-289. 

Monitors,  description  of,  255. 

Morgan,  Fort,  defense  of  Mobile 
Bay,  247,  258,  259,  271,  290  ; 
surrender  of,  290. 

Mosquito  fleet,  origin  and  serv- 
ice of,  63-66. 

Napoleon  I,  Emperor  of  the 
French,  mentioned,  77,  136, 
143.  308,  309,  315,  317. 

Napoleon,  Louis,  Emperor  of 
the  French  :  Purpose  to  recog- 
nize Confederacy,  173  ;  effect 
upon,  of  fall  of  New  Orleans, 
175, 176  ;  Farragut  dines  with, 
298. 

Navy,  United  States,  indequate 
strength  of,  at  different  periods, 
6,  13,  86,  ior,  116,  117,  314; 
consequent  bad  results,  6-8, 
ir,  13,  14,  16,  19,  50,  102, 
223,  242,  314 ;  reasons  for 
partial  successes  of  1 812,  and 
delayed  action  in  1861,  ior, 
102 ;  character  and  impor- 
tance of  services,  in  civil  war, 
135-137.  142,  146,  171-176, 
180-182,  I99,  206,  207,  222- 
225,  231  (and  note),  233-235, 
238,  242,  244,  291. 

Nelson,  Horatio,  British  Ad- 
miral, mentioned,  70,  160, 
240  (and  note),  266,  308  ; 
military  character  contrasted 
with  that  of  Farragut,  309- 
312. 


332 


INDEX. 


New  Orleans,  expedition  against, 
1 15-176  ;  defenses  of,  127- 
129,  131,  136,  145,  146,  165  ; 
scenes  at  surrender  of,  166- 
172  ;  effect  of  fall  of,  172- 
176  ;  Confederate  demonstra- 
tions against,  1863,  233. 

Oreto,  see  Florida. 

Pemberton,  Confederate  gen- 
eral, opinion  as  to  effect  of 
Farragut's  passage  by  Port 
Hudson,  224,  225. 

Pensacola,  evacuated  by  Con- 
federates, 196  ;  importance  to 
navy  as  base  of  operations, 
196,  249,  268. 

Perkins,  Lieutenant-Command- 
er George  H.,  U.  S.  N.,  ac- 
count of  Cayuga  at  passage 
of  Mississippi  forts,  151-155, 
159  ;  accompanies  Captain 
Bailey  to  demand  surrender 
of  New  Orleans,  169  ;  com- 
mands Chickasaw  at  Mobile, 
276,  285,  287,  288. 

Porter,  Captain  David,  U,  S. 
N.,  commands  naval  station 
at  New  Orleans,  4  ;  adopts 
David  Farragut,  5  ;  com- 
mands frigate  Essex,  11-44  ; 
professional  character,  31,  55  ; 
battle  with  Phoebe  and  Cher- 
ub, 38-44  ;  navy  commis- 
sioner, 63  ;  commands  Mos- 
quito fleet,  63-66  ;  court-mar- 
tialed, 66  ;  leaves  navy,  66  ; 
Minister  to  Constantinople, 
67  ;  death,  67. 


Porter,  Admiral  David  D.,  IT. 
S.  N.,  commanding  mortar 
flotilla,  121-123,  130,  152, 
171,  186,  188  ;  opinion  on 
passing  the  Mississippi  forts, 
^S,  !39  ;  commanding  Mis- 
sissippi squadron,  206,  209, 
210,  226,  229,  230,  231  ;  opin- 
ion on  Farragut's  dash  past 
Port  Hudson,  223,  224  ;  takes 
over  from  Farragut  command 
of  Mississippi  above  New  Or- 
leans, 235  ;  Red  River  expe- 
dition, 254  ;  harmonious  co- 
operation with  Grant,  206, 
291. 

Port  Hudson,  position  of,  195  ; 
importance  of,  to  Confeder- 
ates, 199,  201,  207,  209,  222- 
225,  232,  233  ;  armament  of, 
211  ;  passage  of,  by  Farragut, 
211-216  ;  surrender  of,  235. 

Queen  of  the  West,  U.  S.  ram, 
capture  of,  and  effect  on  Far- 
ragut's movements,  209-211. 

Red  River  expedition,  purpose 
of,  253  ;  militarily  erroneous, 
245,  246  ;  disastrous  termina- 
tion, 254  ;  consequences,  246. 

River-defense  fleet,  Confeder- 
ate, description  of,  156,  158. 

Rosas,  Argentine  Dictator,  72, 
74.  91.  92- 

St.  Philip,  Fort,  defense  of  New 
Orleans,  119,  128,  148,  153, 
258  ;  surrender  of,  171,  causes 
of  fall  of,  141-147. 


INDEX. 


333 


San  Juan  de  Ulloa,  Mexican 
fort,  description  of,  79  ;  French 
attack  on,  80  ;  Farragut's 
opinion  as  to  attack  on,  by 
U.  S.  Navy  in  1846,  95. 

Sherman,  General  W.  T.,  dif- 
ference of  opinion  with  Grant, 
137  (and  note)  ;  attack  on 
Vicksburg,  205  ;  raid  upon 
Meridian,  253. 

Smith,  Martin  L.,  Confederate 
general,  opinion  as  to  cause 
of  fall  of  Mississippi  forts,  145. 

Szymanski,  Confederate  colo- 
nel, opinion  as  to  effect  of 
Farragut's  passage  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi forts,  146. 

Tecumseh,  U.  S.  monitor,  sunk 
at  Mobile,  256,  268,  271,  273, 

274.  275- 

Tennessee,  Confederate  iron- 
clad, description  of,  248,  256- 
258  ;  part  taken  by,  in  battle 
of  Mobile  Bay,  265,  273,  274, 

275,  279-288. 

Texas,  importance  of,  to  Con- 
federacy, 207,  209,  237. 

Varuna,  U.  S.  steamer,  sunk  at 
passage  of  Mississippi  forts, 
163. 

Vera  Cruz,    French  attack   on, 


75-83  ;  Farragut's  report  on, 
83-88. 
Vicksburg,  Farragut's  first  ad- 
vance against,  181,  182  ;  his 
reluctance  to  a  second  ad- 
vance, 182-184  ;  second  ad- 
vance, 186  ;  situation  of,  186  ; 
Farragut  passes  batteries,  187  ; 
return  below,  192  ;  impor- 
tance of  Vicksburg  to  Confed- 
eracy, 180, 187,  194,  195,  233  ; 
Farragut's  third  advance  to, 
226  ;  surrender  of,  235. 

Warley,  A.  F.,  Lieut.,  Confed- 
erate navy,  commands  Ma- 
nassas at  battle  of  New  Or- 
leans, 157,  158. 

Watson,  Lieut.  John  C,  (now 
captain),  U.  S.  N.,  Farragut's 
flag-lieutenant,  1862-65,  161, 
260,  272. 

Welles,  Gideon,  Secretary  of 
the  Navy,  i86i-'69,'ii7  ;  con- 
nection with  New  Orleans 
expedition,  119,  120,  121, 
125,  126  ;  impressions  of 
Farragut,  124  ;  urges  Farra- 
gut up  the  Mississippi,  177, 
181  ;  letter  of,  222  (note). 

Wolseley,  Lord,  views  as  to  the 
cause  of  reduction  of  Missis- 
sippi forts  criticised,  142-147. 


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